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Preface 
The first century B.C. was a turbulent period in Roman history. It was a 
period of transformation and political conflict. It is also a very well 
documented period. All this has resulted in a continuous and large flow of 
publications. Is it then necessary to add yet another comprehensive study 
of the late Roman Republic? 
In the city of Rome during the late Republic, crowds of citizens 
frequently acted under the leadership of members of the Roman upper 
class. Aspects thereof have been researched by modem historians in 
various monographs and articles. A systematic study of popular 
leadership and crowd behavior in the late Roman Republic and the 
interaction between these two phenomena, however, is still lacking. 
The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between 
popular leadership and collective behavior in the political process of the 
late Roman Republic. The focus will be on the period from circa 80 to 50 
B.C., i.e. from the death of Sulla (78) until the beginning of the second 
civil war (49), which marked the end of the Republican polity. During the 
final 30 years of the Republic, the processes of change, which had been in 
operation for several centuries as a result of the continuous expansion of 
the Roman empire, reached their peak and had their repercussions on all 
aspects of Roman society. Furthermore, this is the best documented 
period of Roman history, especially because of the rich amount of 
contemporary sources. That is why this period is best suited for a detailed 
analysis of the problems which have been researched here. I will deal only 
with the events in the city of Rome, since it was the center of politics. 
Besides, there are very few data about comparable events elsewhere 
during the same period. 
One might wonder whether the sources are representative. This book 
deals with conflicts, which means that they had news value already in the 
late Roman Republic. We may therefore assume that at least the successful 
and spectacular - violent as well as nonviolent - events will have been 
recorded and, considering the relatively large density of the sources, will 
have come down to us. Moreover, many of the contemporary sources are 
eyewitness reports by participating observers. Our data, therefore, should 
be considered representative, albeit not complete. 
Another problem is the prejudice of the sources. Many data are 
derived from the writings of Cicero, which are known to be subjective. 
Nevertheless, the Ciceronian source material is valuable, because Cicero's 
political viewpoints are known to us and because he was a sharp and able 
observer. Furthermore, Chapter 6 especially addresses the problem of the 
biased literary tradition. 
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Throughout the book I will regularly refer to preceding and later 
periods of Roman history for a better understanding of the events between 
80 and 50. Considering the subject of my research, I have opted for a 
sociological phrasing of the questions. The first section of the 
Introduction summarizes some important sociological theories for 
readers who are unfamiliar with the social sciences. I hope that the results 
of this book will offer social scientists and historians who deal with other 
periods additional reference material for their own research. Here and 
there, especially in the notes, I have indicated what direction such further 
comparative study could take. For this reading public, I have also 
included some general information on Roman history, especially in the 
second part of the Introduction. 
This study has been arranged by topic, but a chronological survey of 
the events is offered in Appendix B. After the Introduction, the chapters 
will successively treat leadership, participation, mobilization, collective 
behavior, and the role of these factors in the political process. The last 
chapter offers an analysis of the treatment of popular leadership and 
collective behavior in the ancient sources. At the end of the book, five 
appendices have been included, which will be referred to regularly in this 
study, but which perhaps also may serve as reference material for future 
research. 
Some technical information for the reading of this book: all dates are 
B.C., unless otherwise indicated or evidently belonging to later periods. 
For the classical authors reference is made to the editions in the Loeb 
Classical Library, whenever possible. The translations of classical authors 
are mostly after Loeb, with slight modifications. 
This research was made possible in part thanks to financial assistance 
from the Netherlands organization for the Advancement of Pure 
Research, the Fulbright-Hays program, and the Nijmegen University 
Fund Foundation. 
Many individuals have contributed to the realization of this project and 
have encouraged and counseled me in multifarious ways. Some of them I 
should like to mention by name. In Paris I have been much inspired by 
cooperation with Professor Claude Nicolet and his élèves, among whom I 
would like to mention Jean-Louis Ferrary, Jean-Marc Flambard, and 
Hélène Leclerc. At the University of Michigan I have experienced fruitful 
cooperation with Professors John H. D'Arms, John W. Eadie, and others -
students and faculty - in the Departments of Classical Studies, History, and 
Sociology. I should also like to thank emeritus Professor G.J.D. Aalders 
H.Wzn. who has provided me with support and advice in the course of my 
research. I thank Professor H.F.M. Peeters for having introduced me to 
interdisciplinary history. Professor Bruce W. Frier most kindly went 
over the manuscript and corrected the translation. Among my colleagues 
in the Department of Classics in Nijmegen, I thank those who have put 
their expertise at my disposal. I would like to thank all, including those 
who have not been mentioned by name, for their support and 
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encouragement. I should like to finish with the familiar, yet not 
unnecessary phrase that no one, except myself, is to be held responsible 
for the views expressed in this book or any remaining errors. The book is 
dedicated to my parents, who have granted me the opportunity to pursue 
my interests, and who have never doubted a successful result. 
Nijmegen, June 1987 
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Theoretical Starting-P oints 
An interdisciplinary approach to ancient history, in my opinion, can yield 
important results. The intention of such an approach is not to apply 
modem theories to antiquity or to test the validity of those theories against 
data from ancient history. If that would be the object of research, one 
might, for example, incur the following problem: how can ancient 
collective behavior be fitted into a modem sociological typology if such 
behavior is part of normal participation in political life? For modem 
theorists generally view collective behavior and social movement as 
something which occurs outside regular and accepted patterns. They take 
for granted that these phenomena take place in authoritarian political 
systems or representative democracies. The events in antiquity, however, 
are often instances of direct democracy, such as in classical Athens, or 
accepted civilian participation, which from a political point of view is 
comparable to parliamentary action or referenda. 
Nevertheless, some general sociological notions and conceptions are 
useful in ancient history. The intention of an interdisciplinary approach is 
to ask new questions with regard to the ancient source material with the 
help of social science theories, to find a terminological framework in 
which the output of historical research can be mounted, and to use modem 
theories as a heuristic device, which means that the historian provides 
himself with opportunities for comparison. The discovery of analogies 
and equivalents with the modem era or with modem theories can be of 
use for a better understanding of Roman history, but especially the 
differences between antiquity and the present are of importance if one is 
to understand the singularity of Roman reality.1 
An important component of modem sociology is formed by research 
of group behavior. Many theories have developed on the subject. For the 
historian who wishes to take advantage of these theories the problem of 
selection crops up.2 I have selected a number of sociological theories 
whose general notions and conceptions have served as starting-points for 
the research on popular leadership and collective behavior in the late 
Roman Republic. These theories have a solid empirical and often also 
1
 On the use and value of social science theories in historical research, see: V.E. 
BONNELL, The Uses of Theory, Concepts and Comparison in Historical Sociology, 
CSSH 22 (1980), pp. 156-173; H.F.M. PEETERS, Historische gedragswetenschap. 
Theorieën, begrippen en methoden. Een bijdrage tot de studie van menselijk gedrag op 
de lange termijn, Meppel 1978. 
2
 On criteria of selection for social science theories in historical research, see: PEETERS, 
op.cit.n.l, Ch. 3. 
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historical basis. Moreover, they are broad theories which pretend to have 
a general validity. They do not approach the problem of collective 
behavior from a monocausal point of view, but include a variety of 
factors, such as cognitive, social, political, and economic. We will now 
look at how these theories view the origin, development, and outcome of 
collective behavior.3 
TURNER and KlLLIAN's theory of collective behavior is centered on 
the collectivity rather than on the individual. According to their theory, 
collective behavior refers to the action of a group composed of interacting 
individuals who constitute a unit. Interaction is determined by group 
norms. Collective behavior is contrasted with organizational and 
institutional behavior. The group members and leaders in collective 
behavior are not selected and identified by procedure and tradition but 
more or less spontaneously. Coordination and direction of collective 
behavior do not depend on established norms, pre-existing social 
organization, or primary-group integration. Collective behavior is a 
novelty, and, therefore, prior social organization is not involved in the 
development of collective behavior, but new forms of organization are 
established. Though important, organization is less responsible for the 
origin of collective behavior than spontaneity. Collective behavior is 
neither irrational nor emotional, but is guided by an "emergent norm" 
which basically is a deviation from the traditional societal norms.4 
In TURNER and KlLLIAN's view, structural breakdown, the 
psychological state of the participants, and the role of shared beliefs are 
important in collective behavior. Structural breakdown means breakdown 
of culture and organization, which may result from changes in the 
redistribution of power in society, disasters, mass migration, disturbances 
in the economic system, and interruptions in the élite circulation process. 
Conditions which facilitate communication and mobilization are 
conducive to collective behavior, such as physical environment, type of 
social control, cultural homogeneity, and the functioning of 
institutionalized mechanisms of adjustment. Unanticipated events, 
disruption of the social structure, and value conflicts can precipitate 
collective behavior. 
Collective behavior is noninstitutionalized behavior and it occurs 
"when the established organization ceases to afford direction and supply 
channels for action".5 In such a situation informal and unconventional 
channels of communication become important. The situation is ambiguous 
3
 For a review of the most important theories on collective behavior and social 
movements, see: R.A. BERK, Collective Behavior, Dubuque 19762; A. MORRIS, С 
HERRING, Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review, CRSO 
Working Paper 307, Ann Arbor 1984; J.B. PERRY, M.D. PUGH, Collective Behavior. 
Response to Social Stress, St. Paul 1978; TARROW, Struggling, passim. 
4
 For their definition of collective behavior: TURNER, et al., Collective Behavior, pp. 4-
6. 
5
 Ibidem 30. 
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and unstructured. There is a feeling of uncertainty and urgency in the 
crowd. Collective behavior starts when a norm is created. 
The individuals in a crowd act in different ways and have different 
motives for participation. Yet there is an illusion of unanimity because the 
behavior of a part of the crowd is seen by both observers and participants 
as being the sentiment of the whole crowd. This is to be explained by the 
emergence of a norm, i.e. "a common understanding as to what sort of 
behavior is expected in the situation": 
"Such a shared understanding encourages behavior consistent with the norm, 
inhibits behavior contrary to it, and justifies restraining action against 
individuals who dissent. Since the norm is to some degree specific to the 
situation, differing in degree or in kind from the norms governing noncrowd 
situations, it is an emergent norm."6 
The norm develops through a process of rumor, which "is the 
characteristic mode of communication in collective behavior". "Rumor 
must be understood as a form of group interaction that involves a network 
of communicators who engage in a collective decision-making process."7 
In crowds symbols have a significant function in communication, for they 
constitute the material and the product of rumor. Symbolic interaction is 
important in the development of collective behavior, the direction of the 
action, and the formulation of goals. 
In a crowd in which the participants cooperate to achieve shared 
objectives, i.e. a solidaristic crowd, a division of labor develops between 
the leaders, the active nucleus, and the spectators. Leaders mainly act as 
keynoters, i.e. they present a positive suggestion in an ambivalent frame 
of reference. Other leaders may implement these suggestions. By 
introducing symbols, for instance symbols with a negative connotation, 
leaders are able to manipulate the crowd into certain actions. Participation 
is differentiated. A distinction can be made between an active nucleus and 
spectators, who are more passive. 
Collective behavior is not static, but some crowds can become 
conventionalized. Its members assemble with the expectation that 
collective behavior will develop. Repetition leads to regularized behavior. 
Conventionalized collective behavior can serve as an outlet to maintain 
and strengthen the social order. 
Finally, TURNER and KILLIAN distinguish between social movement 
and other types of collective behavior. They consider the social movement 
the most extensive, continuous, and well-organized form of collective 
behavior. Distinguishing features are sustained action, enduring group 
identity, and continuity in strategy and in leadership. Their definition of 
social movement is: 
6
 Ibidem 22. 
7
 Ibidem 32 and 42. 
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"A social movement is a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or 
resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a 
movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with 
leadership whose position is determined more by the informal response of the 
members than by formal procedures for legitimizing authority".8 
A reaction to the collective behavior approach is provided by resource 
mobilization theory, as set forth by MCCARTHY and ZALD.9 It provides a 
theoretical framework for the study of social movements. In resource 
mobilization a social movement is defined as: "A set of opinions and 
beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some 
elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society".10 
This broad definition reflects the opinion in this theory that there is no 
distinction between a social movement and other types of collective 
behavior. Collective action is always part of a social movement. 
Furthermore, there are no fundamental differences between collective 
behavior and institutionalized behavior. 
Resource mobilization stresses the importance of the existing 
infrastructure and almost denies the relevance of existing grievances and 
discontent: "Grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and 
manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations".11 According to 
this theory, the emergence of collective action and its success depend on 
several factors: the availability of resources (outside support and 
especially money and labor), the pre-existing organization (especially 
structures of communication and solidarity), and the entrepreneurs and 
their organizations, who generate demands. Social control, too, is an 
important factor affecting the potential success of mobilization and 
outcome. 
People participate in collective action to realize their interests, and 
motivation depends on a rational calculation of costs and benefits. For an 
examination of the outcome of collective action one should look at the 
rational choices which the participants have made. Resource mobilization 
also distinguishes between active participants (élite) and a bystander 
public (mass). The mass are those individuals and groups that control very 
limited resource pools, for instance only their own time and labor. The 
élite controls a larger resource pool. Another distinction can be whether 
or not these groups will benefit directly from the accomplishment of 
movement goals. 
TILLY supports the resource mobilization approach but focuses on the 
political process which generates collective action.12 Furthermore, his 
theory has a strong historical founding. Collective action results from a 
8 Ibidem 246. See also 11. 
9
 MCCARTHY, et. al., AJS, passim. 
10
 Ibidem 1217-1218. 
11
 Ibidem 1215. 
12
 TILLY, Mobilization, passim. 
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power struggle within the political process. Contenders produce 
collective action in their struggle for political power. 
"A contender is any group which, during some specific period, applies pooled 
resources to influence the government. Contenders include challengers and 
members of the polity. A member is any contender which has routine, low-cost 
access to resources controlled by the government; a challenger is any other 
contender." 13 
In contentions for power, coalitions usually are made between members 
of the polity or between nonmembers, but also coalitions between 
members and nonmembers are possible. 
Since TILLY sees collective action as a product of power struggle, he 
pays attention to collective violence, which he defines as "any observable 
interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or 
physically damaged in spite of resistance."14 
According to TILLY, the analysis of collective action has five main 
components: interest, i.e., the gains and losses of the group; organization; 
mobilization, i.e., the process by which a group acquires collective 
control over the resources needed for action and proceeds from passivity 
to activity; opportunity, i.e., the chances to act provided by the 
environment; and collective action, i.e., people acting together in pursuit 
of common interests.15 All these components interrelate and influence 
each other. 
TILLY stresses the importance of the opportunity to act together, made 
up of repression and facilitation. The presence and extent of social control 
determine the materialization of collective action. From the point of view 
of the government, repression is more successful if it focuses on raising 
the costs of mobilization rather than on the costs of collective action. 
Furthermore, the opportunity to act is determined by the susceptibility of 
the government to the claims of the contender and by the threat of 
competing claims by other groups. 
Several types of collective action are possible: competitive action 
claims resources which are also claimed by other groups; reactive action 
attempts to reassert established claims; proactive action attempts to realize 
new claims. Collective action in each society or community has a different 
repertoire. The repertoire is determined by prevailing standards of rights 
and justice, daily routine, internal organization, prior experience, and 
pattern of repression. 
While reviewing the studies on collective behavior and social 
movements, TARROW rightfully points out the fact that the question of 
success and failure of these phenomena has received little attention and 
largely remains unanswered. TARROW attempts to assess the political 
M Ibidem 52. 
14




achievements of social protest.16 Policy innovation is the major 
expression of the social change demanded by protest movements. 
Although adhering to a resource mobilization point of view, TARROW 
does distinguish between collective behavior, as in general crowd 
behavior and riots, and social movements. For social movements have 
some ideological content. He defines social protest movements as "groups 
possessing a purposive organization, whose leaders identify their goals 
with the preferences of an unmobilized constituency which they attempt to 
mobilize in direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political 
system."17 
Finally, the outcome of social protest movements is influenced by the 
political opportunity structure, which is composed of openness and 
closure of political access, stability of political alignments, and allies and 
support groups. 
Obviously, several approaches to and definitions of collective behavior 
are possible. We have to address the question, what is collective behavior? 
First, there seems to be a difference between collective behavior and 
collective action. The latter term is used by the adherents of resource 
mobilization, because they research individuals cooperating to achieve 
certain interests and goals, while others also research less target-
orientated types of behavior by a collectivity. The difference, however, is 
not always very clear, and this is even more true when analyzing data 
from the late Roman Republic. For our purposes, therefore, I will use the 
following definition: collective behavior is every larger gathering of 
people in which some action or reaction of the crowd is discernible. This 
is a deliberately broad and rather vague definition in order to include as 
many cases as possible. Furthermore, since many types of collective 
behavior were interrelated and sometimes overlapped or merged into one 
another, I think it is necessary to research all types, and not to limit the 
research to, for example, only violent or only nonviolent cases. 
Next, is there a difference between collective behavior and social 
movement? I agree with TURNER, KILLIAN, and TARROW that the two, 
albeit part of one phenomenon, should be distinguished, especially if we 
concentrate on the role of collective behavior in the political process. If 
we look at the ancient world, we can observe significant differences 
between, on the one hand, for example, the revolt of Spartacus in the 70s 
B.C., during which tens of thousands of slaves attempted to realize their 
freedom by sustained action under one leader, and, on the other, the 
recurrent violent clashes between circus factions in the hippodrome of 
Constantinople in late antiquity. At the end of Chapter 5 the question will 
be treated whether the relationship between popular leadership and 
collective behavior in the late Republic can be termed a social movement. 
16
 TARROW, op.cit., passim. 
17
 Ibidem 7. 
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The theories are less explicit on leadership. Let us here keep matters 
simple: a popular leader is a person who in some way provides leadership 
to collective behavior. 
Rome in the Late Republic: The Preconditions for Collective Behavior 18 
The political system of the Roman Republic was based on a city-state, 
which implied that there existed three levels of administration: executive 
officials (magistrates), an advisory council (the senate), and a legislative 
body (popular assembly, of which there were two actually functioning in 
Rome). To start with the magistrates, a classification from top to bottom 
during the late Republic looked as follows: consul (2 yearly; general 
administration, military command), praetor (8 yearly; organization of 
and introduction to jurisdiction, replacement of the consuls), aedile (4 
yearly; public works, supervision of markets, organization of games), and 
quaestor (20 yearly; administration of the treasury). These magistracies 
belonged to the cursus honorum, the honorable career a Roman had to 
complete if he was to be counted among the most prominent citizens. 
Furthermore, the occupancy of these magistracies provided access to the 
senate. 
Besides, there existed two other magistracies: tribune of the plebs 
(tribunus plebis ; 10 yearly; president of the concilium plebis) and censor. 
The office of the tribune of the plebs had been instituted in the early 
Republic to protect the rights of the people. Only plebeians were allowed 
to hold the office, and they could obstruct the decisions of all other 
magistrates and the popular assemblies by their right of veto. Every five 
years two censors were elected (ex-consuls), who granted public works to 
contractors and saw to it that the senate had a sufficient number of worthy 
members. The censors periodically (usually every five years) made a 
revision (census) of the number of citizens and their property. 
Except for the censors, the Roman magistrates were subject to the 
system of annuity and collegiality. Annuity meant that a magistrate's 
tenure did not exceed one year and that as a rule he was not re-elected. 
Collegiality implied that each magistrate had at least one colleague in 
office and that fellow magistrates could veto each other's decisions. In that 
way one kept each other in check and no one could exercise the same 
power for too long. (In emergencies a dictator was nominated, who 
received absolute power during six months.) The magistrates, including 
18
 Introductions to the various aspects of the late Roman Republic are provided by: K. 
CHRIST, Krise und Untergang der römischen Republik, Darmstadt 1979; NlCOLET, 
Rome, passim, who also provides a most extensive bibliography; H.H. SCULLARD, 
From the Gracchi to Nero, London 1973. 
For a survey of the history of the late Republic and its most important problems: 
BEARD, et. d\.,Rome, passim; L. DE BLOIS, De Romeinse Revolutie (133-27 v.С), 
Lampas 11 (1978), pp. 109-127. 
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the tribunes of the plebs, always belonged to the top layer of Roman 
society. Magistrates did not receive a salary and in the execution of their 
office they often had to contribute from private means.19 
The senate was the most powerful organ. Membership was for life and 
the senators all had administrative experience. Bills proposed to the 
assemblies were always accompanied by an advice from the senate. 
Foreign affairs and public finance were even administered entirely by the 
senate without intervention by the people. Though the people were 
officially sovereign, the senate was considered the true government. In 
practice, therefore, the Roman polity became an oligarchy.20 
During the late Republic two types of popular assemblies were 
operative in Rome. Unlike Athens, which had a one man-one vote system, 
Rome knew the principle of the group vote.21 The citizens cast their 
ballots within their group, and in the popular assemblies each group had 
one vote. An important change in the voting procedures occurred when at 
the end of the second century the oral vote was replaced by a written, 
secret ballot. This considerably lessened the control of the élite on the 
course of the voting in the assemblies.22 
The comitia centuriata decided on war and peace and elected the 
highest magistrates - consuls, praetors, and censors. The centuriate 
assembly was divided into five property classes, which were subdivided 
into 193 centuries. The number of citizens in a century varied. The 
highest census class had 70 centuries, while the unpropertied citizens were 
packed into one century and therefore only had one vote in the centuriate 
assembly. The voting proportion, consequently, was heavily in favor of 
the propertied.23 The result of the voting in the centuriate assembly to an 
important extent was determined by the so-called centuria praerogativa. 
The centuria praerogativa was assigned by lot, but was always one of the 
centuries from the highest property class. This voting unit was the first to 
vote and only after its vote was cast the other units could vote. 
Superstition had it that the gods expressed their will through the lot and 
that the vote of the praerogativa represented divine will. The vote of the 
praerogativa therefore was usually followed by the other units.24 
The comitia tributa decided on most legislation, elected the lower 
magistrates and the tribunes of the plebs, and in jurisdiction could serve as 
19
 On the magistrates: NlCOLET, Rome, Ch. XI. 
2 0
 On the senate: NlCOLET, Rome, Ch. X. 
2 1
 On the principle of the group vote: NlCOLET, Métier, pp. 292-294; STAVELEY, 
Voting, Ch. VII. 
2 2
 On the secret ballot: NlCOLET, Métier, 361-365; STAVELEY, Voting, 158-159; 
TAYLOR, RVA, p. 34 and n.2. The secret ballot was introduced successively by a 
series of leges tabellariae : in elections in 139 by the lex Gabinia, in trials in 137 by the 
lex Cassia, and in legislation in 130 by the lex Papiria. 
2 3
 On the centuriate assembly: NlCOLET, Métier, 297-304; STAVELEY, Voting, 123-
129; TAYLOR, ÄVA, Ch. V . 
2 4
 On the centuria praerogativa : NlCOLET, Métier, 349-357; TAYLOR, RVA, 91. 
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court of appeal. The tribal assembly was divided into 35 tribes (tribus, 
residential districts) - 4 for the city and 31 for the countryside. The voting 
proportion in this assembly, therefore, was more representative of the 
citizenry. Additionally, there existed a distinction between the tribal 
assembly proper and the concilium plebis. The tribal assembly 
represented the entire Roman people and was presided by a consul or 
praetor and occasionally by a cumie aedile. In the concilium plebis the 
small group of the patricians was absent and it was presided by a tribune 
of the plebs.25 The differences, however, were minor and in this book we 
will not distinguish between the two. 
Only voting was allowed in the assemblies. Political discussion took 
place in the contiones. These were unstructured public meetings which 
served for discussion on bills, elections, and jurisdiction. The meetings 
were called by a magistrate, and orations and debates were held in it.26 
Roman society was highly stratified and divided into property 
classes.27 The Roman upper stratum was composed of two groups -
senators and équités - which basically belonged to one status group. 
Access to the senate was open to members of the equestrian order who had 
held a magistracy belonging to the cursus honorum, i.e. as from Sulla the 
quaestorship.2 8 Among the senatorial élite there existed several 
categories, such as nobiles and homines novi. The nobiles formed the top 
élite, the actual oligarchical nucleus. The nobles were the members of the 
families which generally produced most of the higher magistrates and 
certainly most of the consuls. During the late Republic the great majority 
of the consuls were still members of the nobilitas.29 A homo novus was 
either the first member of a family to enter the senate through an elective 
magistracy, or a person of senatorial ancestry who became the first 
praetor or consul of his family, or a member of a non-senatorial family 
who was the first of his family not only to enter the senate but also to 
reach the praetorship or the consulate.30 
Social status and prestige of the senators were not hereditary. In order 
to remain a part of the senatorial élite and certainly to maintain one's 
membership of the nobility, the members of the Roman upper class 
constantly had to prove themselves: they constantly had to secure their 
2 5
 On the tribal assembly: NlCOLET, Métier, 304-307; STAVELEY, Voting, 129-132; 
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election to the highest magistracies, to take up military commands, and to 
demonstrate their serviceability to the res publica in other ways. 
Membership of the élite, therefore, was inextricably bound up with 
politics. This resulted in permanent competition for the offices.31 That 
was equally true of the patricians, the remaining small group of families 
from the early Republican aristocracy. Their status was the only 
hereditary status among the Roman élite, but in order to actually belong to 
the ruling class they, too, had to prove themselves in public service. All 
things considered, the Roman oligarchy was a combination of timocracy, 
meritocracy, and aristocracy. 
Admittance to the equestrian order was gained by a minimum amount 
of property, by a career as a public servant (secretary, herald) of a 
magistrate, and especially through a career as an officer in the armed 
forces.32 The minimum property qualification for équités, and therefore 
also for senators, was 400,000 HS (sesterces), which was about 800 times 
the annual income of a poor peasant family.33 
The economic basis of the upper strata was foimed by landed property. 
The productivity of the ancient economy and especially of agriculture was 
insufficient to bring about large economic growth or accumulation of 
capital. Wealth was produced by external factors, such as confiscation of 
property, exploitation of provinces, and booty from war. The members 
of the upper class also engaged in trade and granting of credits, but these 
activities remained subordinate to landed property. A separate group was 
formed by the publicani - mostly équités. The Roman state left a lot to 
private initiative; thus the execution of public works and the lucrative 
collection of taxes in the provinces were left to the publicans, who leased 
these tasks from the state.34 
As far as the senatorial élite was concerned, work in service of the 
community was recompensed to such an extent that personal ambitions 
could be entirely realized through political and military accomplishments. 
At the same time, one had to take care that individuals in their necessity to 
31
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perform did not rise above their peers, in order to maintain the power of 
the oligarchy and the equality among the leading group.35 The oligarchy 
ruled by means of inner solidarity, personal vertical ties with other social 
groups, wealth, and authority which was legitimized by collective 
morality, achievement, and religious sanction.36 
At the bottom of society were the (male) free citizens, who had the 
right to vote and who participated in the popular assemblies. Among this 
group large differences could exist. On the countryside there were 
wealthy farmers, poor tenants, day laborers, and all kinds of gradations in 
between. In Rome there were artisans, shopkeepers, and day laborers. At 
the very bottom and without rights were the slaves. A special phenomenon 
of Roman society was that freed slaves were enfranchized. The 
relationship between members of the upper strata and the lower strata is 
mostly to be qualified as a patron-client relation. Vertical ties permeated 
all status groups and existed in multifarious forms. 
Roman economy, politics, and society were fundamentally influenced 
by the expansion. After the victory against Hannibal in the second Punic 
war, Rome started a series of wars of conquest. During the last two 
centuries B.C., the Roman empire expanded constantly until it comprised 
the entire Mediterranean basin.37 
The consequences of the expansion were manifold. The conquests were 
especially advantageous to the upper strata. Because of the many wars 
they could gain military prestige. The enormous capital in booty which 
the members of the élite accumulated was used for conspicious 
consumption in Rome, which enlarged their prestige, and for investment 
in land, which led to concentration of landed property. Furthermore, due 
to the conquests large numbers of cheap slaves were imported into Italy, 
who were employed on the estates of the rich, their agents, and the Italian 
gentry. The pressure of rich landed proprietors on the small-holders to 
give up their land increased. Large-scale landownership increased, and 
large and mid-size estates developed and began to produce for markets; 
the peasantry which lived on a subsistence economy decreased. 
Incidentally, this only applied to certain parts of Italy. The expulsion of 
peasants was facilitated because of the fact that many peasants as conscript 
soldiers were away for a long time on military campaigns. Through 
migration from the countryside and through the frequent practice of 
manumitting slaves the city of Rome grew, and at the same time the urban 
market expanded.38 
Furthermore, the public revenues increased. The conquered territories 
were tributary to Rome, and from the provinces there came a continual 
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flow of revenues in the form of money and also in the form of com, with 
which the growing population of the city of Rome could be fed. 
Tradesmen, merchants, and tax farmers could enrich themselves in the 
new territories. 
Because of the many wars a substantial part of the Roman citizens were 
constantly under arms. Due to the decline of small-holdership there was a 
decreasing number of recruits who met the minimum property 
qualification to serve in the army. At the end of the second century, the 
Roman armed forces were transformed into a volunteer army, which 
resulted in a professionalization of the armies. Poor citizens, mostly 
landless peasants, joined up for a living. The soldiers' income depended 
on the share in the booty they received from their general. Additionally, 
ex-soldiers depended on their general in order to retain a source of 
income after their time in the army. For that purpose, generals attempted 
to pass an agrarian law in the popular assembly in Rome, by which 
veterans received a plot of land. This was a source of political conflict, 
since other members of the élite were afraid that by means of an agrarian 
law a general could acquire a loyal clientele among veterans. The officers 
also became professionalized. They were more and more recruited from 
the Italian upper class, which, though having been enfranchized after 88, 
was integrated into the Roman oligarchy only with difficulty. The officers 
settled for the best career available to them. Moreover, the detachment of 
citizen and soldier plus a declining consensus with regard to the 
legitimacy of the government of the ruling oligarchy among the 
professionalized officer corps led to a shift in loyalty among the armed 
forces from state to commander. Sulla and Caesar, therefore, were able to 
perform a coup d'état with the help of the armed forces.39 
In the late Republic, the Roman élite was subject to change. The 
expansion led to an increasing inequality among the oligarchy; some 
senators as a result of military campaigns became much richer and much 
more powerful than others. This undermined the most important pillar of 
the regime, for an oligarchical system was based on an élite balanced by 
persons whose influence and wealth were not too different and who kept 
each other in check. Differences and conflicts between individual 
members of the élite increased. The competition for the magistracies 
intensified, because a magistracy could imply participation in a lucrative 
military campaign or a profitable governorship of a province. The 
obsolete institutions offered insufficient career opportunities to young 
members of the élite. The growing problems within Roman society 
formed a breeding ground for political conflicts. The harmony with 
which the senatorial élite had governed Rome for centuries did not exist 
anymore. 
Political conflicts were fought in different ways. One way was through 
political trials. The members of the Roman élite sued each other 
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regularly, and political differences of opinion and feuds were frequently 
settled in court. Since much administration of justice was public, popular 
opinion played a part in this as well.40 Another way was through the 
people.41 Because of the problems which faced Roman society, the people, 
mostly under the leadership of an opposing politician, frequently found 
themselves in an antagonistic position towards the ruling élite. In that 
respect, one might possibly speak of social conflicts.42 
With regard to collective behavior, there existed a number of 
conditions which were highly conducive to collective behavior. There 
were numerous occasions in which the people acted collectively or were 
assembled in great numbers: meetings, popular assemblies, elections, 
games, performances in the theater, and religious festivities. 
Although patron-client relations were an important factor in the 
maintenance of power by the élite, there was fierce competition between 
the members of the élite for the most important offices. This competition 
increased during the late Republic. Further, a certain influence of the 
people was an accepted phenomenon. These two factors, competition and 
popular influence, resulted in the fact that certain types of interaction 
between élite and plebs were embedded in Roman political culture, which 
signified that politicians attempted to gain the favor of the people and that 
popularity enlarged the prestige of a politician. 
The polity of the late Republic was still aimed at the administration of a 
city-state. Rome, however, by then ruled an empire. For the government 
of such a vast empire, the existing administrative system was inadequate 
and it led to multiple dysfunctions. The number of magistrates and the 
civil service were too small. In 50, for example, Rome and the provinces 
were administered by some 60 magistrates. This provided opportunities 
for private initiative without adequate state control. Acute problems, 
which were mainly caused by Rome's expansion, increasingly had to be 
solved by individuals with extraordinary powers, which then led to great 
power concentrations outside the state. The political structure of the city-
state was expanded and stretched to its limits under pressure from the 
government of an empire. The late Republic was a period of political 
crisis, but a crisis without an alternative, because everyone wished to hold 
on to the existing polity and also because imperialism offered sheer 
unlimited opportunities to especially the upper strata for personal and 
material advancement. The alternative, the monarchy, only developed 
after a series of devastating civil wars.43 
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In this chapter I will discuss the persons who provided leadership to 
collective behavior. In the Roman Republic, just like in other periods, a 
division of labor existed. In Rome a three-level leadership structure can 
be discovered: top level, middle level, and low level leadership, or, as it 
will be called in this book, (top) leadership, assistant leadership, and 
intermediate leadership,1 These types of leaders will be analyzed in the 
three sections of this chapter. The analysis will try to determine who these 
leaders were, what relationships they had with each other, and what their 
motives were to pursue popular politics. The role of leadership in 
collective behavior will be discussed in Chapter 3 on mobilization. 
Top leadership included famous characters of the late Republic, such as 
Caesar and Pompey. Much has already been written on the life of these 
persons, on their political strategy, and on their actions. There is not 
much new I can add. In this chapter, therefore, the middle and low level 
leaders will be emphasized, the persons who have thus far received little 
attention in modem historiography. That is not to say that the major 
leaders were insignificant. But by stressing their subordinates it is 
possible to demonstrate on the one hand what their great power and 
influence on the history of the late Republic was (partly) founded on, and 
on the other hand how their actions were influenced by their subordinates. 
Before dealing with the various types of leaders, it is necessary to make 
some general remarks on the political situation of the élite in the late 
Republic. 
In the elections the nobiles were greatly advantaged. They carried with 
them the prestige of descending from consular families. In view of the 
powerful position of their families they also were able to mobilize clients, 
friends, and financial means to support their election. In the late Republic 
the élite had become considerably more rigid. From 249 to 220 about half 
of the consuls had a father or a grandfather who had held the consulate; 
between 80 and 50 the number had risen to three out of four, as is shown 
by HOPKINS' research.2 So the nobilitas claimed increasingly more 
consulates. 
1
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For homines novi it took a tremendous effort to compete with this. The 
new men also were barely accepted within the nobility. They were 
stigmatized by their social descent.3 The ruling élite had become rigid; 
there was a lack of mobility. It was particularly difficult for new men to 
reach the top: the consulate and the nobilitas. But on the lower level of the 
upper strata the situation was less dramatic. Senators of lower rank often 
were descended from nonsenatorial families.4 Owing to the fierceness and 
the high costs of political competition, and to a decreasing fertility in 
combination with a high mortality not every family could constantly 
produce successful candidates for office. Especially on the lower level this 
cleared the way for persons from outside to enter the senatorial élite.5 
Next to them, there were persons who did belong to the senatorial élite, 
but who nevertheless fell outside the centers of power: scions of senatorial 
families who for a long time had not held any important political 
positions, members of impoverished families, persons whose careers 
were frustrated by factionalism, ambitious politicians without suffient 
family clientele. These persons were at a disadvantage and needed 
something extra against their competitors with a better starting position.6 
In general the consensus concerning the oligarchical polity and its 
institutions was declining among the ruling élite in the late Republic.7 
Conformity to the traditional norms and values of the élite decreased. The 
Roman upper class was disintegrating, individualism increased. Personal 
dignitas became more important than the collective interests of the 
oligarchy and the mos maiorumß Competition, especially at the top, grew 
fierce. A contributing factor was the opportunity of imperialism. A 
magistracy could lead to lucrative provincial or military commands, 
especially in the eastern Mediterranean. Senators who were able to reach 
the top magistracies and lucrative commands put their unsuccessful peers 
at a great distance as far as wealth and influence were concerned.9 
All this becomes clear in the reforms which Cicero and Sallust, both 
homines novi, proposed with regard to the élite. Both thought changes 
necessary if the élite was to govern the state properly and unanimously. 
Cicero complained about corrupt senators who were only after their own 
INMRS pp. 100-107. 
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interests.10 He disdainfully commented on piscinarii, Roman nobles who 
merely concerned themselves with their fishponds (Att. 1.19.6, 20.3, and 
2.1.7). Cicero advocated a consensus omnium bonorum, whereby the 
Italian middle class and rich, industrious citizens (even freedmen) who 
also wanted to complete a cursus honorum got the opportunity to 
participate in politics.11 Sallust thought that the élite had become greedy, 
had degenerated, and only served personal interests. In the second Letter 
to Caesar, which is ascribed to Sallust, suggestions are made to add 
members to the senate and to improve its function.12 
The competition within the upper strata, particularly in the case of 
popular politics, was accompanied by large expenditures of politicians on 
behalf of their political careers. The task of the aediles was to organize the 
various games in Rome. Although they received recompense from the 
treasury, they usually contributed from personal funds to make the games 
especially grand and spectacular. Private persons on their own initiative 
organized games too, such as gladiatorial shows. Furthermore, public 
feasts and banquets were organized and food and other commodities were 
distributed. Bribery of voters increased. Finally, aediles had to carry out 
public works, generals erected monuments to commemorate their 
campaign, and buildings were constructed by private persons. All this 
entangled the politically ambitious members of the upper strata in 
ostentatious expenditure, which subsequently had to be recovered through 
a provincial command or a military campaign.13 This was one of the 
causes of late Republican imperialism.14 
Personal and political relationships within the élite were founded on 
the system of amicitia, in principle a system of reciprocal services 
between equals.15 It was important for a politically ambitious person to 
provide himself with amici. Friends were obtained by providing services, 
through the membership of a political club (sodalitas), and through 
marital ties and kinship (Com.Pet. 16-17). The services which amici 
provided to a politician could consist of escorting a candidate during 
elections or the donation of tickets for games (Cic. Mur. 70 and 73), or of 
putting clients, freedmen, and slaves at his disposal, and of letters of 
recommendation (Cic. Red.Sen. 20). In addition, help in repaying debts, 
finding an appropriate suitor for the offspring, and help in legal matters 
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counted as services of friends (Cic. Off. 2.54 and 65-70). The expansion 
of the empire, which led to a growing inequality within the élite, resulted 
in a modification of the amicitia relationships; they became increasingly 
similar to patron-client relationships, in other words a relationship 
between unequals.16 
The general picture of the Roman Republic in modem historiography 
holds that political parties, in the sense of an organized group of 
individuals whose concerted action is independent of the issue, did not 
exist. For certain political problems, ad hoc coalitions were formed 
between families and their supporters or between politicians and an 
interest group. They were factions who at every political discussion had a 
different composition. They were gegenstandsabhängig as opposed to 
modem political parties which are gegenstandsunabhängig. This also 
concerned the senatorial majority when it united to offer resistance to a 
popular leader who obtained too much power. The senatorial majority did 
not form a close-knit group either.17 
In the political language of the late Republic a distinction was made 
between populares and optimates. Although these terms, which usually 
were employed in the plural form, indicate a dichotomy in Roman 
politics, it was not a distinction between parties. These terms rather 
served to express a certain type of political behavior. A popularis was a 
politician who wanted to pursue a career through a policy directed 
towards the people and who at the same time placed his personal interest 
above the common good. The best translation of the word is demagogue.^ 
An optimus was a politician who endorsed the traditional values of the 
senatorial oligarchy.19 In this book both terms will be used to characterize 
certain politicians in a short way. 
Top Leaders 
A number of popular leaders appeared in the years before Sulla.20 
Popular politics started with the Gracchi (133-121), who combined their 
political ambitions with a number of plans for necessary reform. Tiberius 
Gracchus wanted to help the impoverished peasant class and to solve the 
recruiting problems of the Roman army by parcelling out public land. His 
brother Gaius Gracchus added a law which distributed subsidized grain to 
the inhabitants of Rome. Senatorial repression however overcame the 
Gracchi brothers. Next came Marius, who reached the consulate six times 
16
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in the years 107-100. He owed his popularity above all to his status as a 
homo novus and to his military achievements. For some time he 
cooperated with the tribune of the plebs Satuminus (104-100), who 
opposed the senate especially with the support of the rural plebs. The 
senate charged Marius, who as a consul was responsible for public order, 
with the repression of Satuminus in 100. Marius let this responsibility 
prevail above his private loyalties and interests, and he carried out the 
commission. Satuminus was killed during the subsequent riot. Finally, 
there was Livius Drusus the Younger (91), who tried to enfranchise the 
Italian allies. For his plans he received little support. He too encountered a 
violent death. The result was the Social War, in which the Italians gained 
the long awaited Roman citizenship. The popular leaders of this period 
are mostly characterized by their elevated status within the élite and by the 
combination of their political ambitions with attempts to reform the 
increasing problems which confronted Roman society. 
Despite the repression of those who had introduced the plans, some of 
the proposed reforms were carried out. The problems of the growing city 
population were met by grain subsidies. The équités saw their political 
ambitions satisfied by a larger influence in the decision process. The 
professionalization of the armed forces by Marius provided a solution to 
the lack of recruits. The Roman state was forced to enfranchise the allies. 
Nevertheless it all turned to be merely a treatment of symptoms. The true 
cause, the inadequacy of institutions of a city-state for governing an 
empire, was not dealt with. 
The tensions in Roman society and especially the growing tensions 
within the élite led to the civil war between Marius and Sulla (88-82). 
Sulla won, and during his dictatorship (81-78) he tried to solve the 
tensions by a bloody purge of the élite (the proscriptions) and a 
reinforcement of the senatorial oligarchy. He limited the powers of the 
tribunes of the plebs and prohibited former tribunes of the plebs from 
occupying other offices. He also enlarged the senate from 300 to 600 
members and he extended the number of quaestors and praetors.21 
The Sullan system persisted for ten years, but it proved too rigid to 
meet the ambitions of various persons. The senate Sulla had created was 
politically biased. Sulla did not bring about a reconciliation, but put his 
adherents in power. The supporters of Marius and their relatives who had 
survived the proscriptions were debarred from a political career. 
Between 80 and 60, as WARD demonstrates22, the consulate was occupied 
mainly by Sulla's heirs. At the end of the 70s the political conflicts 
surfaced again. Now politicians who had won honor and fame under Sulla 
and who were unwilling to make their careers dependent on the ruling 
group within the élite began to sabotage the Sullan system. They 
gratefully availed themselves of the opportunities offered by the problems 
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which confronted Roman society in the late Republic and of the methods 
which had been developed by popular leaders from the Gracchi.23 
Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus24 descended from a senatorial family of 
rather recent origin. His father Pompeius Strabo had been consul in 89 
and a successful general in the Social War. The most important bequest he 
left his son was the patronage of the area of Picenum, in central Italy on 
the Adriatic coast. That region was under the patronage of the Pompeii, 
and throughout his career Pompey was able to draw clients from there as 
soldiers, voters, and personal assistants. Pompey's starting-point for a 
career was not quite advantageous: the nobility of his family was 
relatively recent, his father had not been that popular, and he died when 
Pompey was still considerably young. Under Sulla and afterwards 
Pompey achieved important military successes. Therefore he found that 
he could get ahead faster than others. He refused to adhere to the 
minimum ages for the completion of offices which had been fixed in the 
cursus honorum. This went against the principles of the Sullan state 
reform and against the principles of the oligarchical system. 
Pompey turned to the people in order to realize his ambitions. His 
popularity brought him the consulate already in 70, and later he received 
extraordinary military commands. Thus he was charged in 67 with the 
war against the pirates. He fulfilled the task with great fervor; within 
three months he cleaned out the Mediterranean. Between 60 and 62 he 
stayed in the East and added large areas to the Roman empire. He 
personally divided the new territories into provinces. His military 
campaigns left him with a large clientele in the provinces. In 57 he 
received the assignment to control Rome's com supply. Pompey's 
political career and his extraordinary commands in fact placed him 
outside the political system, albeit he himself did not aspire to such a 
position. Pompey wanted nothing but recognition within the ruling élite. 
After years of political conflicts he finally received that 
acknowledgement, and he made an alliance with the senate. It resulted in 
the conflict with Caesar in 49. They started a civil war which marked the 
end of the Republic. 
Gaius Julius Caesar originated from a most respectable patrician 
house.25 His family had belonged to the Marian faction and Caesar 
continued to propagate that association. Consequently, Caesar's 
opportunities for a political career after Sulla were slim. Furthermore, 
Caesar's family lacked financial means and clients to support a political 
career. Caesar, therefore, sought refuge with the plebs. He deeply 
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indebted himself to furnish largitiones to the people. He took a great risk 
at that, but as Plutarch argues: 
"He was unsparing in his outlays of money, and was thought to be purchasing a 
transient and short-lived fame at a great price, though in reality he was buying 
things of the highest value at a small price. "26 
After his consulate in 59, he received the governorship of the Gallic 
provinces. He used the command between 58 and 51 to conquer Gaul 
entirely. The Gallic conquest procured him a devoted army, prestige, and 
enormous financial means. Eventually his power became too big for the 
senate and Pompey. Caesar was victorious in the following civil war, 
which he had not started to attain supreme power but to keep his position. 
Subsequently he became dictator for life. 
Marcus Licinius Crassus27 was a member of the nobilitas. During the 
first civil war he aligned himself with Sulla. Crassus was able to enrich 
himself with the possessions of the persons who fell victim to the Sullan 
proscriptions. After that he enlarged his wealth with real estate in Rome 
and landed property. He got the name of being the richest man in Rome. 
He gained military fame by crushing the slave revolt of Spartacus. He 
became consul twice and fell in 53 in an expedition against the Parthians. 
Despite the assumption of numerous modem historians, Crassus was not 
the champion of the équités. 28 He figures less prominently as a popular 
leader than others. He has been included as such because of his political 
cooperation with important popular leaders. Crassus' wealth enabled him 
to operate independently and to stay in the background to a certain extent. 
He was able to create a large following, especially among the senators of 
lower rank. Unlike Pompey and Caesar he did not need to pursue a 
specifically popular policy to realize his ambitions. 
The big three - Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus - cooperated from 60 in 
what is usually called the first triumvirate.29 Individually, Pompey and 
Crassus had already been able to amass political and military fame against 
the will of their peers; Caesar stood at the beginning of his career, but had 
already gained great popularity among the urban plebs. The three 
2(> Plut. Caes. 5.4: "χρωμ^νο? 6è rais- δαπαναις- άφειδώ?, και δοκών μ€ν 
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politicians decided to pool their resources in order to realize their 
personal ambitions and to carry their plans through against the will of the 
Sullan oligarchy. As consul Caesar, partly due to his popularity with the 
people, passed a law for the benefit of Pompey's veterans and had 
Pompey's enactments in the new oriental provinces and vassal states 
ratified. Pompey had his veterans and his newly acquired richness behind 
him. Crassus contributed his wealth and political connections. In 56, at the 
conference of Luca, the cooperation was renewed and agreements were 
reached on the division of political power in Rome. Because of their 
power and because of the resources they had at their disposal the 
triumvirs are often called "magnates" or "dynasts". When Crassus died in 
battle in 53, Caesar and Pompey were left to themselves. They 
increasingly were at odds with each other and, when the senatorial 
oligarchy formed a coalition with Pompey by recognizing him as the 
leading statesman, it resulted in civil war. 
Publius Clodius Pulcher, finally, was of most noble stock, the patrician 
family of the Claudii.30 Instead of a normal political career, Clodius 
sought a shorter route to the top by operating as a popular leader. He had 
gained experience in the mobilization of large crowds in 68 when he, as an 
officer on Lucullus' staff in the East, incited a military unit to mutiny. In 
61 he got involved in the Bona Dea affair, a religious scandal for which he 
was prosecuted. He was acquitted among other things because he could 
influence the trial through armed gangs. Early in his career Clodius 
already made contacts with the plebs and engaged in the manipulation of 
elections. He had himself adopted by a plebeian and thus could become 
tribune of the plebs in 58, an office that was closed to patricians. As a 
tribune he passed some important laws: free grain distribution for the 
people and the restoration of the collegia, the plebeian organizations. He 
also was responsible for the exile of the orator Cicero, who had repressed 
the conspiracy of Catiline in 63. In 56 Clodius became aedile and in 52 he 
was a candidate for the praetorship when he was killed by Milo (Ao-2). 
Clodius' power base was the urban plebs, whom he controlled by 
efficient use of the plebeian organizations. Between 80 and 50 Clodius was 
the only popular leader who was able to keep an independent position 
from the tribunate of the plebs. We will never know what Clodius' role in 
the civil war would have been, since he was murdered in 52. Clodius 
lacked the financial and military resources of the magnates and, in view of 
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the almost insignificant role of the plebs urbana during the civil war, we 
may assume that a firm grounding in the city of Rome by itself was 
insufficient to reach great political power.31 
Clodius cooperated in part with the triumvirs. In 58 he was supported 
by Pompey in the banishment of Cicero. They severed relations when 
Clodius began to interfere with Pompey's enactments in the East. Clodius 
had Cyprus annexed and freed the son of the Armenian king Tigranes, 
who was a hostage of Pompey.32 After the conference of Luca a renewed 
cooperation with the triumvirs was established. Clodius, contrary to 
frequent assumptions, had never been a subordinate henchman of big 
men. He was an independent politician, who in his own original way 
played an important part in the late Republic.33 
Lucius Sergius Catilina was an unsuccessful popular leader.34 Catiline 
was descended from a patrician family, which for a long time had been of 
minor political significance. He tried to attain the consulate three times, in 
vain. In 63 he tried to grasp power in Rome by a coup. The participants in 
his conspiracy were members of senatorial families with the same 
background or with little financial means or with large debts, who all 
were ambitious. Also among Catiline's following were politically 
ambitious équités. The Roman élite united under the leadership of the 
consul Marcus Tullius Cicero, and the conspiracy was aborted. The 
mobilization of the urban plebs failed completely. Only in the countryside 
was Catiline able to muster some support, which was destroyed by a 
Roman army. 
What made these persons into popular leaders? The methods they used 
were at everyone's disposal. However the populares led an active as 
opposed to a reactive policy. The initiative to involve the people in 
political conflicts was taken by them. That is, they addressed the people 
and groups within the upper strata who did not belong to the top in order 
to realize new laws and thus to obtain a following which could support the 
personal ambitions of the popular leaders. Probably they will have 
engaged as well in the promotion of interests of groups in Roman society 
who received little attention from the senatorial élite. But such actions are 
difficult to trace in the sources due to their not very spectacular character. 
Furthermore, the tribunate of the plebs kept its traditional function of 
protector the plebs and institution of appeal. The persons who opposed the 
31
 Cf. LINTOTT 190. 
3 2
 On the breach between Pompey and Clodius, see SEAGER, Pompey, 105-107. 
3 3
 As has been convincingly established by GRUEN, Phoenix. See also BENNER, 
op.cit., 17-18 and 133-147. Describing Clodius as a loser, as MEIJER, Verliezers, 
does, is an exaggeration. Clodius indeed lacked the resources of the magnates, as has 
been remarked before, but at the moment of his death he was still very influential and 
his death was too premature to draw any conclusions about his political future. After 
all, Crassus, who died at the zenith of his power as well, cannot be called a loser either. 
3 4
 On Catiline see LGRR 416-433; L. HAVAS, Die Catilina-Bewegung und der 
Senatorenstand, ACD 14 (1978), pp. 25-36; MEIJER, Verliezers, 38-105. 
31 
popular leaders mostly employed the same methods to counter their 
politics, without offering any real alternatives. This policy was only 
directed towards maintaining the status quo, which was not satisfactory, 
so that new people constantly had to pursue a career through popular 
politics.35 Although popular leaders cooperated, there was nothing like a 
popular party. There was no continuity in program, but there was a 
continuity in method. The same methods of mobilization constantly recur 
with different popular leaders who do not strive after the same goal. A 
popularis ideology, in the sense of a complex of ideas about what politics 
or society should look like, did not exist, let alone the pursuit of a 
democratic system.36 
The persons who operated as popular leaders were by definition 
members of the élite, and they wished to figure prominently in that élite. 
In Cicero's words in 56: 
"No one who preferred to be a popular leader has ever here had it in his power 
to be the leading man in the state. But some men, either distrusting themselves 
on account of their own dement or being driven from union with this order 
because of obstruction by the others, have often, almost out of necessity, left 
this harbor and dashed into those waves beyond And if, after a tossing on the 
seas of a popular career and after having rendered the state good service, they 
turn their gaze back upon the senate and seek to find favor with this most 
distinguished body, then, far from being turned down, they should even be 
courted."37 
Essentially, the conflicts between what is called populares and 
optimates were conflicts between individuals and the rest of the oligarchy. 
There certainly was no question of an ascending group which sought its 
place within the ruling group.38 The popular leaders were rather political 
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contenders within the ruling élite or with a certain leeway. Their 
membership of the élite on the one hand gave the popular leaders the 
resources to pursue a successful policy. On the other hand they adhered to 
the same ideology as their fellow members of the élite. For that reason the 
popular leaders did not produce any innovations or alternatives to the 
existing power structure. 
Typical in this respect is Pompey's dream, as it is described by 
Plutarch (Pomp. 68.2). On the night before the battle of Pharsalus in 48, 
during the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Pompey had a dream. 
The battle, as both opponents knew, would be decisive. The victor would 
rule Rome. Pompey, however, did not dream of sole rule, but he dreamt 
that he entered the theater and that the people applauded. What Pompey, 
like Caesar, was aiming at was not a monarchy, but a prominent position 
in Roman society, recognition as leader and statesman, and popularity 
with everyone, in other words: status, prestige, and authority. The 
Romans had one word for that: dignitas. That the ambitions of these great 
men were not compatible with the existing political system, perhaps is the 
tragedy of the Roman Republic. 
Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, cos. 54, can serve as an example of 
how much popular leaders and their political opponents resembled each 
other.39 Ahenobarbus was a nobilis and counted as a principled defender 
of the senatorial oligarchy, who constantly opposed popular leaders. He 
started as an assistant leader of the optimates and developed into an 
independent politician. In the 50s he tried to deprive Caesar of his 
command in Gaul and in 48 he fell in the battle of Pharsalus against 
Caesar. 
The question is: Can Ahenobarbus' behavior be explained from 
political principles? In the first place Ahenobarbus, like other nobles, had 
big financial interests in the conquered territories (especially Gaul) 
through intermediaries and publicani. During the Roman expansion of the 
second and first centuries we can trace the development of a regional 
specialization among families of the Roman upper class. When wars had 
to be waged in certain geographical areas, persons from the same families 
constantly came to the fore to wage them. Consequently, these families 
obtained great influence in the provinces and could count these regions 
among their clientele. Thus we see the Aemilii Paulli operate in Greece 
and Macedón, the Scipiones in Africa and Spain, the Pompeii in Spain. 
For the Domitii Ahenobarbi it was Gaul.40 Grandfather Cn. Domitius, 
cos. 122, defeated the Gallic tribes of the Allobrogi and Arvemi. Next, he 
added the province of Gallia Narbonensis to the Roman empire. He also 
constructed the Via Domitia in that area. Father Domitius, cos. 96, was 
involved in the foundation of the Roman colony of Narbo. Lucius tried to 
39
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take over Caesar's command in Gaul, because he thought it belonged 
rightfully to him in view of his family background. In 49, the senate 
appointed him governor of Gaul and without much success he tried to 
defend Marseilles against Caesar's army. 
Ahenobarbus was a rich landed proprietor. He called his slaves and 
peasants to Rome as shock troops in politics. It is possible that he was short 
of liquid assets, for in the civil war he promised his soldiers land as 
payment; it was customary in those days that soldiers receive cash for pay 
and possibly land after discharge. Due to his lack of cash Ahenobarbus 
supposedly could not entirely prove himself in politics. Furthermore, 
Caesar was constantly a step ahead of him. Caesar became consul sooner 
and snatched Gaul away. Ahenobarbus probably wanted to achieve the 
same as any other ambitious politician, but circumstances forced him to 
take the side of the opponents of the popular leaders. 
The lack of opportunity within the existing institutions on the one 
hand, the great possibilities of the empire on the other, the political 
obstruction as a result of the fear of individual increase of power, and 
conversely the fear of individuals of losing face and power, led to an 
escalation of political conflicts without anyone wanting to implement 
actual modifications in the system. That would take years of civil war and 
the genius of Augustus. 
Characteristically, popular leaderhip in Rome was by definition a 
formal leadership.41 The higher level leaders who were involved in 
collective behavior all held a magistracy. In this we discover a distinctive 
Roman modality which distinguishes the Roman Republic from other 
periods. Only Clodius was able to develop into an informal leader, i.e. he 
was able to mobilize the crowd also beyond his magistracies. We will 
return to this distinctive feature of Roman leadership in more detail in 
Chapter 3, where the role of leadership will be discussed. Another, 
weaker form of informal leadership consisted of a top leader, with a 
certain popularity, who wanted to continue to exert influence by way of 
the people as a private person, i.e. without the possession of a magistracy. 
To do so, he needed others who did hold an office. This brings us to the 
second level of the leadership structure, the assistant leaders. 
Assistant Leaders 
On a lower level we come across the second group of leaders: the assistant 
leaders. These middle level leaders, just like the great popular leaders, 
were members of the élite but they held a lower magistracy, the tribunate 
of the plebs. They joined a leader and supported him in his popular 
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politics by serving as a link between the leaders on the one hand and the 
intermediate leaders and the people on the other. 
To find out who these persons were, a prosopography has been made 
of tribunes of the plebs who aligned themselves to popular leaders. They 
will be compared to their counterparts who supported the policy of the 
opponents of the popular leaders.42 It is a known fact that political parties 
in the modem sense were nonexistent in the Roman Republic, and that 
political alliances often were short-lived and were formed on an ad hoc 
basis. Nevertheless there were politicians who pursued a policy oriented 
towards the people and who through that policy were in opposition to the 
rest of the élite, i.e. the senatorial majority. For the sake of convenience, 
Roman terminology will be employed here, as it will be throughout this 
book; that is to say that the assistant leaders of the popular leaders will be 
indicated with populares and the assistant leaders of the senatorial 
majority with optimates. 
Why the tribunes of the plebs? The tribunes of the plebs in view of 
their function and the possibilities of their office were the most suitable to 
support popular policy. Tribunes of the plebs could convene meetings and 
tribal assemblies, preside over them, and introduce bills. The cooperation 
between leaders and tribunes of the plebs was necessary, because a Roman 
statesman was not allowed to propose a bill which was beneficial to 
himself43. A leader, therefore, needed an assistant who introduced a bill in 
the assembly to grant his leader, for example, a lucrative provincial 
command. In addition, tribunes of the plebs had the right of veto 
(intercessio) to the decisions of all other magistrates and in the assembly. 
Thus they could obstruct unfavorable decisions for their leader. 
Moreover, there was a consciousness among the plebs that the tribunes 
had been established to promote the interests of the people. A tribune of 
the plebs, therefore, had a great advantage in the mobilization of the plebs 
in comparison to other magistrates.44 
In the years 80-50 the tribunes of the plebs did not have the 
independent function in popular politics they had once had. Politicians 
such as the Gracchi and Satuminus had been top leaders in popular 
politics, although even they could not do without the support of important 
magistrates and senators. As a result of the measures of Sulla, who limited 
the powers of the tribunate of the plebs and who blocked further career 
possibilities of the tribunes, the office had become less attractive during 
the 70s. Only after "desullanization" could the tribunes of the plebs fully 
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participate in politics again. But at that time, the formation of a large-
scale society had progressed so far already that the office of tribune of the 
plebs was insufficient for the power struggle among the élite. The army 
and enormous financial resources now were of overriding importance. 
Therefore the tribunes of the plebs by definition had to join a powerful 
leader, which meant that the once independent office had been reduced to 
a subordinate function.45 Clodius was the only exception, albeit an 
important one.46 
How did leaders and assistant leaders get together? Some connections 
went back to the period before the beginning of the assistant leader's 
career. Thus Pompey could recruit a number of persons from Picenum, 
the traditional recruiting ground of his clientele.47 An important way of 
recruiting a following was the army. A general could reward political 
allies with a lucrative position on his staff, and officers often remained 
faithful after the campaign was terminated. Pompey thus acquired a 
following among the nobles during his campaigns in the 60s. After he 
joined the triumvirate against the senate, he lost most of them, and in the 
50s he depended on new men, former équités, and Italians. Caesar's 
officers seem to have been more faithful than Pompey's. Caesar acquired 
a following among senators of lower rank and Italians.48 
Furthermore, persons engaged in business together or had other kinds 
of economic relationships. Many contacts were made in Rome. The vast 
number of trials provided ample opportunity for people to get acquainted 
or to draw attention to oneself. The small Roman upper class was 
interconnected through marriage and there were adequate ways and 
means available to introduce potential allies to each other. 
In this section a number of quantitative comparisons will be made 
between the assistants of populares and optimates. Quantitative research in 
ancient history is always a hazardous affair, because the researcher never 
has any certainty about the representativity of his data. So also for this 
research. Each year ten tribunes were elected in Rome, which results in 
300 persons in the 30 years between 78 and 49, the period under 
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investigation.49 Of those 300,114 are known by date and year of office.50 
Of 87 of those, some political activity is known, so that they can be 
classified in one of the two categories: 52 populares and 35 optimates.51 
Although we may presume that the most politically active persons will 
have been recorded in the sources, we will never know if 87 out of 300 
tribunes of the plebs are a representative sample. A quantitative analysis 
of one group, for example populares, therefore is not meaningful, apart 
from significant differences and tendencies52. A quantitative comparison 
between two groups, e.g. between populares and optimates, is however 
meaningful, since both groups will have suffered as much from 
premature death, fragmentary source material, and historical oblivion. 
Nonetheless, in comparisons between the groups a wide margin of 
significance will be employed: significant is a difference between die 
outcomes of at least 20 %. Furthermore, individual cases will be 
examined to underscore the numerical conclusions. 
The main purpose of the prosopographical research has not been to 
find any new prosopographical data. The results of a series of 
prosopographies made by other historians have been combined in order to 
find the data relevant to this research. In order to determine the 
background of the assistant leaders, their relationship with top leaders, 
and their motives to pursue a certain type of political behavior, the two 
categories have been researched for social status, career opportunities 
(which in Rome meant opportunity for social mobility), political 
allegiance, and political loyalty. 
Let us start with some general comparisons. First, social status. I have 
investigated whether the assistant leaders appear in the list of homines 
novi in NMRS. Unlike in NMRS, no distinction has been made between 
homines novi certi and incerti, since it is not relevant to this research if 
someone was a "real" new man or not. What counts is if someone was of 
obscure social descent, and that includes the incerti too. NMRS only lists 
the persons who were the first of their family to enter the senate. Those of 
senatorial descent who were the first to reach the praetorship or the 
49
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consulate and therefore should be counted among the homines novi as 
well53, do not appear in W I S E M A N ' S list. But that is not important for our 
purposes, because we are dealing with lower magistrates and their social 
status at that point. 
Tribunes of the plebs came from a wide variety of backgrounds: the 
nobility, the equestrian order, the Italian municipalities. In general the 
tribunate was a magistracy which was more open to new men than the 
aedilate or the praetorship.54 There appears to be no difference between 
populares and optimates. Both number as many novi as non-novi among 
their ranks: 
Table 1: Social status 
Novi Non-Novi 
populares n=52 (21)40% (31)60% 
optimates n=35 (14)40% (21)60% 
This tendency is confirmed by BRUHNS' research. When the civil war 
broke out in 49, the Roman politicians, who had been fighting each other 
individually until then, gathered in two camps around a leader: the 
populares under Caesar and the optimates with Pompey in command. 
Most high-ranking nobiles were on Pompey's side. The majority of the 
nobles of lower rank and the young were with Caesar. In both parties, 
however, there were considerable numbers of all categories. Caesar had a 
heterogeneous following and was not a rallying point for the outcasts and 
have-nots of the Roman élite.55 
Next, the career opportunities. Were the assistant leaders able to rise in 
office after their magistracy as an assistant leader? By career is meant that 
the assistant leader held a higher magistracy after the tribunate of the 
plebs (aedile or up): 
Table 2: Careers 
Career No Career 
populares n=52 (27) 52 %« (25)48% 
optimates n=35 (20)57%" (15)43% 
The opportunities for both groups prove to have been about equal. A 
little over half of both groups rose to aedile, praetor or consul. Moreover, 
it was a marked career: of the populares two tribunes did not go beyond 
aedile and of the optimates one tribune did not go beyond aedile. All the 
53
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others attained the praetorship or the consulate. Of both groups a little less 
than half did not rise beyond the tribunate. 
The situation becomes different if we look at the attainment of a high 
office (praetor or consul) and the time at which the office was reached. 
The times roughly match for both groups. Both groups were active as 
assistant leaders between 78 and 49. From 70 the first reached the 
praetorship, and as from 58 we come across consuls. The table below 
distinguishes between the attainment of the highest magistracy before 
(<49) and after (>49) the beginning of the civil war. Those who held their 
highest magistracy in 49 are included in the first column, because they 
were elected in 50, before the outbreak of hostilities. 
Table 3: Career opportunities before and after the outbreak of the civil war 
pr<49 pr>49 cos<49 cos>49 
populares n=16 (14)87% (2)13% n=9 (2)22% (7)78% 
optimates n=15 (12)80% (3)20% n=4 (2)50% (2)50% 
The assistant leaders of both groups had nearly equal opportunity to 
reach the praetorship before the civil war began. Of all assistant leaders 
who became praetor, 80 % or more reached the office in 49 or earlier. 
With the consuls, however, there is a substantial difference.58 Although 
populares assistant leaders and optimates assistant leaders started their 
official career in the same period, the optimates were more successful in 
attaining the highest office: the consulate. 
The absolute numbers are of course small for far-reaching 
conclusions. But, unlike the tribunes of the plebs, all the consuls in this 
period are known. Furthermore, it is not remarkable that the difference 
occurs at the consulate. For Sulla had augmented the number of quaestors 
during his dictatorship from 10 to 20 and the number of praetors from 6 
to 8, while the number of consuls was kept to 2. These reforms remained 
in force until the dictatorship of Caesar. The result was that more 
opportunity for a magistracy was created on the lower level and also for 
the entry to the senate. The competition at the top level, conversely, was 
intensified, because now each year there were more candidates for the 
same number of consulates. Up to and including the praetorship the 
chances were equal, but it took much more effort to attain the consulate. 
The fierce competition for the highest offices in the late Republic also 
follows from the fact that persons of senatorial descent who were the first 
of their family to reach the consulate or the praetorship were counted 
among the new men.59 
58
 The intervals between the careers hardly differ. The average interval between the 
tribunate and the praetorship before 49 for the populares is 4.4 years and for the 
optimates 4.7 years. The interval between tribunate and consulate before 49: for 
populares on average 6.5 years; for optimates 6.5 years as well. 
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The difference could imply that the populares before 49 had more 
difficulty in attaining the consulate and that they owed their career to the 
civil war. We could then suppose that it did not matter much for a career 
on a lower level if a young politician joined a popular leader or if he 
sought support with the senatorial majority. But as soon as a populares 
assistant leader wanted to become consul, he was obstructed because of his 
political allegiance. The power of the Sullan oligarchy, which virtually 
controlled the consulate before 6060, was declining after 60 under the 
influence of the triumvirate. But even in the 50s the triumvirs were 
unable to control the consular elections. The power of the oligarchy was 
still most strongly felt in the consulate.61 It led to a biased attitude towards 
those who did not put themselves under the patronage of this powerful 
group within the senatorial élite. 
A supplementary reason could be that the top leaders reserved the 
consulate for themselves and conceded to their assistants only other 
magistracies. The consulates of the assistant leaders for both groups fall in 
the period starting with 58. In that period, Pompey became consul twice 
(in 55 and 52), Crassus once (in 55), and Caesar, who had already held the 
consulate in 59, stood for the office in 49. Support in consular elections 
also was a good way to win for the populares persons who should be 
counted among the optimates (Ao-8 and 15). Considering the fierce 
competition there was not enough room to have assistants hold the 
consulate as well. 
A political career was often connected with a military career. Those 
who strove after a political career in Rome often needed a position in the 
army or a governorship in a province to finance their political career. An 
assignment as an officer, as legatus, during a military campaign was very 
adequate for that purpose.62 What about the distribution of known legati 
among the assistant leaders? During the civil war the entire Roman élite 
bore arms. In consideration of the special situation resulting from the 
civil war, the table below only shows the legations which were held in the 
"normal" period, i.e. 49 or earlier. 
Table 4: Legates (before the outbreak of the civil war) 
Legati Non-Legati 
populares n=52 (19)37% (33)63% 
optimates n=35 (5) 14% (30)86% 
Comparatively more legates are to be found among the populares than 
among the optimates. Great popular leaders, such as Caesar and Pompey, 
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 N. 21 above. 
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were also successful military commanders and owed a large part of their 
political success to their military conquests. The legations of the 
populares, consequently, fell primarily in die 60s and 50s, when Pompey 
and Caesar held their big campaigns. 
Did social status play a part in making a career? 
Table 5: Social status and career opportunities 
Novi Novi Non-Novi Non-Novi 
and and and and 
Career No Career Career No Career 
populares n=21 (13) 62 % (8) 38 % n=31 (14) 45 % (17) 55 % 
optimates n=14 (6) 43 % (8) 57 % n=21 (14) 67 % (7) 33 % 
Although the difference between the novi who had a career amounts to 
19 % (62-43=19) and therefore falls below the 20 % margin of 
significance adhered to in this research, there does seem to be a tendency 
for new men to have better career perspectives with a popular leader than 
with the optimates. 63 
The difference becomes significant when we introduce the time factor 
for the highest magistracies. Of the 21 populares assistant leaders of low 
social status, i.e. the first senators of their family, eight reached the 
praetorship and four the consulate. Among the optimates novi we come 
across four praetors and one consul. The table below shows when the novi 
attained their highest magistracies: in 49 or earlier, or after 49. 
Table 6: Career oppoitunities of novi before and after the outbreak of the civil war 
pr<49 pr>49 cos<49 cos>49 
populares n=8 (7) 86 % (1)14 % n=4 (0) 0 % (4) 100 % 
optimates n=4 (2) 50 % (2) 50 % n=l (0) 0 % (1) 100 % 
As appears from the table, the new men with the popular leaders had a 
better chance to reach the praetorship than their political counterparts (86 
versus 50 %). Typically, the two optimates assistant leaders who became 
praetor after 49 (Ao-10 and 13) thanked the office to their switchover to 
Caesar. For the category homines novi which is employed here (the first 
senators of a family) the attainment of the praetorship implied an 
enormous social advancement. 
No new man among the assistant leaders reached the consulate before 
49. They all had to wait until the civil war. For the populares, attention 
can be drawn to Afranius (Ap-54), not a tribune of the plebs but a new 
man who became consul in 60 thanks to Pompey's patronage, and 
Gabinius (Ap-18), an assistant leader and consul in 58. Gabinius falls into 
another category of homines novi : the first consul of a senatorial family. 
The only novus among the optimates who reached the consulate was C. 
63 Of all tribunes known between 70 and 50 almost half of the new men reached curule 
office: LGRR 188. 
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Fumius (Ao-19), who changed his allegiance to Caesar in 49 and became 
consul in 29. 
It appears that new men who joined a popular leader stood a better 
chance of social promotion, from which follows that social prejudice 
played a more important part with the optimates. During Caesar's 
dictatorship more new men became consul than before the beginning of 
civil war. BRUHNS argues plausibly that this was not a deliberate policy 
of Caesar's, but that the cause lay in the larger possibilities created by the 
civil war: there was an insufficient number of nobiles candidates.64 
Nevertheless, this explanation seems too one-sided. The tendency of new 
men before the civil war to have the best career perspectives with the 
popular leaders will have continued under Caesar's dictatorship.65 
The difference is even more obvious among the legati, where the novi 
among the populares evidently had more chances. 
Table 7: Social status and legates (before 49) 
Novi Non-Novi 
Legati Legati 
populares n=19 (12)63% (7) 37% 
optimates n=5 (0) 0 % (5) 100 % 
Among the optimates novi no one was able to attain a legation. The 
majority of the legations among the populares werd occupied by new 
men. For homines novi a successful career in the army was an important 
way of social advancement.66 On a lower level a military career, e.g. as a 
military tribune, provided opportunities to members of the municipal 
élite in Italy to enter the equestrian order of Rome.67 In fact, the army and 
especially long-term military campaigns provided opportunities of gain 
and social mobility to every member of the Roman élite and to those who 
aspired to enter it. But new men distinctively had the best opportunities 
with the populares. 
If we take a look at the political allegiance of the assistant leaders, it 
becomes obvious that Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus were the big three 
among the popular leaders. Of the populares assistants 41 out of 52 or 
79 % were connected during their active period with one or more 
members of the triumvirate, and the great majority (38) clearly with 
64
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Caesar and/or Pompey.68 The optimates assistant leaders were less clearly 
aligned to a person or persons. Of the populares only two assistant leaders 
or 4 % are classified as "independent", i.e. not having a clear personal 
alignment (Ap-46 and 48). Among the optimates, on the contrary, 17 
independents or 43 % of the total can be discovered. 
The newly established difference in personal alignment between the 
two groups is reflected in their political loyalty. The table below reports 
how many changed allegiance after their activity as assistant leader: 
Table 8: Loyalty 
Change No Change 
populares n=52 (13)25% (39)75% 
optimates n=35 (16)46% (19)54% 
Of the populares a quarter changed allegiance, while the ratio among the 
optimates is almost fifty-fifty. This proves that the optimates were more 
willing to change allegiance than their counterparts. The populares, 
therefore, not only were more personally aligned but also had a stronger 
political loyalty. In other words the populares had a stronger "leadership 
loyalty". Leadership loyalty is defined here as the degree of personal 
alignment in combination with the degree of loyalty in political 
allegiance. 
There is another form of loyalty: group loyalty, i.e. the degree of 
loyalty to one's own group of those who changed political allegiance. For 
two types of changes of political allegiance are possible: a transfer to 
another leader within one's own group and a transfer to the opposing 
group. It appears that when a change of allegiance was made, 
comparatively more optimates switched to the populares than vice versa. 
The populares had a stronger group loyalty; more than the optimates they 
tended to stay within their own group. If populares changed, they usually 
made a transfer from one popular leader to another: 
Table 9: Group loyalty 
Change Within Group Change to Other Group 
populares n=13 (11)85%69 (2)15% 
optimates n=16 (7)44% (9)56% 
To put it in another way, only two populares assistant leaders or 4 % of 
the total appear to have switched to the optimates (Ap-9 and 20). For the 
optimates the number is 9 or 26 % of the total who have made the reverse 
move. In two respects, then, differences in political loyalty between 
68
 Crassus hardly appears in the story. Only Quinctius (Ap-41) was probably aligned to 
Crassus alone. 
69
 Messius (Ap-29) included in this group. 
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populares and optimates assistant leaders can be ascertained: the populares 
had a stronger leadership loyalty and a stronger group loyalty. 
What was the reason for the difference in political loyalty? Was it 
perhaps social status? Although the occurrence of new men in both groups 
was comparatively equal, the novi with the populares perhaps were less 
prepared to change than those of a more elevated social descent. The 
relationship between social status and change of political allegiance is 
described below: 
Table 10: Loyalty and social status 
Novi Novi Non-Novi Non-Novi 
and and and and 
Change No Change Change No Change 
populares n=21 (5)24% (16)76% n=31 (8)26% (23)74% 
optimates n=14 (7)50% (7)50% n=21 (9)43% (12)57% 
If we compare this table to the overall loyalty (Table 7 above), the new 
men do not differ from those with a higher social status. Of the populares 
about 25 % were willing to change allegiance, and of the optimates the 
number was about half. The homines novi showed the same behavior as 
those of higher social status. Both groups reflect the general picture of 
political changings: the populares were less willing to change allegiance 
than the optimates. Social descent, therefore, cannot account for the 
difference in political loyalty.70 For the homines novi this does not seem 
odd, because after all it was profitable for them to stay with the populares 
because of the better career opportunities and the higher chances of a 
legation. The optimates novi tended more to transfer to the other group 
because, as we have seen, they had better career opportunities under a 
popular leader. 
If social status does not account for the difference in leadership loyalty, 
what does? Political motives for a change of allegiance, in the sense of an 
ideological choice, will not have come into it, since such ideas played a 
minor part in the political process of the late Republic. It could be 
hypothesized that career perspectives must have been the most important 
reason for a change of allegiance. Did a chance of allegiance have in fact a 
favorable influence on one's career? The table below gives the 
interrelationship of political change and career opportunities for both 
groups. Since some had already reached their highest office before their 
change of allegiance, only those who rose in office after the change are 
included in the first column. 
70
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Table 11 : Leadership loyalty and career opportunities 
Change Change and No Change No Change 
and Career No Career and Career and No Career 
populares n=13 (4)31% (9)69% n=39 (18)46% (21)54% 
optimates n=16 (7)44% (9)56% n=19 (8)42% (11)58% 
The difference between populares and optimates is not significant. In spite 
of the fact that populares were more loyal than optimates, the difference 
in loyalty did not influence the career opportunities. For both groups it 
can be said that weak leadership loyalty was not rewarded with higher 
career opportunities. Some individual cases will be discussed shortly. 
Did it make a difference for the career perspectives which type of 
change took place? In other words, did a relationship exist between group 
loyalty and career perspectives? Listed below is the interrelationship of 
group loyalty and career perspectives, again adjusted for time period, as a 
result of which only those who were promoted after their transfer have 
been included as having a career: 
Table 12: Group loyalty and career opportunities 
Within Within Toother Toother 
Group and Group and Group and Group and 
Career No Career Career No Career 
populares n=ll (4)36% (7) 64% n=2 (1)50% (1)50% 
optimates n=7 (0) 0 % (7) 100 % n=9 (7) 78 % (2) 22 % 
Although the majority of the populares who changed within their group 
did not make any career progress, it was more profitable for the 
populares to change within their own group than it was for the optimates. 
To put it in another way, in comparison to the optimates a stronger group 
loyalty was more favorable to the populares. The explanation is provided 
by the civil war. The optimates who changed within their group all were 
persons who joined Pompey in 49. At that time, Pompey had opted for the 
senatorial majority. Because Caesar controlled Rome during the civil war 
and could distribute the magistracies in the capital, career possibilities for 
optimates evidently were nonexistent. 
Out of eleven populares who switched within their group, five did so 
before the civil war broke out. Fufius Calenus (Ap-17) switched to Caesar 
after Clodius died; he became Caesar's legate and then consul in 47. 
Messius (Ap-29) went to Caesar in 54, became his legate, but did not rise 
above his aedilate of 55. Cato (Ap-39) changed allegiance from Clodius to 
Pompey after the conference of Luca in 56 and became praetor in 55. 
Curio (Ap-46) became an adherent of Caesar during his tribunate in 50 
and subsequently Caesar's legate. Trebonius (Ap-49) opted for Caesar in 
54, became legate in Gaul, praetor in 48, and eventually consul in 45. In 
short, all of the populares who changed allegiance within their own group 
received at least a legation. This leads to the conclusion that for the 
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careers of the populares it was profitable before the beginning of the civil 
war to change within their group. 
As for the relationship between a weak group loyalty and career 
possibilities, the following picture emerges from Table 12: For optimates 
a weak group loyalty is more profitable than for populares. 78 % of the 
optimates who changed to the opposing group were then promoted against 
50 % of the populares. Out of seven optimates who switched to the 
populares, three did so before 49. Metellus Scipio (Ao-8) in 53 aligned 
himself to Pompey, at that time still a popularis, and managed to become 
consul in 52. Caelius Rufus (Ao-10) transferred to Caesar in 50 hoping to 
receive financial support. He became praetor in 48. Domitius Calvinus 
(Ao-15) became consul in 53 thanks to Caesar's support. Thus all 
optimates who switched gained from their lack of loyalty to their group. 
The two populares who changed to the optimates before the outbreak 
of the civil war were Calpumius Bestia (Ap-9) and Labienus (Ap-20). 
Bestia was the only popularis who also rose in office. He sympathized with 
Catiline, but did not actively partake in the revolt. The only thing he did 
was to denounce Cicero for his execution of the conspirators. The exact 
time of his change is unknown, but it probably took place after his 
tribunate. He supposedly became aedile in 59. His activities as a partisan of 
the optimates were limited to providing shelter for Sestius (Λο-31) during 
a riot. In short, his political allegiances were uncertain and his career was 
not significant. He therefore should perhaps not be taken into 
consideration. 
Labienus is an interesting case. His foremost motive for a change of 
allegiance most likely was ambition. The optimates probably will have 
offered him career opportunities and perhaps an army of his own. But 
since at this point we only look for results and not for motives, Labienus 
must be classified as a changer who did not profit from his transfer. 
Labienus became a legate with the optimates, but he had held that position 
already under Caesar. He did not get any other office. Of course, the 
optimates did not have the possibility of granting Labienus a magistracy 
since Caesar ruled Rome. But on the other hand, Labienus' switch took 
place in extraordinary circumstances. In January 49, war was at hand and 
for the optimates at that point Labienus' military capabilities took higher 
priority than his low social status as a new man. They probably offered 
him career opportunities they normally would never have considered. 
To sum up, the following conclusions can be drawn from the 
interrelationship of group loyalty and career opportunities. Populares 
had a stronger group loyalty than optimates. The difference cannot be 
explained by a comparison between the career opportunities of those who 
were loyal to their group, since all of the optimates who changed within 
their group did not do so until 49. Considering the situation in the civil 
war, nothing can be said about their careers. But for the populares it 
seems to have been profitable to remain loyal to their group, because 
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those who transferred to another popular leader before the civil war all 
took advantage of it. 
The stronger group loyalty of the populares can be explained, 
however, by comparing the careers of those in both groups who changed 
to the opposing group. The populares were less change-minded than the 
optimates and, if they changed, they usually made a switch within their 
own group. The only popular is who changed to the optimates with some 
promotion (Ap-9) should actually be dismissed because of the unclarity of 
his case. Conversely, all optimates who joined a popular leader before 49 
took advantage of the transfer. A weak group loyalty among the optimates 
was rewarded with more favorable career opportunities. 
Popular leaders exerted an attraction for the optimates assistant 
leaders. Those who made the transfer could count on support in their 
careers. Support in consular elections was an especially good way of 
receiving political support from optimates adherents. The cases of Scipio 
(Ao-8) and Calvinus (Ao-15) have already been mentioned.When Pompey 
wanted to recall Cicero from exile, he promised Milo (Ao-2) the 
consulate in exchange for his help.71 Some examples of persons who had 
not been tribunes of the plebs are M. Pupius Piso, a Pompeian legate who 
thanks to Pompey's support and against the wish of the senate became 
consul in 61 7 2 , Afranius (Ap-54) who was rewarded by Pompey for his 
loyal services with extensive financial support during his election 
campaign in 61, Aemilius (Ap-53) who as a consul changed allegiance 
after having received financial support from Caesar, and Piso (Ap-55) 
who became consul with Caesar's support and who during his consulate 
buttressed popular politics. The most obvious example of the attraction 
exerted by popular leaders is the conference of Luca in 56, at which 
Caesar distributed the Gallic spoils of war among a large number of 
senators.73 
The important difference in leadership loyalty between the two groups 
can be partly explained by the fact that those who pursued popular 
politics, from a political perspective, formed an opposition group, a 
group which resisted the majority in the senate. In order to persevere 
effectively against that majority a strong bond within their own /actio 
was necessary. 
More importantly, there was a forced loyalty and particularly a forced 
group loyalty: a populares assistant leader had compromised himself to 
such an extent that he could count on little support from the optimates for 
the rest of his career. That is why Cicero during his election campaign in 
64 for the consulate had to play down his good relations with Pompey and 
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had to pose, to the extent he could, as pro-optimates and anti-populares in 
order not to antagonize the nobilitas.14 The careers of the populares 
assistant leaders depended on a popular leader, especially if they wished to 
reach the highest office, the consulate. That was pre-eminently true of 
persons of lower social status. The populares assistant leaders had little to 
expect from the political opponents of the popular leaders. It forced them 
to loyalty. The opportunity of a legation, which the populares assistant 
leaders had, provides an additional explanation of the strong group 
loyalty which was to be found in this group. Thus popular leaders and 
assistant leaders were closely bound to each other. 
A example is Aulus Gabinius (Ap-18), one of the most exemplary 
assistant leaders. From the beginning of his career, he worked under the 
patronage of Pompey. Gabinius as a tribune of the plebs in 67 was 
responsible for Pompey's extraordinary command against the pirates. 
Subsequently, he was a successful legate under Pompey in the East. 
Thanks to Pompey he became consul in 58. As such he supported Clodius, 
with whom Pompey was on friendly terms at that time. When the 
cooperation between Pompey and Clodius was terminated in the course of 
the same year, Gabinius too turned away from Clodius. Gabinius 
remained faithful to Pompey during his subsequent provincial command 
in Syria. Probably as a result of the arrangements between the magnates at 
the conference of Luca, Gabinius left the expedition against the Parthians 
to Crassus and returned to Rome against his liking. Pompey thought 
Gabinius expendable. In 54 Gabinius was prosecuted for his intervention 
in Egyptian affairs. Pompey did help him, but not sufficiently. Pompey 
dropped him or at least Gabinius thought he did, and Gabinius was exiled. 
Despite his successful career Gabinius could not do without his patron's 
support. Politically and socially he collapsed. No one spoke up for him. 
He was saved at the outbreak of the civil war, when Caesar recalled him 
from exile and he revengefully joined Caesar. 
Popular leaders did not need to be afraid of their assistants joining the 
optimates. But an attraction was exerted by competing popular leaders. 
Although populares assistant leaders were not very change-minded, those 
who did make a transfer could count on career support or at least a 
lucrative legation. A leader had to make an effort to retain his 
followers.75 Even as a dictator Caesar did not have a free hand: while 
distributing the offices he had to reckon with the claims of his talented 
legates, the young nobles who had been on his side from the beginning of 
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the civil war, and the Pompeians whom he drew into his camp76. It goes to 
show that popular leaders were obliged to hold on to their assistants by 
continuously guaranteeing them promotion. This must have been one of 
the reasons why popular leaders meddled in elections so regularly. That 
interference subsequently led to a competition with other candidates. 
The popular leader-assistant leader relationship shows how much the 
magnates surpassed their peers in the Roman élite. In 52 no less than all 
ten tribunes of the plebs supported the proposal to let Caesar stand for the 
consulate in absentia.11 Another example is С Curio (Ap-46), tribune of 
the plebs in 50. Curio was a scion of an important Roman family. He had 
the potential of becoming a popular leader with the status of Clodius. 
Curio had been with Clodius in his youth and had married Clodius' 
widow. His policy seemed to be inspired by Clodius. He started his 
tribunate as an independent politician and proposed bills on the grain 
distribution and on the building and repairing of roads, which made him 
very popular.78 However the growing enmity between Pompey and 
Caesar forced him to make a choice for the latter. The resources of the 
magnates outside Rome were far too important for an independent tribune 
in Rome to compete with. 
In the years 80-50 those who rose to the consulate generally were 
capable of pursuing an independent policy of their own. But as a result of 
the enormous resources of the magnates, even consuls at a certain moment 
were reduced to assistant leaders.79 The consulate, Rome's highest and 
most powerful magistracy, thus had gone through the same development 
as the tribunate of the plebs. It was a harbinger of the Principale: the 
occupation of a magistracy did not suffice for political power if it was 
opposed by persons with a huge private fortune and a strong army. 
Due to its expansion, Rome had developed into a large-scale society in 
the late Republic. The rewards of political competition were higher, but 
so were the risks. It took a greater effort to reach the top. As a result of 
this development, junior politicians more than ever needed to secure the 
political patronage of an influential person, especially if they lacked the 
backing of an important family. The forced group loyalty of the 
populares possibly reveals an important cause of the political conflicts of 
the late Republic. The senatorial majority was not prepared to forgive a 
populares assistant leader for his political choice. If the oligarchy would 
have evinced some flexibility in that respect, they could have undermined 
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an important part of the power of the popular leaders. This too 
foreshadows the Principate; the power of the emperors from Augustus on 
rested largely on the private financial means of the emperor and the 
canalization of ambitions of the élite by a conscientious support of 
magisterial careers. 
The development of Roman society in the late Republic has recently 
been described in the terms of structural differentiation.80 Structural 
differentation these days is a classic sociological concept, but still usefully 
applied to the late Republic. As a result of the growing complexity of 
Roman society in an expanding empire, some institutions became more 
functionally specific. Roman law, for example, became more 
professionalized; the late Republic was the time of the rise of legal 
experts.81 Increased competition was accompanied by professionalization 
and specialization.82 These developments provide a parallel to the 
development of the assistant leaders. 
One of these parallel developments occurred in the Roman army. The 
lack of interest among young members of the nobility in a military career 
increased. Serving in the army was not considered the certain and 
compulsory springboard to a political career any more. Officer's duties 
were increasingly performed by scions of low ranking senatorial families, 
équités, or Italian families. Just like soldier, military officer became a 
profession. This group had little to expect from the Roman oligarchy, 
who even excluded them from a political career. As far as their social and 
material advancement was concerned, these officers, evidently, had more 
to expect from their general than from the traditional Roman élite.83 
Another parallel is provided by the orators. From the time of the 
Gracchi, the criminal trials, which were conducted within the Roman élite 
and which often were started by popular politicians, offered young 
orators from Italian stock the opportunity to prove themselves. In that 
way they could attract attention and advance socially. Because of their low 
descent, it was advancement they otherwise would have achieved with 
more difficulty.84 
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The assistant leaders developed into specialists of popular politics. The 
Commentariolum Petitionis, the "Handbook of Electioneering" most 
likely written by Cicero's brother Quintus for the benefit of Cicero's 
campaign for the consulate in 64, tells us about another form of 
specialization (Com,Pet. 18-19). The fierce competition in the late 
Republic produced electioneering experts. They concentrated on winning 
support in their tribe. For that purpose they had established sodalitates, 
electoral organizations. They could put these organizations at the disposal 
of candidates. One such an expert was the assistant leader Cornelius (Ap-
13). Clodius had started his public career as an electioneering expert.85 
On the one hand, structural differentiation and the rigidity of the 
Roman élite forced young politicians to join a leader in order to get 
promotion. On the other hand, the problems which faced Roman society 
offered opportunities for professionalization and specialization, which 
could lead to a career: as an officer in the army, as an orator, or as an 
assistant leader of a popular leader. 
In the late Republic, as has been said before, there was no question of 
political parties in the modem sense. But the coalitions formed among the 
populares were more than mere ad hoc alliances.The observed loyalty 
with the populares points to the existence of a political organization: 
persons at different levels, who cooperated with each other and who were 
dependent on one another. Popular leaders needed assistant leaders to 
realize their political plans. The political latitude of the popular leaders 
was limited by the ambitions of the assistant leaders. Those ambitions had 
to be met in order to prevent a desertion to other leaders. Assistant leaders 
required the patronage of a popular leader in order to make a career. 
Their loyalty, consequently, was to their leader and not to the Republic. 
The importance of a political organization to a leader appears from the 
characters L. Cornelius Balbus and the less known С Oppius. They were 
rich influential persons who stayed in the background and, at first (Balbus 
became cos.suff. in 40), did not strive for a magistracy. They were 
engaged by Caesar. During the 50s they had created an efficient 
communication network between Rome and Caesar's headquarters in 
Gaul. They conducted Caesar's money flow to the right people in Rome 
and represented Caesar in politics. After Caesar's death, the organization 
they had set up remained in their hands. The contacts and channels they 
had at their disposal enabled them, among other things, to convert 
immovables into cash quickly, which gave Octavian the means to win the 
loyalty of large groups of veterans and plebeians and to organize splendid 
games. By putting themselves and their organization behind Octavian, 
Balbus and Oppius were able to launch him as Caesar's successor.86 
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As Caesar stood at the Rubicon in 49, he was not faced with the choice 
between a civil war, with the possible result of one-man rule, and peace. 
Caesar did not aspire to supreme power. His options were on the one hand 
the resignation of his offices and, simultaneously, the complete loss of 
prestige (dignitas) and the ability to support his assistants, and on the other 
hand civil war. Caesar must have realized that he was not alone and that 
the people who had served him in Gaul and in Rome and also a number of 
malcontents and opportunists still were expecting a lot from him. Caesar's 
supporters will have exerted a tremendous pressure on him not to give in 
to his opponents. After all, they had nothing to expect from a settlement 
with the optimates. 87 
Intermediate Leaders 
The low level of the leadership was formed by the intermediate leaders. 
This term has been chosen, because these persons constituted the true 
intermediaries between popular leaders and crowd. They operated as a 
relay in the communication between leader and public. They were the 
ones who had to translate the policy of the leaders to the plebs and 
accomplish the alliance between popular leader and people. These relays 
had become necessary in the late Republic, because the distance between 
top and bottom in Roman society had grown larger. The economic and 
social differentiation resulting from the expansion into a large-scale 
society as well as the development of the city of Rome into a metropolis 
rendered communication more difficult. Intermediaries were needed to 
bring leaders and plebs together. Roman aristocrats had always used 
slaves and especially freedmen as go-betweens and assistants in their social 
and economic as well as their political activities.88 On a larger scale, 
intermediate persons were now employed as agents in popular politics. 
First of all there existed a category of intermediate leaders who 
actually mobilized parts of the crowd on behalf of a popular leader and 
provided leadership for collective behavior. Mostly they are indicated 
with the term dux multitudinum (Liv. 4.13) or dux operarum. Other 
terms used are dux seditioms (Cic. Dom. 12-13), satelles (Cic. Mil. 90, 
Dom. 72), and minister (Cic. Dom. 48). According to Sallust, there even 
existed professional duces in the late Republic.89 That is probably 
87
 K. RAAFLAUB, Dignitatis contentio Studien zur Motivation und politische Taktik im 
Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius, München 1974, pp. 182-192 and 219-
225, argues that Caesar's motives for entering the civil war were highly personal-
Caesar refused to give up his position of status, authority, and prestige; he was 
prepared to fight for his dignitas However, Caesar owed his position mainly to his 
political organization That as well was at stake if Caesar lost his dignitas Caesar's 
motives might have been personal, but they certainly were influenced by his followers 
Caesar's future was inextricably bound up with theirs 
88
 On freedmen as political agents, see TREGGIARI, Freedmen, pp. 177-192. 
89
 Cat. 50.1: "duces multitudinum, qui pretio rem pubheam vexare soliti erant." 
52 
exaggerated, but it goes without question that there existed persons who 
performed an important function in the mobilization process. 
We have some indications that intermediate leaders existed already 
before the years 80-50. Plutarch describes Scipio Aemilianus' election 
campaign for the censorship in 143. On the Forum Scipio surrounded 
himself with "men who were of low birth and had lately been slaves, but 
who were frequenters of the Forum and able to gather a mob and force all 
issues by means of solicitations and shouting"90 Plutarch also reports the 
names of two of them: Licinius Philonicus and Aemilius, a herald (kèrwc ; 
Aem. 38.5). The herald Aemilius, considering his profession and his 
name, probably was a freedman of the Aemilii family, of which Scipio 
was by birth a member. Elsewhere91, Plutarch mentions that Philonicus 
was a publican, which means that his social status was that of an eques or 
lower. It is, of course, possible that Plutarch's description is anachronistic 
and that he projected facts from a later period into this scene. Plutarch's 
sources for this particular case are unknown92, but we may believe him 
since his description is very detailed. 
Nothing is known of possible intermediate leaders of the Gracchi. The 
next notice concerns the popular leader Satuminus. Orosius (5.17.5) 
mentions a C. Mettius as satelles of Satuminus. Mettius killed the consular 
candidate Memmius in 100. Nothing further is known of him. Despite 
Orosius being a late source, the notice seems to be truthful, because there 
are more indications for the occurrence of intermediate leaders with 
Satuminus. In his speech against Lepidus in 78, Sallust has Phillipus say 
that Satuminus' satellites had come by way of Sulpicius and Marius into 
the service of Lepidus (Яш. 1.77.7M). Florus, finally, mentions duces 
factionis in Satuminus' company. Therefore, the popular leader 
Satuminus employed intermediate leaders. 
After Sulla the records of intermediate leaders are more numerous. In 
66 Cornelius' (Ap-14) prosecution was interrupted with the help of 
operarum duces (B-16). In 65 Manilius (Ap-26) did the same in his trial 
(B-18). In 63, Catiline's fellow conspirators tried to mobilize the 
shopkeepers in Rome by means of duces multitudinum (Sail. Cat. 50.1), 
one of whom was a pimp (Cic. Cat. 4.17; B-23). In 59 Vatinius (Ap-50), 
90 Plut. Aem. 38.3: "άνθρώττου? àyzvvus και δεδουΧευκοτας", αγοραίους1 δε καί 
δυνάμενου? οχλον συναγαγείν και σττουδαρχίςι και κραυγή πάντα πράγματα 
βιασασθαι". 
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tribune of the plebs and assistant leader of Caesar, employed the services 
of a certain C. Fibulus and other "furies".93 
Not only those known as popular leaders made use of intermediate 
leaders. During the 50s Milo (Ao-2) attempted to fight Clodius with his 
own methods. He organized small groups, which operated violently. One 
of his intermediate leaders is known: M. Saufeius (RE 6). He was a dux 
operarum of Milo (Ase. 55C) and commanded Milo's slaves during the 
fight at Bovillae, where Clodius met his death (Ase. 32C). 
We are best informed about Clodius' intermediate leaders, who were 
extremely numerous. This results from the size of the Ciceronian source 
material and also from the fact that Clodius was the most efficient popular 
leader of the late Republic. Several modem historians have already 
researched Clodius' duces. NOWAK mentions six.94 FAVORY gives 
fourteen, one of whom does not belong to Clodius and three of whom are 
tribunes of the plebs. The latter, however, should be qualified as assistant 
leaders.95 The best and most extensive research thus far has been done by 
FLAMBARD.96 He has made a prosopography of twelve duces. I largely 
agree with his conclusions, which means that I wish to retain eleven of 
FLAMBARD's duces as intermediate leaders and add three. This results in a 
total of fourteen Clodian intermediate leaders known by name. They are 
classified below according to social status. The numbers between brackets 
refer to FLAMBARD's numbering, where the sources are to be found, and 
to the numbers, if any, in RE. 
The first six intermediate leaders are of servile descent: 
1. (RE 7) С CLODIUS, a de plebe notus homo (Asc. 31C; for the 
justification see below). Considering his name, probably a freedman of P. 
Clodius. He was present at Clodius' assassination in 52 (Cic. Mil. 46; Asc. 
31C) and perhaps during the riots afterwards (B-86). 
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2. (Fl; RE 12) SEXTUS CLODIUS97, the most important of all; a 
freedman or a descendant of a freedman of the Claudii family. He not only 
was an agitator, but also Clodius' counsellor and secretary (scriba). Sextus 
had a considerable career. He organized the Compitalia of 58, during 
which he wore the toga praetexta, the symbol of Roman magistracy (B-
40). He was charged with the com supply in 58 (cura annonae ; Cic. Dom. 
25-26). After Clodius' assassination he mobilized the crowd and provided 
leadership during the subsequent riots (B-86). In 44 he was the subject of 
a correspondence between Cicero and Antony; Sextus had been exiled 
from Rome and Antony wanted to call him back. (Cic. Phil. 2.9; Att. 
14.13B.3 and 15.13.3.) 
3. (F2) DAMIO, a freedman and apparitor of Clodius (Asc. 47C). 
4. (F3) DECIMUS, a dissignator according to Cicero (Att. 4.3.2), i.e. an 
attendant in the theater or an undertaker. Both functions were usually 
performed by freedmen. FLAMBARD correctly links a Republican 
inscription to this person (ILLRP 771 = CIL I2 2519): L. Maecenas, son 
of Decimus, is mentioned as dissignator and patronus of the societas 
cantorum Graecorum. 98 
5. (F9; RE) PLAGULEIUS, probably a freedman of Ateius, Milo's 
prosecutor in 52. With nos. 6, 11, and 12, a leader of the shopkeepers 
mobilized by Clodius (Cic. Dom. 89). 
6. (FU; RE 15) L. SERGIUS, probably a freedman of Catiline. 
Together with no. 12 one of the intermediate leaders mentioned by name 
who provided leadership to the crowd during a food riot in 57. Known as 
a concitator tabernariorum, an agitator of shopkeepers. (B-60.) See no. 5. 
The next intermediate leader is of Italian descent: 
7. (Fl2; RE 2) T m u s . A Sabine from Reate. 
The next six are freebom or of unknown descent: 
8. (F4; RE ) FlDULIUS, who was poor according to Cicero. He led the 
operae during the popular assembly in which Clodius in 58 passed his law 
on the exile of Cicero (B-47). 
9. (F5; RE ) FIRMIDIUS. 
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10. (RE 3) L. G A V I U S . Cicero calls him a Clodi cams (Att. 6.3.6). 
Since Cicero also qualifies the known intermediate leaders nos. 2, 7, and 
13 as such (Har.Resp. 59, Pis. 23), Gavius should be included among the 
intermediate leaders. Cicero, as governor of Cilicia in 50, offered him a 
prefecture on Brutus' request (Cic. Att. 6.1.4 and 3.6). 
11. (F7; RE 1) LENTIDIUS. See no. 5. 
12. (F8; RE 10) M. LOLLIUS. See nos. 5 and 6. 
13. (RE 12) P. POMPCWIUS, together with no. 1 present at Clodius' 
assassination and a de plebe notus homo (Asc. 31C; for the justification see 
below). 
The fourteenth and last intermediate leader belonged to the equestrian 
order: 
14. (F6; RE 1)99 GELLIUS POBLICOLA, a ruined eques of senatorial 
descent.100 
Among Clodius' intermediate leaders we see quite a few freedmen or 
people from outside Rome. These persons, who were in close contact with 
the popular leader, probably had a patron-client relationship with 
Clodius. It is very well possible that these intermediate leaders tried to 
have a career with the help of Clodius: through him they could receive 
paid offices and their prestigious position enhanced their social status 
within the plebs. 
С. Clodius and P. Pomponius (nos. 1 and 13) have been included 
among the intermediate leaders because Asconius calls them noti homines. 
The term notus homo occurs several times. Asconius calls M. Aemilius 
Philemon, freedman of Lepidus, a homo notus (37C) and L. Luscius a 
notus centuria of Sulla (91С). The word notus can mean "well-known" or 
"notorious", like the noti operarum duces who assisted Cornelius in 66 
(B-16); Eudamus and Birria, Milo's gladiatores noti in 52 (Asc. 31C); and 
the notissimi latronum duces in Antony's army in 43 (Cic. F am. 
10.14.1)J0' 
In a political sense, notus can also have the meaning of "being well-
known among a certain group". In the Commentariolum Petitionis (28, 
31, 41-42, and 50) we read how important it was to a politician to show 
that he knew people of the lower social strata. These people were the noti 
homines. They were not just anybody, but the principes, the leading 
99 OÉ 2, no. 170. 
100 VETTIUS SCATO (F 10, RE 17), an Italian, cannot be considered an intermediate 
leader. He served as Clodius' straw man for the purchase of Cicero's house in Rome, 
but he is nowhere indicated as an intermediate leader. 
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49C). He was present at Clodius' assassination and testified against Milo (Asc. 31 and 
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persons, of the collegia, the suburbs, the country districts, and the Italian 
townships (Com.Pet. 30). Their support implied the support of the crowd, 
for they were capable of winning entire tribes for a politician: 
"Inquire and seek out men everywhere, get to know them, pursue them, secure 
them, see that they canvass their localities for you and act like candidates on 
your behalf. (...) Yet merely to know them, though important, is not enough 
unless it is followed by the hope of advantage and friendship, so that you are 
seen to be a good friend and not only a recollector of names. So, when those 
who have the most influence with their tribesmen because of their own political 
ambition are busy for you in the centuries - and when you have made desirous 
of your interests those others who carry weight with some of their tribesmen by 
reason of their home town, district, or college - then your hopes should be 
high." 102 
The same occurs with Rullus' lex agraria in 63. Rullus wanted to have 
his law implemented by a commission, as was usual. The members of this 
commission, the decemviri, would be elected by nine tribes. "And the 
decemvirs, to show themselves grateful and not forgetful of the favor, 
will allow that they do owe something to the noti homines of these nine 
tribes."103 These noti homines were persons with a certain degree of 
prestige and influence among the plebs, the ideal persons to act as 
intermediate leaders. They were the noti homines who were present at 
Clodius' cremation in 52 (B-86). 
In order to get in touch with these persons and placate them, Roman 
aristocrats employed a nomenclátor,104 a slave who prompted his master 
with the names of the persons he had to greet, so that the impression was 
102
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constitueris, in optima spe esse debebis." 
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VOGT, Nomenciator. Vom Lautsprecher zum Namenverarbeiter, Gymnasium 85 
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created that he knew them. Such a nomenclátor formed an important link 
within the communication process between politician and people.105 
Particularly in the city of Rome, the noti homines owed their influence 
to the fact that they belonged to the group of persons who presided a 
plebeian organization. Rome knew various kinds of associations. The 
collegia were professional organizations in which people with the same 
profession, mostly artisans and shopkeepers, were associated. The 
collegia could also be religious or territorial organizations. Sometimes 
several functions were combined in one collegium. Next to those there 
were the territorial organizations of the vici (city neighborhoods), the 
pagi, and the vicinitates (suburban and country hamlets). Magistri, 
elected by the members, stood at the head of these associations. Free-bom, 
freedmen, and slaves participated in the colleges and probably also in the 
other organizations. But within the colleges the social stratification and 
ideological prejudices of the city were reflected, which means that slaves 
had a subordinate position and that the magistri already before their 
election possessed a higher social status.106 
These magistri were vital for receiving the support of the crowd: 
"Then, reckon up the whole city - all the colleges, the suburbs, the environs; if 
you strike a friendship with the leading men from among their number, you will 
easily, through them, secure the remaining crowd." 107 
The plebeian organizations were important for mobilizing the crowd. 
They offered an organizational framework through which large groups 
of people could be reached and, through their leaders, incited to action. 
We will return to this subject more extensively in Chapter 3. The magistri 
formed one of the links between leaders and crowd; from them 
intermediate leaders could be recruited. We have already seen that 
105
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through an inscription a connection can be established between one of 
Clodius' intermediate leaders (Decimus, no. 4) and a collegium. Another 
inscription shows another possible link between Clodius and the headmen 
of the colleges. C. Causinius Schola, a partisan of Clodius, had a 
freedman, who was curator of a funeral college.108 
The next group of intermediaries who played a role in the political 
process of the late Republic were the so-called apparitores, mostly 
freedmen, sons of freedmen, or free-bom from the Italian municipia, 
who socially were to be ranked below the équités.109 They were civil 
servants who assisted the magistrates in the performance of their tasks, 
but they were not themselves allowed to hold a magistracy while in office. 
The apparitores can be subdivided into several functions: the scriba, a 
secretary who, among other things, drew up bills; the praeco, a herald 
who summoned the people to the assemblies, read out the results of the 
voting, and sometimes acted as nomenclátor ; the viator, a messenger; and 
the lictor, the escort of the magistrate and the symbol of his authority.110 
The apparitores were not appointed by an incumbent magistrate, but 
were appointed in advance (since Sulla three years in advance). They 
remained in office for several years.111 A magistrate, therefore, had to 
work with the persons who were put at his disposal; the viatores were 
assigned to him by lot (Cic. Cat. 4.15). Nevertheless, patronage, 
especially during the Republic, played an important part in the 
appointment, and patronage ties remained in force after the appointment 
also. A position as apparitor paved the way to upward mobility. The 
position itself and the ties of patronage offered the opportunity to have a 
career. The position could be a reward for merit or a springboard to 
success. It could lead to acceptance in the equestrian order, it could serve 
as an entry to political life in Rome for Italian dignitaries, and it could 
even lead to a magistracy.112 
The group of apparitores was subdivided into professional 
organizations (decuriae), in which apparitores of the same profession 
108
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were associated.113 One even spoke of ordines, i.e. recognized status 
groups.114 Among the plebs the apparitores held a prestigious position, 
because they were part of the state machinery and connected to the 
persons who controlled the political process and because they were 
ceremonially involved in the public life of the state.115 Their prestige is 
evident from the fact that they proudly mentioned their office in funeral 
inscriptions.116 
In order to function properly as a magistrate it was of great 
importance to a politician to be on good terms with the apparitores. They 
constituted the link between magistrate and people. Furthermore, they 
could be helpful with electoral fraud in the assemblies.117 The 
apparitores' intermediate position between plebs and élite is clarified by 
the case of Cn. Flavius. Flavius, the son of a freedman, was a scriba at the 
end of the fourth century. He laid down his office, and was subsequently 
elected aedile by the Forum crowd, which consisted of freedmen.118 
It need not surprise us that some intermediate leaders were recruited 
from the apparitores or that they were appointed apparitor. We have 
already seen that Aemilius, one of the known intermediate leaders of 
Scipio Aemilianus in 143, was a herald. Among Clodius' intermediate 
leaders we come across two apparitores : Sex. Clodius (no. 2) was a scriba 
and Clodius let him organize the Compitalia dressed in the toga praetexta, 
the magisterial garb. Damio (no.3) is called an apparitor of Clodius. 
The importance of these officials appears from a passage from 
Cicero's De Legibus, where Atticus says: 
"For, like you just have said, that the laws have to be requested from the 
librarians, I remark that most people during their magistracy, because of 
ignorance of their rights, only know as much as the apparitores want them to 
know."ll9 
Atticus' words are quite understandable. A Roman magistrate, after all, 
was in office only for one year and he had to work with civil servants who 
113PURCELL, op.cit., 128-131; cf. COHEN, op.cit., 46-48. 
H4 Cic. Verr. 2.3.183-184, Mur. 42; COHEN, op.cit., 24-25, 35, and 38. 
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generally had many years of experience behind them. Cato the Younger 
too, during his quaestorship in 64, encountered the problem of 
apparitores who operated independently because of the inexperience of 
the magistrates. When Cato tried to do something about it, the apparitores 
rose in revolt.120 Here we see that the apparitores had developed into an 
interest group. The fact that the incumbent magistrate could not directly 
influence the composition of the apparitores fostered the independence of 
the group. The ordo scribarum in particular operated as a close-knit, 
solidary group with a political opinion of its own.121 This is another 
example of professionalization and specialization during the late 
Republic. 
The contact between politicians and apparitores passed through 
personal ties of patronage, and, in view of the independence of the 
apparitores, it was important to win the group as a whole through their 
organizations, the decuriae. 
Sometimes civil servants were temporarily assigned to magistrates or 
governors of a province, such as pracfecti (see the intermediate leader 
Gavius no. 10), general servants (accensi), architects and medici (Cic. 
Verr. 2.2.27, Leg.Agr. 2.32). Their appointment ended at the close of 
their superior's term of office. They did not have an organization and did 
not form an ordo either.122 Their influence was less important than that of 
the apparitores, but they too could have a prominent role as an 
intermediary. An example of this is the praefectus fabrum (head of the 
military engineers) of Murena's army. During his consular campaign in 
63, Murena had him distribute theater tickets among his tribesmen (Cic. 
Mur. 73). 
The politicians of the late Republic surrounded themselves with a 
group of advisers and assistants from top to bottom who assisted them in 
politics. Such a group, a consilium (Cic. Verr. 2.2.27, Att. 4.3.2), was of 
utmost importance and only with difficulty could a politician extricate 
himself from it. The increasingly powerful position and the increasingly 
important tasks of apparitores and other intermediaries foreshadowed the 
position of imperial freedmen and amici in a future age.123 
Another category of intermediate leaders was constituted by the 
claqueurs. During the Empire, the theater and the circus became the most 
important means of communication between the people of Rome and the 
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emperor. In the theater the people were able to express their grievances to 
the emperor or, more trivially, to indicate which games they would like to 
see in the circus. The emperor likewise could communicate with the 
people, and his presence at the public shows made him popular. Applause 
for performers and acclamations of the emperor were often organized by 
theater claques and cheerleaders. In that way, the mood of the crowd 
could easily be turned into a political demonstration. Occasionally, an 
emperor bribed claqueurs to have the public react favorably towards him. 
In A.D. 190, a cheerleader, probably engaged by senatorial conspirators, 
led the spectators in the circus in a successful popular demonstration 
against the praetorian prefect Cleander, a freedman of the emperor 
Commodus and in the eyes of the senatorial élite a dangerous parvenu.124 
During the late Republic too, cheerleaders appear to have already been 
present at the games. The earliest report dates from 70, during the 
prosecution of Verres. According to Cicero a certain T. Allienus acted as 
a cheerleader (Cic. Caecil. 48-49). In those days there even were 
claqueurs who ascended to scriba.125 The cheerleaders probably 
originated as claqueurs on behalf of actors, hired by the actors themselves 
or the organizer of the games; but they gradually received a political 
function by leading the public in acclaiming or hissing politicians.126 The 
cheerleaders may have used a flute for rhythmic purposes (Cic. An. 
1.16.11). The method was derived from religious practice. On large 
public occasions, Roman priests employed flute-players to help them 
recite prayers.127 The development of the cheerleaders is a typical 
example of how existing traditional features were used for different 
purposes as a result of the dysfunctions of the late Republic. 
Cheerleaders also operated during trials (B-65, 88) and in popular 
assemblies, which, however, is not to say that they were the same persons 
as in the theater. Clodius' intermediate leaders Sergius and Lollius (nos. 6 
and 12) acted as cheerleaders during a riot in 57 (B-60). Claques in the 
assembly could also be used against popular leaders (Cic. Att. 2.16.1). 
The final group of intermediaries were the so-called divisores. A 
divisor was a person connected to a tribe who distributed presents or 
money among a tribe on behalf of a candidate in the elections. They were 
private persons without an official task. It was a traditional and accepted 
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position, but during the late Republic the divisores increasingly developed 
into agents of electoral corruption.128 It happened ever more frequently 
that candidates had money and commodities distributed in order to get 
elected. Now this was done not only among the candidate's own tribe, as 
was traditional, but among all tribes. Divisores had to be used in order to 
reach the right persons. 
When Cicero was prosecuting Verres in 70 because of his crimes as a 
governor of Sicily, Verres counteracted him by calling in divisores to 
sabotage Cicero's election as plebeian aedile.129 During his election 
campaign for the consulate in 64, Cicero was advised to reduce the 
influence of the sequestri1:30 and the divisores, so that bribery would not 
interfere (Com.Pet. 57). 
Some divisores belonged to the equestrian order. They must have been 
especially important in the elections in the centuriate assembly, 
considering the weight of the votes of the équités in those elections.131 
Divisores of lower social status will have operated during elections in the 
tribal assembly. The position of the divisores grew more important 
because of the increasing political competition and the related constant 
expansion of resources politicians had to muster for a successful career. 
Therefore it became a means of social mobility: Octavius, the natural 
father of the future Emperor Augustus, probably had been a divisor.'1'*2 
The senator C. Verres, father of the above mentioned Sicilian praetor, 
had been a divisor once.133 C. Herennius, son of the divisor Sextus 
Herennius, became tribune of the plebs in 60.134 
Just like the apparitores, the divisores became more independent and 
developed into an interest group.135 At regular intervals during the late 
Republic, measures were enacted to check electoral corruption {leges de 
ambitu), without much success. In 67 the consul Piso proposed a severe 
anti-bribery bill. The divisores tried to sabotage voting on the law by 
staging a riot (B-13). 
12
« LIEBENAM, RE 5.1 (1903) s.v. divisor, 1237-1238. 
129
 Cic. Verr. 1.22-25 and 2.3.161. Other cases of the involvement of divisores: Cic. 
Att. 1.16.12-13 (elections of 61), Plane. 45, 47-48, and 55 (aedilician elections of 55), 
De Or. 2.257 (the divisor Nummius). Cicero's accusation (Har.Resp. 42) that Clodius 
had murdered all of the divisores is probably exaggerated, see: LENAGHAN, De 
Haruspicum Responso, p. 164; MOREAU, REL, 225 n.2. 
130 A sequester served as a mediator during trials. In the late Republic he especially 
was an intermediary in election campaigns, who, because he is often mentioned 
together with the divisores, probably had a similar function in electoral corruption, see: 
Cic. Plane. 38, 45, and 48; Ase. 83C; E. WEISS, RE 2.4 (1923) s.v. sequester, 1659-
1660. MOREAU,REL, 225 andClodiana, 184, defines sequester as an intermediary 
between candidates and divisores. 
131
 OÉ 2, pp.911 and 1069; see nos. 179, 180,293, 381, and 382. 
132
 Suet. Aug. 3; OÉ 2, no. 249. 
133
 OÉ 2, no. 382. 
134
 Cic. Att. 1.18.4; OÉ 2, no. 180. 
135
 OÉ 1, 603-604, calls the divisores an ordo. 
63 
What interest did the divisores have in preserving electoral 
corruption? For this, we have a very recent parallel. During the election 
campaign of the former Philippine President Marcos in January 1986, 
people were brought together for a payment to attend his election rallies. 
During a rally on the island of Negros, the public got into a quarrel with 
the issuing intermediaries, because they had pocketed two-thirds of the 
promised amount (100 pesos).136 The late Republican divisores had 
developed from voluntary officials in the tribes into professionalized 
agents of electoral corruption, who appropriated part of the cash intended 
for distribution. Thus they could acquire the funds which opened the 
channel to a possible acceptance into the equestrian order and from there 
even into the senate. It goes without saying that these persons had every 
interest in preserving the existing system of campaigning. 
It is impossible to assess whether the divisores should be considered 
intermediate leaders in the sense of providing actual leadership during 
collective behavior.13? in any case they belonged to the network of 
intermediaries which a popular leader had to deploy for the mobilization 
of support and to be successful in politics. Among the divisores links can 
be established between popular leaders and intermediate leaders. Clodius 
started as an electioneering expert and later also kept up good relations 
with divisores^ The assistant leader Cornelius (Ap-13), despite a 
proposed bill against electoral corruption including measures against 
divisores (B-13), became an electioneering expert, which implies good 
contacts with divisores. The tribune Herennius, mentioned above, whose 
father was a divisor, was an assistant leader of Clodius (Ap-19). 
To sum up, the following can be said on the intermediate leaders. 
There existed a group of persons in Rome who possessed a higher social 
status among the city plebs. It enabled them to pass on the political plans of 
a popular leader, to gain support for him, and occasionally to mobilize 
plebeians for popular assemblies, riots, and other types of collective 
behavior. They were "the ones who ruled the meetings" (ii qui contiones 
tenent. Com.Pet. 51). Next to this group of intermediate leaders, who 
actually provided leadership for collective behavior, there was a larger 
group of intermediate persons who were important to the operation of 
politics. Not all of them were actual intermediate leaders, but they were 
indispensable for the creation of a situation which was conducive to 
collective behavior. Moreover, the two groups merged into one another: 
we have seen intermediate leaders who were a notus homo in a tribe, or a 
magister collegii, or apparitor.139 A late Republican inscription tells us 
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that a certain Clesipus Geganius combined several functions or had 
occupied them in succession; he was magister of two collegia as well as 
assistant of a tribune of the plebs.140 These persons, noti homines, 
apparitores, headmen of plebeian organizations, who did or did not act as 
intermediate leaders, should be considered one and the same group. They 
constituted a group of private persons and civil servants around a 
politician, who assisted the leader in conducting politics and who were 
especially useful for a policy directed towards the people: a consilium 
(Cic. Har.Resp. 53, Dom. 48). Politicians, particularly popular leaders, 
had to be on good terms with those persons in order to make a success of 
their politics and their career. 
Popular leaders and intermediaries had a patron-client relationship. 
The client supported the politics of the patron, and, in exchange, the 
contact with the patron added to the client's prestige and ambitious 
persons could get ahead through their patron. The activity as an 
intermediary was an important booster of social mobility. Claqueurs rose 
to be scriba. A person could become apparitor or praefectus and from that 
position even ascend to the equestrian order or to a magistracy. Or 
someone was a divisor and his son attained a lower magistracy. The 
political conflicts of the late Republic and the ever increasing scale of the 
resources which had to be mobilized by politicians provided 
intermediaries with unprecedented opportunities. Increasingly, therefore, 
they became an independent factor in Roman politics. Reform proposals 
to improve the working of politics could be against the interests of the 
intermediate leaders or those of their patrons. In that respect, the 
intermediate leaders perhaps had a vested interest in maintaining the 
existing political system. 
Leadership of collective behavior in Rome was provided on three levels. 
On the top level were the top leaders, the great men of the Roman 
Republic. The middle level consisted of assistant leaders, junior 
politicians holding a lower magistracy, particularly the tribunate of the 
plebs. Finally, on the lowest level, there existed intermediate leaders, 
persons with a wide range of functions. They were members of the plebs 
with an elevated social status. 
The expansion of the Roman empire led to fierce competition at the top 
and social differentiation at the bottom. Top leaders, whose opportunities 
were limited within the existing system or who refused to compromise to 
the ruling oligarchy, needed a new power base: the people. In order to 
mobilize a following among the plebs in this expanded society it was 
necessary to build up an organization of assistant and intermediate 
leaders. These middle and low level leaders had to receive something in 
return: prestige, career opportunities, and financial gain. The different 
WlLLRP 696 (= CIL ¡2 1004 = X 6488 = DESSAU 1924): "Clesipus Geganius, 
mag(ister) Capit(olinorum), mag(ister) Luperc(orum), viat(or) tr(ibunicius)." 
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types of leaders, being in opposition to the oligarchy, had to work closely 
together and were mutually dependent. A large number of the persons 
involved, especially on the middle and lowest level, in some way benefited 
from the continuation of the existing political system. But their loyalty 
was with their patron and not with the Republic. It is quite possible that 
this contributed in an important way to the fact that an alternative to the 




Until now, the words "crowd", "people", and "plebs" have been 
employed, in the best traditions of ancient historiography, 
indiscriminately and without further specification, as if the lower social 
strata in Roman society consisted of a uniform crowd of similar persons. 
In Appendix В all known cases of collective behavior in the years 78-49 
are analyzed separately. The appendix shows that in the majority of the 
cases the determination of the participants does not go beyond "plebs". 
The problem with ancient sources is that only in a few occasions do they 
give a more exact indication of crowd composition. For the late Republic, 
as for any other period of ancient history for that matter, we lack sources 
such as police reports or voter registration lists. Nonetheless, it may be 
possible, after a more detailed analysis, to distinguish different groups in 
the lower strata of Roman society; groups which also display different 
behavioral patterns. In this chapter I will investigate which social groups 
participated in collective behavior, especially in collective behavior which 
was important to the political process of the late Republic. 
Plebs Urbana and Plebs Rustica 
In early Roman history, Rome met the qualifications of the classical city-
state. The citizens occupied the city and the surrounding countryside. 
There was no sharp identifiable division between urban population and 
rural population. The inhabitants of the country regularly visited the city, 
which formed the economic, religious, and administrative center. Most 
city-dwellers were farmers who worked the lands outside the city. The 
Roman expansion from the third century onwards, however, altered this 
situation. The territory of Roman citizenship expanded far beyond the 
boundaries of the city-state. In some parts of Italy the traditional class of 
peasant small-holders diminished in favor of large-scale landownership, 
while the city of Rome knew an enormous population growth. The 
difference between urban and rural population increased, which was 
expressed in their different participation and actions in collective 
behavior. 
By the end of the second century, the rural citizen population, the plebs 
rustica, consisted of free peasants with a piece of land of their own, 
tenants, day laborers, and hybrids of these. Many independent small­
holders found additional income as seasonal workers on large estates. The 
main labor force on mid-size and large estates was made up of slaves, 
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supplemented by hired free labor of day laborers and tenants in times of 
peak production. After the Social War (88), all free inhabitants of Italy 
south of the Po possessed Roman citizenship.1 
From the third century, the population of the city of Rome had been 
growing steadily, especially as a result of the migration of landless 
peasants to the city and the manumission of slaves.2 The number of 
inhabitants at the end of the Republic is difficult to establish. The only 
exact figure is for 45, when Caesar reduced the number of grain 
recipients from 320,000 to 150,000.3 In any case, more than 320,000 
people lived in the Rome of the late Republic, for to those recipients (male 
citizens) should be added women, children, slaves, and foreigners. But 
concerning those groups there are no quantitative data available. 
Therefore the city population can only be estimated. I choose HOPKINS' 
estimate: 800,000-1,000,000 inhabitants at the end of the Republic. 
HOPKINS uses the most convincing arguments; his estimate is based on the 
number of grain recipients and the number of other inhabitants who 
should be added, the possible density of population, the estimated total 
grain consumption and the number of tenement blocks (insulae).4 In any 
case, Rome was densily if not surpopulated. 
Regarding social status the lower population in Rome, the plebs 
urbana, consisted of freebom Roman citizens, frcedmen, and slaves. The 
average standard of living of these groups will not have much surpassed 
the subsistence level5, although there existed considerable economic 
differentiation. The freebom, if possible, eked out a living by working as 
day laborers, by seasonal work, and by unskilled labor in the building 
1
 See NlCOLET, Rome, 206 and 295. On rural labor relations see: P. G ARNSEY, Non-
Slave Labour in the Roman World, in: GARNSEY, Non-Slave Labour, pp. 34-47; 
NlCOLET, Rome, 108-116. 
2
 On the growth of the city population see: BRUNT, Manpower, pp. 383-384. 
3
 Dio 43.21.4; Plut. Caes. 55.3; Suet. lul. 41.3; RICKMAN, Corn Supply, pp. 175-
179. Another source, App. 2.102 (apparently overlooked by RICKMAN), says that 
Caesar made a recensas of the people, which turned out that only half of the pre-war 
citizen population existed. This almost matches the difference of 320,000 and 150,000. 
The passage from Appian most likely applies to the grain recipients. It therefore is 
possible that Caesar did not exclude a number of people from the distributions, but 
merely made a new registration of the survivors. See also YAVETZ, Plebs, p. 46, 
Caesar, 156-158. 
4
 HOPKINS, Conquerors, 96-98. See also BRUNT, Manpower, 382-383; RICKMAN, 
op.cit., 8-13; both estimate the number of inhabitants at 750,000-1,000,000. LGRR 
358-359 gives an estimate of about 1,000,000; NlCOLET, Rome, 87: 800,000. 
5
 BRUNT, Conflicts, 128-129; idem, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, 
Sozialgeschichte, pp. 271-310, esp. 285-296 (revised edition ofP&P 35 (1966), 3-
27); NlCOLET, Rome, 204-205; YAVETZ, Die Lebensbedingungen der "plebs urbana" 
im republikanischen Rom, in: SCHNEIDER, Sozialgeschichte, pp. 98-123 (=Latomus 
17 (1958), 500-517). 
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trade and the docks.6 The freedmen often had learned a trade as a slave 
and therefore made up the majority of the artisans and shopkeepers 
(opifìces and tabernarii ).7 Freedmen had Roman citizenship, but were not 
allowed to occupy a magistracy.8 Manumissions were a frequent 
phenomenon in Rome. One of the motives for manumission was 
economic. Since the introduction of the com distributions it was 
advantageous, especially for poorer masters, to manumit slaves. Being 
citizens, freedmen were entitled to receive subsidized and later free grain. 
Thus the master could pass the liability of maintenance onto the 
government, while still being able to request certain services from his 
freedman.9 Freedmen made up a large part of the urban population, 
probably even the majority.10 Here as well quantitative data are lacking. 
Slaves moved freely around in Rome and often independently practised a 
profession or were employed as domestic staff in the houses of the rich 
citizens. 
Political participation of the urban and the rural plebs differed 
increasingly. These differences can be largely explained by the centralism 
of the Roman political system. Political decision-making, such as elections 
and legislation, took place in Rome. In Roman politics neither a 
compulsory voting nor a necessary quorum in the popular assemblies 
existed. It goes without saying that not all Roman citizens, and certainly 
not the less wealthy, could afford to travel to Rome frequently to 
participate in political life. For the inhabitants of the city it was easier, of 
course.11 
As has been set out in the Introduction, Rome had several popular 
assemblies. The elections took place in July, together with sumptuous 
games. At that occasion many people from outside Rome flocked to the 
city. They then could attend the popular games and participate in the 
elections. In the centuriate assembly, which during the late Republic 
mainly engaged in election of the highest magistrates and hardly in 
legislation, the rich population groups were favored. In that assembly the 
inhabitants of the countryside and especially the members of the Italian 
upper class had an important vote. In the elections of the lower 
magistracies, held in the tribal assembly, the members of the rural tribes 
6
 LGRR 362; BRUNT, JRS, passim; idem, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, 
Sozialgeschichte, 289-290. 
There also were day laborers and workmen who could enter a contract for a longer 
period of time (mercenarii ): S.M. TREGGIARI, Urban Labour in Rome: mercenarii and 
tabernarii, in: GARNSEY, Non-Slave Labour, pp. 48-64, esp. 51. 
7
 BRUNT, Manpower, 110; idem, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, 
Sozialgeschichte, 291-293; LGRR 362; TREGGIARI, Freedmen, 95-102. 
8
 TREGGIARI, Freedmen, 37 and 52-64. 
? Ibidem 11-20, esp. 16. 
10
 ibidem 31-36; LGRR 360. According to BRUNT, Manpower, 385-388, freedmen 
made up between 2/3 and 3/4 of the urban plebs around 70, but that is only an estimate. 
11
 Cic. Verr. 1.54; BLEICKEN, Lex publica, pp. 251-258 and 264; NICOLET, Métier, 
391-401. 
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(31 out of 35 tribes) could have a decisive role, because these elections too 
were held in Summer. Only in the legislative tribal assembly did the urban 
plebs carry the day. This was so, first, because of the time factor: 
legislative activities took place at times when few people from outside 
Rome were in the city. No bills could be proposed later than 24 days 
before the start of the elections. Since there existed a statutory interval of 
24 days between the proposal of a bill and the vote, the next legislative 
assemblies took place at least 24 days after the elections. Few members of 
the rural plebs could afford an absence of more that two months from 
their jobs. Of course people could be summoned from Italy to Rome to 
vote on laws, but that was not always easy in the 24 days between the 
introduction of a bill and the vote.12 
Second, the city plebs ruled the legislative tribal assembly because of 
the composition of the tribes. The inhabitants of the city who were 
inscribed in the four urban districts, among whom were all the freedmen, 
had only 4 out of 35 votes in the assembly. But former peasants who had 
moved to the city often kept their registration in a country district. 
Moreover, the presiding magistrate of the assembly had the possibility of 
transferring members of one tribe to another during a vote, if the 
members of one or more tribes had not shown up.13 The difference in 
participation between the several popular assemblies becomes obvious 
from the exile and return of Cicero. Clodius passed his law which sent 
Cicero into exile in a tribal assembly (B-47). The law on Cicero's recall 
failed to pass in a tribal assembly (B-51). Cicero had to be recalled by a 
law which was passed in a centuriate assembly filled with people from 
outside Rome (B-58). It was the only time in the investigated period that 
the centuriate assembly enganged in legislative activity.14 
In addition to political centralism, the differences between urban and 
rural plebs can be explained through a difference in interests. The first 
great popular leader of the late Republic was Tiberius Gracchus. For his 
political support he depended on the rural plebs, who had the greatest 
interest in the proposed agrarian law of 133. Therein lay also the 
weakness of Tiberius' following. Because the country folk were busy with 
12
 TAYLOR, PP. 50-62; idem, RVA, 67-68; NlCOLET, Métier, 393-401. 
13
 Cic. Sest. 109; TAYLOR, PP, 53-54 and 60; NlCOLET, Métier, 419; STAVELEY, 
Voting, 136-137, 198-202, and 209-211. 
METAXAKI-MITROU, AC, pp. 181-182 states that the urban plebs consisted of 
immigrated Italian peasants, slaves from the conquered territories, and immigrated 
freedmen and that these three groups were registered in the four urban tribes. The 
assessment of the registration is entirely wrong: slaves were not citizens and, therefore, 
were not registered in the voting districts; many ex-peasants kept their registration in 
their rural district. The article shows the author's apparent unfamiliarity with the most 
important publications on this subject, such as L.R. TAYLOR'S. 
14
 Another example: Antonius in 44 managed to get the provincial command he wanted 
by turning the centuriate assembly, in which the proposal was to be introduced, into a 
tribal assembly (App. 3.30). 
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the harvest, they could not come to Rome to support Tiberius at the 
crucial moment. This resulted in the downfall of Tiberius Gracchus.15 
Tiberius' brother Gaius learned from his mistakes. The strong point of 
Gaius Gracchus' policy was his ability to hold on to several groups: the 
équités, by granting them more political influence; the rural plebs, by a 
new agrarian law; and the urban plebs, by a com law. Through the latter, 
Gaius showed that he recognized the specific interests and the singularity 
of the city population of Rome. In spite of the fact that the big population 
growth in Rome during the second century was primarily due to 
immigration from the countryside, the city-dwellers had other needs and 
demands than the peasants. They wished to find a living in the city, and an 
agrarian law, the goal of which was to distribute lands among the 
peasants, had little appeal for them.16 Therefore Gaius Gracchus proposed 
his lex frumentaria, which provided for state-subsidized grain prices. 
Furthermore, Gaius was able to secure the favor of specific groups among 
the urban plebs, particularly artisans, by providing employment through 
public works, such as the construction of granaries and roads.17 
Just like Tiberius, Gaius Gracchus was brought to ruin by senatorial 
repression. Before that, the senate had tried to undermine Gaius' popular 
support through the tribune of the plebs Livius Drusus. Livius Drusus 
especially tried to gain support from the rural plebs and possibly from 
dispossessed peasants who had recently moved to Rome. He promised land 
distributions which went far beyond Gaius' plans. 
When Gaius was killed in 121, he had virtually lost the support of the 
people. It is likely that he kept the support of the urban population until 
the end. Just before the tribunician elections he endeared himself by 
moving to a popular neighborhood close to the Forum and by providing 
access to the gladiatorial shows for poor Romans. The latter he did by 
having the stands demolished by "all the craftsmen whom he had under his 
15
 App. 1.14, STOCKTON, Gracchi, ρ 75. 
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 Some other attestations of the attractiveness of urban life- Liv. 4 12, Cic. Leg Agr 
2.71; Sail. Cat 37 7. On the different interests of the urban and rural plebs dunng the 
late Republic, see also· LlNTOTT 178-181. 
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 Cheirotechnai, App. 1.23. See further on the urban side of Gaius' policy: 
STOCKTON, op cit, 18-21, 126-129, 136-137, and 164-167. 
H.C. BOREN, The Urban Side of the Gracchan Economic Crisis, AHR 63 (1957/58), 
pp. 890-902, was the first to relate the urban element to the Gracchi BOREN argues 
that the crisis which precipitated the Gracchan laws was primarily urban and that it was 
due to a lack of revenues and a decrease of public and private building activities. His 
thesis has recently been attacked, on the basis of archeological and numismatic 
evidence, by F. COARELLI, Public Buildings in Rome between the Second Punic War 
and Sulla, PBSR 45 (1977), pp. 1-23, esp 3-9 COARELLI demonstrates that the 
economic cnsis was not as bad as BOREN makes it appear. It still remains a fact, 
however, that Gaius got a large part of his support from the city population and that his 
projects which were aimed at that part of the citizenry obviously met certain demands. 
Moreover, it is quite possible that, although there was not a severe crisis, the increase 
of public and private building simply did not keep pace with the flow of migrants to the 
city. See also BRUNT, JRS, 98 η 91. 
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orders in public contracts".18 These technitai, whom Gaius had obliged by 
his public works, now were of use in his politics. Another clear indication 
for this is to be found in the events during the final fight. On the run from 
his pursuers, Fulvius Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus' political partner, hid in a 
workshop of an acquaintance. After the pursuers had threatened to bum 
down the entire alley, Fulvius was handed over.19 This shows that 
Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus had a following among the tabernarii and 
opifices. 
Thus at the end of the second century there existed clear-cut 
differences of interest between two groups of Roman citizens, the plebs 
rustica and the plebs urbana. Although they sometimes operated together, 
e.g. in support of Marius20, both groups had to be mobilized by popular 
leaders in different ways. This becomes more obvious with Satuminus, 
tr.pl. 103 and 100. According to Appian (1.29-33), in 100 street fights 
even arose between urban plebs {politikos ochlos, astikoï) and rural plebs 
(agroikoi) over Satuminus' land bill. According to BADIÁN21, however, 
this was not true and the urban plebs remained faithful to Satuminus until 
the end. BADIÁN attaches more credence to Livy's account, which, 
according to him, has come down to us through Orosius. Appian is the 
only source which in this particular case differentiates between groups. 
However that need not be a reason for discrediting his description. For 
Appian is the only author who, in his history of the late Republic, 
regularly notes the existence of different groups in the lower strata of 
Roman society.22 
Satuminus tried to establish a coalition similar to that of Gaius 
Gracchus. He received the support of the équités by exiling Q. Metellus 
18
 Plut. С Gra 12 4: "των τεχνιτών όσου? ¿Ιχεν εργολάβους· ύφ' έαυτώ". See 
also NIPPEL, JRS, p. 27, STOCKTON, op at, 178 
1 9
 App. 1 26: ergastèrion (workshop) and stenopos (narrow street, alley, also vicus ; in 
this case probably a street with tabernae). 
2 0
 Sail lug 73 6. Note that Sallust in this passage indicates the two groups as a matter 
of course with agrestes and opifices 
2 1
 E. BADIÁN, The Death of Satuminus. Studies in Chronology and Prosopography, 
Chiron 14 (1984), pp 101-147, esp 108-109 For a survey of opinions in modem 
historiography on this question, see: SCHNEIDER, Ancient Society, pp 193-194. 
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 App. 1.10 (concerning Tib. Gracchus' agranan law in 133: several groups of people 
from the countryside [plèthos allo] come to Rome, among others colonists and 
isopohtai [inhabitants of the municipalities with Roman citizenship]), 14 (absence of the 
rural plebs at the reelection of Tib. Gracchus, who is forced to seek support with the 
urban plebs); 24 (artisan support for G Gracchus ), 55 and 64 (conflict between old 
and new citizens over the distribution over the tribes in 88 and 87), 2.2 (Catiline's 
following in 63: senators, équités, plebeians, foreigners, slaves, and the veterans of 
Sulla), 5 (artisans [cheirotechnai] support Catiline), 22 (slaves and rustics [agroikoi] 
mobilized against the urban plebs by Milo in 52 = B-87), 113 (artisans and shopkeepers 
[cheirotechnai and kapèloi] as a separate and politically active group in 44), 119 (the 
presence in Rome of several groups in 44 after Caesar's assassination: the dèmos, 
Caesar's soldiers, some of whom recently dicharged, and veterans who had already 
been settled); 3.28 (in 44 Octavian seeks support against Antony among the dèmos, 
those who had received favors from Caesar, and Caesar's veterans ). 
72 
Numidicus (Or. 5.17) and by allying himself with the new man Marius. In 
103 he proposed a com bill on behalf of the urban plebs.23 He tried to win 
the rural plebs, and especially Marius' veterans, by an agrarian law. 
Saturninus' popular leadership also was put down by senatorial 
repression. The senate, by means of the emergency decree (senatus 
consultum ultimum), ordered the consul Marius to stop Saturninus' 
activities. Marius now had to act against his own ally. Probably Marius 
looked upon this assignment as recognition, at last, that as a new man he 
had sought so long from the ruling élite. This was more valuable to him 
than the ad hoc coalition with Saturninus. Along with Marius, the équités 
also turned their backs on Saturninus. The rural plebs possibly had to 
make a difficult choice between the proposer of the agrarian law and their 
former general. Did the urban plebs, as BADIÁN argues, continue to back 
Saturninus? In that case, what had Saturninus to offer this group? 
Saturninus had proposed a com bill, but it was never passed. The 
senate, by replacing Saturninus in 104 as quaestor Ostiensis, responsible 
for the com transport, with the princeps senatus M. Aemilius Scaurus, 
showed its consciousness of the supply problems and the possible political 
consequences. The senate wanted to prevent a repetition of Gaius 
Gracchus' policy, and it is likely that a sufficient com supply was 
provided for.24 The senate carried on counterpropaganda against 
Saturninus by referring to the com supply on coins.25 The urban plebs, 
consequently, had more reason to look upon the senate as the guardian of 
its interests than upon Saturninus. Furthermore, in 100 Saturninus was 
responsible for the murder of the consular candidate Memmius, who had 
been a most popular tribune of the plebs in 111. Saturninus' agrarian law 
did not produce any advantages for the urban plebs and a conflict between 
city-dwellers and country folk, as described by Appian, therefore was 
quite possible.26 
Another argument of BADIAN's is that Orosius' remark, that Marius 
had to calm down the commota plebs in order to be able to proceed against 
23
 For the date I accept A.R. HANDS, The date of Saturninus' com bill, CR 22 (1972), 
pp 12-13; contra H.B. MATTINGLY, Saturninus' corn bill and the circumstances of his 
fall, CR 19 (1969), pp. 267-270. 
24
 See SCHNEIDER, Ancient Society, 210, RlCKMAN, op cit, 162-164. 
25
 ZEHNACKER, Moneta, I, pp. 550-552, NlCOLET, Métier, 260-261. 
M H. CRAWFORD, Roman Republican Coinage Volume I, Cambridge 1974, pp. 73 
and 330-331 no. 330, states that Saturninus' com law was implemented and that the 
coin of Piso and Caepio indicates that the senate furnished the necessary funds. It is 
more probable, however, that the senate took measures to compensate for the com law 
sabotaged by Caepio and, for example, financed some extra distributions in connecuon 
with the slave war in Sicily. 
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 In Diod. 36.15.2 we read that Saturninus directed himself towards the urban plebs 
(kata ten polin ochlos) in order to prevent his conviction in a tnal By taking up an anti-
senatonal stand, he succeeded and was elected tribune of the plebs for the year 100 
This shows that a clear-cut division had arisen between urban and rural plebs and 
provides a parallel with Tibenus Gracchus, who in 133 was forced to turn to the urban 
plebs for support (App. 1.14). 
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Satuminus, contradicts Appian's account. But such a contradiction need 
not exist. It concerns the following passage, in which Orosius describes 
the reactions to the assassination of Memmius: 
"When the senate and the people of Rome screamed in rage because of such a 
great misfortune to the state, the consul Marius, with an ingenuity which fit the 
times, associated himself with the consensus of the better citizens and calmed 
the aroused plebs by a measured speech."27 
It also is possible to interpret this passage thus: The death of Memmius 
aroused great indignation in the entire society (senatus populusque 
Romanas). Among the boni a consensus existed that Memmius' murder 
could not be tolerated. The urban plebs (who in the eyes of someone like 
Orosius always reacts in a less civilized manner) agreed and wanted to 
lynch Satuminus. Marius, however, as the responsible consul could not 
permit this. The proclaimed senatus consultum ultimum was an ideal way 
to play Marius and Satuminus off against one another. Marius realized 
that, but he also knew that, if he brought his assignment to a satisfactory 
conclusion, the senate would not be able to deny him his recognition. (Not 
surprisingly, Orosius awards Marius a sense of Realpolitik : accomodato 
ad tempus ingenio.) That is why the repression of Satuminus had to be a 
legitimate action and not lynch law. Marius calmed the people and 
subsequently, as is mentioned by Orosius as well, let them, divided into 
maniples, partake in the fight against Satuminus.28 This reaction of the 
urban plebs makes more sense than, as BADIÁN represents it, an anti-
Marius and pro-Satuminus attitude which, by means of an oration, was 
turned into participation in the assassination of Satuminus. 
A comparable antagonism is visible in a case in 88. The tribune of the 
plebs Sulpicius proposed to distribute the votes of the former allies, who 
had recently been enfranchized, over all the tribes. This would imply that 
their influence in voting and elections would increase. The old citizens 
resisted the proposal and it resulted in violent conflict. (App. 1.55.) 
Finally, the difference in participation can be explained by a shift in the 
dependence relationships. Within the urban plebs a group can be 
distinguished which was less strongly bound to the élite than formerly, as 
we will see in the section on the public clientele. The rural plebs, as is 
demonstrated by DE BLOIS29, was more strongly bound through vertical 
2 7
 Or. 5.17.6: "Fremente pro tantis reipublicae malis senatu populoque Romano, 
Marius consul accommodato ad tempus ingenio consensui bonorum sese inmiscuit 
commotamque plebem leni oratione sedavit." Senatus populusque Romanus indicates 
Roman society as a whole, in this case subdivided into boni and plebs, and not, as 
BADIÁN, op.cit.n.21, 108, claims, only the consensus bonorum. 
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 The arming of the plebs by Marius also in Cic. Rab.Perd. 18. Like BADIÁN, 
SCHNEIDER believes that Appian is wrong, because he seems to be contradicted by 
other traditions. SCHNEIDER, incidentally, does admit that the urban plebs did not 
protest when Satuminus was murdered: Ancient Society, 220. 
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 DE BLOIS, Army, 10 and 36. 
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ties and had lost a part of its past independence. At the time of the Gracchi 
the country folk were still prepared to defend their interests as 
independent peasants. During the first century the situation was different. 
The estates of the senatorial élite were mainly concentrated in Central 
Italy (Latium, Campania, and Etruria)30. Increased urbanization resulted 
in rising com prices and more market-oriented ways of production. This 
promoted the expansion of larger estates and the use of tenants and other 
forms of dependent free labor (coloni) instead of slave labor in that 
geographical area. Landlordism also expanded because free independent 
small-holders were bought out or driven away by large rural proprietors 
after the agrarian laws of the end of the second century. Similarly, the 
veterans, who had received plots during the first century, lost their 
possessions as well. Mostly, it did not result in joined-up estates; large 
rural property consisted of a number of plots of different sizes which 
were rented out.31 
Roman citizens, who travelled to Rome from the countryside to visit 
the market, to attend the games, and to partake in politics, will mainly, 
considering the geographical circumstances, have had their domicile in 
Central Italy. These farmers must have had few possibilities to take up a 
political stand different from their patrons.32 Consequently, for popular 
leaders it was not interesting anymore to make attempts to mobilize the 
rural plebs, unless its members belonged to their personal clientele or the 
clientele of their friends. The farmers, who still possessed a piece of land 
of their own and thereby some independence, were located in areas much 
farther away. Their participation in political life in Rome may be 
considered minimal. As far as patron-client relationships and political 
participation are concerned, we therefore observe an opposite 
development between urban plebs and rural plebs during the first century. 
When we look at the years 80-50, we see that it sometimes was 
necessary for politicians to mobilize supporters from the countryside in 
order to win an election in Rome (Com.Pet. 3 and 30-31) or an important 
vote in the popular assembly, when sufficient support in the city was 
absent; we can also count veterans or soldiers among these rural 
supporters. Several such cases are known, but it is typical that it almost 
WSWRP, 29-33 and 45. 
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 P.W. DE NEEVE, Colonus. Private Farm-Tenancy in Roman Italy during the 
Republic and the Early Principale, Amsterdam 1984, pp. 127-149. 
32DENEEVE, ibidem, 13-15 and 187-192, makes a legal distinction between tenants 
and clients. Patron-client relationships in Roman society, however, rested more on 
common law than on written law. Considering their socio-economic situation, tenants, 
evidently, had a stronger dependence relationship towards rural proprietors than free 
small-holders. This had immediate repercussions on their political operation. (See also 
NlCOLET, Rome, 114-115.) According to Plutarch (Crass. 2.5), Crassus possessed 
many estates, on which workmen worked (ergazomenoi). They were not slaves. These 
rural laborers could be recruited for political purposes. 
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exclusively concerned elections.33 These rural groups also participated in 
several attested cases of collective behavior. Thus Caesar in 59 called the 
veterans of Pompey to Rome to pass his agrarian law in the popular 
assembly, because the law was particularly in their interest (B-34). 
Cicero's recall from exile in 57 was mainly accomplished by the 
mobilization of people from all over Italy.34 It nevertheless remained an 
exception. If the rural plebs, Italians, and military men participated, this 
was mainly was in elections. It was the urban plebs which ruled the 
popular assemblies and especially the legislative tribal assembly, and 
ambitious politicians had to work on that group in order to make the 
voting pass off to their advantage. 
The difference between city population and country folk increased 
through the years. For popular leaders the urban plebs was much more 
important to gain support, since the rural plebs was present in Rome only 
at certain occasions (such as games, the census, and important elections). 
In view of the expansion of the territory of Roman citizenship and the 
centralism of the Republican system, it was generally impossible for 
Roman citizens on the countryside to participate in political life in Rome. 
The members of the urban plebs, on the contrary, were constantly able to 
participate in political activities. Moreover, city-dwellers and country 
folk had distinct interests, and the rural plebs was increasingly bound by 
vertical ties to the large rural proprietors.35 
33
 Rustid : Cic. Att. 1.1.2. (consular elections of 65); Mur. 42 (consular elections of 
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and the veterans of Sulla in 63; see B-23); B-70 (consular elections in 56); Cic. Att. 
4.16.6 (consular elections of 54); Plut. Pomp. 58.1 (elections in 50); Cic. Att. 
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The Spectators at the Games 
Expressive collective behavior in the theater and the circus was a 
recurrent phenomenon during the late Republic. It was to become 
increasingly common in the Principale. At the games the people present 
could declare their opinion on politicians and current political issues. 
Cicero assigned an important political function to these demonstrations. 
He considered it the best measure of public opinion. The question that 
arises is, who participated in these types of collective behavior?36 
From an analysis of the cases of collective behavior in the years 80-50, 
it appears that the public in the theater seems to have been decidly anti-
popularis. In 59, when Pompey and certainly Caesar were popular and 
successfully controlled the assemblies, both they and their assistant 
Gabinius were hissed in the theater (B-35 and 36). Among other things the 
public reacted enthusiastically to a verse of an actor which was critical of 
Pompey's power. Shortly afterwards, C. Cato was almost lynched when 
he denounced Pompey as a despot at a meeting (B-37). The great popular 
leader Clodius never was able to gain the favor of the public in the theater. 
In those cases which involved Clodius and which were related to the 
shows, Clodius' support always came from outside the theater. In 57, a 
crowd under the leadership of Clodius twice interrupted the games in 
order to protest against a com shortage, during the ludi Apollinares in 
July and again during the ludi Romani in September (B-55 and 60). In the 
same year we also know of two cases in which Cicero and his adherents 
were applauded at the shows, while Clodius and his supporters were 
hissed (B-53 and 54). In 56, Clodius himself organized the Megalesia as 
aedile. The result was a riot when Clodius had people from outside enter 
the theater (B-66). Cicero additionally remarks that the past populares, 
such as the Gracchi and Satuminus, received applause in the theater, 
unlike the popular leaders of Cicero's days.37 
How can we explain the expressions of the crowd in these and other 
cases? Except for one case38, the documentation for the behavior of the 
public at the shows comes from Cicero or the Ciceronian tradition (B-20: 
Plutarch's Life of Cicero). Of course it is possible that Cicero has declined 
to mention displeasing, i.e. ρτο-popularis, cases, but the cases he does 
mention cannot be sheer fantasy. A biased Cicero cannot explain the 
absence of mentions of theater demonstrations in other authors. The other 
authors do not mention these demonstrations because they were relatively 
unimportant in the political process. After all, no elections or legislative 
activity took place during the shows. Cicero thought the reactions of the 
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to fear the hisses of the theater public. 
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public at the games politically important, because, unlike in the 
assemblies, popular leaders were not popular at the shows. Therefore, it is 
likely that the theater indeed had an mti-popularis tendency. 
In his speech Pro Sestio (106-127), Cicero dwells on the topic 
extensively. According to Cicero, the opinion of the Roman people is best 
measured on three occasions: at the meetings (contiones), in the 
assemblies (comitia), and during performances in the theater and 
gladiatorial games (106). The expression of opinion in the contio is not 
always trustworthy, because it is often composed of a certain public or 
hirelings. Only meetings at which the verus populas, consisting of omnes 
ordines and the Italian citizens, are present are good measures of public 
opinion. (106-108). The same goes for the assemblies. Here too there are 
good measures and bad ones. A bad measure is a tribal assembly in which 
not all of the tribes are sufficiently represented or in which people vote in 
another tribe than their own. A good assembly is pre-eminently the 
centuriate assembly, because there all the orders are represented (and 
implicitly, of course, because the élite has the largest influence in that 
assembly). (109, 112-114, and Dom. 90.) 
The opinion of the Roman people, however, is best expressed in the 
theater and during gladiatorial shows, for at the games, just like at 
meetings, attempts are made to influence the expression of opinion by 
means of claques, but it is unsuccessful. That is why optimates are 
applauded and populares are hissed. At the gladiatorial shows many more 
people are present than at meetings or assemblies; the public at the games, 
therefore, is the most representative of the Roman people as a whole. 
{Sest. 115 and 124-127.) In Cicero's opinion the public at contiones 
differed from the public at the games (114 and 127). 
Cicero's observation offers a plausible explanation for the difference 
in behavior of the plebs at the games and at other types of collective 
behavior that has been established above. Who, then, were the spectators? 
When Cicero describes the cheering of Brutus, one of Caesar's assassins, 
during the ludi Apollinares in 44 {Phil. 1.36), he holds it a representative 
judgment of the Roman people, because it came not from a small group 
but from the entire theater, i.e. the cheers came a summis, mediis, infimis 
(cavéis) "from all the rows of seats" (ibidem 37). Cicero's description of 
the reactions of the public in this case is probably exaggerated, but the 
passage is important to establish the composition of the public. In the 
Roman theater all social strata of Roman society were present and the 
higher status groups had separate seats: the senators since the beginning of 
the second century and the équités from 67.39 The members of the élite 
were seated on the bottom rows and the common people on the upper and 
cheapest rows. In that way the public attending the shows indeed was a 
reflection of the social structure of Roman population. At first sight 
З
9
 Cic. Mur. 40; BOLLINGER, Theatralis, Ch. I. Augustus later introduced a more strict 
separation of the spectators: separate seats for married men, soldiers, young people, 
and women (Suet. Aug. 44; BOLLINGER, op.cit., Ch. II). 
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Cicero's claim, that a unequivocal expression of opinion in the theater was 
representative of the Roman citizenry as a whole, seems to be right. 
Popular assemblies during which important political decisions were to 
be made sometimes were planned for a moment at which a considerable 
number of people were already about for traditional occasions. The 
tribune of the plebs Manilius called an assembly during the Compitalia, a 
festival for the city population which was organized by neighborhoods. 
During that assembly Manilius passed a law to abolish the confinement of 
the freedmen to the four urban tribes. Clodius passed his four important 
laws in an assembly which took place three days after the Compitalia, 
which had been celebrated under Clodius' leadership despite a 
prohibition.40 Cicero's return from exile, at which point he was greeted 
by a huge crowd, took place when Rome was filled with visitors to the ludi 
Romani originating from the Italian countryside (B-59). 
During the games and during public manifestations such as triumphs 
many people flocked to Rome from the countryside. Among the 
spectators, consequently, were not only city dwellers, but also inhabitants 
of the surrounding countryside, who, as we have seen, during the late 
Republic had a strong patron-client relationship with the élite and 
different interests than the urban population. This definitely must have 
effected their behavior. Moreover, the theater and the circus, like the 
assembly, could not accomodate all the inhabitants of Rome, let alone the 
entire Roman citizenry. The Circus Maximus was the largest and could 
hold 250,000 spectators.41 Whatever its composition, the public always 
was no more than a fraction of the total number of citizens. 
The composition of the public was subject to manipulation. The shows 
were free, but not freely accessible. Providing tickets for clients or the 
members of a tribe was a proven means to gain popularity.42 Gaius 
Gracchus already had opened the gladiatorial shows for the poor in order 
to enhance his popularity (Plut. G.Gra. 12.3-4). In short, the spectators in 
the theater differed from the participants in the popular assembly and they 
were not representative of the Roman citizenry.43 We should not forget 
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that the games were not merely a popular entertainment of the lower 
strata, but that they were popular with the entire population. The 
members of the élite enjoyed the spectacles as much as the plebs. The 
possession of separate seats gave senators and équités the possibility to act 
as a claque.44 The composition of the public was determined by the 
presence of members of the élite and partly by the organizer and other 
important persons who could furnish tickets to city-dwellers and country 
folk.45 
The importance of participation becomes obvious in a number of 
theater demonstrations which took place shortly after the death of Caesar 
in 44. After the assassination of Caesar on the Ides of March, Brutus, 
Cassius, and their comrades were rebuffed by the urban plebs of Rome. 
The cremation of Caesar's corpse resulted in riots and the tyrannicides 
had to flee from the city.46 Shortly afterwards, during the performance of 
a mime by Publilius Syrus at the Megalesia (April 4-10), a demonstration 
in favor of Caesar's murderers occurred.47 It is unknown which aedile 
had organized these games.48 In the second half of April, the consul 
Dolabella ordered the execution of Amatius, who had gained popular 
support by pretending to be Marius' grandson. Next, Dolabella bloodily 
repressed a pro-Caesar demonstration. For these deeds he received 
applause in the theater.49 
Next followed the ludi Apollinares in July. They were planned to be 
magnificent and financed by Cicero's affluent friend Atticus. The goal 
was to turn these games into a demonstration of popular support for the 
tyrannicides.50 The organizers undoubtedly will have seen to the 
attendance of the right public. At the outset, it went well; the public, 
thanks to the presence of a claque, expressed its support for Brutus (App. 
3.24). But Cicero was not very pleased with the applause.51 What had 
happened? Appian provides the answer: Before the games, Octavian had 
distributed large amounts of money among the tribes. Subsequently, he 
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made a sizable crowd of people rush into the theater during a 
performance and put a stop to the pro-Brutus demonstration.52 In other 
words, it was not the attitude of the spectators which changed, but their 
composition.53 
At the end of the same month the ludi Victoriae Caesaris were 
celebrated. These games became an expression of popular support for 
Octavian and disapproval of the tyrannicides.54 The reason is obvious. 
Octavian organized the games himself and could determine the 
composition of the spectators (probably the urban plebs). The theater 
demonstrations which followed Caesar's death once again show that the 
urban plebs did not by definition make up the public at the games and that 
the reactions of the spectators depended on their composition, which 
could be manipulated by the organizer and other members of the upper 
strata.55 
Patronage and the Development of a Public Clientele 
The relationship of the plebs vis-à-vis the élite was determined by 
patronage. These vertical ties were an important feature of Roman 
society. The patron provided legal or economic support {beneficia) in 
exchange for political services of his clients {officia). The patron-client 
relationships, just like many other aspects of Roman society, were not 
couched in a legal framework, but consisted of a trust relationship {fides ) 
to which both parties were morally bound.56 
The enormous population growth of Rome during the late Republic 
rendered personal contact between patron and client increasingly 
difficult. The wishes and grievances of the plebs could no longer be passed 
on to the élite through the existing primitive communication channels. In 
politics, moreover, the introduction of the secret ballot in the latter half of 
the second century resulted in a reduced control of the client by the 
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patron.57 Consequently, the vertical ties relaxed and it can be surmised 
that parts of the Roman plebs were even entirely free from such 
relationships with the ruling élite. This will particularly have concerned 
those groups among the plebs who possessed a certain degree of economic 
independence, the persons with a small business of their own: the artisans 
and shopkeepers. 
The process of relaxing patron-client relationships was intensified by 
the declining unity within the ruling élite, as a result of which politicians 
turned to the plebs for political support. Because of the bad functioning of 
the old forms, the need arose among the plebs for new forms of 
articulation of demands. That is why politicians, operating as popular 
leaders, were able to rally behind them large groups of the plebs, 
composed of plebeians who were free from vertical ties and of clients who 
were drained away from other members of the élite. Thus developed what 
could be called a public clientele, since the popular leader (the patron) was 
almost per definition a magistrate. The relationship between popular 
leader and public clientele was less personal than the traditional bonds, 
because direct material gain became more important than considerations 
of personal loyalty. As a consequence, this type of clientele was more 
volatile, as Gaius Gracchus had already experienced to his detriment 
(Rhet.Her. 67), and few popular leaders managed to keep their patronage 
of the plebs after the expiration of their term of office.58 
The Commentariolum Petitionis is an important source on the type of 
support a candidate should acquire in order to be elected. In addition, it is 
a manual for a new man, who had fewer resources at his disposal than a 
nobilis and therefore had to make more effort. Next to amici and 
relatives, Cicero had to obtain the support of the members of his tribe, his 
neighbors, his clients, his freedmen, and even his slaves.59 Thus a 
distinction is made between several groups, one of whom are the clients. 
A similar distinction between groups also is evident during the conspiracy 
of Catiline. According to Sallust {Cat. 50.1), Lentulus' freedmen and 
some of his clients (pauci ex clientibus) tried to mobilize artisans and 
slaves in Rome for the liberation of Lentulus from prison. This shows that 
clients constituted only a subdivision of the following which politicians 
had to obtain and that not all social groups in the city of Rome belonged to 
the clients. 
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For a candidate at the elections it was important to surround himself 
constantly with large groups of people as a demonstration of his 
importance and the size of his following. There were three ways of 
escorting a candidate during an election campaign, according to the 
Commentariolum Petitioms (34-38): salutano (calling at a candidate's 
home in the morning), deductw (escorting a candidate to the Forum), and 
adsectatio (full-time attendance); the last was the most important. 
The salutation especially formed a part of the show which members of 
the élite generally staged to emphasize their social status, and it also 
occurred with non-candidates.60 It was a traditional officium of clients. 
The morning-callers, however, had developed a new habit in the late 
Republic. They went to call upon several candidates in order to determine 
which candidate had the best chances of election and, therefore, from 
whom most was to be expected. This was a sign of disloyalty, according to 
Cicero. (Com.Pet. 35; Cic. Mur. 44.) It meant they were not bound by a 
strict tie of patronage to one person anymore. 
Cicero also offers us some indication who participated in the various 
forms of escorting. The deductores had the highest status, for Cicero was 
advised to go to the Forum each day at fixed hours lest he kept them 
waiting.61 Senators and équités already performed a major service if they 
took part in the deducilo, for they did not have the time to escort a 
candidate during the whole day. Those who did have the time and who 
participated in the adsectatio were the homines tenues non occupati, poor 
people who had nothing else to do.62 
The people who did have an occupation were the artisans and 
shopkeepers. They were unable to abandon their business during a whole 
day for full-time attendance, but could perform a salutation in the 
morning. And they were the persons who visited several candidates and 
were not tied to a single patron. This group made up the public clientele. 
The tabernani and opifices were mostly freedmen and either their own 
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bosses or the subordinate agents of an aristocrat63. At their manumission, 
slaves often received some capital from their ex-master to set up a 
business. Sometimes the relationship of dependence remained in force; 
sometimes too freedmen became relatively independent. The perspective 
of manumission was an important means of social control of the master 
over the slave and it made slaves work harder. As GARNS Ε Y justly 
remarks, it is not obvious that a slave who had bought his own freedom 
still would find himself in a strong relationship of dependence as a 
freedman. Furthermore, the Roman government in the late Republic 
limited the duties of the libertus towards his patron by the edict of the 
praetor Rutilius Rufus around 118.64 Before, the master had the right to 
demand obedience (obsequium) in exchange for freedom or the 
performance of manual labor (operae) after manumission. After the 
edict, only the operae remained, but those too were limited by law in 
scope and duration.65 Finally, we could wonder why the oligarchy 
resisted time and again the distribution of the freedmen's votes over the 
rural voting districts if the freedmen would have possessed a strong 
patron-client relationship.6 6 Within the group of freedmen large 
differences in wealth and social status existed. Due to their relative 
independence from patronage bonds the freedmen pre-eminently made up 
the public clientele.67 
The non occupati probably were freebom day-laborers, who had a 
lower socio-economic position and whose subsistence partly depended on 
the sportulae and similar material benefits which they received for their 
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adsectatio. This was a typical feature of patron-client relationships.68 In 
any case, they were citizens, for they had the right to vote, as Cicero tells 
us: "Allow the men who hope for everything from us to have something 
(the adsectatio) to give us in return. If poor men have nothing but their 
vote, then, even if they vote, their support is valueless."69 This group 
among the urban plebs was still vertically bound to individual members of 
the élite and their participation in collective behavior was determined by 
these patronage ties. In the light of what has been said in the previous 
section on the composition and the reactions of the spectators at the games, 
it is characteristic that precisely the homines tenues belonged to the people 
who received theater tickets (Cic. Mur. 72-73). 
The following statements may serve as a preliminary conclusion: The 
political influence of the substrata of Roman society was largest in the 
tribal assembly, in which laws were passed and lower magistrates were 
elected. In the timocratically organized centuriate assembly, which 
elected the higher magistrates, senators and équités controlled a major 
part of the votes and were able to call the shots. From a political and social 
perspective a differentiation, perhaps even a disintegration, arose in the 
lower social strata during the late Republic. The members of the rural 
plebs had limited opportunities for participation in political life in Rome. 
Those who dwelled at a reasonable distance from the city were 
increasingly bound by vertical ties. The urban plebs had many more 
opportunities for participation in collective behavior, but here too we 
need to differentiate. The participants in the types of collective behavior 
which were most important to the political process - the tribal assemblies 
and meetings - differed from the spectators at the games. The freebom 
remained tied in dependence and they, together with people from the 
countryside, made up a substantial part of the theater public. The 
freedmen shopkeepers and craftsmen, on the contrary, developed into an 
independent group. They exchanged their personal vertical ties for a 
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(privatae largitiones). Material assistance was an important component of thsbeneficia 
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more independent and more relaxed relationship with politicians: the 
public clientele.70 
Plebs Contionalis 
Our sources do not offer any information on the number of participants in 
collective behavior. In some cases one might conjecture that it concerned 
thousands, in others it related probably to small groups of some tens or 
hundreds. Unfortunately, that is all which can be said on the number of 
participants. In any case, it was technically impossible to assemble the 
entire urban plebs. Many gatherings and manifestations took place in or 
near the Forum. The Forum, for example, had not even enough space for 
the 320,000 grain recipients of the 50s. Only a fraction of the voters 
participated in elections and popular assemblies.71 In all cases of collective 
behavior, therefore, we are dealing with a part of the citizenry, mostly 
city-dwellers. 
MEIER postulates that a specific category among the urban plebs, which 
he calls the plebs contionalis, made up the bulk of the participants in the 
meetings and the tribal assemblies. This group consisted mainly of 
tabernarii.12 The term plebs contionalis as such does not occur in the 
ancient sources. Cicero only uses contionalis plebecula (Att. 1.16.11), 
contionarius populus (Q.Fr. 2.3.4), and turba forensi s (De Orat. 1.118). 
Nevertheless, I will continue to employ MEIER'S term here. In the 
previous section it has been demonstrated that there existed a group 
among the urban plebs, the public clientele, which pre-eminently was 
suitable for mobilization by popular leaders. This group, for the most 
part, was composed of artisans and shopkeepers. Did this group, then, 
match the group which participated in assemblies and meetings? 
Cicero, like other authors, employs various terms in his description of 
the Roman people, but that is usually more conclusive on the value 
judgment an author attaches to their behavior than on the composition of 
the crowd.73 Nonetheless, there are a number of sources which allow us 
some insight in the composition of the plebs contionalis. Cicero as well 
70
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arguments that the process of changing relationships between élite and plebs started in 
the second century. But MILLAR does not differentiate. In my view, the most 
independent citizens in the second century were to be found among the peasant 
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sometimes distinguishes between different groups. His designation of the 
plebs contionalis has already been mentioned. At the games, according to 
Cicero, the real Roman people were present. The following of the popular 
leaders, the public in the contiones, on the contrary, were a peculiar 
group (peculiaris populus, Sest. 125). Cicero also remarks that those who 
are mobilized by closing the shops cannot be equated with the populus 
Romanus {Dom. 89). 
As was remarked before, the artisans with Gaius Gracchus already 
constituted a separately mobilizable group. In several cases of collective 
behavior the participation of shopkeepers and artisans is specifically 
attested or highly likely.74 In Chapter 1 has already been established that 
several intermediate leaders of Clodius particularly mobilized tabernarii. 
In Chapter 3 on mobilization it will be shown that some important 
methods of mobilization were specifically aimed at the artisans and 
shopkeepers: the closing of the shops (tabernae) and the use of 
organizational frameworks, such as collegia and operae. In the plebeian 
organizations, the collegia, there were many freedmen. The operae were 
small groups organized for political purposes in which artisans and 
shopkeepers played an important role. Especially Clodius' following was 
made up primarily of such organizations.75 
The vicinity of the Forum in Rome, where collective behavior 
generally took place, was surrounded by shops. It was easy to mobilize 
tabernarii and opifices (Cic. Flac. 18). They are the people meant by 
"many energetic city folk, many influential and active freedmen are about 
the Forum", who were important in an election campaign.76 
Later, too, this group was seen as the most politically active. The 
popularity Caesar the dictator enjoyed was largest among the artisans and 
shopkeepers. According to Appian (2.112), in 44 slogans were written on 
the tribunal of M. Brutus and on the statues of his ancestors to urge him to 
take action against Caesar's dictatorship. It was said that this was done by 
the people, but Brutus' friend Cassius said to him: 
"If you want to defend the Republic, whom of the aristocracy will you not rally 
to your standard? Do you think it is artisans and shopkeepers who have written 
anonymously on your tribunal, or is it rather the Roman aristocrats, who, 
74
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though they ask from other praetors games, horse-races, and combats of wild 
beasts, ask from you liberty, a deed worthy of your ancestry?"?? 
Indeed, when Brutus and Cassius shortly afterwards actually took steps 
against Caesar, the people by no means reacted enthusiastically.78 
An interesting parallel is to be found in Livy (9.46). Cn. Flavius was 
aedile in 304. He was of humble stock: his father was a freedman and 
Flavius had been a scribe. He had been elected aedile by the forensis 
factio. This faction had become powerful because Appius Claudius the 
censor of 312 had distributed the urbani humiles over all 35 tribes. The 
result was that the Forum and the Campus were corrupted. Since then 
there existed an opposition between the integer populus and the forensis 
factio. Shortly afterwards, to prevent that the latter group would continue 
to rule the comitia, the measure was repealed and the. forensis turba was 
restricted to the four urban tribes. 
It is necessary to examine this passage in greater depth. Livy's 
description is an anachronism on account of the following considerations, 
starting with the "corruption" of the Forum and the Campus. With that, 
Livy means to say that the city-dwellers, because of Appius' reform, 
received a greater influence in the tribal assembly and the centuriate 
assembly respectivily. The tribal organization, however, was introduced 
in the centuriate assembly only after 241. Modifications in the distribution 
of the votes in the tribes, therefore, could not have had any influence on 
the elections in the centuriate assembly in 312.79 
BAUMAN recently has contested this interpretation. He devotes an 
entire chapter to the policy of Appius Claudius. He departs from Livy's 
description and does not deal with the question of anachronism in his 
sources.
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 Against the interpretation that the reallocation of the tribes by 
Appius could not have had any influence on the centuriate assembly 
BAUMAN puts a "common sense argument": "(...) if Appius' reforms did 
not affect the voting strength in the comitia centuriata, then the factio had 
nothing whatever to do with Appius' own electoral successes, since all his 
major offices depended on centuriate elections. In that case why did he 
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have anything to do with the factio?"81 What BAUMAN does not mention is 
that after 300, when his reform was annulled and the influence of the 
forensis factio was nullified, Appius became praetor in 297 and 295 and 
consul for the second time in 296. BAUMAN's common sense argument, 
therefore, does not hold, because the reduced voting strength of the 
forensis factio apparently did not influence Appius' subsequent career.82 
Thus Livy's description should be considered anachronistic. 
Second, Livy's description is anachronistic because the forensis turba, 
the Forum crowd, consisted of freedmen. Livy does not say it in so many 
words, except for Flavius' father's servile descent, but his description of 
the redistribution of the city-dwellers strongly corresponds to a late 
Republican problem. The freedmen in Rome had Roman citizenship, but, 
despite attempts by popular leaders to distribute them over all 35 tribes 
and thereby increase their weight in the voting83, they remained 
registered in the four urban tribes. Plutarch does mention that Appius' 
measure concerned freedmen {Pubi. 7.5). Although Rome had grown 
considerably at the end of the fourth century, it still was a traditional city-
state without a clear separation between town and country. Freedmen will 
have made up a much smaller part of the urban population than in the late 
Republic. The distribution of the urbani humiles over all the tribes, as 
stated by Livy, therefore, is a projection of the author's contemporary 
experiences onto the early Republic.84 
Third, Livy's presentation of Appius Claudius' policy bears too close a 
resemblance to the popular policy of the late Republic: public works (Via 
Appia and an aqueduct) to gain popularity and a policy directed towards 
the freedmen (Diod. 20.36). Plutarch, moreover, calls Appius a 
demagogos on the basis of granting the voting right to the freedmen 
{Pubi. 7.5). 
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Finally, Livy employs the terminology of the late Republic in the 
passage mentioned85, which particularly follows from the fact that Cicero 
(De Orai. 1.118) and Livy both use the term forens i s turba. Cicero even 
speaks of the turba et barbaria forensis, which might imply a pejorative 
reference to the freedmen, who usually were of foreign origin. 
Something, of course, was going on at the end of the fourth century. 
Probably Appius wanted to increase the influence of those who had been 
recently (by the lex Poetilia of 326) released from debt slavery.86 Livy 
expresses all this in anachronistic terms. Livy tries to project the origin of 
the importance of the urban plebs in Roman politics, and especially the 
freedmen, in the fourth century. His Forum crowd is a reflection of his 
own days and was composed of freedmen.87 Freedmen made up the bulk 
of the artisans and shopkeepers. Once more, we have an indication that the 
plebs contionalis от Ú\e forensis factio in the late Republic consisted of 
that group. Another indication of the political importance of the freedmen 
is to be found in the fact that Gellius Poblicola, one of Clodius' 
intermediate leaders, was able to gain popularity among the plebs by 
means of a marriage with a freedwoman (Cic. Sest. 110). 
We still have to deal with the participation of slaves in collective 
behavior. Cicero especially accused Clodius of recruiting his following 
mainly from slaves. That was a rhetorical exaggeration, which was 
particularly aimed at the freedmen who were insultingly indicated by 
their former servile status.88 In one of his philosophical works, the 
Academica, Cicero recounts how this was done: 
"Why then, Lucullus, do you bring me into disfavor, and summon me before a 
public meeting, so to speak, and actually order the shops to be shut, like 
seditious tribunes are used to do? For what is the object of your complaint that 
we are abolishing the practical sciences, unless it aims at stirring up the 
crafsmen? But if they all come together from every quarter, it will be easy to 
incite them to attack your side! First I will make the snide remarks, that all the 
85
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persons then standing in the meeting are on your showing exiles, slaves, and 
madmen;..."89 
On the one hand, this passage proves that slaves made up only a minor part 
of the participants; on the other hand, it provides us yet another indication 
that the following of the popular leaders was mainly composed of artisans 
and shopkeepers. 
Catiline refused to accept slaves as participants in his revolt, because it 
was against his interests (Sail. Cat. 56.5). Only after his uprising in the 
city proved abortive was he prepared to admit fugitive rural slaves as 
auxiliary forces.90 Slaves will have been part of the operae, the small 
groups Clodius and others employed for agitation. These slaves will have 
been recruited especially from the personal familia of the politician 
concerned. The recruitment of slaves was an emergency measure91 and 
was considered most offensive. Furthermore, because of a tradition of the 
use of slaves as a last resort, the involvement of slaves might give potential 
participants the impression that the cause was already lost. There was not 
much sense in a political strategy directed towards slaves, since only 
citizens had the right to vote and a certain control at the voting may be 
assumed. A popular leader, moreover, was in danger of losing his 
indispensible support among members of the upper strata by the 
mobilization of slaves.92 
What is more, the mobilization of slaves quite possibly might prove 
counterproductive. Despite the freedom of movement of the urban slaves, 
there existed a major social distinction between slaves and free. In the 
collegia, plebeian organizations which formed an important mobilization 
factor, freebom, freedmen, and slaves participated together. But these 
colleges reproduced in themselves the social stratification and the 
ideological prejudices of the city; that is to say, the slaves had a 
89
 Cic. Acad. 2.144: "Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem 
vocas, et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni soient, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat 
illud cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? Qui si undique 
omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur! expromam primum illa invidiosa, 
quod eos omnes qui in contione stabunt exsules servos insanos esse dicatis;..." 
90
 J. ANNEQUIN, Esclaves et affranchis dans la conjuration de Catilina, Actes du 
colloque 1971 sur l'esclavage, Paris 1972, pp. 193-238; K.R. BRADLEY, Slaves and 
the Conspiracy of Catiline, CPh 73 (1978), pp. 329-336; LGRR 428-429; K.W. 
WELWEI, Das Sklavenproblem als politischer Faktor in der Krise der römischen 
Republik, in: MOMMSEN, Elend, pp. 50-69, esp. 61-63. 
91
 E.g. B-15, 25, 70. 
On the low participation of slaves in the late Republic: WELWEI, op.cit.n.90, 61-69. 
92
 See also J. ANNEQUIN, M. LéTROUBLON, Une approche des discours de Cicerón: 
les niveaux d'intervention des esclaves dans la violence, Actes du colloque 1972 sur 
l'esclavage, Paris 1974, pp. 211-247, esp. 235-247. According to the authors it is 
impossible, despite a detailed content analysis of a number of Cicero's speeches from 
the 50s, to establish how many slaves participated in collective violence. The slaves, in 
any case, did not operate independently. 
ALFÖLDI, Caesar, 15-19, and METAXAKI-MITROU, op.cit., 182 and 186, do attribute 
an important role to the slaves as participants. 
91 
subordinate position and the leaders of the colleges were recruited from 
persons who already before their election possessed a higher social 
position.93 
Citizens of low social status, to be sure, were aware of the stratification 
of Roman society. Freedmen had citizenship, but all the same they were 
restricted to such an extent that they were not eligible for office and were 
only allowed to vote in the four urban tribes. Attempts to change that 
encountered resistance (B-14). Therefore it is not conceivable that Roman 
citizens would have accepted political participation of the unfree. Hence 
Cicero's invectives stress exactly this point. Roman society was vertically 
stratified; there was no question of horizontal solidarity. 
The socio-political stratification of the Roman urban plebs, which 
became manifest in the participation in collective behavior, had the 
following appearance: The slaves, whose influence from a political point 
of view was slightest, were at the bottom. Above them were the free 
citizens who still found themselves in a position of dependence on the 
élite. The upper stratum of the urban plebs was formed by the public 
clientele, or the Forum crowd, or the plebs contionalis, for the major part 
composed of freedmen artisans and shopkeepers. Socially and 
economically, and consequently politically, these persons took up an 
independent position. Among this group the participants in the politically 
relevant collective behavior were to be found, for their independence 
granted them a larger freedom of choice in political matters.94 A popular 
leader had to turn to the artisans and shopkeepers if he wanted to mobilize 
a following which went beyond his personal clientele. The public clientele 
finds its equivalent in RUDé's "Preindustriai Crowd" and HOBSBAWM's 
93
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"Church and King Mob", which did not consist of Lumpenproletariat, but 
of respectable artisans and shopkeepers.95 
The Participants and their Susceptibility to Popular Policy 
How did the policy, as it was pursued by popular leaders, fit in with the 
needs and expectations of the participants? We will now pass in review a 
number of important matters which formed part of the program, insofar 
as something of the sort existed, which popular leaders presented to the 
people. First of all, there was largess, the largitiones. There were two 
forms of largess: largitiones financed from public means and largitiones 
financed from private means. 
An important type of public largess were the com laws. The city of 
Rome, which had expanded into a metropolis, was no longer able to 
supply its own food from the immediate vicinity. That is why grain had to 
be imported to an increasing degree, initially from Italy and later from 
the conquered territories such as Sicily and Africa.96 Gams Gracchus had 
introduced the practice of distributing subsidized grain in 123. During the 
late Republic this practice was several times abolished and reintroduced 
until Clodius instituted the distribution of free com by the government.97 
Not only the price of grain was important, but also the care for an 
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adequate supply and storage. Clodius' law not only provided for a free 
monthly ration, but also for measures concerning the infrastructure to 
improve the supply.98 In 57 Pompey was put in charge of the com 
supply." At times magistrates, from their own pockets, handed out grain 
and oil to the people.100 
During the Principate the grain recipients received a kind of 
identification (tessera) with which they could collect their monthly ration. 
In that way it was also possible to put a limit on the number of recipients. 
But during the Republic the distribution was arranged by means of lists 
with the names of the com recipients.101 Clodius' arson of the temple of 
Nymphs was connected with the organization of the distribution. Clodius' 
com law had resulted in a wave of manumissions, which led to an 
enormous increase of the number of com recipients and caused problems 
in the com supply. As a part of his cura annanae Pompey wanted to revise 
the lists of recipients and to remove the recent freedmen. The lists were 
placed in the temple of Nymphs and Clodius had them destroyed. Thus, 
Clodius tried to prevent freedmen from not benefiting any longer from 
the distributions, since he would lose an important part of his support 
among the urban plebs. For the increased number of freedmen probably 
had strengthened Clodius' following.102 
We know that the distributions amounted to a monthly ration of five 
modii of com for each male citizen. We also know that this quantity 
largely sufficed to feed one person, but not a whole family.103 The com 
distributions were insufficient for Romans without a fixed income to keep 
afloat and they remained dependent on casual work and occasional gifts 
from members of the élite. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the 
very poor were capable of raising the money to pay for the subsidized 
grain; only after the introduction of the free distribution did all citizens 
benefit10*. 
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For the tabernarii, however, these distributions, on top of the normal 
income from their business, could be sufficient to make them 
economically independent from their patron. Consequently, the grain 
laws were especially in their interest. The city plebs regularly rose in 
revolt because of a com shortage, and politicians could take advantage of 
it by enacting measures concerning the corn supply, i.e. measures 
concerning the com distributions or measures to improve the com 
supply. The participation of tabernarii in a food riot can be traced in one 
case.
1 0 5
 They had something to lose and were prepared to fight for it. 
Catiline tried to mobilize especially this group among the urban plebs (B-
23). Therefore, it is characteristic that the senate deemed it necessary to 
calm the urban plebs and to prevent its participation in the conspiracy by 
means of a com law. 
The identification of the plebs contionalis with the plebs frumentaria 
becomes obvious in a quote in Cicero: "that wretched and starveling plebs 
contionalis, blood-sucker of the treasury". An important argument of the 
opponents of leges frumentariae has always been the pressure on the 
treasury. Because Cicero depicts the plebs contionalis as being disastrous 
to public finance, it may be suitably assumed that he has the com 
recipients in mind.106 After the fall of the Republic the grain distributions 
remained in force, and the emperors went to great lengths in order to 
provide for an adequate grain supply. It was one of the most important 
ways by which the emperors secured the support of the Roman urban 
plebs. 107 
The banquets which were organized for the plebs and the increasing 
habit of distributing money among the voters in elections can be 
mentioned as lar guiones in a material sense.108 By inviting people to a 
banquet tribe by tribe (tributim, Com.Pet. 44), their favor could be 
curried by voting unit. AlGNER has recently claimed that money 
distributions particularly went to the higher strata, considering their 
control of the centuriate assembly.109 Money distributions at elections for 
the higher magistracies certainly must have occurred on a larger scale, 
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given the interests at stake and the fierce competition. But also at elections 
for lower magistracies in the tribal assembly such electoral corruption 
took place. For Cicero's speech Pro Piando is a defense of Plancius, who 
was accused of having committed electoral corruption with the aid of 
divisores during the aedilician elections of 55. Besides, Verres had tried 
to sabotage Cicero's election to aedile through his contacts with the 
divisores.u() The aediles were elected by the tribal assembly. 
Agrarian laws were another type of favors bestowed on the plebs by 
the government.111 Leges agrariae, however, were unable to meet the 
demands of the urban plebs. The city-dwellers did not much fancy the idea 
of fanning. This was especially true of the group which we have been able 
to distinguish as the most politically active: the artisans and shopkeepers. 
The situation was perhaps different for the poor freebom and for former 
peasants who had recently migrated to Rome. The agrarian law of Rullus 
in 63 failed because Rullus was unable to muster sufficient support. Rullus 
himself realized it in some way and he proposed to let the members of the 
land-distributing committee be elected by only half of the tribes.112 
Rullus' scheme to mitigate demographic pressure in Rome by means of 
land distributions113 was completely outdated and a misinterpretation of 
the needs of the urban plebs. 
The agrarian laws which did have success were intended for veterans, 
such as the leges agrariae of Sulla and Caesar. Tiberius Gracchus already 
had to rely on the support of the country folk for his agrarian law. Despite 
his popularity among the urban plebs, Caesar deemed it necessary to call 
soldiers to Rome in order to pass his agrarian law in 59. An agrarian law 
110
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was insufficient to make the urban plebs enthusiastic.114 Caesar also added 
a supplement to his agrarian law in 59: the lex Campana. This law 
provided for a land distribution in Campania for 20,000 poor citizens 
with more than three children, the proletarians in the literal sense of the 
word. But this law was directed towards citizens in general and not only 
towards city-dwellers.115 During his dictatorship Caesar also started a 
project to found overseas colonies, in which a considerable number of the 
colonists was composed of urban proletarians.116 Agrarian laws in the late 
Republic could only count on response from a limited proportion of the 
urban plebs, if they were meant for that group in the first place. An 
agrarian law was mainly aimed at acquiring support among soldiers, who 
received a piece of land on discharge and who thereby returned to their 
original profession. But this, incidentally, was the group which would 
play a decisive part in the eventual power struggle. 
The public works were a mixture of public and private largess. Some 
magistrates, such as the aediles, had the duty of carrying out certain public 
works. These were financed by the treasury, but the provided funds were 
not always adequate. In that case, or if the person in charge wished to 
make his project especially grand, private money was invested in the 
public works. The constructions were part of the elite's conspicious 
consumption. There were also private persons who, on their own 
initiative and at their own expense, erected temples and other buildings. 
Finally, there was the construction of non-public buildings, such as 
residences, an undoubtably frequent phenomenon of which there are but 
few references in the sources. Many Romans lived in ramshackle 
tenement blocks {insulae). The construction of such buildings provided 
work for plebeians and popularity to the commissionar. Thus Crassus was 
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in the habit of buying up insulae damaged by fire and subsequently to 
restore and rent them.117 
Public works provided employment for craftsmen and day laborers. 
They supplied a need and the person who financed the works made 
himself popular.118 Lucius Caesar, a distant relative of Gaius the dictator, 
won the consular elections in 65 as a result of his actions as curator of the 
Via Raminia (Cic. Att. 1.1.2). Gaius Caesar owed his popularity among 
the urban plebs largely to his building projects. At the beginning of his 
political career, Caesar invested a lot of his own money in the Via Appia. 
As aedile he ordered the construction of buildings. (Plut. Caes. 5.5; Suet. 
lul. 10.1.) Later, in 52, he started the construction of a forum as part of 
his election campaign for a second consulate. He financed it with the 
Gallic war booty. (Suet. lul. 26.2.) Pompey too knew how to use this 
method. In 55 he started the construction of a theater which, according to 
Cassius Dio, still won admiration in the third century A.D. (Dio 39.38.1; 
Plut. Pomp. 52.4). We can further point to the Pons Fabricius, with which 
the aedile L. Fabricius spanned the Tiber in 62; the plans for a large-scale 
construction and repair of roads, proposed by the tribune of the plebs 
Curio in 50; and the Basilica Aemilia, reconstructed by order of the 
consul Aemilius Paullus in 50.119 
An important type of largitiones was the organization of games. There 
were games which took place at fixed intervals as religious 
manifestations. These were public games organized by a magistrate, 
mostly an aedile. By putting their own money into the organization of the 
games magistrates could receive important publicity for their subsequent 
political career.120 The obligatory games were often concluded with a 
supplement of venationes, popular animal fights which the organizer 
payed from private means.121 Next to those, there were muñera, games 
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offered by private persons which consisted in the well-attended gladiator 
fights.122 These were organized in honor of a deceased relative, but that 
increasingly became a pretext. Because the organizer was entirely free in 
the choice of the scope and the time of the muñera, these games were pre-
eminently fit for obtaining goodwill. During the late Republic, therefore, 
muñera were not organized until the giver was on the verge of an 
election.123 
The question that arises is for whom these largitiones were meant. 
Considering the difference in composition between the public at the games 
and the participants in the popular assembly, it is plausible that such 
largitiones were not only meant for the plebs contionalis. 
Characteristically, the offering of games, and the same goes for electoral 
corruption and banquets, is almost exclusively mentioned in conjunction 
with elections for higher magistracies, i.e. the offices elected by the 
centuriate assembly, and the time of the muñera was determined by 
impending elections.124 For the subsequent careers of the aediles, who 
were charged with the organization of the official games, depended on the 
centuriate assembly, and there existed a positive correlation between the 
offering of games and the further career of an aedile.125 These largitiones 
served to acquire the favor of the entire Roman people, from bottom to 
top. Consequently, they were not only used by typical popular leaders. It 
was a normal feature of the career of every member of the élite. Unlike 
com or agrarian laws, which aimed at a specific part of the Roman 
people, largitiones such as games were not considered specifically 
demagogic during the late Republic. The image of the politician 
determined whether his largess was judged positively or negatively.126 
The Compitalia, on the contrary, were a type of games aimed solely at 
the urban plebs. These were semi-official games, i.e. they did not belong 
to the official public games, nor were they a private initiative like the 
muñera. The Compitalia were organized at the turn of the year by the 
collegia compitalicia. They were a religious festival of the city population 
to honor the gods of the crossroads (lares compítales).121 The collegia 
were an important resource for popular leaders. That is why the senate in 
64 prohibited these organizations and thereby the festivals organized by 
the colleges, such as the Compitalia (Ase. 75C). Despite the ban, a tribune 
of the plebs in 61 attempted to organize the popular festival of the 
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Compitalia, but the consul designate Q. Metellus Celer prevented it.128 
Clodius, who saw to the organization of the games at the beginning of his 
tribunate in 58, was more successful (B-40). Shortly afterwards, the 
games were again authorized through the lex Clodia de collegiis, which 
reinstated the colleges and permitted the institution of new ones.129 
Clodius obtained great popularity by the law. 
A final aspect of popular policy was composed of technical political 
measures which concerned the operation of political decision-making and 
the political rights of the people.130 Already before Sulla, a number of 
innovations in that respect had been introduced, such as the secret ballot 
and the narrowing of the voting bridges to prevent manipulation of the 
vote. Such measures facilitated the operation of the popular assembly 
because traditional methods of manipulation were taken from the élite. 
Thus, Clodius passed a law in 58 which abolished the obnuntiatio, a type 
of religious obstruction of the assembly, and which increased the number 
of days on which legislation through the popular assembly was 
permitted.131 In addition, the law on the colleges provided Clodius with 
the opportunity to use the organizations of the plebs for mobilization 
purposes. 
An especially popular measure was the restoration of the powers of the 
tribunate of the plebs, which had been restricted by Sulla. The urban plebs 
was aware of the importance of the tribunes of the plebs for the 
promotion of its interests and the plebs was prepared to work for this 
political issue. After Sulla, L. Quinctius in 74 (Ap-41) was the first to 
appoint himself again as a popular leader through the tribunate of the 
plebs: 
"Since the rostra had long been unoccupied and because that spot since the 
coming of Sulla had been deserted by the voice of the tribunes, (Quinctius) 
seized upon it and recalled the crowd, now long unused to contiones, to a 
semblance of its former practice. That is how he became popular, among a 
certain class of people, for a short period of time." 132 
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In this quotation from Cicero, it is stated that a part of the plebs 
{quiddam hominum genus, "a certain kind of people") deemed the 
tribunate of the plebs important. The plebs contionalis is meant, the most 
politicized and the one for whom the tribunes were the most important. 
By restoring the tribunicia potestas as consul in 70, Pompey made himself 
very popular.133 
Another example is the bill proposed in 63 by the tribune of the plebs 
Labienus (Ap-20) with the support of Caesar. Until then the priestly 
colleges of the pontiffs were complemented by cooptation. Because of the 
new law, they now were elected by the people. The law contributed to 
Caesar's election to pontifex maximus that same year, despite competition 
from a strong candidate like Catulus; thus Caesar secured a prestigious 
office.134 
The question of the distribution of the votes of the freedmen over all 
tribes came to the fore twice in the period under investigation. The grant 
of the opportunity to the freedmen to vote in all tribes, instead of merely 
the four urban tribes to which they were restricted, would enormously 
increase the political weight of this important group among the urban 
plebs. None of the proposed leges de libertinorum suffragiis, however, 
was passed. Manilius attempted one unsuccessfully in 66 and Clodius had 
one in his program when he was killed in 52.1 3 5 
Within this framework also fits the lex Clodia de capite civis, a law 
which Clodius passed in the popular assembly in 58. The law provided for 
legal protection, for it prohibited the execution of Roman citizens without 
trial. The law was obviously aimed against the execution of the 
Catilinarian conspirators in 63 by the consul Cicero, and Clodius 
therefore followed the law up by a lex de exsilio Ciceronis. The object of 
Clodius' laws was to cast doubt on the senatus consultum ultimum, an 
important means of repression of the senatorial oligarchy.136 
In some cases interest groups participated, when measures concerning 
their specific interests were promulgated. Thus, slaves and freedmen took 
up a politically active position with the lex Manilla de libertinorum 
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suffragiis in 67 (В-14), already mentioned. The consul Piso in 67 
proposed a bill to combat electoral corruption. The divisores, who acted 
as intermediaries in the distribution of money among the tribes, rose in 
revolt against the proposal and attempted to sabotage the voting in the 
assembly with violence. (B-13.) Finally, in the same category fit the laws 
which were beneficial to the équités, such as measures giving access to the 
court juries, and measures in favor of the tax farmers.137 These laws were 
not as much meant for obtaining popular favor, but were aimed at 
influential groups in the upper strata of Roman society. They could 
possibly receive a popular character if they were presented as measures 
directed against the senatorial oligarchy. 
At the beginning of his tribunate in 58, Clodius proposed four bills 
simultaneously.138 Two of those had an obviously popular character: the 
lex frumentaria and the lex de collegiis. The character of the other two 
was more technical political: the already mentioned law on the regulations 
of the popular assembly and a law on the limitation of the powers of the 
censors. Gaius Gracchus had offered a similar package to the popular 
assembly in 123. Technical political measures as such perhaps were not 
sufficient to win the plebs for a popular leader and, therefore, were 
offered together with a measure which offered the plebs direct material 
advantages. 
To sum up, it can be stated that popular policy consisted of laws which 
offered material benefits to the people, public works, games, and laws 
which technically facilitated popular politics or which could produce the 
support of interest groups. The most active group, as far as participation 
is concerned, - the plebs contionalis - was only partly susceptible to the 
listed components of popular policy. Measures concerning the com 
supply and distribution were certainly in their interest, agrarian laws 
were not. Building was beneficial to artisans, but especially also to the 
poor freebom citizens. The plebs contionalis took advantage of the games 
in the theater and the circus only insofar as they gained access to these; 
furthermore, the games were not only aimed at that group. Technical 
political measures could possibly count on a certain response. 
All things considered, we must conclude that a large part of the 
"program" of the popular leaders did not fit the needs and expectations of 
the plebs contionalis. What is more, the matters mentioned could be 
introduced by any member of the élite, of which Cato's com law is an 
obvious example. Finally, a politician could not implement such measures 
at any desired moment. For example, in a time of surplus there was not 
much sense in proposing a law concerning the com supply. Popular 
policy, as it has been set forth in this section, resulted in fame and 
contributed to the leader's popularity, but it was not of overriding 
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importance.139 Some politicians, however, were more proficient in 
popular politics than others; to induce the plebs and in particular the plebs 
contionalis to collective political action, clearly more was needed than the 
measures enumerated above. How it was done will be explained in the next 
chapter on mobilization. 
139
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In this chapter we will deal with how the various forms of collective 
behavior came about, how the assembly of a number of people developed 
into collective behavior, and especially in what way cooperation between 
leaders and participants was established. It concerns the problem of 
mobilization. Mobilization means the process of actions and events that 
lead to the gathering of a number of people, who subsequently act as a 
group. Mobilization equally concerns the way in which leaders and 
participants are brought together and act jointly. In this chapter the 
factors will be treated which resulted in the mobilization of larger groups 
of people and incited them to collective behavior. 
Communication and Propaganda 
I low did leaders and people communicate with each other? And how was a 
leader able to convey to the people that he deserved their support? From 
time immemorial the communication between the élite and the collectivity 
of the plebs passed through personal contacts and orations. As the city 
grew larger without corresponding technical improvements in the means 
of communication, these two ways of communication declined in 
importance, and new channels had to be sought to establish the contact 
between leaders and crowd. Two important new communication 
structures - the organizations of the plebs and the intermediate leaders -
will be dealt with in the sections on organization and the role of 
leadership. Intermediate leaders could approach the right groups among 
the plebs to acquire support and to mobilize them. Through colleges and 
neighborhoods larger groups of people could easily be reached. In this 
way, too, rumors spread.1 
Personal contact still existed with one's own clients and at the escorts 
and salutations of an important person.2 In that way a politician could 
propagate his plans and his personality. At the salutations at his home 
more was required from the host during the late Republic, since the plebs 
1
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contionalis was in the habit of visiting several candidates before making a 
choice (Com.Pet. 35; Cic. Mur. 44). 
Notwithstanding the necessity of new means of communication, 
oratory, the pre-eminent persuasion of antiquity, was still playing a not 
insignificant part in influencing the plebs. Cicero's Second Speech on the 
Agrarian Law is an example that not only popular leaders commanded 
this method. Oratory could serve to launch slogans and to communicate 
the policy and the personality of the leader. Thus also political opponents 
could be blackened.3 
In a hierarchical society, such as the Roman, the orator's effectiveness 
to an important degree depended on his status. In Rome this status was 
determined by the orator's social background, the offices he held, the 
military commands he obtained, and his liberality towards society. 
In the propaganda of the popular leaders political slogans were 
frequently launched.4 A recurrent theme was libertas. Libertas meant the 
citizen's freedom of action within the res publica, legal protection, and 
sovereignty. Connected to that and in a certain sense part of it were the 
rights of the people, such as the vote, and the tribunate of the plebs as the 
protector of the plebs and the promoter of its interests. Thus the 
restoration of the tribunicia potestas by Pompey was a restoration of 
libertas.5 
The populares exhorted the people to defend their rights and to 
preserve their libertas, which were endangered by the oligarchy.6 When 
Cicero in 65 acted as a lawyer for Cornelius, the popular tribune of the 
plebs of 67, he took over the themes of the populares in his oration and 
extolled the laws which had extended the libertas and the rights of the 
people (Ase. 78C). The populares accused the senate of repressing the 
people by a tyrannical rule.7 
In turn, the populares were accused by their political opponents of 
endangering libertas. The latter especially stressed the authority of the 
3
 On the style and the use of oratory of the populares, see: J.M. DAVID, "Eloquentia 
popularis" et conduites symboliques des orateurs de la fin de la République: problèmes 
d'efficacité, QS 6 (1980), pp. 171-211. 
4
 On the propaganda of the populares see: MEIER, RE, 595-599; TAYLOR, PP. 142-
148 (only on the 50s). 
5
 HELLEGOUARC'H, op.dr., 542-551. See also FERRARY, in: Storia, pp. 761-766; 
A.U. STYLOW, Libertas und Liberalitas. Untersuchungen zur innenpolitischen 
Propaganda der Römer, Diss. München 1972, pp. 12-17 and 20-28. 
6
 A characteristic example is the speech of the consul Lepidus, who called upon the 
people to restore libertas after the tyrannical rule of Sulla together with him (Sail. Hist. 
1.55M). The same in the speech of the tribune of the plebs Macer in 73 {ibidem 
3.48M). See further Sail. Cat. 38.1 and 3, lug. 41; HELLEGOUARC'H, op.dr., 551-
556; MARTIN 45, 57, 64, and 214; SEAGER, CQ, pp. 331-332; TAYLOR, PP, 72; 
WIRSZUBSKI, op.ci'f., 63-76. 
7
 Plut. Cat.Min. 29.1, Cic. 12.1; HELLEGOUARC'H, op.di., 559-565. It is a theme 
which especially occurs in Sallust, who expresses the tradition of the populares : Cat. 
20.11, Яш. 3.48.1-4M, lug. 31.23; cf. lug. 41, Ep.Caes. 2.3.6. See also the already 
mentioned Pro Cornelio by Cicero (Ase. 79C). 
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senate, which allegedly was the best guarantee for the libertas popuh. The 
populares were also pictured as tyrants and it was pointed out that the 
extraordinary commands could lead to one-man rule.8 
The popular leaders linked the slogan commodum ("interest", 
particulaily material interest) to the slogan libertas, by which they stated 
that they would defend the interests of the people. Thus Labienus accused 
Cicero of being contrary to the people's interests (alienus a commodis 
vestris, Cic. Rab.Perd. 15). Commoda increasingly became a substitute 
for libertas. 9 Commoda pre-eminently consisted of corn and agrarian 
laws and all kinds of largitiones. To gain the favor of the people Cicero 
was advised in his election campaign to take care that the multitude 
considered him as someone who was attentive to its interests {Com Pet. 
53). The following year Cicero called himself before the people a consul 
popularis, who had the commoda of the people in mind {Leg.Agr. 1.14-
15), and he stressed the right of the people to elect those magistrates who 
attended to the promotion of their interests (ibidem 17). According to 
Cicero, Pompey, who at that moment was the most popular leader, had the 
guardianship of libertas and the patronage of the commoda.™ Cicero 
exhorted the people to follow him and to save their "influence, libertas, 
votes, dignity, city, forum, games, festivals, and all other commoda " . n 
Later as well Cicero mentioned libertas and commoda in one breath, now 
as part of the anti-propaganda against the popular leaders. It was the 
senate, according to Cicero, who protected and extended the libertas and 
the commoda of the plebs.12 
At the end of the 50s, the value of slogans such as libertas and "rights 
of the people" declined, probably as a result of the increasing violence and 
corruption in politics, but also of a shift towards commoda. In 56 Cicero 
claimed that the people were more in need of peace and quiet under an 
honorable government than libertas (Sest. 98 and 103-105). After 
Caesar's death these slogans were unable to mobilize the plebs anymore. 
Despite an appeal to libertas and res publica, the tyrannicides were 
8 Cic LegAgr 2 9 , 15-17, 24, 29, 71, 102, and 3 16, Rab Perd 11-13, Sail Cat 
38 2-3, HELLEGOUARC'H, op at, 551-555 and 557-565, SLAGFR, CQ, 338 η 2, 
WlRSZUBSKl, op cit, 51-55 and 76-81 The oration of the consul Philippus in 77, in 
which he accuses Lepidus of repression of libertas (Sail. Hist 1 77 3 and 6M), was 
not held before the people (HFLLEGOUARC'H, op at, 552), but in the senate 
9
 HELLEGOUARC'H, op at, 556-557. See also SEAGER, CQ, 332 
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 Custodia libenatis, patrocinio commodorum (Leg Agr 2 25) 
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 Ibidem 71. "Vos vero. Quintes, si me audire vultis, retínete istam possessionem 
gratiae, libertatis, suffragiorum, dignitatis, urbis, fon, ludorum, festorum dierum, 
ceterorum omnium commodorum " Tickets for the shows were counted among 
commoda (Cic Mur 72-73) Matters concerning the com supply too were an important 
argument before the plebs teg Agr 2 80 
1 2
 Sest 137. Another example in the same speech is that Cicero says that the populares 
from the past gained support with largitio and tpes commodi (105, see aho Leg Agr 
2 81) By that Cicero means the lex tabellaría of Cassius, the lex agraria of Tiberius 
Gracchus and the lex frumentaria of Gaius Gracchus (103) 
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received by the people with hostility.13 From a political point of view the 
tyrannicides were right, of course. The coup against Caesar's dictatorship 
re-established the libertas populi, which enabled the people to exert their 
rights again. At that time, however, other matters had become more 
important than libertas. The urban plebs considered a leader who 
promoted its interests of higher importance than political rights. The 
plebs contionalis had recognized that its interests were better realized 
through a popular leader like Caesar than through traditional patronage 
tics or political structures. The shift in meaning and mobilization potential 
of these slogans reflected the development of the leader as a promoter of 
interests, as patronus of the public clientele. 
It goes without saying that slogans such as libertas and commoda 
reached their greatest impact if they were coupled with tangible actions, 
such as games, com laws, and political reform proposals. In this respect 
we discover the communicative value of largitiones, such as games, 
muñera, and also large constructions. These were veritable spectacles, in 
which the greatness and the altruism of the giver could be expressed. This 
liberality involved enormous amounts of money, but it was not a 
redistribution of income. Part of it was public service, but the 
supplementary personal expenses were neither obligatory nor were they 
made on a structural basis. Building activities indeed yielded employment 
for many members of the plebs, yet their initial purpose was symbolic and 
communicative. They were not meant as a poor relief, but as a 
demonstration of the giver's social status and magnanimity.14 
The populares from the past had an important propagandistic function. 
For a long time they remained beloved and known to the people. In some 
cases, such as the Gracchi, one might even speak of the creation of a 
legend. Statues were erected for the Gracchi, sacrifices were made on the 
spots were they had been killed, they were worshipped like gods. Marius 
was similarly adored. It is said that even Catiline's grave was covered with 
flowers.1 5 By praising these popular leaders from the past, by 
worshipping them, and by recalling their memory in orations, the popular 
leaders in the years 80-50 suggested a solidarity with and a continuity of 
their policy, although in practice they often pursued quite different 
13
 App. 2.120-121; Plut. Brut. 18.5-7, Caes. 67.4. Earlier, in 49, Caesar in a speech 
to his soldiers before the crossing of the Rubicon pointed to the fact that the rights of 
the tribunes of the plebs had been violated (SC 1.7, see also 1.5). On the use of libertas 
as a slogan by Caesar in that period, see: K. RAAFLAUB, Dignitatis contentio. Studien 
zur Motivation und politische Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius, 
München 1974, pp. 160-174. Caesar had difficulty with showing his credibility while 
using that slogan {ibidem 174-180). 
14
 See also VEYNE, op.cit., 81-84. 
15
 Gracchi: Plut. G.Gra. 18.2. Marius: Cic. Off. 3.80; Sen., De Ira, 3.18.1. Catiline: 
Cic. Flac. 95. 
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goals.16 Good aspects of past popular leaders lived on in memory, while 
bad were forgotten.17 Although the urban plebs in 100 helped to murder 
Satuminus, a generation later he nevertheless appeared to live on in 
memory as a good leader who wished the people all the best and who fell 
to ruin by senatorial repression. Caesar and his assistant leader Labicnus 
were able to gain favor in 63 by the prosecution of one of Satuminus' 
assassins, the old senator Rabinus. Rabirius was defended by Cicero; 
when in his speech the latter termed Satuminus an enemy of the Roman 
people, the public reacted furiously (B-21). 
It was also important to align oneself to contemporary leaders who at a 
certain moment were the most beloved with the people. Thus Caesar, at 
the beginning of his career, became Pompey's associate, and later the 
triumvirs sought popular support by way of Clodius.18 Cicero, in his 
defense of Cornelius, invoked Manilius (Ap-26), Pompey, and Crassus 
(Asc. 76C). In 59 Caesar incriminated the senators for intending to 
murder Pompey and himself (B-38), thereby arousing popular sentiments 
against the senate. In 56 Clodius made it publicly known that he had 
reconciled with Pompey, with whom he had quarreled shortly before 
over the exile of Cicero and the problem of the cura annonae.^ 
Noticeably, the opponents of the popular leaders used the same slogans 
in order to undermine the popular support of the populares. Cicero, in his 
usual role of an anti-popular is, favorably compared the populares from 
the past with the populares of his own day and publicly associated himself 
with the contemporary popular leader Pompey.20 
Coins served as a means of communication for propaganda. The 
images referred to the ancestors' great deeds, to larginones, to agrarian 
and com laws, to the restoration of libertas, and to civil rights. References 
1 6
 Cic. Acad 2 13, Caes ВС 1 7 Thus also Cicero in the Pro Cornelio : Asc 80C 
See MARTIN 219, MEIER, RE, 596, SEAC.bR, Cß, 332-333 It was a well-tried theme, 
the tribune of the plebs of 111 Mcmmius had already used if Sail lug 312 and 7 
17
 Thus also App 1 114, generalizing with reference to the furious reaction of 
Sertonus' soldiers against hib assassin Perperna, despite the grudges the soldiers had 
held towards Sertonus 
18
 Caesar and Pompey Dio 37 22 1; Pint Cat Mm 31.4 In 73 the tribune of the plebs 
Macer as well made an appeal to Pompey in a speech before the people Sail 11'ш 
3 48 23M In 66 Manilius tried the same Dio 36 42.3-4. 
Triumvirs and Clodius App 2 14, GRUEN, Phoenix, 122 and 127, MEIJER, 
Verliezers, 130-131 and 144-147. 
^ Cic HarResp 51 Before this, Clodius had read a letter from Caesar in a meeting, 
in order to demonstrate his friendship with Caesar (Cic. Dom 22) See further B-29, 
33, 45, 46, 88. 
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 OHpopulares . Cic. Leg Agr 2 10, 31, and 81, Rab Perd 14-15, Sest 105, Mil 
14 and 72 
Pompey Com Pet 51, Cic Att 1 16 11, Leg Agr 2 23-25, 46, and 49-55 See also 
JONKERS, op cit, 71-72. 
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to past events served to legitimate contemporary actions.21 In our period 
new coins were issued each year22, and the possibility to anticipate coming 
events, e.g. elections, therefore in principle existed. As far as they had any 
propagandistic value, coins mainly served as a reinforcement of a 
personality cult. Political issues were of minor importance, as is shown by 
the markedly low number of references to the grain supply on coins.23 We 
should wonder to what extent coins as a means of propaganda towards the 
plebs were effective. CRAWFORD argues that the effect in the Empire was 
small, because too many coin types from earlier issues were in circulation 
for the contemporary coins to have any effect and because only the higher 
social strata received sufficient coins in hand.24 Mutatis mutandis this will 
also have been true in the late Republic. But with regard to CRAWFORD'S 
second argument it can be said that the artisans and shopkeepers, 
considering that they were connected to the money economy by their 
profession, will in any case have come into touch with money more than 
the rest of the plebs. 
Written communication existed in Rome as well. It goes without saying 
that the phenomenon of mass media was completely absent in antiquity. 
Ancient culture in general and the political culture in particular were 
mainly oral. Nevertheless there was enough to read in Rome. Everywhere 
on statues and buildings texts were inscribed. Texts of laws were set up in 
public. Probably price lists were posted in shops and taverns. 
Furthermore, there were quite a few grafitti. They were used as a means 
of communication in politics as well. Plutarch mentions that already in 
133 the people wrote slogans on monuments, doorways, and houses as an 
appeal to Tiberius Gracchus to distribute public land to the poor 
(Tib.Gra. 8.3-4). 
By means of inscriptions on monuments and statues rich Romans could 
show the greatness of their family and themselves. Thus M. Claudius 
Marcellus (cos. 166,155, and 152) erected statues for his grandfather, his 
father, and himself. The accompanying inscription mentioned that the 
statues represented the three Marcelli, who had been consul nine times. 
Marcellus' father, however, had only been consul once (in 196) and his 
grandfather (the famous Marcellus from the Second Punic War) five 
times. By means of this short inscription Marcellus said nothing untrue, 
but he did enhance the prestige of his father. (Asc. 12C.) 
21
 A. ALFÖLDI, The Main Aspects of Political Propaganda on the Coinage of the 
Roman Republic, in: R.A.G. CARSON, C.H.V. SUTHERLAND (eds.), Essays in 
Roman Coinage Presented to H. Mattingly, Oxford 1956, pp. 63-95, esp. 84-86 and 
91-93 {populares); ZEHNACKER, op.cit., 477-627, esp. 509-516 and 577-600. 
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 M.H. CRAWFORD, Roman Republican Coinage II, Cambridge 1974, pp. 654-658. 
23
 See RlCKMAN, op.cit., App. 11, esp. pp. 257-259. 
24
 M.H. CRAWFORD, Roman imperial coin types and the formation of public opinion, 
Studies in Numismatic Method presented to Philip Grierson, Cambridge 1983, pp. 47-
64, esp. 57-59. For the soldiers it might have been different, because they received 
their pay in cash. 
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In 62 Caesar saw to it that the care for the restoration of the temple of 
Jupiter on the Capitol was taken from Catulus and granted to Pompey. 
The work was almost finished, but Pompey now could put his name on 
it.25 In 58 Clodius demolished the porticus of Catulus, together with the 
adjoining house of Cicero. Clodius erected a new porticus with his own 
name on it.26 In that way he could show that he had financed the 
construction. Possibly it was also a demonstration of his power that he, in 
the name of the people, had been able to demolish the existing buildings. 
Another form of written communication were the advertisements on the 
walls, by which muñera (gladiatorial games and animal fights) were made 
known to the people.27 
Then there is also the question of the distribution of pamphlets and 
political statements. Cicero says that Bibulus in 59 published edicts against 
Pompey, which were read by a great number of people (multitudo) and 
even copied (Att. 2.20A and 21.4). Milo did something similar against 
Clodius in 57 (Cic. Att. 4.3.3). In the same year writings were found 
around the Forum and the Curia about the question of the Egyptian 
succession to the throne (Plut. Pomp. 49.6). In 49 Pompey publicly posted 
his answer to Caesar on the possibility of civil war, in order to enable 
many Romans to take notice of it (Cic. Att. 7.12.2). In 44 Octavian 
ordered the distribution of pamphlets (biblia) among the crowd (plèthos) 
of Antony's soldiers in order to undermine Antony's support among his 
army.28 
All this brings us to the problem of literacy. Who could read in Rome? 
Was it the great majority of the population? Or were they the tabernarii, 
who possibly had learned to read and write as slaves and passed on the art 
to their offspring, or who had to have a certain level of literacy in order 
to practice their trade? Or did the intermediate leaders in this area, too, 
possess a special function? Perhaps they, considering their higher social 
and economic status and considering that many among them were former 
slaves, had the ability to read and did read the written propaganda to the 
members of their college or their neighborhood. 
Since the introduction of the secret ballot, voting in Rome was done in 
writing. In legislature and the administration of justice it was a simple 
matter. Ballots were issued engraved with two letters: respectively V and 
A (Uti rogas = yes and Antiquo = no) or L and D (Libero = acquittal and 
Damno = conviction). The voter had to erase one of the two letters so that 
his judgment was left. For this, consequently, literacy was hardly 
necessary. At elections, however, the voter himself had to write down 
2 5
 Dio 37.44.1-2; SEAGER, Pompey, 69. 
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either the initials or, more likely, the whole name of his favorite 
candidate. On the basis of this argument BEST reaches the conclusion that 
widespread literacy must have existed in Rome.29 
HARRIS, on the contrary, using good arguments based on epigraphical 
evidence and on a comparison with early modem history, states that 
widespread literacy did not exist in antiquity and that only a small part of 
the population was able "to write a simple message with comprehension", 
his definition of literacy. The advertisements for gladiatorial games and 
the election bills in Pompeii were probably written by professionals and 
were directed towards the upper strata of the population.30 HARRIS admits 
that literacy among the city population must have been relatively larger 
than among the country folk, and that furthermore in the city at least a 
part of the artisans and small tradesmen must have possessed a 
rudimentary reading and writing skill, which they needed for their 
profession. The great majority of the freebom poor were illiterate.31 
What was the situation in the late Republic? A fact that I have not 
mentioned thus far concerns a practice during triumphs. Plutarch tells us 
that during Pompey's triumph in 61 inscriptions were carried in the 
procession on which the names of the conquered territories were written, 
that 1000 fortresses had been taken and almost 900 cities, that 800 pirate 
ships had been confiscated, that 39 cities had been founded, that 85 million 
drachms extra tribute were added to the state revenue, and that 20,000 
talents worth of gold and silver were deposited in the treasury.32 In short, 
not a simple message. Triumphs were the pre-eminent way in which a 
leader could adduce proof of his military achievements. The people were 
present in great numbers on such an occasion. One way or another, it must 
have been the intention that the inscriptions were read. Or were they 
perhaps read aloud by literate persons among the public? 
There is an indication that in Rome the shopkeepers and artisans could 
read and write somewhat. Appian says that in 44 grafitti were inscribed 
on the tribunal and the statues of Brutus to prompt him to a coup d etat 
against Caesar. There was a rumor that it had been done by the people. 
Cassius then says to Brutus that those grafitti were not written by artisans 
and shopkeepers, but by the aristocracy.33 What should be noted here is 
2 9
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that Brutus and Cassius (or at least Appian if he made the story up) took 
for granted that these members of the plebs were literate. 
Written communication was not an important mobilization factor 
during the late Republic. But written communication mainly reached the 
tabernarii and opifices, and written propaganda which addressed the plebs 
was pre-eminently directed towards the plebs contionalis. Although there 
is no proof, the role of the intermediate leaders as a communication link 
should not be ignored in this area. 
A final type of communication was by pictures. To show the people 
which victories a general had won during his military campaign, not only 
inscriptions were carried in a triumph but also pictures of conquered 
cities and battle scenes. Octavian, among other things, carried in his 
triumph a portrayal of Cleopatra's suicide with a snake.34 
Organization 
Organization was an important mobilization factor. In 43 of the 92 
attested cases of collective behavior, the involvement of some type of 
organization is traceable or likely. We have to distinguish between pre-
existing organizations of the plebs and new forms of organization which 
were especially established for mobilization. 
Among the pre-existing organizations we first come across the tribus, 
of which there were 35 in Rome serving as voting units. At elections as 
well as at legislative assemblies it was important to win these groups as a 
collectivity. To do so a leader tried to contact the noti homines. These 
voting groups could be subdivided into small groups {decuriae) in order 
to control the voting within the individual tribes.35 The increasing 
electoral corruption was accomplished by money distributions among the 
tribes (App. 3.23; Suet. Aug. 40), for which the divisores served as 
intermediaries. Each tribe had its headquarters in the Circus Flaminius 
(Cic. Plane. 55). 
A substantial part of the urban plebs was organized in collegia. The 
colleges were professional, religious, and also territorial organizations.36 
These organizations served as associations of people of the same 
profession, worshippers of a certain god, or the inhabitants of a 
neighborhood. Most colleges had combined functions. The members 
together organized feasts and religious festivities, and there existed a 
34
 Val.Max. 2.8.7 (Sulla in 81); App. 2.101 (Caesar in 46); Plut. Ant. 86.3 (Octavian 
in 29). 
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solidarity among the members, which, among other things, was expressed 
in the collective care and financing of the funerals of deceased members. 
The colleges had a long tradition which went back to the origins of Rome. 
The colleges had administrators, the magistri, elected by the members. In 
the colleges frecborn, freedmen, and slaves were to be found, but they 
especially were organizations of freedmen artisans and shopkeepers. 
Support from collegia implied support from organized electoral groups 
(Com.Pet. 3). Cicero mentions colleges as one of the groups, besides tota 
Italia, municipia, scribae, and publicani, which had voted in favor of his 
return from exile.37 
The pre-existing organization and the leadership structures could serve 
to mobilize important parts of the plebs.38 Clodius especially employed 
the colleges.39 He removed the ban on the colleges and personally saw to 
the institution of new colleges (B-41). 
Next to collegia were the vie/ as pre-existing organizations.40 The vici 
were the organizations of the neighborhoods in Rome, which served as 
geographical structures of communication and solidarity. In that respect 
they are comparable to the neighborhoods in modem Latin-American 
cities.41 The neighborhoods had an organizational framework, in the 
sense that they were led by elected administrators, the vicomagistri. The 
function of the vici was comparable to the function of collegia, and the 
neighborhoods often provided the topographical framework for the 
colleges. For example, the Compitalia were celebrated in each 
neighborhood on the crossroads under the leadership of the magistri 
vicorum. The collegia compitalicia had a territorial basis. The first 
attested appearance of the neighborhood organizations in politics took 
place in 85 in support of Marius Gratidianus' policy of improving the 
quality of coinage.42 Again it was Clodius who recognized the importance 
of these organizations for the mobilization of the plebs (B-40, 41, 66). 
Clodius' opponent Milo as well attempted to use the vzci ; he was accused 
of having houses with armories in many neighborhoods (Cic. Mil. 64). 
How important the neighborhoods became in the urban organization is 
clear from the fact that Caesar in 45 took a census in a novel way, i.e. per 
neighborhood (vicatim), to reduce the number of grain recipients (Suet. 
37
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lul. 41.3). In an enumeration of the measures (including the institution of 
night watchmen and a fire brigade) with which Augustus reorganized the 
city in a more orderly fashion, Suetonius (Aug. 30) mentions also the 
subdivision of the city into regions and vici in 8 B.C. The vici were to be 
administered by magistri elected by the inhabitants of the neighborhood. 
Cassius Dio mentions this measure as well and adds that the vicomagistn, 
within their district and on certain days, were allowed to wear the toga 
praetexta and to have two lictors.43 Both were magisterial symbols and 
granted prestige to the person who was allowed to be adorned with them. 
The city was already subdivided into such wards, but Augustus redid it 
officially. Significantly, the vz'd, which during the late Republic had been 
used to mobilize popular support, now through Augustus' 
institutionalization became a binding force of the new regime.44 
If soldiers were involved in collective behavior, their army 
organization was of course most useful in mobilization, for the Roman 
army was subdivided into several disciplined groups under the leadership 
of officers and NCO's.45 
In collective behavior in the theater, organized groups likewise could 
be of significance (Cic. Sest. 115). Thus the équités, who had separate 
seats, occasionally acted as a claque.46 Outside the theater, too, organized 
groups precipitated collective behavior by means of rhythmic slogans (B-
60, 65). During the Empire the importance of claques in collective 
behavior in the theater increased47, and the colleges often attended the 
games as a group, which facilitated mobilization.48 It is not known 
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 Dio 55 8 6-7. The translation of stenôparchos with magister vici I adopt from H J. 
MASON, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions A Lexicon and Analysis, Toronto 1974, 
s v. stenôparchos This translation seems to me more to the point than curator viarum 
(E. GARY in the LOEB edition). 
4 4
 For geographical structures of communication and solidarity some parallels from 
later times are available. On the neighborhoods during the Principale, see 
MACMULLEN, RSR, 67-69 
Neighborhood organizations were important to gain political support in Pompeii J L 
FRANKLIN, Pompeii the Electoral Progammata, Campaigns, and Politics, A.D 71-79, 
Rome 1980, pp 92-94. 
MARTINES points to the significance of the physical conditions of the city, such as 
neighborhood organization, for mobilization in political violence dunng the middle 
ages- MARTINES, op cit, 345 See also MOLLAT, Popular Revolutions, ρ 304. 
The Pansians who stormed the Bastille in A D. 1789 were mainly composed of the 
inhabitants of the surrounding Faubourg St. Antoine RUDé, Pans, 82-95 and 108. 
4 5 B - 1 , 3 4 , 49,70, 71. 
4 6
 B-20, 36 See also the concerted action of senators and équités dunng a not in the 
theater in 56 (B-66). 
4 7
 On the role of theater claques in the Principale, see. A. ALFoLDI, Die Ausgestaltung 
des monarchischen Zeremoniells am romischen Kaiserhofe, MD AI (R) 49 (1934), pp 
1-118, esp. 79-88; BOLLINGER, op at, 32-44, R. BROWNING, The Riot of A D 387 
in Antioch. The Role of the Theatrical Claques in the Later Empire, JRS 42 (1952), pp 
13-20, MACMULLEN, Enemies, 168-173. 
4 8
 See CIL VI 2 10099, MACMULLEN, Enemies, 170 and 175, WHITTAKER, op at, 
360 
114 
whether that already occurred during the Republic, but probably it was a 
later development. 
Important types of organization were groups especially established for 
mobilization. They were new types of organization that, however, mostly 
originated in the pre-existing organizations, and both types overlapped. 
They were often armed gangs which were indicated with terms such as 
operae, manus, and cheira.49 Sometimes they were recruited from the 
personal following of a politician, such as slaves and clients, or they were 
composed of gladiators.50 Such groups were also deployed by Sestius (Ao-
31) and Milo (Ao-2) against Clodius.^ Mostly, however, they were 
composed of the usual participants in collective behavior, i.e. artisans and 
shopkeepers.52 They were especially important in the mobilization of the 
urban plebs for violent actions.53 Clodius employed these groups on a 
large scale. Considering the fact that the information on Clodius' 
organizations mostly comes from his enemy Cicero and considering the 
fact that Clodius reinforced the organization of the colleges after the 
model of the army (B-41), we may assume that, when operae are 
mentioned with Clodius, this is usually a pejorative indication of collegia. 
Clodius gangs, therefore, consisted of his normal following, i.e. mainly 
artisans and shopkeepers, and not slaves and criminals.54 Moreover the 
gangs of Sestius and Milo, for the major part composed of armed slaves, 
gladiators, and rural clients, proved to be more effective in street fights 
than Clodius' gangs.55 
For politicians it mattered to establish contacts and patronage relations 
with important groups and individuals among the plebs. We have already 
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seen that such opportunities were mainly provided through intermediate 
leaders. Contacts between nobles and plebeian organizations also existed 
in the Principate, especially with theater claques and circus factions.56 
Symbols 
We will now pass in review the symbols and symbolic actions which 
played a part in the mobilization process. Some elements of popular 
policy which we have come across in the section on communication and 
propaganda received a symbolic expression. 
Status symbols were important for successful leadership in Roman 
politics. Through symbols the descent, the capability, and the greatness of 
the leader were shown and not least his legitimacy and authority as a 
magistrate of Rome. It was a general aspect of the Roman élite, not 
reserved for popular leaders. The fact that popular leaders surrounded 
themselves with the same status symbols as the other members of the elite, 
demonstrates that popular leadership in Rome did not or was not meant to 
bring about innovation, but was set within the traditional frameworks of 
Roman politics and society. 
Status was expressed by clothing (the toga praetexta, B-40), the fasces 
(symbols of magistracy, B-l, 86), the presence of lictors (B-40), soldiers, 
or veterans, and escorts and salutations by friends and clients. A man like 
Cicero, a new man without military fame, especially depended on his 
extraordinary qualities as an orator. He had to take care that sufficient 
people during his election campaign publicly showed their attachment to 
him. {Com.Pet. 2, 24-37, 41, and 51-53.) At public manifestations, such 
as triumphs, the prestige of the person who was to be honored was 
expressed by showing the conquered»booty, prisoners, and pictures of 
scenes from the campaign.57 
Another type of symbolism occurred in 58, when Clodius constructed 
a temple, dedicated to the goddess Libertas, on the site of the residence of 
the exiled Cicero (Cic. Dom. 51, 108, and 110-112). It was a symbolic act 
with which Clodius wished to express that the libertas of the people had 
been restored by the exile of Cicero. The temple was a symbol of Clodius' 
influence and served to indicate that the interests of the plebs were 
guaranteed by him. When Cicero's house after his return in 57 was rebuilt 
by senatorial decree, Clodius staged a riot to prevent the destruction of the 
temple (B-61). During the riots after Clodius' death, Sextus Clodius, 
Clodius' foremost intermediate leader, showed the box with Clodius' 
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bills. In that way he wanted to indicate that Clodius' death did not mean 
the end of his policy (B-86). 
Former popular leaders could serve as a symbol. Caesar gained great 
popularity when in 68 he carried portraits of Marius in a funeral 
procession and in 65 restored the veneration of Marius (B-7, 19). Similar 
is the trial (discussed above) that the tribune of the plebs Labienus 
instituted in 63 against Rabirius because of his involvement in the murder 
of the popular leader Satuminus. During the trial, for which there was a 
lot of popular attention, Labienus showed a portrait of Satuminus.58 In 
47, when the tribune of the plebs Dolabella proposed the abolition of debts 
and riots occurred, he erected a statue for Clodius.59 This symbolism fit in 
with Roman tradition. At funerals, for example, it was customary to show 
portraits of the deceased and his ancestors to demonstrate the greatness of 
the family (Pol. 6.53). 
Interesting is also the already mentioned destruction of Cicero's 
residence and the adjacent porticus of Catulus. Q. Lutatius Catulus had 
erected this porticus after his defeat of the Cimbri in 101 together with 
Marius. The site of the porticus, on which Clodius built a new one, had a 
symbolic meaning. It was located on the site of the house of M. Fulvius 
Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus' companion in arms who had been liquidated by 
the senate (Cic. Dom. 102 and 114; Val.Max. 6.3.1). 
Comparable is the use of the Circus Flaminius for meetings. The 
Circus Flaminius was located in the Campus Martius, therefore outside 
the Pomerium, which made it a convenient spot to let a military 
commander appear in a meeting; generals under arms were not allowed 
within the city walls. This was not the only reason for using the circus. 
The circus was used only by popular leaders as a location for meetings. 
We should wonder why, since the Campus Martius itself was frequently 
used for assemblies and meetings. The construction of the circus with its 
stands was suitable for a meeting of course, but the Circus Flaminius 
especially had a symbolic value. The circus was built by the popular 
leader Flaminius in the third century. It was situated on the spot where in 
the fifth century an important popular assembly had taken place, which 
had considerably extended the rights of the people. In twofold respect, 
58
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therefore, the Circus Flaminius had a symbolic value for popular 
politics.60 
Leaders could serve as a martyr symbol, such as after the murder on 
Clodius (52) and Caesar (44). The people took the view that they had died 
for the people's interests and their funerals became great manifestations 
of popular fury and sorrow. The corpses of both leaders, together with a 
number of buildings, were burned in the resulting riots.61 
Contemporary popular leaders also had a symbolic value. 
Contemporary popular leaders were often brought to the fore in a 
meeting in order to sanction certain plans. Thus the solidarity and the 
support of those leaders could be shown to the people.62 
The next type of symbolism consisted of actions that expressed a 
solidarity with the people. In 59, the patrician Clodius had himself made a 
plebeian through adoption. According to Cicero, this was against the mos 
maiorum. 63 Cassius Dio and Suetonius thought it was Caesar's idea, in 
order to be able to deploy Clodius against Cicero.64 Clodius' transition to 
the plebs not only enabled him to become tribune of the plebs, an office 
which was closed to patricians, but also had a symbolic function to express 
his solidarity with the plebs. Dolabella did the same thing to become 
tribune of the plebs in 47.65 Cicero accused L. Gellius Poblicola, one of 
Clodius' intermediate leaders, of having married a freedwoman, not 
because of his lust, but in order to win respect among the plebs {Sest. 
110). 
Before his election to pontifex maximus in 63, Caesar resided in the 
Subura, one of the poorest quarters of Rome (Suet. lul. 46). The tribune 
of the plebs Gabinius in 67 showed a picture of his simple residence in a 
popular assembly to appear incorruptible and not greedy.66 A parallel for 
these symbolic actions we already find with Gaius Gracchus, who went to 
live among the people to gain popularity.67 
An analogous symbolic behavior can be seen in the habit of imploring 
the favor and compassion of the plebs by assuming a humble and poor 
60
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appearance with old and torn clothes.68 Even Cicero did so when in 58 
exile was hanging over his head (App. 2.15). 
There are some cases known from the Principale which prove that the 
colleges possessed banners carried during ceremonial processions. From 
the Republic, unfortunately, no information has come down to us on this 
subject. But considering the importance of colleges for mobilization the 
possibility exists that banners, like the medieval guilds, were used as 
rallying points during collective behavior and especially in riots.69 
A symbol which comes close is the use of the cap of liberty; no 
examples from the years 80-50 are available, but only from the previous 
and subsequent periods. Valerius Maximus (8.6.2) tells us that Saturninus 
in 100 showed the cap of liberty {pileus) to the slaves "as a banner" 
(modum vexilh) in order to call them to arms. Valerius mentions this case 
together with Marius who did the same thing in 87. It is questionable, 
however, whether Saturninus used this symbol for the slaves. No other 
source mentions that Saturninus resorted to this, in Rome, very rare 
emergency measure. It is more likely that Saturninus used the cap of 
liberty to exhort the people to defend libertas. For Caesar's assassins did 
exactly the same in 44 (App. 2.119). Furthermore, they pictured the 
pileus as a symbol of libertas on coins to commemorate the murder of 
Caesar.70 The symbol of the cap of liberty regularly occurs on coins of the 
late Republic.71 The employment of this symbol as a banner and the use of 
libertas as a political slogan show that an appreciation of libertas in large 
parts of the Roman population was thought to exist. 
68
 Diod. 36 15.2 (Saturninus in 101) and 16 1 (Metellus Pius in 98); Cic. Leg Agr 
2 13 (Rullus in 63) See also Oros. 5 17. Such behavior was a part of traditions of 
popular justice and was a cry for help LlNTOTT 16-20 
In B-3 another case of symbolic clothing is to be seen. 
An interesting parallel for this behavior is the case of Michele di Lando, a reasonably 
wealthy wool worker, who in A D 1378 led the insurgents in Florence while barefoot 
and in torn clothes· E. PIPER, Der Aufstand der Ciompi, Berlin 19812, pp. 82-83. 
69
 For banners of collegia during the Empire, see MEIGGS, op cit, 330, who mentions 
two references from the third century A D. Scnptores Histonae Augustac, Galhenus 
8 6, Aurelianiiî 34 4. The SHA, as always, should be used with care, because the 
stones are filled with exaggerations The mention of the banners, however, seems to be 
a casual remark and therefore might be true See also Ten Spect 11, who mentions 
that colleges took part in the pompa cirtensis Perhaps they used banners to identify 
their organization. 
On the importance of banners for mobiluation during the late middle ages, see: 
MOLLAT, op cit, 146-147, R.C. TREXLER, Public Life in Renaissance Florence, New 
York 1980, pp 342-347. 
7 0
 Cap of liberty H A. GRUEBER, Coins of the Roman Republic in the Britisch 
Museum, London 19702 (1910), II, p. 480, nos. 68-69 (denarii of M. Brutus from 43 
in memory of Caesar's murder); ZEHNACKER, op cit, I, 619-620 Cassius Dio 
(47 25.3) mentions the striking of this coin 
7 1
 GRUEBER, op.cit η 70,1, ρ 153, nos 1032-1034 (denarii of С Cassius, the author 
of the lex tabellaría of 137), I, pp 401-403, nos. 3285-3311 (denarii from 75). See 
also n. 21 above 
119 
All these symbols had one thing in common, they were rooted in 
Roman tradition. They evoked images from the past* responsible and 
capable magistrates, who were attentive to the interests and the rights of 
the people and who lived austerely and virtuously; great champions of the 
people, who had not lost their fame in popular tradition. The symbols 
helped to create a norm which made the crowd rally behind popular 
leaders and incited them to active behavior. 
Precipitating Incidents 
In the years 80-50, several examples are to be found of unanticipated 
events that precipitated collective behavior. First of all, of course, a 
situation of acute deprivation could precipitate popular protest, 
particularly if a scapegoat could be found or was suggested by leaders 
Scapegoats were found in magistrates or other members of the élite The 
com supply to the expanded city of Rome was a perpetual problem The 
supply could not always be secured because of crop failure, piracy, and 
the influence of the elements on sea Famine or high com prices were 
never far away.72 An additional problem was that the increased demand 
for grain in Rome created opportunities of enrichment for com traders 
If they kept com off the market they could inflate prices 73 A corn 
shortage three times precipitated collective behavior in the penod under 
investigation (B-2, 55, 60). 
Another type of acute deprivation were disasters. In 54, during 
Gabimus' trial, Rome was struck by a devastating flood. It was popularly 
considered a divine punishment for the acquittal of Gabimus, with which 
the people did not agree at all (B-80) In this pattern also fit the arsons in 
the conspiracy of Catiline, which were planned to precipitate collective 
behavior (B-23). 
Other precipitating incidents were the deaths of popular or prestigious 
leaders or of their relatives. These incidents provoked actions of the plebs 
to render the funerary rites especially honorable. In case of murder, they 
could also result in violence, such as with Clodius and later with Caesar, 
and similarly if there were persons who wanted to repress the 
participants' behavior (B-l, 7, 50, 78, 86.) At the death of Caesar and 
especially during his funeral there was an outburst of collective violence 
72
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Senators were attacked. The people looked for Caesar's assassins; the 
innocent poet Cinna was mistaken for the tyrannicide with the same name 
and was torn to pieces. Marc Antony was strongly suspected of having 
incited the people to such behavior.74 
Cases of injustice could equally be precipitating incidents. If in the 
view of the plebs an individual was treated unfairly or threatened, or, 
conversely, if a person was acquitted at a trial while being guilty in the 
eyes of the plebs, this could precipitate protest.75 
In the theater and the circus, the lines of the actors on the stage could 
provoke reactions from the public76, or the entrance of public 
personalities could precipitate expressions of enthusiasm or 
disapproval.77 
Opportunity: Time and Place 
The possibilities to win a large group of people for a certain leader and to 
mobilize them for collective behavior were limited by time and place. The 
presence of an opportunity was necessary in order to achieve a successful 
mobilization. The proposal of a com law, ever since Gaius Gracchus' lex 
frumentaria in 123, was one of the best ways to gain the favor of the urban 
plebs. GARNSEY has recently claimed that a relationship between com 
laws and com shortages did not exist.78 This impels us to pass in review 
the much discussed theme of the com laws from Gaius Gracchus on. 
Before Gracchus' com law, the slave revolt in Sicily (135-132) had 
partly cut off the com supply to Rome; it would take some years before 
Sicily would be able again to serve as Rome's granary. Moreover, a 
plague of locusts in 124 had destroyed the crops in Africa.79 In 104 
Saluminus, as quaestor Ostiensis, was responsible for the transport of 
grain. The senate discharged him because his activities were supposedly 
unsatisfactory. It is more likely that the senate feared that he would abuse 
his position and exploit a dearth for political purposes. That is why he was 
replaced by the princeps senatus Scaurus. The supply problems resulted 
from the second slave revolt in Sicily, war in Africa, and piracy. Shortly 
afterwards, Saturninus as a tribune of the plebs proposed a lex 
frumentaria, but it was not implemented. The senate took action to 
improve the corn supply.80 
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In 75 a food riot occurred (B-2). It induced a number of food 
distributions by magistrates, from which they gained popularity. Shortly 
afterwards, in 73, the lex Terentia Cassia re-established the corn 
subsidies, which had been abolished by Sulla. Pompey obtained his 
command against the pirates in 67 in a period of high grain prices in 
consequence of the problems in Rome's com supply (B-8, 9, 10). In 62 
Cato's com law calmed the people at the time of the conspiracy of Catiline 
(B-22, 23). It is known that at that time the economic situation of many 
Romans was precarious, since Catiline found a willing ear among the 
plebs with his proposal for the abolition of debts.81 
Eventually free distribution was instituted in 58 by the lex Clodia. 
Nothing is known of a dearth or high prices in this period. But Clodius' 
law also provided for the cura annonae, the care of the com supply, under 
the administration of Sextus Clodius. This could be an indication that in 58 
as well there were supply problems. In 57 riots occurred as a result of 
com shortage (B-55, 60). Was the dearth caused by Clodius' law? The 
people anyway did not think so, for they accepted Clodius' leadership in 
the riots. The shortage was possibly deliberately caused by Pompey, so 
that he would be entrusted with the cura annonae. Clodius in any case held 
that view.82 
In consequence, a relationship between com shortages and laws did 
exist. Shortages provided the opportunity for action and for mobilization 
by means of a com law. In 75 Hortensius on his own initiative distributed 
com rations. It was a year of high prices and scarcity, witness a food riot 
(B-2). Hortensius' distributions did not amount to much and if the prices 
had been low he would never had gained as much popularity, as Cicero 
aptly remarks (Verr. 2.3.215). It goes without saying that the lot of the 
Roman plebs was never enviable, but only in times of crisis was this 
situation exploited. At such a moment a com law was most effective, for 
then the least opposition of the élite was to be anticipated because an 
obvious necessity was on hand. Furthermore, the authority of the senate 
should not be underestimated. In case of senatorial counteraction, support 
of the plebs could only be expected if there was genuine deprivation. 
Com shortages could lead to violent outbursts of popular protest of a 
higher intensity than other types of collective violence. The élite realized 
this, and also that scarcities provided an opportunity for popular leaders. 
The actions of the senate in response to Satuminus have already been 
81
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mentioned. The lex Terentia Cassia of the consuls in 73 was meant to calm 
feelings of discontent among the city plebs (Sail. Hist. 3.48.19-20M). 
Cato's grain measure obviously was related to the conspiracy of Catiline. 
At the time of the vote on Cicero's recall from exile, the com prices were 
artificially kept down by the senate to conciliate the plebs.83 
Assemblies, in which important political decisions were to be taken, 
sometimes were planned for times when a significant number of people 
were already about for traditional occasions. This facilitated mobilization 
for the assembly. In 67 Manilius called a tribal assembly for extending the 
voting rights of the freedmen during the Compitalia, when large numbers 
of slaves and freedmen had already gathered (B-14). Clodius passed his 
four important laws in an assembly which took place three days after the 
Compitalia.^ Cicero's return from exile, at which he was greeted by a 
great crowd, took place when Rome was filled with visitors at the ludi 
Romani (B-59). The tribune of the plebs Fufius Calenus seized the 
opportunity of holding a meeting in the Circus Flaminius when a large 
group of people had gathered there for a market day (B-29). 
The opportunity to act, at any rate within an official framework, was 
partly determined by the temporal restrictions which were imposed on the 
assemblies. Between the prorogation of a law and the actual vote a 
consultative period of at least 23 days had to be observed {trinum 
nundinum). Furthermore, voting was only allowed on the 195 dies 
comitiales, which were yearly assigned for the purpose.85 For that reason 
Clodius passed a law in 58 to increase the number of comitial days. 
Many cases of collective behavior, and certainly those with an official 
character such as meetings and assemblies, took place on the Campus 
Martius or in or near the Forum.86 It offered an important opportunity 
for mobilization. Public spots, where the public and political life of Rome 
mainly occurred, could serve as rallying points for participants. The 
Forum, moreover, offered the opportunity to mobilize the most 
important group, the plebs contionalis ; the Forum was surrounded with 
the tabernae of artisans and shopkeepers. 
Finally, the temple of Castor on the Forum and the adjoining tribunal 
of Aurelian had a special function. The temple was used as the focal point 
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of meetings and assemblies, and its steps for voting. Clodius had this spot 
occupied in order to be able to control the assemblies. According to 
Cicero, he also installed an armory in the temple. Probably the temple and 
the tribunal served as a known and fixed rallying point to which the plebs 
could proceed in case of mobilization.87 
The Role of Leadership 
Leadership was of utmost significance in mobilization. In the great 
majority of the attested cases of collective behavior (81 out of 92) some 
type of leader was involved. Next to these there are a number of cases in 
which the involvement of leaders is difficult to establish. This particularly 
concerns the theater demonstrations.88 But since the importance of these 
types of collective behavior in the political process was limited, they can 
be left out of consideration here. Three riots (B-2, 75, 89) are treated so 
summarily in the sources that the presence or absence of leaders is 
impossible to establish. But considering their similarity to other cases the 
involvement of one or another type of leadership can safely be assumed. 
Only in two cases is it possible to determine with some certainty that 
leadership was absent and that these cases should be considered 
spontaneous: the Isis riot in 58 (B-39) and the intervention of the plebs at 
the funeral of Lucullus in 57 (B-50). 
This need not imply that spontaneous cases of collective behavior were 
very uncommon in the late Republic. It is, of course, possible that the 
substantial difference in the number of cases with and without leadership 
can be blamed on the sources. It may be that only the most interesting, the 
most spectacular, and the most successful cases have been recorded in the 
sources, plus the ones that involved big names. Be that as it may, from a 
political viewpoint collective behavior only had a chance of success if 
leaders were involved and especially leaders from the ruling class.89 
This becomes obvious if we look at the two spontaneous cases. In both 
cases of collective behavior the goal was not achieved. This is more 
striking in the Isis riot. In that case the plebs protested to the consul 
Gabinius against the senatorial ban on the Egyptian cults. Gabinius, an 
assistant leader of Pompey who actively supported Clodius during his 
consulate, refused to meet the grievances of the plebs. At the same 
moment (1 January 58), another case of collective behavior took place: 
the illegal celebration of the Compitalia at the instigation of Clodius (B-
87
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40). Neither Gabinius nor any other member of the élite took action 
against it. Clodius in no way interfered in the Isis affair. On the one hand, 
we have to conclude that the Isis riot did not achieve its goal because of the 
absence of élite leadership. On the other hand, we have to conclude that 
the participants in the Isis riot did not belong to Clodius' target group. He 
took no steps to protect the popular Isis cult, while he did do so for the 
Compitalia, which were organized by colleges.90 
The significance of leadership also follows from the fact that the 
symbols listed above were almost exclusively furnished by leaders and did 
not, as in other periods of history, arise from the crowd more or less 
spontaneously. Besides, the members of the Roman élite, in addition to 
their status and prestige, were trained in oratory, which provided them 
with an important basis for popular leadership. Leadership in the late 
Republic was more important as a mobilization factor than in other 
periods or than modem theories postulate. An explanation perhaps is to be 
found in the fact that Roman collective behavior mainly sprang from 
institutionalized types of collective behavior, in which the people 
assembled under the leadership of a member of the élite. The Roman 
political system provided opportunities to leaders and participants for 
concerted action to promote their mutual interests. 
Let us now distinguish between the various types of leadership. The top 
leaders actively participated in mobilization. In 66 out of the 81 cases with 
attested leadership, the involvement of one or more top leaders can be 
traced. In the next section we will deal with these individuals in greater 
detail. 
Assistant leaders occur in almost half (38) the cases. That is an 
considerable number. From the involvement of assistant leaders it 
becomes obvious that there actually existed a group of politicians whose 
engagement in popular politics was remarkably more active than that of 
others'. If we look, at which assistant leaders were certainly or probably 
involved as leaders in one or more cases of collective behavior, we see 
that it amounted to 48 % of the populares assistant leaders and 29 % of the 
optimates assistant leaders.91 The pattern becomes even more obvious if 
we look at the individual cases of collective behavior in which assistant 
leaders were involved. In 80 % of the cases it concerns populares assistant 
leaders and in 20 % of the cases optimates.91 In the other cases of 
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collective behavior in which optimates assistant leaders were involved 
their activity was limited to a repressive role. Besides, it is noticeable that 
the cases in which optimates assistant leaders actively attempted to 
mobilize the plebs or parts thereof almost exclusively occurred in the 50s. 
It is an indication that the oligarchy in that period increasingly felt forced 
to contend against the popular leaders with their own means. A transition 
had taken place. The power of the senatorial majority was declining. The 
oligarchy was not anymore the ruling élite which had to deal with the 
popular leaders as an opposition group; it was forced to compete with the 
popular leaders for the favor of the plebs. 
Eighteen cases are known with intermediate leaders. One of the 
functions of the intermediate leaders was to serve as a communication link 
between popular leader and plebs. Cicero's nomenclátor for example 
played an active part in rousing the assembled people at Cicero's return 
(B-59). Through intermediaries theater tickets could be distributed to the 
right persons (Cic. Q.Fr. 3.1.1, Миг. 73). The most important function of 
the intermediate leaders was to mobilize and lead the various 
organizations of the plebs: the noti homines in the tribes, the magistri of 
the collegia and vici, and the duces of the operae. The latter gangs, as we 
have seen, mainly originated from the pre-existing organizations of the 
plebs, and their leaders probably were for the most part the 
administrators of these organizations. In the majority of the cases in 
which intermediate leaders were involved (11), therefore, some type of 
organization can be traced.93 
In Chapter 1,1 have already drawn attention to the fact that the persons 
who provided leadership for collective behavior, or at least the top 
leaders and the assistant leaders, generally held a magistracy. In 55 out of 
the 81 cases with leadership, the authority and/or powers of a magistrate 
were (partly) responsible for mobilization, against 26 in which this was 
not the case. "Authority" is conceived here as "legitimate power"94, which 
in Rome meant power derived from an office to which an individual was 
lawfully elected. 
How can the substantial number of magistrates among the leaders be 
explained? The competence and function of a magistracy automatically 
granted a leader possibilities for the mobilization of a crowd and 
facilitated the involvement of the crowd in political decision-making: the 
calling of assemblies and the proposing of bills by consuls and tribunes of 
the plebs, and the organization of games by aediles. A special competence 
of the tribune of the plebs was the proclamation to close the tabernae 
(Cic. Acad. 2.144). It was a method especially used by Clodius (Cic. Dom. 
89-90). Two explicit cases are known: in 58 by Clodius (B-41) and in 52 
by Clodius' assistant leaders (B-88). Possibly Catiline had wanted to apply 
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this method as well (B-23). The closing of the shops obviously was pre-
eminently suited for the mobilization of the plebs contionalis. It was a sign 
of major distress, the proclamation of a iustitium during which public life 
had to be stopped95, and an indication that something important was about 
to happen. 
Lower magistrates, especially the aediles, ex officio had frequent 
dealings with the plebs. In that way contacts could be made with important 
subdivisions of the plebs and especially with headmen or organizations of 
the plebs. Thus the aediles Varrò Murena and Trebcllius in 44 assigned a 
spot where four magistri vici were allowed to erect a silver statue.96 The 
aedile M. Caelius Rufus (Ao-10) in 50 came into conflict with tabernarii 
and aquarii (Cic. Fam. 8.6.4). The shopkeepers had bribed the aquarii 
(responsible for the water supply) to direct more than the permitted 
quantity of water to them. It was the aedile's responsibility to take action 
against it. Obviously a good settlement of such problems and the contacts 
made could be advantageous to a magistrate. An aedile who had gained 
favor could count on support in his ensuing career. Patron-client 
relationships were thus established.97 
A number of matters could be accomplished by a private person, such 
as gladiatorial games and the construction of buildings. A magistracy, in 
addition to the obligations that came with it, opened even more 
possibilities. The organization of games and the execution of public works 
was the responsibility of the aedile. The public funds which were made 
available for these were inadequate; magistrates were traditionally 
expected to contribute from private means. Therefore, there was an 
inherent possibility to execute these tasks in an especially grand scale. To 
propose a bill, a magistracy was by definition necessary. Leaders had to 
see to it that they themselves or their assistants held the office required. 
The role of leadership, and in particular of the magistracy, was 
important because of the lack of an effective organization among the 
people to promote their own interests. On the one hand promotion of 
interests traditionally occurred by way of vertical ties. This system 
remained operative in the late Republic, except that the type of clientele 
and the type of patron changed. 
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On the other hand there existed barriers for the political action of the 
plebs98: the people were not able to act independently. Someone outside 
the people, in this instance a magistrate, had to set the will of the people in 
motion by bringing them together (in an assembly) and making proposals. 
In this respect it is possible to speak of the making of a "contract".99 For 
that, the people were unable to take any initiative. In Rome, laws with 
material advantages for the people were often coupled to laws from which 
only the proposer of the law would profit. Since the opportunity to act 
was limited to the making of a "contract", the contracting parties had to be 
present. Therefore only those present in the assembly could decide on the 
matter. Efficiency also necessitated that leaders directed themselves pre-
eminently to that group, the plebs contionalis, which frequented the 
assemblies the most. The "contract" had to be entered according to certain 
forms and procedures in order to be lawful, from which stemmed the 
regulations of the assemblies. The people were assigned a passive role and 
depended on a magistrate, especially the tribune of the plebs. The tribunes 
of the plebs, therefore, were essential as assistant leaders to top leaders. 
The most important reason, however, why the leaders who were 
involved in collective behavior were magistrates was that their presence 
constituted a legitimation of the action. A magistrate was a legitimized 
leader; the legitimacy connected to the magistracy rendered the 
relationship between leader and followers a relationship of authority.100 
This becomes obvious if we look at a case in which mobilization failed: the 
conspiracy of Catiline (B-23). How did this case differ from other cases 
which succeeded? 
The revolt seemed to be well-planned. Leadership was provided by 
various members of the senatorial élite, among them the praetor Lentulus, 
by an assistant leader (the tribune of the plebs Bestia), and by intermediate 
leaders. The participants were sought among artisans and shopkeepers, to 
whom abolition of debts was promised. The personal clients and slaves of 
the conspirators could serve as the organization of small groups. A 
precipitating incident was to be found in arson and in the murder of a 
number of important senators and magistrates. The opportunity to act was 
there: the chaotic festival of the Saturnalia and the deprivation of the 
urban plebs as a result of indebtedness. The authority and powers of 
magistrates were represented by the involvement of the praetor Lentulus 
and the tribune Bestia, who was to call a meeting and proclaim the closing 
of the shops. What went wrong? 
It has been stated that the conspiracy aborted because the proposed 
abolition of debts was insufficient to meet the demands of the artisans and 
shopkeepers; they were unprepared to put their possessions at stake. The 
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fear of the involvement of slaves and the danger of arson was too big. 
These, in fact, are the reasons Cicero gives.101 It is obvious, however, that 
the economic situation of the urban plebs in 63 was precarious. Not in 
vain did the élite oblige the plebs through Cato's grain measure. 
Moreover, the plebs contionalis in similar situations was prepared to riot, 
despite the risks of fire and chaos. The fear of involvement of slaves was 
unfounded. Slaves seldomly participated in collective behavior, and 
Catiline had explicitly excluded their participation (Sail. Cat. 56.5). The 
main cause of failure, therefore, is not to be found in Catiline's program. 
What did wreck the uprising was, first, the effective repression. The 
repression consisted in the grain measure, the virtually unanimous action 
of the élite, the taking of repressive measures from the start (such as 
posting guards), the proclamation of the state of emergency, and the 
imprisonment of the chief leaders. 
On other occasions when the state of emergency was proclaimed, e.g. 
against Satuminus and Gaius Gracchus, a group remained which had risen 
in revolt and which had to be violently repressed. Remarkably, with 
Catiline actual mobilization entirely failed to materialize. The reason was 
that the uprising lacked legitimacy. It is exactly this which distinguishes 
Catiline's conspiracy from successful cases of collective behavior. 
Catiline himself did not hold a magistracy, for he had lost the consular 
elections in 63. The praetor Lentulus was taken prisoner and discharged 
from office. The tribune Bestia withdrew from the conspiracy. 
Considering the fact that he was neither imprisoned nor convicted and that 
he later could become aedile, he quite likely was no longer involved in the 
conspiracy when he entered office. Consequently, there was no longer a 
leader who could legitimize the revolt by means of his magistracy. That 
was crucial. The plebs was ready for action, but not for an action without 
any official sanction. Catiline realized this, for when he left the city he 
took military standards and the status symbols of office, the fasces, with 
him in order to enhance his authority and legitimacy among the country 
folk whom he went to mobilize.102 It is therefore noticeable that 
mobilization of the rural plebs did succeed. 
The importance of official legitimation becomes even more obvious in 
the events after Caesar's assassination, according to the description of 
101
 These arguments are used by Z. YAVETZ, The Failure of Catiline's Conspiracy, 
Historia 12 (1963), pp. 485-499, esp. 490-497. Thus also MEIJER, Verliezers, 75-79, 
88,93-94. The explanation of Cicero: Cat. 4.17. 
102
 Cic. Cat. 2.13, Sull. 17; Plut. Cic. 16.4; Sail. Cat. 36.1. On the rods as symbols 
of legitimate power, see A. MARSHALL, op.cit., 127-141. In other cases of power 
usurpation, too, the fasces were employed for legitimation: App. Mithr. 52 (mutiny of 
Fimbria in 86); Diod. 36.2.4 (slave revolt in Sicily in 104). 
129 
Appian.103 The tyrannicides could reckon with little support from the 
urban plebs after killing Caesar. Shortly after the announcement of 
Caesar's death, the tyrannicides gathered a crowd on the Forum by 
distributing money. This crowd, however, was reluctant to support the 
assault wholeheartedly but called for peace, for fear of the reactions of the 
rest of the people. At that moment the praetor Cinna appeared. He 
addressed the crowd and before speaking he ostentatiously laid down the 
insignia of his office. By that gesture he wanted to demonstrate that he 
refused to hold an office which had been assigned to him by the dictator 
Caesar. He should not have done that, for nothing changed in the attitude 
of the crowd. Those present were still afraid of the rest of the people. The 
situation changed, however, when the consul Dolabella appeared. He was 
in full regalia and adorned with all the status symbols of his office. At that 
moment the crowd found new courage, now that it found a consul as well 
as a praetor on its side, and with all its heart it supported the tyrannicides. 
In other words, Cinna's action was unsuccessful, because he gave up his 
legitimacy by laying down his insignia. The crowd only proceeded to 
action after action had been supported by a magistrate and therefore 
legitimized.104 
Finally, attention can be drawn to the behavior of the tribune of the 
plebs Quinctius in 74. At that time, the tribunate was still suffering from 
the Sullan restrictions. Quinctius adorned himself not with an undecorated 
toga, as was customary, but with an entirely purple garb. This was a 
symbol to show himself with the authority of the higher magistrates (B-
3). 
The importance of legitimation of action by the leadership of a 
magistrate says much about the politicization of the participants. A 
revolution was far from their minds. In Chapter 5 we will return to this 
point in more detail. 
Image Building 
Most methods to gain support which were used by popular leaders were 
set within traditional frameworks and did not significantly deviate from 
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common political methods. That is why popular leaders had to distinguish 
themselves in another way to win the support of the plebs contionalis. 
Many of the mobilization factors mentioned above (communication, 
propaganda, symbols, and magistracies) contributed to image building of 
the popular leader. This was a crucial factor in mobilization.105 
What was an image composed of? It had little to do with charisma, in 
the sense of a strong man with an extraordinary personality who appears 
in a time of insecurity and crisis and who promises change to the people. 
There were leaders, like Caesar and Clodius, who probably were more 
charismatic than others.106 But the image of the leader in Rome was more 
based on the traditional relationships between élite and people. At the top 
as well as at the bottom of society, with the élite and with the people, 
expectations existed with respect to right leadership. The accepted image 
was that of the responsible aristocrat, who put his life in the service of the 
populas and the res publica, who was attentive to the interests of the plebs, 
who showed his liberality through largitiones, and who added to the glory 
of Rome. Such a person also had to show himself capable of leadership. 
That is why a leader had to prove that he was an able military commander 
and an able magistrate. To put it differently, the image did not as much 
depend on the politician's status and personality as on his behavior.107 In a 
status-sensitive society like the Roman a certain social standing was 
indispensible to become a politician in the first place, but beyond that, 
behavior counted. From his behavior a leader derived his legitimacy.108 
This matter becomes clear from an oration delivered before the people 
by the consul C. Aurelius Cotta in 75 (Sail. Hist. 2.47M). The speech was 
related to a food riot in the same year (B-2) and was probably delivered 
afterwards, because Cotta in his speech mentions "unworthy actions" 
{indigna, 2.47.8), which must refer to the riot. Cotta's purpose is to 
explain to the people that the government is not responsible for the 
existing problems in the com supply. The shortages are due to the wars 
Rome has to wage against Sertorius in Spain and Mithridates in Asia 
Minor. The armies need money and grain, the revenues from the 
provinces have decreased, and the pirates have cut off the com supply (6-
8). Cotta states that from his youth he has dedicated himself, both as a 
private person and as a magistrate, to the Republic and its citizens (4). He 
owes his return to Rome to the victory of the citizens over Marius. The 
consulate too, the highest honor, he owes to the citizens. (4-6.) It goes 
without saying that he is indebted to the people. To describe what he owes 
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the people, Cotta uses the humble term beneficia 1 0 9 , something that 
patrons usually bestow on clients. The consul Cotta therefore poses as a 
client of the Roman people. "Look, here I stand, С Cotta your consul" 
(adsum en С Cotta consul, 10), thus says Cotta, and he offers his life as 
sacrifice for the Republic. It will be up to the citizens to decide to whom 
they will entrust the Republic, but no one will feel called to assume that 
responsibility in this extremely difficult situation. Finally, Cotta exhorts 
the people to show themselves strong and keep the public interest in mind, 
just as their ancestors had done (13-14). 
Why did Cotta deliver this oration? It would be too simple to suppose 
that it was only meant to subdue the plebs with smooth talk. More was 
happening, and Cotta's speech grants us an insight into the ideology of the 
Roman élite. Cotta thanks the citizens for his consulate and even calls it a 
beneficium. Those, however, who had participated in the food riot and 
who had especially suffered from the dearth, will have had the least 
influence in Cotta's election to the consulate, for their votes counted little 
in the centuriate assembly. Cotta was an aristocrat, a nobilis, with a long 
and honorable ancestral tradition. He did not need the lower social strata 
to achieve something. Yet he takes up a humble posture and recognizes the 
sovereignty of the people. Furthermore, he deems it necessary to account 
for the policy pursued. Cotta was consul of Rome, the top magistrate of an 
empire. He was member of a senatorial élite that took pride in an age-long 
tradition of efficient government and quality: the persons with virtus, 
who were best capable of accepting governmental tasks, a group whose 
ideology was based on the idea that they were the ones most able to 
promote the interests of state and society. Cotta took that responsibility 
and explained to the people why the élite, despite good efforts, had not 
achieved the required result.110 
In the early Republic, in the days of the patrician aristocracy, 
leadership was based on birth. After capable and rich plebeians were 
accepted in the aristocracy, the Roman élite increasingly became an 
achievement-orientated upper class, an élite whose authority and 
legitimacy were derived from its achievements. This élite, moreover, was 
engaged in continuous competition and had to prove itself time and again 
in the elections. Success in this competitive élite could be judged from the 
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completion of the cursus honorum, in other words from the evaluation the 
citizens expressed in the popular assemblies.111 
But when the élite, as a result of the backward governmental system, 
proved no longer capable of adequate administration of the res publica 
and also showed itself rigid by making the recruitment of new members 
more dependent on birth than ability, it lost its authority and legitimacy. 
This cleared the way for individuals to demonstrate that they could do 
what the oligarchy could not.112 
How was the image of the leader built? Largitiones, besides satisfying 
an actual need, also had an important communicative value. In this way a 
leader could show that he was prepared to give something to the people 
and that he was attentive to the interests of the people. Despite the fact that 
the plebs contionalis constituted merely a part of the theater public, the 
games will not have failed to be effective on this group. The games took 
place in the city and, just like modem sports events and popular street 
festivals, will have been discussed in shops and taverns. The name of the 
organizer will undoubtably have been mentioned in the discussion.113 
It fitted the good leader to be modest and dutiful, which shows that the 
plebs endorsed the old values of the Roman élite, their virtus. This 
becomes manifest in the fact that Caesar made himself unpopular when he, 
as a dictator, engaged in the settlement of state affairs while attending the 
games instead of enjoying the show together with the spectators. This was 
seen as a mark of arrogance; Augustus was careful not to fall into the same 
mistake.114 Already mentioned above was symbolic behavior, such as a 
sober lifestyle and even shabby clothes, with which a leader could 
demonstrate his unselfishness. As Cicero remarks: "The Roman people 
loathe private luxury, but they adore public splendor".115 
The cursus honorum, the military assignments, and the provincial 
governorships of a popular leader were not only advantageous to the 
individual himself, but also a condition for good image and thereby 
successful leadership and subsequent career opportunities. In this way the 
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leader could prove that he was worthy of his function as a leader. 
Politicians also could demonstrate their abilities as advocates in trials.116 
A good example of the proof of successful leadership is Pompey's 
command against the pirates in 67 (B-8, 9, 10). Pompey's resounding 
success against the pirates (he cleared the Mediterranean in three months) 
showed that the design of Gabinius' proposal was the right way to deal 
with the problem. The senate was shown to be unable of dealing with the 
problem with regular procedures: a clear example of the dysfunctioning 
in an empire of a constitution based on a city-state. The solution, a great 
command for an individual, was diametrically opposed to the egalitarian 
principles of the oligarchy.117 The senate, therefore, justifiably feared 
Pompey's expansion of power. From the perspective of the people, 
however, the problem was quite real; Rome's corn supply was 
endangered. Now that the senate was unable or unwilling to solve the 
problem, the people deemed it entirely reasonable to comply with 
Gabinius' proposal. Pompey adopted a modest and compliant attitude 
towards the people118 and subsequently proved that, where others failed, 
he was capable of taking swift, decisive action.119 
Interesting also is a reaction of the people during the debates on the lex 
Gabinia. The influential senator Catulus addressed the people in order to 
persuade them to vote against the bill. He particularly pointed to the 
danger of one-man rule if one individual obtained so much power. That, 
however, was a problem that concerned only the oligarchy, and the people 
were not receptive to it. When Catulus in addition pointed to the danger 
Pompey would incur in the campaign and rhetorically asked who else 
would be left to receive a great command if Pompey were killed, the 
public answered: "You, Catulus!"120 In other words, never mind who 
goes, someone just has to do it. 
An ability to make decisions and vigorous action were important 
aspects of the image of the good leader. This was already true of Marius. 
He became consul for the second time in 104 after having successfully 
terminated the war against Jugurtha. The year before, the arrogant 
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patrician Q. Servilius Caepio had suffered an ignominious defeat against 
the Cimbri and Teutones. The new man Marius subsequently obtained the 
command against the Germans and vanquished them, thereby averting a 
huge military danger for Rome. Marius rendered himself most popular 
and thereupon remained consul until 100. Similarly, Crassus became a 
beloved consul after having held back Spartacus from the gates of Rome at 
the end of the 70s. 
It was pre-eminently Pompey who was able to acquire fame as 
decision-maker and troubleshooter.121 In 72 he had defeated Sertorius and 
finally terminated the civil war. For the people, therefore, Pompey was 
an obvious choice for the command against the pirates in 67. When 
Catiline's uprising was still continuing on the countryside at the beginning 
of 62, Pompey attempted to have himself called back with his army to 
quell the rebellion (B-25). But this time the oligarchy was able to sabotage 
Pompey's schemes effectively. In 57 Pompey saw to it that he was charged 
with the cura annonae, again an influential position in the service of the 
Republic.122 During the riots of 52 (B-86), the fasces were brought to 
Pompey and he was hailed as consul and even as dictator, the decision-
maker from Roman tradition. The Pompeian assistant leaders led the 
behavior of the crowd into that direction, but to the people, in any case, it 
was acceptable and a logical choice. 
The competition among the élite not only occurred at elections but also 
in obtaining military and provincial commands. Popular leaders 
attempted to acquire these assignments by means of a law in the popular 
assembly.123 A command in the field was an excellent way for personal 
enrichment. Generals who returned from a victorious campaign could 
reckon with a great deal of attention and even acclamations of the plebs, 
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for example during a triumph.124 That was not only true of popular 
leaders: the plebs wanted to honor Lucullus, a successful general but not 
quite a popularis, during his funeral (B-50). 
With respect to their image, leaders took great effort to make their 
victories actually public and to reap the publicity harvest. During the final 
stage of the slave war of Spartacus, Crassus tried to finish the war as 
quickly as possible to prevent there being any honor left to be gained for 
Pompey, who was on his way with an army (App. 1.120). Afterwards 
Crassus, to his disappointment, had to settle for an ovation, a limited 
triumph for victories over unworthy enemies, while Pompey was allowed 
to have a full triumph for his war in Spain.125 During his propractorship 
in Spain in 61, Caesar had vanquished some native tribes and therefore 
was entitled to a triumph. In 60 he also stood for the consulate. Both 
things at the same time, however, were not allowed, for a triumphator 
was still a military commander and therefore was not allowed within the 
city walls to stand for office. In order to keep the publicity advantage of 
the triumph, Caesar requested to stand for office in absentia, which the 
senate refused to allow. Caesar had to choose between a triumph and a 
consular campaign.126 He chose the latter and became consul in 59. 
We should wonder why military success was so important for success 
as a popular leader, for military fame was an important factor of 
mobilization. There were hardly any advantages for the urban plebs in the 
conquests of far away territories. The advantages were much more 
immediately available for the officers and the soldiers, who were 
recruited from the countryside and who received a share of the booty. 
The explanation should be looked for in the traditional character of 
Roman society. Despite the fact that the inhabitants of Rome during the 
late Republic differed significantly from their ancestors in the time when 
Rome still was a peasant community, beliefs from that period remained in 
force. The members of the urban plebs hardly took part anymore as 
soldiers in military campaigns. Yet Roman society kept its military 
character from time immemorial.127 The symbols of it were everywhere 
clearly visible. The city was filled with monuments to commemorate 
victories, military victory was patently obvious in the triumphs, the 
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centuriate assembly retained its original military organization, the higher 
magistracies had a strong military character and often were connected to a 
military command. In collective consciousness, further, the memory was 
kept alive of the many years of war which Rome had experienced from 
the beginning of its existence. The Romans even believed that they had 
conquered the world under divine sanction128. The inhabitants of Rome 
were proud of being Romans; the victories of the Roman armies were also 
their victories. In short, they knew that they were at the head of an 
empire. This also follows from the fact that the plebs actively interfered 
in matters concerning foreign policy, especially if it concerned the issue 
of a just or an unjust war (B-65, 74, 79, 80). Not surprisingly, therefore, 
in many speeches before the people or at occasions attended by a large 
public the power of populas Romanus over the entire world and its 
sovereignty were stressed.129 The mentality of the Roman urban plebs in 
the late Republic was partly determined by collective undercurrents 
which originated in early Rome.130 In that respect Rome, despite the 
expansion, still was in every way a Gemeinschaft. 
Let us now observe what the image of some important popular leaders 
was based on. In the beginning of his career, Pompcy made himself 
popular by restoring the powers of the tribunes of the plebs. Next to that, 
he was known as a great military commander, but above all as a 
troubleshooter. In times of emergency it was always Pompey's name 
which was called. But that, especially during the 50s, was all. In those 
years Pompey could boast great respect, but he was not really popular 
anymore. Perhaps he lacked the right manners with the plebs, showed off 
his achievements too much, and perhaps his too openly aired desire for 
recognition by the nobility was a reason for the people to consider him 
less attentive to their interests. 
From the beginning of his career, Caesar had showed himself friendly 
to the people by his attitude, his public works and his games, his support 
of reform bills, such as the election of the pontiffs, his propagandistic 
activities by taking advantage of the reminiscences of the former popular 
leaders Marius and Satuminus, and his legislative activity during his 
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consulate. Typically, it was said that Caesar gave substance to his 
consulate as if it were a tribunate (Plut. Caes. 14, Pomp. 47.5). As aediles 
he and his colleague Bibulus showed themselves very generous, but 
Caesar was able to get all the credit for the largess (Suet. ////. 10.1). In 
Spain he gained military fame and during the 50s he enhanced it 
enormously. In that period Caesar was able to increase his prestige in 
Gaul by his military campaigns and with the help of his assistant leaders in 
Rome, while Pompey in Rome ran the risk of making himself unpopular. 
Pompey therefore incurred the hatred of the people when he dissolved his 
alliance with Clodius. Caesar had a most urbane personality and the gift 
not to make any mistakes in his image building. He knew how to ally 
himself with the right persons at the right time. During the 60s he aligned 
himself to the popular Pompey and his assistant leaders. At the time of the 
conspiracy of Catiline he took up the most moderate stand, which earned 
him suspicion of complicity from the élite but appreciation from the 
people, because he opposed oligarchical brutality. In 61 he refused to 
prosecute Clodius for the Bona Dea affair, despite the fact that Clodius' 
blasphemy had taken place in Caesar's residence. Clodius' popularity with 
the plebs at that time was already too valuable. Also thereafter Caesar 
remained on speaking terms with Clodius. As a dictator he continued his 
policy of good contacts with the people on an even larger scale.131 
Clodius' image finally was not based on military fame. He could 
mainly boast actual promotion of the people's interests. He professed to 
dedicate himself unselfishly to the well-being of the people. By his 
legislative activity and symbolic actions he demonstrated that he had a 
good appraisal of the needs of the plebs. The tremendous popularity he 
gained with it was expressed in the reactions after his death.132 
In the relationship between élite and people a shift occurred. In the past 
the élite, assembled in the senate, promoted the interests of state and 
people. The élite demonstrated its ability and its serviceability to society 
by magistracies, conquests, and largess. When during the late Republic 
some nobles attempted to rise above their peers, the interests of people 
and state were increasingly promoted by individuals instead of the élite as 
a collectivity. These individuals had to show themselves capable and 
compliant in the same way. Nothing therefore changed in the method of 
acquiring legitimacy and in the expectations of the plebs. The change was 
to be found in the shift from collectivity to individual. Augustus later 
would fulfil the expectations of the first citizen by putting his 
serviceability to the res publica first and by being modest in his display of 
power.133 
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Conclusions 
"It does not matter what is given, what counts is how it is given".134 This 
profundity of the philosopher Seneca expresses the essence of the 
relationship between popular leader and crowd in the late Republic. A 
number of members of the Roman élite achieved a successful cooperation 
with the people, especially with a certain social group within the urban 
plebs. The success of the mobilization process depended on a number of 
factors, in which the leader's program was of less importance than his 
appearance and behavior. 
A number of mobilization factors were responsible for the creation of 
a frame of mind which could lead to active mobilization of a group of 
participants in collective behavior. They have been treated here under the 
headings of communication, propaganda, and image building. These 
factors, if necessary, were complemented by concrete legislative 
proposals. In direct mobilization the most important factors appear to 
have been pre-existing organization and the presence of leadership. The 
availability of these factors for a large part determined the success of 
mobilization. 
The common denominator of the mobilization factors, as far as they 
were not unexpected or due to outside interference, was their 
embeddedness in Roman tradition. Slogans went back to time-honored 
traditions of popular influence in Roman politics or to popular heroes 
from the past. The organization was based on pre-existing organizations. 
Even the operae were not basically new constructions, but merely a more 
efficient organizational type of the pre-existing collegia. The symbols that 
were employed appealed to the ideological concepts of the relationship 
between élite and plebs. The leaders by definition belonged to the group 
which had always governed the Republic; and they were the most 
successful if they were members of the official administration. Many 
leaders were magistrates, not only because it granted them the powers to 
assemble the plebs, but also because their office sanctioned collective 
behavior. A successful leader answered to the classical image of 
leadership by the Roman senator. 
Mobilization therefore did not bring an innovation in Roman politics. 
What changed was the function and the impact of certain elements in the 
traditional forms of communication between élite and plebs. This was 
caused by structural differentiation and dysfunctions of the prevailing 
political system under the influence of the expansion. 
In Chapter 2 we have observed that a differentiation had occurred 
within the Roman plebs. One group became detached from existing ties of 
patronage and sought new ways for the articulation of demands. This void 
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in the patron-client relationships was filled in by popular leaders. A new 
relationship of patronage was established, essentially equal to the old 
relationship, i.e. the mutual expectations remained the same. But the scale 
of the relationship and the distance between patron and client were larger. 
The personal relationships disappeared and were replaced by 
relationships between a leader and a collectivity. This required a new 
communication structure between patron and client. It was established by 
using pre-existing elements in Roman society. The leader addressed his 
following not only directly but also through intermediaries: assistant 
leaders and intermediate leaders. The employment of pre-existing 
organizations such as the colleges facilitated mobilization of larger 
groups. Mobilization resulted in cooperation between a popular leader 
and the public clientele. The members of that group, the artisans and 
shopkeepers, were the most susceptible to important mobilization factors: 
the organizations, the closing of the shops, the location of collective 
behavior in the Forum. 
Considering the fact that mobilization was set within traditional 
frameworks and was not innovative, we should wonder how popular 
leaders differed from their political opponents and from each other. The 
difference consisted in the resources a leader had to mobilize and in his 
image. The resources first were composed of an efficient organization. 
This organization passed through assistant leaders to intermediate leaders 
to arrive finally at the organizations of the plebs. Second, financial means 
were important as a resource. The financial potential of the magnates far 
surpassed the means of their peers among the élite. It gave them the 
possibility of liberality and the acquisition of a personal following. Image, 
finally, was based on the demonstration of successful leadership. In this, 
they could utilize the failure of the prevailing governmental system as a 
result of an obsolete administrative structure and discord within the 
ruling class. 
One leader, Clodius, did not quite conform to these conditions and can 
be qualified as unique. Without having to rely too much on assistant 
leaders and without military achievements he was able to provide direct 
leadership to the plebs in times when he did not hold a magistracy. That 
was already the case before his tribunate in 58. In 26 of the attested cases 
of collective behavior, leadership without the presence of a magistrate 
was involved. In almost half of those cases (12), leadership was furnished 
by Clodius.135 The proportions change if we count from the moment at 
which Clodius started to move actively in Roman public life. Clodius' 
activity started with the Bona Dea trial in 61, when he already employed 
operae. From 61 on we know 62 cases of collective behavior. 19 out of the 
62 are with leadership and without a magistrate. The majority of those 
(12) occurred under the leadership of Clodius. 
135 B-31, 51, 52, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 84, 85. The other fourteen: B-l, 7, 15, 
16, 18, 24, 28, 43, 53, 54, 59, 78, 81, 83. 
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A primary explanation, of course, is to be found in the incompleteness 
of our data. Considering the animosity between Clodius and Cicero, 
Clodius stood a better chance of being mentioned in Cicero's works than 
other politicians. Yet this explanation is insufficient. Clodius counted as a 
notorious and successful popular leader among other authors as well. 
The uniqueness of Clodius resulted from his efficient use of a number 
of important mobilization factors. Clodius, more than any other popular 
leader, realized the importance of the organizations of the plebs and he 
improved their organization to facilitate mobilization. Also he seems to 
have made the most use of intermediate leaders. In that way Clodius set up 
an extremely effective structure of communication and organization, with 
which he could attach the members of the public clientele to himself. In 
that, Clodius perhaps was the only one who brought some innovation in 
Roman politics. 
Clodius' image as a leader was not based on military fame, but rather 
on a direct promotion of the interests of the urban plebs, in particular of 
the plebs contionalis. It may be surmised that Clodius received his 
inspiration from Gaius Gracchus, for there are many parallels between 
the two popular leaders. Just like Gaius Gracchus, Clodius proposed a 
package of bills in the popular assembly, which were a combination of 
direct advantages for the people (com law and restoration of the colleges) 
and political reform (law on the censorship and adaptations of the Aelian 
and Fufian laws). Just like Gaius Gracchus, Clodius took measures to 
prevent senatorial repression {lex de capite civis). Just like Gaius 
Gracchus, Clodius sprang from very prestigious stock, and Clodius' 
family was even more powerful than the Sempronii Gracchi. Clodius' 
background promised him an illustrious career in public life. Yet Clodius 
took a different route, and as a tribune of the plebs he incurred the hatred 
of the oligarchy. Just like Gaius Gracchus, Clodius matched political 





After having observed who the leaders in collective behavior were, whom 
the participants were composed of, and how collective behavior 
developed, in this chapter the actual collective behavior will be treated. 
First, some categories of collective behavior will be considered. Next, the 
violent cases will be discussed, and, finally, we will observe the ways in 
which the government tried to prevent or to control collective behavior. 
Public Manifestations 
One category of collective behavior can be qualified as public 
manifestations. These belonged to the most traditional aspects of Roman 
public life. From the years 80-50, nine cases are known in which some 
action or reaction of the public present is discernable. The behavior 
displayed mostly was just expressive, but in some cases violent behavior 
also occurred. 
The first type of public manifestations consisted of funerals. Funerals 
of members of the aristocracy were a public event, at which the 
opportunity was used to demonstrate the greatness of the deceased and his 
stock by means of laudatory orations and portraits.1 In 78 the dictator 
Sulla was buried in great splendor (B-l). The public was particulary 
composed of those who owed much to Sulla, namely his soldiers and the 
veterans to whom he had allotted land. Considering the terror Sulla had 
exerted during his dictatorship, not everyone agreed with an honorary 
funeral. But those who were reluctant to participate were forced to join in 
under threat of the soldiers. Sulla's death was mourned with loud clamor. 
The other cases of funerals were those of Caesar's aunt Julia (B-7), 
Lucullus (B-50), and Caesar's daughter Julia (B-78). The funeral of 
Caesar's aunt, Marius' widow, became a demonstration in favor of 
popular politics, because Caesar clearly propagated his allegiance to 
Marius. As already stated, the emphasis on family backgrounds at funerals 
was a normal phenomenon. Caesar incorporated this tradition into his 
popular politics.2 
The traditions of public funerals also emerged in the collective 
behavior after the death of Clodius (B-86). The plebs assembled in great 
numbers at Clodius' residence. Clodius' death was mourned. Leaders put 
1
 Pol. 6.53-54; NICOLET, Métier, 460-467; SCULLARD, Festivals, 218-221. 
2
 On public funerals as part of popular politics, see: G. Λ CHARD, "Ratio popularis" et 
funérailles, LEG 43 (1975), pp. 166-178. 
142 
an end to the feeling of uncertainty of the crowd and directed the action 
which was to be pursued. Clodius' assistant leaders suggested carrying the 
corpse to a public spot - the Forum. The intermediate leader Sex. Clodius 
took the initiative to carry the corpse into the Curia and to cremate it 
there. In other words, the leaders appealed to the existing traditions of 
honorary funerals for great Romans and therewith found a response with 
the plebs, which set off a concerted action. A similar action pattern was 
visible at the cremation of Caesar by the people in 44.3 
Another type of public manifestation was the triumphs (B-32, 68, 82), 
which attracted much attention. During a triumph, a victorious general 
passed through Rome with his army, the amassed booty, and the 
vanquished prisoners of war. The general was loudly acclaimed.4 
Following on his triumph in 61, Pompey was hailed by the people as 
Magnus, the Great.5 
Public manifestations were rooted in Roman tradition. These events 
had great publicity value for anyone, and certainly for popular leaders 
who could act as leaders at such occasions. 
Demonstrations 
A second category of collective behavior was formed by demonstrations; 
to start with, demonstrations at the games.6 In Chapter 2 it was concluded 
that the spectators at the games differed from the usual participants in 
urban collective behavior and that, consequently, political reactions in the 
theater and the circus tended to be anti-popularis. During public shows 
expressive collective behavior was habitual; the public reacted to the 
performances and showed its enthusiasm or disapproval towards the 
actors. Such behavior received a political meaning when there was a 
reaction to lines of an actor with a political connotation or to the entrance 
of a public personality. The behavior consisted of hisses or cheers and 
applause. Leadership in these cases is difficult to assess. Sometimes 
claqueurs acted as intermediate leaders (B-53). An important factor was 
the arrangement of the stands. Senators and equestrians attended the 
games. Each group had separate seats and could act as a claque. The 
collective expressions at the games foreshadowed developments in the 
Principale, during which their political meaning increased. Because of the 
abolition of the popular assemblies, the theater and the circus remained as 
3App. 2.126, 147, and 3.2; Cic. Att. 14.10.1, Phil. 1.5 and 2.91; Dio 44.50 and 
45.23.4; Plut. Ant. 14.3-4, Brut. 20, Caes. 68. 
4
 On triumphs: NlCOLET, Métier, 467-472; SCULLARD, Festivals, 213-218. 
5
 B-32. Other public manifestations: B-5,40. 
6 B-20, 35, 36, 53, 54, 76, 77, 90. See also NlCOLET, Métier, 479-494. 
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the only accepted type of public communication between government and 
people.7 
Next to theater demonstrations, there are a series of demonstrations 
which can be defined as behavior during meetings without an official 
character, i.e. not officially called by a magistrate such as a contio. They 
involved expressions of support or honor for a leader.8 Thus Caesar (B-
19, 24, 26) and Curio (B-92) could enjoy such public interest. Pompey 
was welcomed after his victories in the East with great splendor (B-28). 
Who received such support depended for an important part on the 
participants. Thus, the équités in Rome in 58 demonstrated as a 
collectivity in favor of Cicero (B-43), and when Cicero returned from 
exile he was welcomed by a cheering crowd of Italians and country folk 
(B-59). 
Assemblies 
Collective behavior most frequently occurred during popular assemblies 
(comitia) and meetings (condones). There it was also the most significant 
for the political process. 38 out of the 92 cases fall into this category. If 
we itemize these cases, we observe the following proportions: the 
majority of the 38 cases (23) were meetings. Next to these, there were 8 
legislative tribal assemblies, 3 elective tribal assemblies, 1 legislative 
centuriate assembly, and 3 elective centuriate assemblies.9 
These proportions are not surprising. Considering the design of the 
various political assemblies, it is obvious that the opportunity for 
collective behavior was larger at meetings than at popular assemblies. For 
the contio was a meeting for political discussion prior to legislation, 
elections, or voting in public trials, which had been especially introduced 
for that purpose. The debate was mostly held between the presiding 
magistrate and members of the élite who received permission to speak 
from the chairman, but, besides that, there was an accepted space for 
participation by the public. 
In the actual popular assemblies discussion was prohibited. The only 
permitted collective behavior of the citizens at those occasions was to cast 
7
 On expressive collective behavior during the games in the Empire, see A. ALFöLDI, 
Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells am römischen Kaiserhofe, MDAl 
(R) 49 (1934), pp. 1-118, esp. 79-88; BOLLINGER, «p.dr., 29-71; HOPKINS, Death, 
14-20 (gladiatorial shows); KNEPPE, Untersuchungen, pp. 52-56; MACMULLEN, 
Enemies, 168-173; F. MILLAR, The Emperor in the Roman World. (31 B.C.-A.D. 
337), Ithaca 1977, pp. 368-374; С ROUECHé, Acclamations in the Later Roman 
Empire: New Evidence from Aphrodisias, JRS 74 (1984), pp. 181-199; YAVETZ, 
Plebs, 9-24. 
8
 On such demonstrations, see: NICOLET, Métier, 472-479. 
9 Meetings: B-3, 4. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 21, 25, 27, 29, 33, 37, 38, 41, 44, 45, 
46, 57, 67, 74. Tribal legislative assembly: B-13, 14, 30, 34, 47, 51, 52, 73. Tribal 
elective: B-22, 72, 91. Centuriate legislative: B-58. Centuriate elective: B-70, 71, 85. 
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the ballot and that, in fact, was an individual affair. Furthermore, the 
voting procedures were structured. Elections took place on the Campus 
Martius. It was divided into 35 rows of individual tribes, the saepta. The 
voters in succession passed through these rows to cast their ballot in their 
own tribe. During the elective tribal assembly the voting took place 
simultaneously; in the centuriate assembly first the highest census classes 
voted. During legislation in the Forum there also existed a tribal 
arrangement, and the voters walked over the voting bridges to depose 
their ballot into the urns.10 Actual collective action in these assemblies 
could only consist of illegal behavior. The cases which are known to us, 
therefore, only consisted of behavior which was exceptional or out of the 
order; the great majority of these cases were violent. The remaining cases 
concern the exceptional concourse of people at Cato the Younger's 
election to the tribunate of the plebs (B-22) and two cases we know of 
thanks to the involvement of Cicero, i.e. the voting on his exile (B-47) and 
the voting on his return (B-58). The latter case in itself was exceptional 
because of the mobilization of great numbers of Italians and because it was 
the only legislative centuriate assembly in this period. 
Of one case, the voting on the lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis (B-47), 
some interesting incidental details are known. There were a few 
organized small groups (operae) present under the leadership of the 
intermediate leader Fidulius. Their task was to make the voting pass in a 
favorable way by loudly expressing support for the bill. The lot or 
Clodius, the presiding magistrate, designated Fidulius as the first voter, 
whose vote generally was considered an omen to be followed by the 
subsequent voters. 
Since the violent cases will be discussed in the next section, we will now 
deal only with non-violent meetings.11 In view of the official character of 
the contiones it goes without saying that leadership in all cases (including 
the violent ones) was provided by a magistrate. The purpose of the 
meetings was to arrive at a political opinion on the issue which was under 
discussion. A magistrate who called a contio wished to gain support for 
the eventual vote on a bill or the verdict in a trial. Such, too, was the goal 
of the known contiones between 80 and 50. 
What collective behavior occurred during contiones ? In general it was 
limited to expressive behavior in the form of showing agreement or 
acclamations (B-4), showing disagreement (B-21), protest against 
senatorial obstruction (B-10, 38), a request for peace (B-6), and 
interested presence (B-29, 33, 45, 46). In these cases there were no 
spontaneous actions, but only reactions to remarks made by orators or to 
issues brought up by leaders. An actual type of peaceful action came about 
only in a meeting called by Clodius in 58, during which the assembled 
10
 On the voting procedures in the various popular assemblies: NICOLE!, Métier, 333-
349, 365-375 and 380-385; STAVELEY, Voting, Ch. IX; TAYLOR, RVA, Ch. Ill and 
pp. 74-83. 
11
 B-4, 6, 10, 21, 29, 33, 38, 41, 45, 46. 
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artisans and shopkeepers registered in the recently re-established colleges 
(B-41). Finally, it is remarkable that this was the only peaceful contio in 
which the presence of organization can be detected. 
Collective Violence 
The late Republic is known as a period of frequent violent crowd 
behavior.12 It is thus no accident that out of the 92 known cases of 
collective behavior, 62 can be qualified as violent. An explanation, first of 
all, is to be found in the nature of our tradition. Collective violence, 
considering its spectacular and often dramatic character, naturally was 
more worth mentioning for ancient authors than other cases of crowd 
behavior. Furthermore, we have observed that in popular assemblies 
collective action by the participants almost automatically had a violent 
character, because the permitted behavior was limited. Rome had a long 
tradition of popular justice, which could express itself violently.13 Self-
help, also in a violent form, was an accepted principle in the Roman sense 
of justice.14 Finally, the late Republic seems to have been a period in 
which collective violence, as a result of political conflict, occurred more 
frequently than before. 
Collective violence consisted, on the one hand, of the previously 
discussed categories of collective behavior which took on a violent 
character, and, on the other hand, of cases which were violent from the 
start - to be qualified as "riots". At some public manifestations, dissension 
arose between protagonists and antagonists of the manifestation (B-l, 78, 
82). One theater demonstration ended in a riot. In 63 a skirmish came 
about in the theater between the équités, who welcomed Roscius at his 
entrance, and the rest of the audience, who hissed Roscius (B-20). But in 
the other cases of theater demonstrations there was no conflict between 
various parts of the audience, possibly due to its composition. For the 
12
 During the Principale, too, collective violence occurred with some regularity in 
Rome and other cities. On collective violence in the Principale in general, see: T.W. 
AFRICA, Urban Violence in Imperial Rome, Journal of Interdisciplinary Hisory 2 
(1971), pp. 3-21; MACMULLEN, Enemies, Ch. 5; YAVETZ, Plebs, 24-37. 
Some individual riots are analyzed by: L. GRACCO RUGGINI, Nuclei immigrati e forze 
indigene in tre grandi centri commerciali dell'imperio, MAAR 36 (1980), pp. 55-76; H. 
GALSTERER, Politik in römischen Städten: die "seditio" des Jahres 59 n.Chr. in 
Pompeii, in: W. ECK, et al. (eds.), Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift F. 
Vittinghoff, Köln 1980, pp. 323-338; Т.Е. GREGORY, Popular Opinion and Violence 
in the Religious Controversies of the Fifth Century A.D., Columbus 1979; C.P. 
JONES, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom, Cambridge 1978, Ch. 3 "Riot at 
Prusa"; KNEPPE, op.cit., 20-91; W.O. MOELLER, The Riot of A.D. 59 at Pompeii, 
Historia 19 (1970), pp. 84-85. 
On food riots: H.P. KOHNS, Versorgungskrisen und Hungerrevolten im spätantiken 
Rom, Bonn 1979. 
13
 LINTOTT Ch. I. 
14
 LINTOTT Ch. Π. 
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composition of the audience was subject to manipulation, by which an 
unanimous expression of opinion was easily created. In one case Clodius 
was physically threatened by the theater public in 57 (B-53). The late 
Republic was still far from late antiquity, when aficionados of the teams in 
the chariot races frequently came to blows. The demonstrations in the 
theater offer parallels with events in the Empire, but the late Republican 
theater was still lacking the political function it had in the Empire, when 
riots with some regularity arose during the performances as an expression 
of social protest.15 Finally, in our period two other demonstrations took 
place which took on a violent character (B-24, 26); the people threatened 
the senate which had treated Caesar unfairly in the eyes of the people. 
We now come to the frequent violence in meetings and popular 
assemblies. Looking at the meetings, we observe that violence occurred as 
a reaction to matters which were considered unfair by the people, for 
example actions taken against popular leaders.16 Further, it occurred to 
enforce a political decision (B-8, 11, 57) or as a reaction to senatorial 
opposition against a submitted proposal (B-25). Finally, it could serve to 
support a popular candidate at elections (B-12). In some of the cases 
mentioned, violence broke out in support of the policy which was pursued 
by the senatorial majority against the populares (B-57, 74). 
The violence in the tribal assembly was similar to the violence in 
meetings. In the legislative tribal assembly it could involve acts of 
violence in order to support bills (B-14) or resistance to opposition from 
the senate during voting (B-9, 52, 73). On the other hand, it could also 
involve violent attempts to prevent the passing of unfavorable bills in the 
assembly (B-13, 30, 51). In the elective tribal assembly violence was used 
to support the election of certain candidates (B-72, 91), and so also in the 
centuriate assembly (B-70,71, 85). 
Almost half of the cases of collective violence (30) involved riots. An 
important number consisted of riots which took place during or in 
relation to a trial. The goal was to influence the judicial process. The 
people interfered in jurisdiction by either attempting to prevent the 
conviction of a popular leader (B-15, 16, 18, 31, 49, 83, 89) or, on the 
contrary, to achieve the conviction of a person who had obviously 
misbehaved in the eyes of the people (B-65, 79, 80, 88). These cases, 
together with the above mentioned cases in which the people violently 
reacted to injustice and the reactions after the death of Clodius (B-86, 87), 
formed part of the ever important traditions of popular justice. 
15
 Some examples from the first century A.D.: Tac. Ann. 1.77, 6.13 (Tiberius); Suet. 
Cal. 40; Jos. AJ 19.25-26 (Caligula); Plut. Galba 17.4 (Galba); Tac. Hist. 1.72 
(Otho). WHITTAKER, op.dr., 360-364, enumerates a series of riots in Rome between 
A.D. 182-238, which were linked to political events and most of which started or took 
place during the games. On the political function of the theater in the Empire, see: E. 
TENGSTRÖM, Theater und Politik im kaiserlichen Rom, Éranos 75 (1977), pp. 43-56. 
16
 B-3, 17, 27, 37, 44, 67, 74. 
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Next to these, there were a series of riots which can be classified as 
"political", i.e. acts of violence outside the regular meetings and 
assemblies, whose goal was to influence political decision-making. It often 
concerned intimidation of or attacks on political opponents.17 Finally, 
there were some food riots. High com prices and perhaps the beginning of 
a food shortage could lead to violent protests of the plebs.18 Acute 
material deprivation had a catalyzing effect. Food riots were more intense 
than other types of collective violence, and also, though proof is lacking, 
seem to have had a higher number of participants. 
What is meant by collective violence?19 In a few cases violence was 
limited to exclusively material damage. Most cases did not go beyond 
threatening opponents (18), or physical violence (31) in which people 
came to blows or threw stones and in which persons were injured. Only in 
10 cases were some victims probably killed. The scale of the violence, 
therefore, was limited. As Cicero already said, violence in meetings 
mostly consisted of shouting and secessions in the public; only at the end 
and in rare cases did an actual scuffle come about (Sest. 77). Moreover, 
we should be careful with the sources. In his speeches Cicero made much 
of the acts of violence by his opponents. But in one of his letters (Att. 
1.14.3) Cicero admits that in his speeches he tended to grossly exaggerate 
arsons and violence.20 
If we look at the objects under attack, we observe the following: Most 
cases concerned violence against persons, i.e. attacks against opposing 
magistrates and senators or the adherents of the rival party. Also the 
homes of opponents were attacked (B-56, 61, 87). Considering the 
propaganda of popular leaders in which the senatorial oligarchy was 
depicted as being against the people's interests and as an oppressor of the 
libertas populi, it can be surmised that the senate in these cases became a 
symbol which evoked hostile reactions. In cases of acute deprivation it 
was a scapegoat. During a com shortage in 75 the consuls were deemed 
responsible and were attacked by the plebs (B-2). In a food riot in 57 
Clodius was able effectively to suggest Cicero as scapegoat (B-60). After a 
flood in 54 Gabinius was taken as scapegoat, because he was thought to 
have misbehaved towards the gods (B-80). These actions were cases of 
material deprivation; the death of Clodius could be called a case of severe 
psychological deprivation (B-86, 87). An obvious scapegoat was found in 
Clodius' murderer Milo, but popular fury was also directed against the 
senatorial élite as a whole, which was held responsible for Clodius' fate. 
Some objects under attack had a symbolic value; the most important 
were the fasces, rods carried by the lictors as a symbol of the authority of 
the magistrate. Three cases are known in which the plebs broke the fasces 
17
 B-23, 42, 48, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 75, 81, 84, 86, 87. 
18
 B-2, 55, 60. See furthermore B-39, 66. 
19
 See also LlNTOTT Ch. V. 
20
 See further ACHARD, Pratique, 335-351. 
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of a consul who took up a position adverse to the will of the people (B-l 1, 
34, 48). Breaking the fasces was a symbolic action whereby die people 
sought to deprive the magistrate of his authority.21 The action indicated 
that the power of the magistrate was no longer considered legitimate. The 
person who held the magistracy had acted so contrary to the popular will 
that the people wished to deny him the right to hold the office. This 
behavior should be connected to actual legislative attempts to discharge 
from office magistrates who resisted the will of the people or who acted 
against popular interest (B-9,10). 
The counterpart of the breaking of the fasces is to be found in the 
events after Clodius' death when the crowd carried the fasces to Pompey, 
thereby indicating that he should hold the consulate and even the 
dictatorship in order to provide a solution for the emergency situation 
that had arisen (B-86). The counterpart of the deposition of the 
magistrates is to be found in the willingness of the plebs to maintain 
popular leaders in their office. In 62 the senate discharged Caesar from 
the praetorship because of his involvement in a violent popular assembly. 
The crowd, however, showed its readiness to support Caesar with 
violence, and Caesar was reinstated in office (B-26). Such symbolic 
actions once again demonstrate how much collective behavior in Rome 
was set in a traditional framework. The people did not wish to achieve 
state reform, but asserted itself if the responsible magistrates did not 
perform their task well, or if they did perform well and incurred 
opposition. Possibly a shift in the attitude of the plebs contionalis can be 
discerned. The power of the magistrates was no longer accepted or 
considered legitimate merely on the basis of their election, but only if 
coupled with proper behavior. If that was not the case, the magistracy was 
not to be replaced, but the individual, irrespective of possible 
constitutional implications. 
Another case of a symbolic object under attack was the stoning of the 
statues of Pompey in 55 as a reaction to his unfair treatment of Cato the 
Younger.22 Something similar happened in 48. After Caesar had defeated 
Pompey at Pharsalus, the statues of Pompey and Sulla were torn down in 
Rome to indicate that Caesar's enemies were not worthy of being honored 
by a statue (Dio 42.18.2; by the urban plebs according to Suet. lul. 75.4). 
As a gesture of magnanimity Caesar had the statues re-erected in 44.23 
21
 See also A. MARSHALL, op.cit., 138. Some other examples of the breaking of the 
fasces : App. 1.15 (during the reelection of Tiberius Gracchus to tribune of the plebs in 
133); Liv. 3.49.4 (in 450). 
2 2
 B-73. See also the demolition of a statue of Piso by his mutinous soldiers in 
Macedonia because they had not received their pay (Cic. Pis. 93). 
2 3
 YAVETZ, Caesar, 96. 
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Such aggression against statues foreshadowed the Empire.24 During 
the Republic, portraits of living persons were considered a condemnable 
form of personality cult. But during the late Republic it became 
increasingly common. A similar development is to be seen on coins from 
Caesar's dictatorship on. The popular reactions against statues provide an 
indication that leadership more and more came into the hands of 
individuals. The people showed their favor or disfavor towards 
individuals instead of the collectivity of the ruling oligarchy. The pendant 
of aggression against statues was the expression of joy over the erection of 
statues of past popular leaders, of which we have seen some examples in 
the previous chapter.25 
In collective violence a division of labor often is visible: leaders direct 
the actions, small groups act as an active nucleus, and the rest of the crowd 
forms a more or less passive body of bystanders. The information from 
the sources, unfortunately, for the most part offers insufficient details on 
how the leaders were able to move the mobilized crowd to violent action. 
Mostly we do not know more than that a leader was responsible for the 
violence committed, or that he ordered a small group to turn to violence, 
or that he called upon the assembled crowd, for example, to attack a 
political opponent or to protect himself. In any case, the role of leadership 
was essential; leaders were responsible for mobilization in the first place, 
but in the majority of the cases of collective violence the leaders also took 
the initiative in provoking violence. Leaders pointed out the objects that 
were to be attacked, so that a maximum political effect could be achieved: 
opposing magistrates, the followers of opponents, or the residences of 
political opponents. The top leaders, especially Clodius, sometimes 
directed the action themselves. They took the initiative by exhorting the 
crowd to violence or by putting themselves at the head of a small group 
which turned to violent action.26 They were aided by assistant leaders, or 
they remained in the background and left the initiation of violence to 
assistant leaders27 and intermediate leaders.28 
There are a few cases which provide us some more information on the 
role of the leadership and how leaders performed as directors of the 
action. In the first section on public manifestations, I have already 
discussed the role of the assistant and intermediate leaders during the riots 
24
 E.g.: During a food riot in 40 B.C. the statues of Octavian and Antony were torn 
down (Dio 48.31.5). A statue of Piso, suspected of being guilty for the death of 
Germanicus, was demolished by the people (Tac. Ann. 3.14). Nero repudiated his wife 
Octavia in favor of Poppaea. The people reacted by throwing down the statues of 
Poppaea and revering those of Octavia (Tac. Ann. 14.61). See also KNEPPE, op.cit., 
60-62; YAVETZ, Plebs, 27. 
25
 Chapter 3 n.59 and B-19. 
26 B-30, 42, 48, 49, 51, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 
81, 85. 
2 7
 B-3, 12, 14, 25, 34, 37, 69, 73, 74, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91. 
28 B-13, 16, 18, 23, 30, 34, 44, 52, 60, 78, 86. 
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after Clodius' death. In addition, attention can be drawn to the fact that the 
assistant leaders probably suggested to the crowd to bring the fasces to 
Pompey in order to instate him as leader (B-86). The same assistant 
leaders incited the crowd to use violence in overcoming Milo's attempts to 
have his assassination of Clodius approved (B-87). Intermediate leaders 
mostly acted as leaders of small groups {dux operarum). They could also 
act as claqueurs (B-44). During the food riot of September 57 (B-60), 
Clodius and his intermediate leaders indicated Cicero as scapegoat, 
shouted slogans and started to throw stones.29 We may also assume that it 
was Clodius who led the crowd to the Capitol, where the senate was in 
session to discuss the supply problems. For Clodius himself was a senator 
and knew the agenda of the meeting. A riot at that moment and on that 
spot, of course, had the highest chance of achieving the intended result. 
Furthenmore, in the two food riots which were led by Clodius (B-55, 60), 
he selected the theater as the location for action. The interruption of a 
public festivity had a maximum publicity effect, not least because the 
decision-makers - the senate, magistrates, and the rest of the upper strata -
were present at these occasions. Moreover, the emotions of the crowd thus 
received a logical expression: in times of emergency public business 
should be stopped.30 
In violent behavior we observe the significance of small groups and 
organizations. In 37 of the 62 violent cases, organization was a factor in 
mobilization. To put it differently, in the total of 42 cases of collective 
behavior in which some type of organization can be traced, violent action 
occurred in the great majority (37). This proves that small groups were 
important to incite the crowd to violent action. On the other hand, in a 
large number of cases it becomes obvious that small groups, such as 
operae, acted as an active nucleus, while there were also present a large 
number of bystanders who remained passive.31 A clear example is a 
contio in 67 (B-ll): when the consul Piso tried to stop a discussion on a 
bill of the tribune of the plebs Cornelius, stones were thrown from the 
29
 A parallel for this role of leaders as directors of the action is to be found in the food 
riot of A.D. 190. The com shortage was artificially caused by a number of conspirators 
under the leadership of Papirius Dionysius, the com prefect. The fury of the crowd, 
however, was not directed against the com prefect, who would have been the most 
obvious target. Under the leadership of a cheerleader in the circus the popular fury was 
directed against Cleander, the praetorian prefect, who had endeared himself to the 
people by the construction of public baths (Dio 73.12.5; Hdn. 1.12.4). See further on 
this revolt: WHITTAKER, op.cit., passim. 
30
 Cf. BENNER, op.cit., 111-115. 
31
 During the Principate, too, small groups played an important part in collective 
behavior. On the role of the colleges during riots in the Empire, see: MACMULLEN, 
Enemies, 173-178; WHITTAKER, op.cit., 359-360. 
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back of the meeting, therefore not by the entire crowd.32 Another 
example is the riot after Clodius' death (B-86). In this case it is not clear 
whether organization was a factor in mobilization, but from a remark by 
Appian (2.21) it follows that a small group took the most daring action, 
namely the arson of the senate house. 
Collective violence which served to influence political decision-
making usually consisted of physical intimidation or removal of 
opponents. But other types of manipulation were possible as well, in 
which again an important role was reserved for small groups, such as the 
occupation of the voting bridges33, the destruction of the voting urns (B-
49), or the shouting of slogans (B-60, 65). The rhythmic use of slogans in 
the form of a game of questions and answers, incidentally, was not an 
innovation, but was associated with the techniques of rhetorics.34 Yet 
another type of political manipulation consisted of the distribution of false 
ballots.35 Small groups did not exclusively belong to popular politics; the 
optimates, too, were able to employ small groups to manipulate the 
popular assemblies (Cic. Att. 2.16.1). 
Did violence pay? To answer this question, we have look at the success 
ratio of collective violence as compared to non-violent collective 
behavior. If we draw some careful quantitative conclusions, while 
keeping all options open because of lacunose data, the following picture 
appears: out of 62 violent cases of collective behavior, 41 achieved their 
goal (66 %); from the remaining 30 non-violent cases of collective 
behavior, 24 reached their goal (80 %). A preliminary careful conclusion 
could be that collective violence was not necessarily the best way to reach 
a goal. This becomes more plausible if we take into account that there 
perhaps have been more cases of unsuccessful collective behavior than we 
know of, for such cases stood a smaller chance of being recorded in the 
sources. Let us now itemize these cases and look at two categories of 
collective behavior that are important from a political point of view: 
popular assemblies as collective behavior within an official framework, 
and unofficial types of behavior such as riots. It turns out that there was 
no significant difference in success between violent and non-violent 
popular assemblies.36 Violence, therefore, could not be a goal in itself. 
32
 Other cases in which small groups were responsible for the violence: B-15, 16, 18, 
23, 25, 30, 34, 49, 51, 52, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 73, 81, 83, 84, 91. 
Cases in which organization was involved, but in which it is not obvious whether small 
groups initiated violence: B-l, 11, 14, 20, 31, 39, 48, 55, 56, 66, 71, 78, 85. 
The nonviolent cases with organization: B-36,40,41,47, 58. 
33
 B-30. A method which could also be used against popular leaders: Q. Caepio in that 
way sabotaged the voting on Saturninus' corn law in 103 {Rhet.Her. 1.21). 
34
 The conplexio {Rhet.Her. 4.20). Cicero also used it {Leg.Agr. 2.22). 
35
 B-30; Cic. Dom. 112; Plut. Cat.Min. 46.2. See further on the manipulation of the 
vote: NICOLET, Rome, 352-353; STAVELEY, Voting, 211-215. 
36
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Collective violence should be considered an ultimate means. This also 
follows from the success ratio of riots, of which only about half were 
successful.37 
It is necessary to modify this picture somewhat. The infrequent food 
riots, of which three occurred during the late Republic, all were 
successful, in that sense that as a result of violent action measures were 
taken to improve the com supply. These violent expressions of popular 
protest, in which probably many more people participated than in 
political riots between followers of politicians, found a response. This 
indicates that, although the riot in itself was not accepted, the real cause 
was not denied and measures were deemed necessary. It also indicates that 
there were few other means for the articulation of demands. This also 
follows from the remarkable absence of food riots before Sulla. In that 
period problems in the com supply occurred as well, but violent 
expressions of popular protest did not take place. This cannot be explained 
from a difference in deprivation, for the food riots after Sulla did not 
spring from hunger, but from rising prices or from an expectation of a 
com shortage. What emerges is a breakdown in communication between 
élite and plebs, because of which, in a part of the urban lower strata, there 
developed new ways to articulate demands: the public clientele. 
The opportunity of the people to act collectively was limited as a result 
of restrictions in the mobilization opportunities and, as we have seen, the 
limited possibilities of peaceful action in the popular assemblies. Attention 
has already been drawn to the fact that action in popular assemblies and 
meetings was limited to reactive behavior. In collective violence, 
behavior sometimes also consisted of reactions to, for example, the 
opposition of a magistrate. In most cases, however, and especially in case 
of a riot, the behavior consisted of action, i.e. acts which were violent 
from the start, without provocation. It goes without saying that leaders 
and small groups were largely responsible for this, but it was also caused 
by the fact that there were few other possibilities of behavior available to 
the participants. 
Repression 
How did the Roman government react to collective behavior? What 
attempts were made to prevent it and to control or stop it when it 
occurred? These are the questions to be answered in this section. It has 
already been stated that, on the one hand, ample opportunity for 
(accepted) collective behavior existed in Roman society and that, on the 
other hand, institutional restrictions were imposed on mobilization and 
action. First, the specific measures which were taken to prevent or to limit 
collective behavior will be treated. Next, we will deal with social control. 
37
 Riots (30): successful 17 (57 %) - unsuccessful 13 (43 %). 
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In 92 the censors Licinius Crassus and Domitius Ahenobarbus 
promulgated an edict against the Latin orators.38 The purpose of the edict 
was to restrict the teaching of Latin rhetorics, because the censors feared 
that such eloquence fostered demagogy. The edict does not seem to have 
had any effect. 
In the previous chapter we have observed that the opportunity to act 
was limited partly because of the fact that legislation was restricted to 
certain days. The Roman government sometimes used the possibility of 
making adaptations in the calendar, so that dies comitiales were limited in 
number to prevent popular leaders from putting undesirable laws to the 
vote.39 
The Roman government soon realized the importance of 
organizations, such as the collegia, in the mobilization process. Several 
efforts therefore were made to neutralize this factor.40 In 64 a senatorial 
decree banned subversive colleges, while the colleges with a long-standing 
tradition were allowed to exist. When a tribune of the plebs in 61 
attempted to organize the Compitalia through the colleges, this was 
prevented by the authorities. (Cic. Pis. 8; Asc. 7 and 75C.) But the decree 
of 64 does not seem to have been very effective. Clodius, in any case, 
organized the Compitalia in 58 without opposition and a few days later 
passed a law to legalize the colleges (B-40). Subsequently, in 56, a senatus 
consultum de sodaliciis was proclaimed (Cic. Q.Fr. 2.3.5), which was put 
into law a year later - the lex Licinia de sodaliciis (Cic. Plane. 44-48). 
These measures were equally directed against colleges which were 
misused for political purposes and against sodalitates - organized groups 
within the upper strata which served to manipulate elections. But their 
effect seems to have been limited as well. In reaction to the riots in 48 and 
47 under the leadership of Caelius and Dolabella, the dictator Caesar 
passed another lex de collegiis in 46, which again put a ban on the 
colleges.41 
Furthermore, a series of laws were passed which were especially 
directed against the leadership. First, there were laws whose purpose was 
to contain political violence (leges de vi ) . 4 2 Their effect however was 
38 MRR 17. 
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 Cic. Q.Fr. 2.4.4-5 (In 56 against С Cato Ap-39), Fam. 8.11.1 (In 50 against Curio 
Ap-46); TAYLOR, PP, 78-80. Also in 88 against Sulpicius: App. 1.55; Plut. Suil. 8.3. 
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see: ALFöLDI, Caesar, 79-90; LGRR 228-231; FLAMBARD, MEFRA, 117-122; idem, 
Ktema, 162-165; YAVETZ, Caesar, 85-96. 
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limited, the more so because political opponents kept suing one another, 
and the verdict often depended more on the composition of the jury and 
manipulations than on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Trials often 
were the scene of collective violence. On the other hand, the annulment of 
laws which were passed by violence was hardly practical and did not have 
a preventive effect43. 
Second, laws were passed against treason (leges de maiestate).44 These 
laws were not only directed against persons who engaged in subversive 
activities in internal affairs, but also against individuals who during their 
provincial command had not observed their instructions or had gone 
beyond their orders. The same was true of these laws as of legislation 
against violence: partly due to Roman judicial process they were not very 
effective. 
Finally, a number of laws were passed against electoral corruption 
(leges de ambitu).45 These were especially directed against electoral 
corruption in the centuriate assembly, where the magnitude of bribery 
was largest. The laws were inadequate to counteract the increasing 
practice of electoral corruption. In short, extensive legislation was unable 
to prevent collective behavior or to limit its extent. Other instruments 
were necessary to do that. As Tacitus aptly remarked: "corruptissima re 
publica plurimae leges" (Ann. 3.27). 
We now arrive at repression in the form of terminating collective 
behavior. Repression did not occur very frequently. Only in 35 out of 92 
cases of collective behavior were attempts at repression undertaken. 
Remarkably, the majority of the cases (23) involved repression of 
collective violence.46 There were also a few cases in which repression 
provoked collective violence.47 This is an indication that, at least in the 
cases known to us, opportunities for collective behavior were fairly 
abundant, especially in a peaceful form. The Roman government had no 
policy of immediate suppression of collective behavior. In addition, 
almost all collective behavior had élite leadership, which implied 
dissension among the élite and impeded repression. When repression 
occurred, it was not always successful; only half the attempts at repression 
succeeded.48 
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 LINTOTT Ch. X; R.E. SMITH, The Use of Force in Passing Legislation in the Late 
Republic, Athenaeum 55 (1977), pp. 150-174, esp. 150-167. 
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 Repression of collective violence: B-13, 14, 20, 23, 26, 30, 39, 51, 57, 62, 63, 65, 
70, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89. 
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 Collective violence in reaction to repression: B-l, 8,9, 11, 25, 34, 67. 
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 Successful repression: B-10, 13, 14, 20, 23, 25, 26, 30, 39, 43, 50, 63, 65, 74, 
85, 88, 89, 71. Among these there were three cases (B-10, 26, 71) in which the 
popular leader himself put an end to collective behavior. 
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Which repressive methods were applied? For the most part, common 
political procedures or traditions. A protest was lodged, orations were 
held to change the attitude of the participants, tribunes of the plebs put 
their veto (intercessio), or magistrates tried to terminate collective 
behavior by means of their powers and authority.49 A special method in 
this respect was obnuntiatio.50 Before each popular assembly the gods had 
to be consulted (auspicia) to see if the omens were favorable. If the 
presiding magistrate during the assembly saw unfavorable omens, he was 
allowed to terminate the assembly (obnuntiatio). Clodius passed a law 
which restricted this practice, but obnuntiation was still applied 
afterwards. Feigning the observation of unfavorable omens was an 
accepted method among the élite to sabotage undesirable popular 
assemblies (Cic. Leg. 3.27). The effectiveness of the method however 
declined, because it was counteracted by violence.51 
At times of extreme emergency, the possibility existed of appointing a 
dictator. This person received absolute power during six months in order 
to avert dangers in the form of war or rebellion which threatened the 
state. The dictator could not be called to account for his deeds after his 
term of office. After the second Punic war, however, the office fell into 
disuse. The senatorial oligarchy was unwilling to grant unlimited powers 
to one individual again.52 The dictatorship was replaced by a novelty: the 
proclamation of the state of emergency - the senatus consultum 
ultimum.5^ 
It was applied for the first time in 121 to repress Gaius Gracchus. The 
senatus consultum ultimum was a vague decree by which the consuls and if 
necessary other magistrates were ordered to avert the danger for the state 
by any means ("Videant cónsules ne quid detrimenti res publica caperet"). 
The ultimate decree was proclaimed when the élite was able to unite in 
great majority to suppress a rebellious popular leader. It was applied 
several times after Sulla: in 63 in reaction to the Catilinarian conspiracy 
(B-23), in 52 to repress the riots after Clodius' death (B-88, 89), and also 
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 B-52, 73. Pompey, too, used it once (B-71). Bibulus, Caesar's colleague in the 
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occasion, legislation was prohibited according to tradition. Caesar did not care less, and 
his laws were regularly enforced: RPA 282-284; GELZER, Caesar, 70-72. 
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in 78 against Lepidus as a result of the civil war and in 49 after Caesar had 
crossed the Rubicon. 
Enforcement of the decree mostly meant slaying the insurgents. Since 
the legality of the decree was debatable and since the powers which the 
magistrates received were not clearly defined, the senatus consultwn 
ultimum occasioned discussion. Opimius, who had implemented the 
decree against Gaius Gracchus, already was convicted and exiled for it in 
109 (Asc. 17C). Popular leaders were the victim of the measure and, 
therefore, opposition against the decree came from their side. This was 
the reason why Labienus in 63 prosecuted Rabirius, one of the oppressors 
of Satuminus (B-21). After the main suspects of the Catilinarian 
conspiracy had been arrested, a heated discussion arose in the senate on 
the sentence. Eventually, the suspects were summarily executed by the 
consul Cicero. That is why Clodius could force Cicero into exile in 58 (B-
42, 46, 47). In itself the ultimate decree of the senate was an effective 
means of repression, but it was only applicable if the élite was actually 
able to act in unison. 
A means of repression the Roman government lacked was a police 
force. The important magistrates were accompanied by lictors, but their 
function was mainly symbolic and they were too small in number and 
inadequately armed to perform a real police task in case of violence. At 
most they could serve as instruments of crowd control, for example 
during triumphs (Plut. Aem. 32.1-2). The Roman magistrates' means of 
exercising power were clearly inadequate to counteract large-scale 
violence; for this they had to employ private means.54 Police forces were 
introduced in Rome only during the Principate: the urban cohorts, which 
occasionally were assisted by the emperor's bodyguards, such as the 
praetorian guard and the imperial cavalry.55 The Roman oligarchy during 
the Republic shrank from calling troups into the city; this was considered 
politically dangerous. Their fear of military intervention, moreover, had 
been confirmed during the civil war between Marius and Sulla, who both 
had taken the city with their armies. 
Consequently, if violence was deemed necessary as means of 
repression, it was only possible to do so by employing body guards and 
personal retainers. In other words it was a matter of private initiative.56 
The latitude for private initiative was offered by the fact that self-help was 
an accepted form of conflict settlement.57 
54
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Eventually, the available means of social control were inadequate to 
cope with the chaos that had arisen at the end of the 50s. The solution was 
found in harsh action, but this solution could only be used if the élite was 
unanimous or if power was vested in one person. Since the first condition 
was absent, the solution that was opted for in 52 came close to the 
dictatorship. Pompey was nominated consul without a colleague, he was 
invested with extraordinary powers by means of the senatus consultum 
ultimum, and he received permission to levy troops and to use them to 
restore law and order in Rome (B-88, 89). 
Interestingly, when Caesar as dictator was faced with collective 
violence in 48 and 47, he, as the child of his time, reacted with the same 
measures his political opponents had used in the period before the civil 
war. He passed a lex de vi and a lex de collegiis to be able to punish the 
ringleaders. Also a senatus consultum ultimum was proclaimed. But the 
collective violence was actually brought to an end by military action.58 
This proves that the Republican means of social control were inadequate. 
During the late Republic deficient social control facilitated collective 
behavior and especially collective violence. It was not caused so much by 
the absence of a police force as by the dysfunction of its functional 
equivalents, for Rome had never needed a police force. A magistrate had 
limited repressive means and mainly depended on his authority to 
maintain public order.59 For Rome, magisterial authority was the 
functional equivalent of a police force and for a long time it had been an 
effective means of social control. The Romans themselves realized that the 
authority of the élite usually sufficed as a means of repression.60 In the 
late Republic, too, a number of cases are known in which the appearance 
of a magistrate and/or his address of the people was sufficient to stop 
collective violence (B-20, 39, 67, 75). When this authority, i.e. legitimate 
power, was no longer accepted, when the ruling class lost its legitimacy, 
things went wrong. This was the main cause of late Republican collective 
violence and the failure of social control. Because the élite was unable to 
solve existing problems adequately within the city-state structure and 
increasingly fell victim to internal conflicts, it lost its legitimacy and its 
58
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most important instrument of social control was neutralized.61 Social 
control was additionally reduced by the relaxation of the vertical ties of 
the plebs contionalis. 
In this respect, the unsuccessful conspiracy of Catiline (B-23) is telling, 
since it was a case of abortive collective behavior and successful 
maintenance of public order. As has been stated in the previous chapter, 
an important reason why mobilization miscarried was the lack of 
legitimacy of the conspirators, because leadership was not provided by a 
magistrate. Two additional reasons accounted for the failure. First, there 
were effective police measures62, which could be taken because in this 
case the élite operated unanimously. Although there was disagreement 
among the élite about what should happen to the conspirators, that action 
should be taken was not in question. Second, the grievances of the plebs 
were met by the enlargement of the number of com recipients at the 
suggestion of Cato the Younger. Thereby senatorial power was 
legitimized. 
But that was an exceptional case. The common means of social control 
proved inadequate and therefore at the end of the Republic harsh and 
violent action was opted for. In itself it was an effective means of 
repression.63 The plebs were no match for trained troops. That was 
already the case with Milo's gangs of gladiators. After Pompey had 
restored order by means of soldiers in 52, soldiers would never disappear 
from Rome as a means of repression. During the Empire, troops usually 
were present at the games. When the emperor Nero removed the soldiers 
from the theater by way of experiment, he soon had to bring them back 
because the disorders got too much out of hand.64 But soldiers by 
themselves were insufficient to keep public order, i.e. to prevent social 
protest. Such a means of repression only had a preventive effect if it was 
used by a legitimate power. That had already become obvious in 40. 
Antony, with the help of his soldiers, crushed a food riot, but nevertheless 
61
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the triumvirs were forced to conclude an armistice with Sextus Pompey in 
order to secure the com supply (App. 5.68 and 72; Dio 48.31.6). 
In the Empire the problem of social control was solved because the 
emperors on the one hand received legitimacy by meeting the interests of 
the city population, for example by a constant com supply, and on the 
other hand created effective means of repression in the form of police 
troops.65 Furthermore, care was taken that conflicts within the élite 
remained limited to a minimum and that possible pretenders to the throne 
did not get a chance. 




Before turning to the treatment of popular leadership and collective 
behavior in the ancient sources, this chapter will analyze the relationship 
between these phenomena in the political process of the late Republic. 
Attention will also be paid to the outcome of collective behavior. 
Impact 
What was the impact of collective behavior in the political process, or, to 
put it differently, what was the ratio between success and failure? If we 
look at the proportions as they appear from Appendix B, we observe that 
65 out of 92 cases of collective behavior achieved their goal, and 27 did 
not. As has been stated before, it is quite possible that the ancient sources 
have recorded mainly successful and spectacular cases. That could explain 
the large difference. Nonetheless, collective behavior was a frequent 
phenomenon during the late Republic, also in the perception of 
contemporaries. We therefore may assume that collective behavior was a 
suitable means to reach a political goal, for otherwise successful 
mobilization would never have recurred time and again. 
What were the goals that were or were not achieved? Goals of a 
material kind constituted a minor part of the total. They were only present 
in collective behavior linked to problems in the food supply. Material 
grievances and cases of acute deprivation caused a number of occurrences 
of collective behavior, but it appears that other motives were more 
common. Goals of a material kind could assemble a great number of 
people and had a catalyzing effect. But first and foremost they offered the 
opportunity for popular leaders to show themselves as new-style patrons, 
by, for example, offering a solution through a com law. 
Next to goals of a material kind, political reform proposals were 
supported or, on the contrary, obstructed. Another goal could be the 
manipulation of public trials by enforcing the acquittal or conviction of a 
defendant through collective action. The remaining goals can be classified 
as general support of a leader: support at elections and in legislation, 
protection and expression of support, or attacks on political opponents. 
In general these goals, in fact, fall within the expectations connected 
with the traditional system of patronage. Clients supported their patron, 
especially politically, by their vote or by acts of violence, in exchange for 
which they expected economic, political, and legal support and protection 
from their patron. Popular politics in the late Republic resulted in the 
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elevation of patron-client relationships to a national level. It was basically 
the same relationship but now between a new-style clientele - the public 
clientele - and a new-style patron - the popular leader. 
From the participants' point of view, collective behavior was the only 
way to have certain demands realized. The administration of the ruling 
oligarchy was not satisfactory anymore and thereby lost its legitimacy; the 
traditional personal bonds of patronage were not capable anymore of 
meeting certain grievances. Consequently, collective behavior appeared 
as a means to achieve demands. But this happened within the existing 
structure; leadership was provided by members of the élite who were 
officially sanctioned, i.e. through a magistracy, and most types of 
collective behavior sprang from institutionalized types of popular 
influence.1 
At the same time collective behavior became conventionalized. 
Because politicians regularly turned to the people in order to pursue an 
opposition policy against the senatorial majority, because precedents were 
constantly established, because violence was accepted as a political means, 
and because the same behavioral patterns constantly repeated themselves, 
a conventionalization occurred: collective behavior received a 
regularized and repetitive character in the political process and deviated 
from existing norms of accepted collective behavior, such as existed, for 
example, in the popular assemblies. This was especially true of the plebs 
contionalis, which had a regularized behavioral pattern and anticipated 
collective behavior. 
Popular leadership and collective behavior, through a convergence of 
factors, were important phenomena in the political process of the late 
Republic. Leaders from the ruling class - dissident members of the 
oligarchy - had access to public and private resources and took advantage 
of existing discontent in the lower orders. The relaxation of old vertical 
ties among a large group in the lower orders, particularly in the city of 
Rome, created a vacuum in the patron-client relationships between élite 
and plebs. The independence from traditional personal obligations 
granted the members of the public clientele an opportunity to follow on an 
ad hoc basis a popular leader who provided them with a new way to 
articulate their demands. Moreover, the ruling class - the old senatorial 
élite - was no longer homogeneous and as a collectivity no longer 
generally accepted as the center of power and point of integration of 
Roman society. These factors brought collective action about and gave it a 
political role. In other words, in Rome members of the polity or rather 
members of the government, i.e. popular leaders, who were seeking more 
power, made a coalition with other members of the polity, i.e. the plebs 
contionalis, and increased their influence in the polity. 
1
 Both this and the elevation of patron-client relations to a national level are examples of 
how the political structure of the city-state was expanded and stretched to its limits. 
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Popular leadership and collective behavior were not responsible for 
the fall of the Republic, but did accelerate the process. The way in which 
these phenomena manifested themselves in the late Republic and the 
latitude they offered to fight out political conflicts made the dysfunctions 
of the Republican system clearly apparent. That system was inadequate 
for the administration of an empire and equally for steering political 
conflicts in the right direction. Because of this and because of the 
militarization of the crisis, a civil war eventually broke out, during which 
the decisive factors came from outside the structure of a city-state: the 
professional army and enormous private financial means which were 
especially derived from the provinces of the empire. 
The Strategy of the Leadership 
Why did popular leaders and participants cooperate? What interest did 
popular leaders have in mobilizing the plebs? The strategy of the 
leadership was not aimed at innovation or seizure of power. The goal of 
the popular leaders was to hold a prominent position within the existing 
structure. Since they saw their ambitions insufficiently met by taking the 
normal course, they took advantage of the opportunities which were 
offered by the dysfunctioning political structure in order to realize their 
plans along other paths. The fact that some leaders sought popular support 
during an extended period of time was more caused by the fact that they 
achieved success in this way or that they were forced to it because of 
obstruction by the senatorial majority, than by any strategy aimed at 
creating a more or less permanent popular movement. 
In pursuing a career at the top, it does not seem at first sight purposeful 
to mobilize the group of artisans and shopkeepers, because their vote 
hardly counted in the centuriate assembly which elected the highest 
magistrates. Yet support of the plebs contionalis was necessary: to reach 
the top one first had to be elected to the lower offices by the tribal 
assembly. Popular support was necessary in competing with other 
members of the élite, for the people had the power to assign provinces and 
other commands whereby money and prestige could be accumulated; both 
were absolutely necessary to hold a position of power at the top of Roman 
society. Popular support was further important in the many public trials 
with which the members of the élite fought one another. Demonstrable 
support of large groups resulted in prestige, which in turn could create 
support from members of the upper strata, for prestige was a significant 
factor in Roman social and political culture. In general, considering the 
organization of the Roman polity, popular support was indispensable to 
exert a decisive influence on the legislative process. 
The foremost reason for a politician to seek support among the lower 
citizenry was that it was the only legitimate alternative to work his will if 
agreement among the élite proved impossible. The Roman city-state 
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institutions offered ample opportunity for action, even if it was 
accompanied by violence. Another, but illegitimate alternative was the 
military. That had been used by Marius and Sulla and it was a spector that 
was obviously present in the years 80-50. Eventually the common means 
of conflict settlement proved inadequate and the illegitimate alternative 
was seized. The result was the civil war between Caesar and Pompey and 
eventually the downfall of the Republic. 
At the highest level of Roman society individualism among the élite 
was rising. Private interest and prestige became more important than the 
traditional values and norms of the oligarchy. It is also possible that some 
rich and prominent citizens tended to place themselves less in the service 
of the collectivity, both in internal affairs and in external and military 
affairs, witness Cicero's sardonic and perhaps slightly exaggerated 
remarks about piscinarii - senators who merely worried about their 
fishponds (Att. 1.19.6, 20.3, and 2.1.7). In general, however, it seems that 
among the top leaders, to a certain degree, a consensus on the existing 
institutions and political procedures still existed and that the traditional 
authorities still were respected. For the ideas of these individuals 
remained within the existing institutional framework and they sought the 
realization of their ambitions and solutions of conflicts within that 
framework. When the existing system proved inadequate, partly due to 
the pressure of the obligations towards their following into which the 
leaders had entered, the civil war broke out. 
As far as the middle level leaders - the assistant leaders - were 
concerned, their loyalty shifted from the res publica to individual patroni. 
Because of the high costs of political competition and for lack of career 
opportunities within the existing social and political structure, they joined 
a rich and powerful leader to realize their ambitions. In their eyes, the 
ruling oligarchy lost its legitimacy and the existing institutions needed 
modification. At the middle level the respect for traditional authorities 
was lowest. 
The intermediate leaders tried to make a career within the existing 
structure, but to do so they were compelled to tie themselves to a leader. 
Being clients of a top leader their goals were derived from the leaders. 
Since the top leaders did not have a substantial change of the existing 
system in mind, such an initiative was not to be expected from 
intermediate leaders. Moreover, political conflict and competition 
offered opportunities to intermediate leaders which perhaps they would 
not have had if the oligarchy had still been ruling unanimously and 
efficiently. Improvements in the constitution, which would provide an 
efficient government and take away most of the causes for dissension 
while keeping the Republican social and political structure intact, did not 
fit the interests of intermediate leaders. Their loyalty was first of all to 
their patron, and they stuck to what they had until the system broke down 
in civil war. 
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Politicization and the Absence of a Social Movement 
We have observed that there existed a group among the Roman urban 
plebs - the plebs contionalis - which participated more actively in 
politically relevant collective behavior than the rest of the city population. 
We now have to wonder what the level of politicization of this group was. 
Was it politicized or depoliticized? Did the frequent collective behavior of 
the late Republic fit into the framework of a social movement? 
What were the determining factors for the politicization of the crowd 
in Rome? First, there was the social stratification which was deeply rooted 
in Roman society. Social distances in Rome were much more extreme than 
in other societies. The great social differences impeded political education 
of the lower orders and transmission of political information from upper 
to lower strata. This is underscored by evidence from later periods: one 
of the reasons why riots in London were more politically sophisticated 
and more successful than in Paris during the eighteenth century, was 
London's more diversified social structure; there were more links 
between nobility and working classes which facilitated political 
education.2 
Roman society was permeated with borders between social groups and 
census classes, which could not easily be bridged. At the bottom of 
society, too, important differences in social standing existed, such as 
between free and slaves. This stratification in itself was not challenged and 
it hampered the development of horizontal solidarity. Anything like a 
class structure was completely absent in Rome.3 Among the plebs 
contionalis there existed no group solidarity, whereby this group could 
separate itself from other groups within the plebs and form part of a 
social movement. The members of the plebs contionalis only knew a 
vertical solidarity towards leaders. That they were politically more active 
was due to the fact that their traditional vertical ties with individual 
members of the élite were less strong than those of other members of the 
plebs. 
Another factor was economic. The complete absence of labor conflicts 
in antiquity is striking. In the ancient city, production was organized on a 
small scale. We have an important text on division of labor in antiquity: 
"In large cities, on the other hand, inasmuch as many people have demands to 
make upon each branch of industry, one trade alone, and very often even less 
than a whole trade, is enough to support a man: one man, for example, makes 
shoes for men, and another for women; and there are places even where one 
man earns a living by only stitching shoes, another by cutting them out, another 
by sewing the uppers together, while there is another who performs none of 
these operations, but only assembles the parts. It follows, therefore, as a matter 
2
 RUDé, Paris, 59-60. 
3
 On this see W.G. RUNCIMAN, Capitalism without classes: the case of classical Rome, 
British Journal of Sociology 34(1983), pp. 157-181, esp. 169-177. 
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of course, that he who devotes himself to a very highly specialized line of work 
is bound to do it in the best possible manner."4 
Xenophon wrote this in the fourth century. A similar text does not 
exist for the cities in the Roman era, but the situation in the Rome of the 
late Republic and the Empire will not have been different. A tabernarius 
who had more work than he and his family could manage, bought a slave 
if he could afford it. As a permanent work force, especially if the slave 
had to learn a trade, a slave was more cost-efficient than hired free labor. 
The household was the central unit of production in the ancient economy. 
Next to households there were slightly larger units of production, which 
manufactured, for example, pottery for the market. There could be 
association through cooperation of family-based units. Larger units had 
ten or twenty slaves. Concentration of production did not exist, but these 
units of manufacture, through personal ties and capital investment, could 
be the building blocks of a big "company" with a member of the Roman 
nobility or his agent at its head.5 
The hiring of free labor did exist, but it was on a temporary and casual 
basis. A substantial number of free-bom Romans were employed in the 
public works at Rome, but they were day-laborers who were dismissed 
after the work was done, and at best they found regular, but not 
permanent, employment in the building trade. Wage-labor, long-term 
contracts, etc. were rare in the Roman economy.6 The people who were 
employed on a permanent basis were slaves. They, of course, did not have 
a labor contract either, and if they rose in revolt, which seldom occurred, 
their concern was especially with their personal freedom and not to 
abolish slavery as an institution.7 
These features of the ancient economy impeded the occurrence of 
labor conflicts; the aggrieved could not focus on salaries and labor 
conditions. This had an important impact on the formulation of claims. 
The difference between demands for food and demands for higher wages 
is the difference between short-term and long-term thinking. Moreover, 
strikes of the urban plebs in the late Republic would hardly have been 
4
 Xen. Cyr. 8.2.5: "kv δ« ταϊς цсуаХаір πολ€σι δια το τιοΧλού? έκαστου 
беіа аі арка кса μία έκαστω τέχνη elç то трсфса аі- πολλάκι? δ£ ούδ" όλη 
μία· άλλ' υποδήματα -ποια ó μεν άνδράα, ó δ« γυναικεία- еоті бе е а και 
υποδήματα ó μεν νευρορραφών μόνον трефетаі, ó Se. σχίζων, ó δ« χιτώνα? 
μόνον συντέμνων, ó δ€ ус τούτων оибе ποιών άλλα συντιθίΐ? ταΰτα. 
ανάγκη ουν τον èv βραχυτάτω διατρίβοντα €ργω τούτον και άριστα δη 
ήναγκάσθαι τοδτο ποιαν." 
5
 J.H. D'ARIAS, Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome, Cambridge 1981, 
pp. 36-47 and 162-168; J.P. MOREL, Les producteurs des biens artisanaux en Italie à 
la fin de la République, in: Bourgeoisies, pp. 21-39, esp. 35-39. 
6
 See also FINLEY, Economy, pp. 65-68 and 73-75. 
7
 See ibidem 68; idem. Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, London 1980, pp. 72, 
110, and 116. 
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effective. In the ancient economy agriculture prevailed, and the élite did 
not need the urban plebs as farmers or as soldiers. 
The collegia were quite different from the medieval guilds. The 
purpose of the colleges was not to protect or to foster the economic 
interests of their members. The only thing they did in this respect was to 
find a rich patron, from whom they hoped to receive benefactions.8 
In the middle ages, on the contrary, the question of wages and the 
demand for the establishment of new guilds for those who were excluded 
from the guild system could lead to popular protest. The hierarchy in the 
guilds (master-journeyman) may be considered as an institutionalization 
of vertical mobility. Guilds were an important political factor during the 
middle ages. Negotiations with employers and contractors, who also had 
political power, could gradually transform into political conflicts in the 
medieval city. Furthermore, unlike the colleges in the ancient city, the 
guilds were represented in the city government.9 During the middle ages 
and the Ancien Régime, the organization of the labor factor differed from 
the ancient city, which in part accounted for the different level of 
politicization of the urban crowds in antiquity. The difference between 
the Roman urban plebs and the crowd in medieval cities is to a certain 
extent paralleled by the fact that the London mob during the eighteenth 
century possessed a higher level of politicization than the Parisian mob as 
a result of social and economic differences, for London at that time had a 
more modem economy and a more democratic city government than 
Paris.10 
Further, the strategy of the leadership was by no means aimed at 
democratization, and this too formed a barrier to extensive politicization. 
If, finally, we look at the duration of the collective actions in the late 
Republic, we observe that in most cases (80) they did not go on for longer 
than one day, irrespective of whether the goal of the action was achieved 
or not.11 A number of cases which continued for two days or longer 
involved reactions during officially organized gatherings which in 
8
 FINLEY, Economy, 80-81; MEIGGS, op.cit., 313. See also YAVETZ, Caesar, 88. 
Contra WALTZING, op.cit., 181-195. In the eastern cities during late antiquity possibly 
a development can be discerned towards an economic solidarity among colleges, which 
could be employed as a lever, see: MACMULLEN, Enemies, 176. In late Roman 
Alexandria, colleges of artisans provided employment for poor members of the Jewish 
community: The Babylonian Talmud. Seder Mo'ed, Oxford 1938, vol. 3, Sukkah 
V.51b (p. 245). This was a type of solidarity connected to religious charity and to the 
membership of a closed and sometimes oppressed community. It does not seem to have 
been an economic solidarity with a political implication of the type found in medieval 
guilds. (The reference to the Talmud I owe to Christopher Haas.) 
9
 On guilds and riots see: MARTINES, op.cit., 333-334; MOLLAT, op.cit., 293 and 
304. 
10
 RUDé, Paris, 8 and 35-60. 
11
 On the frequency of the actions it is difficult to make a statement considering the 
possibly poor representativeness of the data. 
In the fourth century A.D., food riots usually went on for one day, while religious 
conflicts often continued longer: KNEPPE, op.cit., 80-83. 
167 
themselves already had been planned for a number of days, such as the 
reactions during Pompey's return from the East (B-28), Pompey's 
triumph (B-32), and during games (B-54). Next to those, there was the 
conspiracy of Catiline (B-23) in which actions were planned for a number 
of days, but in which actual mobilization failed to materialize. Further, 
there were some cases which took place on several days and obviously 
were interconnected, but for which it is difficult to establish whether they 
involved a continuous action during an uninterrupted time period (B-3, 
48). Finally, there were cases in which there was a continuous and 
unbroken pattern of action. They include two legislative popular 
assemblies (B-14, 73), the recruitment of the colleges (B-41), and the 
reactions after Clodius' death (B-86, 87, 88). 
The latter cases are the most interesting and at the same time the most 
exceptional. After Clodius' death a continuous and successful mobilization 
took place, albeit that it led only occasionally to real action. The actions 
went on until the goal - revenge and the conviction of Clodius' assassin -
was reached, while the intensity and the violence of the action towards the 
end were limited by police measures. Even food riots, which after all 
could incite a large group of people to violent action, never had such a 
duration. This indicates how strong the loyalty to its leadership among 
Clodius' following was. But, because of its exceptional character, this 
indicates as well that in most cases the continuance of the actions was very 
short. The mobilization process had to repeat itself time and again, 
because of which a social movement never occurred during the late 
Republic. 
In the reactions to Clodius' death, a singular event occurred. During 
the cremation of Clodius' corpse in the Curia, Clodius' intermediate 
leader Sextus Clodius set up the wooden case with Clodius' bills as a 
palladium - a talisman (B-86; Cic. Mil. 33). Sextus Clodius thereby 
wanted to draw attention, not to what Clodius had done for which he 
should be honored, but to what Clodius had planned to do. To put it 
differently, a continuation was suggested. Despite the death of the leader 
the program would be continued. This implied a disconnection of leader 
and program, something that was unique, for until then leader and 
program had been inseparably linked and the program had been 
subordinate to the image and the behavior of the leader. We see here what 
Clodius had achieved. We have already observed that Clodius was the only 
one who could develop into an informal leader because he could maintain 
his leadership beyond the term of a magistracy. From this event after his 
death it follows that he also had given the initial impetus to an actual social 
movement. His program lived on after his death. But it never got beyond 
this impetus. Those who took over Clodius' leadership, in first instance 
the assistant leaders aligned to him and Pompey, steered the action in 
another direction. The goal of the action was restricted to revenge for the 
people and the fighting out of political conflicts for the leaders. Sextus 
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Clodius as an intermediate leader lacked sufficient authority to turn the 
action in another direction; Clodius' program was never heard of again.12 
In comparison to other periods, therefore, the plebs contionalis had a 
low level of politicization. The level of politicization, however, had 
always been low, so that it is impossible to speak of depoliticization.13 
Among the plebs contionalis the consensus on the existing institutions and 
political procedures was hardly declining. 
One of the factors which accounted for this was inherent in the 
organizations of the plebs. The collegia and other organizations of the 
plebs urbana, in Cicero's words (Dom. 74), had committees 
(conventicula) and a kind of popular assemblies (quasi concilia). They had 
been set up after the example of the Republican institutions (ad exemplum 
rei publicae, Gaius Dig. 3.4.1.1). Because of their administrators 
(magistri) and their assemblies, in which they elected their leaders and 
took collective decisions, the colleges in fact were like little republics. 
Such associations, therefore, could provide their members with an 
education in civics. In that way the many new citizens, such as the former 
slaves who originated from the various parts of the empire and beyond, 
could be integrated into Roman social and political culture. At the same 
time, the colleges had a compensatory function for those who were too far 
down on the social ladder to reach the top.14 
We have seen that a differentiation and disintegration occurred among 
the Roman substrata. A division developed between urban plebs and rural 
plebs. Among the urban plebs, moreover, a group broke away which had 
been detached from ties of patronage with individual members of the élite 
and which came to form a separate group - the public clientele. Among 
this group, however, at the same time a reintegration took place. Through 
the urban organizations and through participation in the political process 
as public clientele, this group was reintegrated into Roman society. There 
was also an integration in the ideological sphere, for this group thus 
assumed traditional values and norms which continued to exist as 
collective undercurrents. In this way, not a social but a cultural 
homogeneity was achieved. The public clientele felt itself part of the 
populus Romanus, the rulers of an empire. Thus eventually a symbiosis 
12
 A somewhat parallel situation occurred after the death of Caesar. Caesar had 
designated a number of magistrates for office and had left instructions and plans - the 
acta Caesaris. The spirit of Caesar was still hanging over Roman politics after his 
death. New leaders had to conform to Caesar's program in order to make themselves 
credible at least among the veterans and the urban plebs. See Cic. Att. 14.5.2, 10.1, 
and 17.6; DEBLOIS, Army, 47-48; YAVETZ, Caesar, 59. 
13
 Cf. VEYNE, op.cit., 92-94 and 411-415. 
14
 On the organization and functions of the colleges, see: ALFöLDI, Caesar, 31-35; 
FLAMBARD, Ktema, 165-166; WALTZING, op.cit., 357-368. Some examples of elected 
magistri in collegia : ILLRP 701 (= CIL I2 984 = VI 30888 = DESSAU 6081) and 767 
(= CIL I2 1274 = VI 10326 = DESSAU 7878). 
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between princeps and plebs could develop in a patron-client relationship 
at a national level. 
Among the plebs contionalis the confidence in the existing institutions 
and political procedures remained in force. The fact that collective 
behavior mostly sprang from or was connected to institutionalized forms 
of popular influence and that leadership was furnished by magistrates 
indicates that the participants in fact trusted the existing system and 
believed that their demands could be realized through the existing 
political procedures.15 Actually they were right, for the goals of 
collective behavior were set within the traditional patron-client 
relationships and were realized in that way. All that occurred was a shift 
in loyalty from collectivity to individuals. 
For the relationship between élite and people, the so-called imposters 
are also interesting; they were persons who professed to be descendants of 
popular leaders. In 100 there was a certain Equitius who alleged himself 
to be a son of Tiberius Gracchus. Satuminus had him stand for the 
tribunate of the plebs. When the censor Metellus proved that he was not 
Tiberius' son and removed him from the roll of citizens, the people 
reacted furiously.16 Around 44 Amatius or Herophilus gained great 
support among the urban plebs by claiming to be Marius' grandson. After 
the death of Caesar he was killed.17 Valerius Maximus (9.15.4), finally, 
mentions a Trebellius Calca who was very popular after the death of 
Clodius, because the people took him for Clodius' son. 
Such reactions are not surprising. The members of the ruling class, 
after all, for centuries had pointed the plebs to the great deeds of their 
ancestors in order to indicate that they themselves were capable of a good 
administration. The legal and constitutional inaccuracies of the imposters 
eluded the average citizen of low birth. For him there was little difference 
from what normal nobles did. Furthermore, the concern of the plebs was 
not so much with the continuity of a policy as with the continuity of a 
certain type of behavior. Thus within the oligarchical polity there existed 
a sense of dynastic loyalty. This was one of the factors which made 
Octavian's seizure of power successful. As Caesar's adopted son he had a 
lead over his competitors in becoming accepted by the plebs as its leader. 
But this did not go so far that a family relationship with a leader 
primarily accounted for the bond to a leader. Above all, mutual 
expectations had to be satisfied.18 A leader constantly had to prove his 
15
 Cf. W. NIPPEL, Die plebs urbana und die Rolle der Gewalt in der späten römischen 
Republik, in: MOMMSEN, op.cit., pp. 70-92, esp. 77; RFA 111. Compare also 
HOBSBAWM, op.cit., 120. On the acceptance of the ideology of the ruling élite by the 
plebs, see: M.I. FINLEY, Politics in the Ancient World, Cambridge 1983, p. 141. 
ібСіс. Sest. 101, Verr. 2.1.151; Val.Max. 9.7.1. 
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(1986), pp. 112-121; YAVETZ, Plebs, 58-62 and 70-73. 
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legitimacy. For that matter, the plebs had an empirical attitude.19 During 
the late Republic the loyalty of the plebs contionalis could shift from one 
leader to another or even to the senate, as in the revolt of Catiline. The 
plebs also realized that loyal behavior was recompensed by leaders. When 
Octavian, for example, returned to Rome after his victory on Antony at 
Actium in 31, he was greeted by a man with a crow. Octavian rewarded 
the man's tribute. The crow had been trained to welcome Octavian as 
victor. The man, however, had another crow which had been trained to 
welcome Antony.20 A similar type of behavior had occurred before. 
After Caesar's victory at Pharsalus in 48, the statues of Sulla and Pompey 
were torn down (Dio 42.18.2; Suet. ful. 75.4). 
The shift in the patron-client relationships to a relationship between 
leader and public clientele also follows from rhetorical language. In his 
Second Speech on the Agrarian Law, held before the people in 63, Cicero 
says that Pompey possessed the patronage - in the sense of 
protection/advocacy - over the interests of the plebs: patrocinium 
vestrorum commodorum (LegAgr. 2.25). Individuals were able to turn 
a large part of the urban plebs into their clientele, foreshadowing the 
Empire. But the pattern of the patronage relationship did not change. For 
that matter, Rome was a typical example of a society in which patron-
client relationships were predominant.21 
In the strategy of the leadership there was no alternative to be found, 
nor were there alternative social, economic, and political models available 
in theory; the motives of the participants tended to be conservative within 
the existing structure. This is why a social movement in the sense of an 
actual innovation did not develop, let alone a revolution or class 
19
 Cf. ibidem 111. 
2 0
 Macrob. Sat. 2.4.29. See also F. MILLAR, State and Subject: The Impact of 
Monarchy, in: F. MILLAR, E. SEGAL (eds.), Caesar Augustus. Seven Aspects, Oxford 
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RONIGER, Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange, CSSH 
22 (1980), pp. 42-77, esp. 75-77. 
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struggle.22 Besides that, continuity was absent in goals, leadership, and 
duration of the action, because of which it is equally impossible to speak 
of a social movement. Furthermore, despite coalitions such as the first 
triumvirate, there was no unified leadership; rather there was competition 
among popular leaders. 
What, then, was happening in the late Republic? As the traditional 
political institutions and structures of social communication in Rome 
ceased to function and the distance between élite and people increased, 
room was created for a social movement or popular protest equivalent to 
those of later periods. This, however, did not happen; the solution was 
sought retroactively. The plebs contionalis was a group whose bonds of 
clientage had relaxed. They sought new ways to realize their demands. 
These demands concerned more the realization of abstract and emotional 
expectations than the satisfaction of material grievances and discontent. 
To realize those desires, because of a diminished social control by relaxed 
vertical ties, artisans and shopkeepers took up a more active and more 
politically independent position than the rest of the urban plebs. Since 
however no alternative was available in theory or as a model, nor was any 
suggested by the leadership, the goal of the plebs contionalis remained 
within the old structure. That goal, a responsible patron who met their 
demands, was finally realized in the institution of the Principale, even if 
this probably was brought about more by the civil wars than by collective 
action in Rome. The Principale signified the final stage of a development 
which had started long before: the replacement of a collective leadership 
by an individual. That it also implied a reduction of the political influence 
of the citizens was irrelevant. The political influence of the plebs, after 
22
 See also RFA xix; cf. 108-115. 
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all, had never been important, and the reduction basically occurred 




It is common knowledge that the work of the ancient historian is 
complicated by the prejudice of the literary sources. The behavior and the 
expressions of the people are known to us only through the writings of the 
members of the higher social strata. In a book on popular leadership and 
collective behavior it is therefore necessary to investigate to what extent 
these writings have been colored by political and social prejudice. This 
will be done by means of lexicographic research.1 In this chapter the view 
of the literary sources on popular leaders and the crowd will be discussed. 
The popular leader, who in this chapter will be called demagogue 
(analogous the Greek demagogos), has two distinct images in literary 
sources. The usual image of the demagogue is negative. But in classical 
Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries the word demagogue did not 
always have a pejorative connotation. As we will see, it was the same in 
post-classical Greek literature and in the works of Latin authors. There 
existed a negative and a positive/neutral image.2 To be clear, I will also 
discuss sources outside the period from 80-50 B.C. 
The Negative Image of the Demagogue 
The negative image emerges particularly clearly in Greek political 
philosophy of the fourth century.3 Sometimes (especially in Plato and also 
in Herodotus and Thucydides) prostates or rhetor is used instead of 
demagogos.4 The negative image of the demagogue is clearly defined, and 
the following three qualities are ascribed to him: 
1
 See С NlCOLET, Lexicographie politique et histoire romaine: problèmes de méthode 
et directions de recherches, in: Atti del Convegno sulla Lessicographia politica et 
giuridica nel campo delle scienze dell'antichità 1978, Tonno 1980, pp. 19-46, esp. 25: 
"En d'autres termes (...) l'objet d'une lexicographie politique n'est pas de reconstruire 
une histoire de mots de nature politique (.. ), mais au contraire d'éclairer, par l'usage 
qu'elle faisait des mots de toute ordre, l'histoire politique." 
2
 Cf. CONNOR, New Politicians, p. 110 and n.34. 
3
 See Appendix С. On Plato's and Aristotle's thought on democracy see: E BARKER, 
The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, New York 19592 (1906), pp. 181, 175-
176, 193, 211-213, 311-314, 320, 351-352, 453-455, 459-460, and 487-490. 
4
 CONNOR, op.cit, 110-115 and 118; M. LOSSAU, Demagogos. Fehlen und Gebrauch 
bei Aristophanes und Thukydides, Palingenesia 4 (1969), pp. 83-88, esp. 84. For a 
survey of the terminology of Isocrates, see: LABRIOLA, QS, pp. 154-156 and 165 
(demagogos and rhetor). 
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1. The demagogue flatters the people, 
2. The demagogue causes sedition in the state, 
3. The demagogue aims at personal power. 
The demagogue flatters the people by means of orations or laws which are 
agreeable to the people. He incites the people against the rich, thereby 
disturbing social harmony. Often the demagogue is reproached with 
confiscating the possessions of the rich in order to please the people by 
redistributing them. The demagogue is only after his personal interest. By 
flattery and sedition he attempts to enhance his power and, eventually, to 
attain supreme power in the form of tyranny: an illegitimate type of one-
man rule for personal benefit. 
Historians in antiquity make use of this model of the demagogue to 
denote a certain type of politician.5 In this respect it is possible to speak of 
a locus communis.6 Often one of the three qualities is sufficient to brand 
someone as a demagogue. In Polybius there is a fine citation in which all 
three qualities are ascribed to Molpagoras, a popular leader in 2037: 
"There was a certain Molpagoras among the people of Gius, a capable speaker 
and politician, but in character a demagogue greedy for power. This man, by 
flattering the populace, by inciting the rabble against men of means, by finally 
killing some of the latter and banishing others whose property he confiscated 
and distributed among the multitude, soon attained by these means to supreme 
power..."8 
5
 Some typical examples on the early Republic in which all three qualities appear: 
Dion.Hal. 8.69.3-4 (Spurius Cassius); Plut. Cam. 36.2-4 (Marcus Manlius). 
6
 Cf. BéRANGER, REL, pp. 85-86; LANG, CPh, pp. 163-164. 
7
 Polybius also uses the negative image of the demagogue in his constitutional theory. 
In 6.9.6-9 he describes how members of the élite who are unable to make a political 
career in a normal way attain sole rule in a radical democracy through flattery and 
violence. Cf. С. NiCOLET, Polybe et la "constitution" de Rome: aristocratie et 
démocratie, in: NICOLET, Demokratia, pp. 15-35, esp. 27-33; F.W. WALBANK, A 
Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. I, Oxford 1957, pp. 656-657. See on 
demagogy in Polybius in general: WELWEI, Historia, 290-296; E. BRAUN, Die extreme 
Demokratie bei Polybios und bei Aristoteles, JŒAI 54 (1983) Beiblatt, sp. 1-40, esp. 
33-34. 
8
 Pol. 15.21. 1-2: ""Οτι Μολπαγο'ρα? τι? ήν παρά TOÎÇ Kiavoîs", άνήρ και 
λέγειν και πραττειν Ικανός, κατά δε την αϊρεσιν δημαγωγικό? και 
πλεονεκτη?. oç προ? χάριν ομιλών τφ πληθει και тоііс· εύκαιροΰντα? τοις 
βίοι? υποβάλλων ιοίς όχλοι?, και τινά? μεν εΐ? τελο? άναιρών, τινά? δε 
φυγαδευων και τα? ουσία? τα? τούτων δημεύω ν και διαδιδού? τοί? πολλοί?, 
ταχέω? τω τοιοΰτω τρο'πψ περιεποιήσατο μοναρχικήν έξουσέαν." 
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In modem literature only a few scholars have written on the 
representation of demagogy in Classical Athens.9 In an article on the 
Athenian demagogue Cleophon, RENAUD dwells upon the meaning of the 
concept "demagogy", but he mentions only the negative sense and one 
characteristic: flattery.io ZOEPFFEL, in an interesting article, treats the 
image of the demagogue in Aristotle. She shows that, with respect to 
demagogy, a relationship existed between Aristotle's political models and 
historical reality, in which Aristotle lets theory prevail over practice. 
ZOEPFFEL paraphrases the important passage in Aristotle's Politica 
(4.4.3-7) where he defines demagogy; but, in my opinion, she does not 
sufficiently realize the importance of the three qualities of the demagogue 
in the negative sense.11 
BOTTéRl and RASKOLNIKOFF analyse the picture of the popularis 
from the representation of Gaius Gracchus in Diodorus. They juxtapose 
demagogy and tyranny: Gaius Gracchus was accused of both demagogy 
and tyranny; the optimates reproached the populares with flattery and 
subversion on the one hand and with tyranny on the other.12 Diodorus' 
description (34/35.25, 27, 28a and 37.9) of Gaius Gracchus, however, is a 
negative image of the demagogue in which all three qualities appear. I 
hope to have shown that these qualities constitute one coherent image and 
that "aiming at tyranny" was a component of the negative image of the 
9
 TURASCIEWICZ' article on this subject is in Polish, and I was therefore unable to 
establish to what extent the author shares my conclusions. The article, next to the 
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, has been most useful for finding mentions of demagogy: 
R. TURASCIEWICZ, Quid scriptures Graeci qui V et IV saec. a. Chr. η. Athenis 
floruerunt de demagogis senserint scripserintque, Meander 21 (1966), pp. 397-423. 
CONNOR'S study is a political approach of demagogues in fifth-century Athens, and he 
does not pay much attention to the image of the demagogue. He does, however, 
recognize the presence of two images of the demagogue, see supra nn. 2 and 4. 
FINLEY discovers in Thucydides a picture of the demagogue who is after the increase of 
his personal power and for that reason is agreeable to the people. He does not discuss 
the subject in detail because the establishment of the image of the demagogue is not the 
purpose of his article: M.I. FINLEY, Athenian Demagogues, P&P 21 (1962), pp. 3-24, 
esp. 4-5. 
LOSSAU does not treat the image of the demagogue either. He only records a negative 
meaning of demagogue (op.cit.n.4, 85 and 88). 
LABRIOLA recognizes the pursuit of power of the demagogues in Isocrates and 
mentions that Isocrates has a positive judgment on some popular leaders (op. cit., 154-
156 and 165). 
Ю R. RENAUD, Cléophon et la guerre du Péloponnèse, LEC 38 (1970), pp. 458-477, 
esp. 458. 
11
 ZOEPFFEL, Chiron, pp. 71-72. 
12
 P. BOTTéRl, M. RASKOLNIKOFF, Diodore, Caius Gracchus et la Démocratie, in: 
NICOLET, Demokratia, pp. 59-101, esp. 67, 74, 77-83. The authors (p. 82) claim that 
only "subversiveness" is characteristic of the Aristotelian demagogue. However, 
"flattery" can also be found in Aristotle, see Appendix C. 
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demagogue. Finally, it is remarkable that the term demagogos does not 
appear in PAULY-WlSSOWA's Realencyclopädie .13 
The Positive/Neutral Image of the Demagogue 
In ancient literature, next to the negative, a non-negative image appears. 
The image is not entirely positive, but neither is it completely without a 
favorable connotation. Therefore, the term "positive/neutral" has been 
chosen here. Albeit a linguistic oddity, the term "positive/neutral" best 
captures the meaning of the non-negative image. For that image is not 
favorable enough to be called positive and it is too much opposed to the 
negative image to be called neutral. It can be described as follows: In 
Greek thought, demagogy always was associated with radical democracy, 
and radical democracy did not accord at all with the political ideals of 
most authors and philosophers, nor with those of the higher social strata. 
When a situation required demagogic action, the demagogue, in the 
ancient view, should operate in a certain manner. That manner of 
demagogy was considered positive/neutral. The image was also applied to 
popular leaders who undeniably had a good influence on society as a 
whole.14 
Unlike the negative image, the positive/neutral image of the 
demagogue has no clear characteristics. It occurs less frequently than the 
negative image. Such a demagogue is a popular leader who works for the 
public interest and who leads the crowd to what is good for the crowd.15 
Not until the Principate, positive/neutral demagogy is more clearly 
defined by Plutarch: 
"For leadership of a people is leadership of those who are persuaded by speech; 
but enticing the mob by such means as have just been mentioned [bread and 
circuses] is exactly like catching and herding irrational beasts." 16 
13
 There is an article on prostates. The treatment of the prostates tou demon in the 
article is limited to the political function of the prostates. The literary representation is 
not discussed. See RE Suppl. 9 (1962) s.v. prostates, esp. 1292-1296. 
14
 Perhaps the borderline between negative and positive-neutral demagogy was drawn 
on the basis of the interference of the popular leader with private property. The most 
common slogans of Greek demagogues were cancellation of debts and distribution of 
land. Fear of loss of property was perhaps more important among the ruling classes 
than fear of loss of political influence. For it seems that private property was more 
sacrosanct in antiquity than anything else. See e.g. Cicero's ideas about property: 
BRUNT, Conflicts, 125-126; B.W. FRIER, The Rise of the Roman Jurists: Studies in 
Cicero's Pro Caecina, Princeton 1985, pp. 185,187,281, and n.25. 
15
 Cf. FINLEY, op.cit.n.9, 5. 
16
 Plut. Mor. 802E (= Praec. Rei Pubi. Ger. ): "δημαγωγία γαρ ή δια λογού 
τκιθομένων έστιν, αί δε τοιαΰται τιβαοεύσας των όχλων obSiv άλογων ζωών 
άγρα? και βουκολήσεω? διαφέρουσιν." See also 818Α-Ε; Phoc. 2.4-5; AALDERS, 
Plutarch, p. 31. 
177 
Like the negative image, the positive/neutral image of the demagogue 
was applied in ancient historiography. LANG describes how Thucydides 
and Aristophanes contrast Cleon's demagogy with Pericles' demagogy: 
Pericles was a good demagogue who led the people in a constructive 
manner, but Cleon was a bad demagogue who led the people in a 
destructive manner.17 
Thucydides' picture of Pericles (2.65.8) is an example of a frequent 
phenomenon. The demagogue in the positive/neutral sense is seen as the 
antithesis of the demagogue in the negative sense; i.e., the demagogue in 
the positive/neutral sense is described by denying that he possesses the 
qualities of the demagogue in the negative sense. According to 
Thucydides, Pericles gave intelligent and severe leadership to the crowd, 
and he never resorted to flattery, for that is an improper way to gain 
power. Pericles is an example of a popular leader whose policy 
undeniably led to positive results. The image of Pericles as a demagogue 
in the positive/neutral sense became a topos that reappears in Cicero {De 
Or. 3.138 and Дер. 4.11) and Plutarch {Per. 15.2). 
The positive/neutral image also occurs in fourth-century Greece.18 
Here too it was opposed to the negative one: Theopompus contrasts the 
demagogue Eubulus, who only worked for his personal benefit, with the 
demagogue Callistratus, who took interest in the common good 
(Philippica, F.97 and 100, J АСОВ Y). In Plato and Aristotle this image does 
not appear, though Aristotle has a not unfavorable judgment of Pericles.19 
In Plutarch's historical writings the opposition of negative to 
positive/neutral demagogy also occurs: Cato the Elder was a demagogue 
in the positive/neutral sense, in contrast to other popular leaders.20 
The Image of the Demagogue and the Sources of the Late Republic 
It turns out that the persons who were known as populares in the last 30 
years of the Roman Republic are considered demagogues in the negative 
sense, exactly like the popular leaders of Greek history.21 To indicate 
their negative qualities, Latin authors mostly use terms such as largitio 
(bribery/flattery), sedino (sedition), and regnum (tyranny). Especially 
Pompey, Caesar, Catiline, and Clodius are thus accused of demagogy. By 
1 7
 LANG, op.cit., 162-164. 
1 8
 Dem. Olynth. 3.24; Isoc. Рас. 122-128. Cf. on the "good" demagogue in fourth-
century literature: ZOEPFFEL, op.cit., 80-82; in Isocrates: LABRIOLA, op.cit., 165. 
^Ath.Pol. 28.1. Aristotle's representation of the demagogue is unequivocal and 
pejorative: ZOEPFFEL, op.cit., 73 n.16 and p. 88. 
2 0
 Plut. Cat.Maior 16.6; cf. AALDERS, op.cit., 30. 
2 1
 See Appendix D. On the attribution of the quality "aiming at personal power", see 
also AALDERS, op. cit., 30; BéRANGER, op.cit., 86-90; DUNKLE, ΤΑ Ρ hA, passim; 
LINTOTT, op.cit., 58; WlRSZUBSKI, op.cit., 78; YAVETZ, Caesar, 186-188. 
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way of illustration, a passage from Floras in which all three 
characteristics appear: 
"The power of the tribunes was the eventual cause of all seditions; under the 
pretext of protecting the plebs, for whose aid they were originally established, 
but in reality aiming at tyranny for themselves, they courted popular support and 
favor by laws on the distribution of land and com and on the courts. "22 
The positive/neutral image was also applied in the historiography on 
the late Republic. It appears in Sallust and Cassius Dio.23 Plutarch uses it 
several times24; to illustrate, his judgment on Cicero: 
"For this man beyond all others showed the Romans how great a charm 
eloquence adds to the right, and that justice is invincible if it is correctly put in 
words, and that it behooves the careful statesman always in his acts to choose 
the right instead of the agreeable, and in his words to take away all vexatious 
features from what is advantageous."25 
The positive/neutral image of the demagogue comes close to the image 
of the ideal statesman, as appears from this quotation and the passage from 
Plutarch quoted in the previous section.26 
Plutarch has a favorable judgment on the Gracchi in his biography of 
the two brothers. Plutarch's opinion on Gaius is the most interesting, 
because many authors represent Gaius as a demagogue in the negative 
sense. For Plutarch, on the contrary, Gaius was a demagogue in the 
positive/neutral sense. He applies this image to Gaius by denying that he 
was a demagogue in the negative sense. When Plutarch, in his introduction 
to the Life of Gaius, treats the deeds and the personality of the tribune in 
general, he says: 
"And yet a strong opinion prevails that he was a demagogue pure and simple, 
and far more eager than Tiberius to win the favor of the multitude. But this is 
22
 Floras 2.1.1: "Seditionum omnium causas tribunicia potestas excitavit, quae specie 
quidem plebis tuendae, cuius in auxilium comparata est, re autem dominationem sibi 
adquirens, studium populi ac favorem agrariis, frumentariis, iudiciariis legibus 
aucupabatur." 
2 3
 Dio 37.22.2 (Cato the Younger). In two orations, Sallust shows how two tribunes 
of the plebs pose as demagogues in the positive/neutral sense: Sail. lug. 31.2, 6, Il-
io, and 23 (Memmius), Hist. 3.48.1-4, 14-15, and 17M (Macer). Both tribunes 
repudiate violence as a means and denounce lust for power and greed as political 
motives. For other examples in Sallust see the next section. 
24
 Plut. Caes. 35.3 (Metellus), Luc. 23.1 (Lucullus), Pomp. 2.1 (Pompey) and 10.6 
(Sthenis), Sert. 14.2 (Sertorius). 
2 5
 Plut. Cíe. 13.1: "ΜάΧιστα yàp ούτος ó άνήρ ϊ-πέΒζιξΐ. 'Ρωμαίοι? οοον ήδονήε· 
Xdyoç τω καλψ προστίθησι, και οτι το δίκαιον άήττητον έστιν αν όρθώ? 
λέγεται, και δει τον έμμίλώ? νο\ΐΎ(.υόμΐνον àà τω μεν έργω το καλόν αντί 
του κολακευοντο? αίρείσθαι, Tijj δε λο'ν4 το λυτιουν αφαιρεί ν τοϋ 
συμφεροντο?." 
2 6
 See also e.g. Plut. Mor. 800A-B and 815B-C (= Praec. Rei Pubi. Ger. ). Cf. 
AALDERS, op.cit., 51-52. 
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not the truth; it would appear that he was led by necessity rather than by his own 
choice to engage in public matters."27 
By contrast, Plutarch says of Livius Drusus the Elder, the tribune of the 
plebs who by order of the senate tried to undermine Gaius Gracchus' 
popular support, that Livius proposed laws disregarding the right or the 
advantageous, and that he pleased the crowd like a demagogue from 
Greek comedy (G.Gra. 9.1). In short, according to Plutarch, Livius 
Drusus' actions were those of a demagogue in the negative sense. 
Another example occurs in the Life of Cato the Younger. In 63, after 
Catiline's abortive coup in Rome, Cato the Younger proposed a com law 
in order to win the plebs for the senate. Plutarch justifies that law by 
calling it an act of humanity, of philanthropia {Cat.Min. 26.1). 
Conversely, he says of Clodius, who passed a com law in 58, that Clodius 
proposed laws to win the people for himself (Сгс. 30.1). Cato's law 
prevented a danger for the state, whereas Clodius' laws and other deeds 
are bracketed together as subversive actions. In his Precepts of Statecraft, 
Plutarch mentions Cato's com law as an example of the right way to deal 
with the crowd {Mor. 818D). 
We can conclude, then, that Plutarch considered Cato a demagogue in 
the positive/neutral sense and Clodius as a demagogue in the negative 
sense. Thus we can establish a political prejudice in Plutarch, since he 
passes a different judgment on the same act of these two politicians. 
Cicero makes use of the concept of positive/neutral demagogy in his 
writings and speeches. He relates it particularly to himself. In his Second 
Oration on the Agrarian Law, he poses as a consul popularis. The right 
popular leader, according to Cicero, should provide peace, quiet, and 
harmony. He is supposed to guard the rights of the people and should not 
resort to flattery or stirring up strife.28 Partly, this should be seen as 
propaganda, for the speech - held before the people in 63 - as a whole has 
a manipulative tenor.29 But Cicero uses the concept also in earlier and 
later orations, and in his First Oration on the Agrarian Law which was 
held before the senate.30 In Cicero's subsequent rhetorical and philosophic 
2 7
 G.Gra. 1.5: "καίτοι κρατά δόξα ποΧΧή τοΰτον ά'κρατον γενέσθαι δημαγωγο'ν, 
και πολύ του Τιβίρίου λαμπρότερον προς· την άπο των όχλων 5όξαν. ουκ 
ϊχίΐ δ« ούτω το αληθές"· άλλ' еоікс im' ανάγκης- τινός μάλλον OUTOÇ ή 
προαιρέσεως- έμπεσάν άς την πολιτείαν." 
29Leg.Agr. 2.9-10 and 102. See on the good popularis in Cicero: SEAGER, CQ, 333-
338; ACHARD, Pratique, 193-197. 
2 9
 MARTIN 46-51. 
30 In 66: Clu. 94. In 63: Cat. 4.9, Rab.Perd. 11, Leg.Agr. 1.23. In 56: Sest. 109 and 
114. In 52: Mil. 95. 
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works the concept recurs.31 In his orations and writings, Cicero 
constantly opposes his positive/neutral image of the demagogue to the 
characteristics of the negative image.32 Such political or philosophic 
definitions, of course, are only meant for the ruling élite.33 His writings, 
in any case, were only accessible to the educated classes. Another example 
of the use of the concept of positive/neutral demagogy is the advice to 
portray himself as a popularis in his campaign for the consulate, i.e. to act 
as a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense.34 
In this way, Cicero turns a rhetorical commonplace into a political 
slogan.35 The concept of the demagogue, therefore, for the most part 
appears in his orations. By posing as a demagogue in the positive/neutral 
sense, he attempts to neutralize an important weapon of the propaganda of 
the popular leaders. Probably Cicero also attempts to undermine the 
support of the popular leaders within the élite in an ideological way. Thus, 
he has no need of showing himself entirely anti-popular leadership and he 
disapproves only of certain aspects of popular policy.36 
3 1
 Amie. 95, Leg. 3.24, Off. 1.85-86, 2.31-36, 48, and 54-60. In Amie. 95 and Off. 
1.85 Cicero uses the concept popularis in the negative sense, in Off. 2.35 in the 
positive/neutral sense, and in De Or. 3.138 even in both meanings; a clear indication 
that Cicero constantly employed two concepts of popularis. See also 
HELLEGOUARC'H, op.cit., 535-539. TAYLOR, consequently, is wrong when she 
maintains that Cicero distinguished between good and bad populares only before his 
exile in 58: TAYLOR, PP, 11-12. 
32
 See on the opposition good-bad populares by Cicero: n.28. SEAGER (pp.cit.n.28 ) 
lists a number of qualities which Cicero attributed to the bad popularis (acting against 
the interests of the entire people or against libertas, aiming at tyranny, irresponsibility, 
stirring up strife). In my view, these qualities can be summarized in the three qualities 
of the demagogue in the negative sense. 
33
 See J.L. FERRARY, A propos de deux fragments attribués à С. Fannius, cos. 122 
(ORF4, fr. 6 et 7), in: NlCOLET, Demokratia, pp. 51-58. In this connection it is typical 
that Cicero's Greek, comparisons (infra n. 48) particularly appear in his letters and 
philosophic writings. Only in three forensic speeches - Pro Fiacco, Pro Milone and Pro 
Sestio, held at public trials - do Greek references occur; in the characteristically popular 
speech De Lege Agraria 2 they do not. 
BéRANGER, op.cit., 91-92, shows that while for the élite a moral distinction could exist 
between rex and tyrannus, the general public was oblivious of the distinction; 
however, DUNKLE, TAPhA, 156, remarks that through the performance of Greek 
tragedies the Greek concept of the tyrant became known to a large public. Y AVETZ, on 
the contrary, argues that even the average Roman senator was not sufficiently educated 
to grasp these allusions to Greek philosophy (HSCP, 55-58; Caesar, 188-189). 
34
 Com.Pet. 52-53. SEAGER shows that Livy's description of early Roman history was 
influenced by Cicero's image of the popularis : R. SEAGER, "Populares" in Livy and 
the Livian Tradition, CQ 27 (1977), pp. 377-389. SEAGER lists the characteristics of 
Livy's populares : sedino, largitio, regnum (pp. 378-380). It is obvious that these are 
exactly the qualities of the negative image of the demagogue. It is quite possible that 
Livy adopted his image of the demagogue from Cicero, but it is also possible that Livy, 
like Cicero, took it directly from Greek tradition. 
35
 The same he did with homo novus : VANDERBROECK, op.cit., 241-242. 
36
 Cf. JONKERS, op.cit., 40 and 59. 
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Appian and Sallust 
Two important sources for the late Republic will now be compared to 
show how the ancient image of the demagogue was used by ancient 
authors: Appian's work on the Civil Wars, and Sallust's monographs on 
Catiline and lugurtha as late Republican, Latin sources.37 In Appian, the 
word demagogos hardly occurs (but dèmokopeo and derivations do occur 
often). When Sallust employs the evident Latin equivalent popularis, it 
never has the meaning of "demagogue" {Cat. 22.1, 24.1, and 52.4). 
Appian attributes the qualities of the demagogue in the negative sense 
to politicians who are known to us as populares. But also some of those 
who, in Cicero's terminology, should be rated among the optimates are 
pejoratively described as demagogues: those who tried to win the people 
in a demagogic fashion for the senatorial majority (Drusus the Elder, 
Gaius Gracchus' opponent; Milo after Clodius' death; the tyrannicides 
after the assassination of Caesar). For Appian, popular policy per se was 
condemnable and the positive/neutral image of the demagogue hardly 
occurs in his writings. 
In Appian's description, demagogy causes an escalation in violence. 
The problems start after the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, subsequently 
the situation deteriorates with Satuminus, and after the Social War it gets 
entirely out of hand (1.2, 33, and 34). At the outbreak of the second civil 
war, the era of the demagogues is over and the decision of who is to 
become sole ruler is made on the battlefield. A short-lived revival takes 
place in Rome during the struggle for power between the tyrannicides, 
Antony, and Octavian in the period between Caesar's death and the 
outbreak of the third civil war. 
Sallust too uses the image of the demagogue in his monographs to 
describe his dramatis personae. An important passage is the one from the 
Catilina, where he gives a general survey of the issues in the late Republic. 
There it is the tribunes of the plebs who operate in a demagogic manner. 
We have already seen in Florus the opinion Sallust expresses on the 
tribunes of the plebs: 
"For after the tribunician power had been restored in the consulship of Cn. 
Pompey and M. Crassus, various young men, whose age and disposition made 
them aggressive, attained that high authority; they thereupon began to excite the 
plebs by attacks upon the senate and then to inflame their passions still more by 
doles and promises, thus making themselves conspicuous and powerful."38 
In contrast with Appian, though both have a similar anti-senatorial 
attitude, Sallust does not denote any of the optimates as a demagogue. 
37 For the passages see Appendix E. 
3 8
 Sail. Cat. 38.1: "Nam, postquam Cn. Pompeio et M. Crasso consulibus tribunicia 
potestas restituía est, homines adulescentes summam potestatem nacti, quibus aetas 
animusque ferox erat, coepere senatum criminando plebem exagitare, dein largiundo 
atque pollicitando magis incendere, ita ipsi clari potentesque fieri." 
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According to Sallust, two factions contend for power: the demagogues 
and the members of the senatorial majority.39 
We will now consider the judgment of both authors on some individual 
politicians. Appian has a favorable judgment of Tiberius Gracchus. It is 
not clear whether Appian's representation of Tiberius can be called a 
positive/neutral image of the demagogue. The judgment is notably based 
on Tiberius' agrarian law, rather than on his political behavior, which is 
the essence of the image of the demagogue. Appian gives a negative image 
of the demagogy of Gaius Gracchus: Gaius corrupted the people, menaced 
the senate, and tried to break its power (1.21-22). Livius Drusus, Gaius' 
antagonist, was just as much a demagogue in the negative sense.40 
As opposed to Appian, Sallust is favorably disposed towards both 
Gracchi, though, in Sallust's view, they lacked self-control in the 
realization of their political goals. The short description of the Gracchi in 
the lugurtha (42) is a positive/neutral image of the demagogue. According 
to Sallust, they wanted to restore the liberty of the plebs and to denounce 
the crimes of the aristocracy.41 
It is useful, as a result of the above, to dwell upon the use of the term 
"positive/neutral". Sallust and Appian can be juxtaposed where they 
agree, namely on Tiberius Gracchus. Both authors have a favorable 
judgment on Tiberius, but both also think that he became too radical. This 
shows that the non-negative image of the demagogue cannot be called 
entirely positive and that, therefore, the term positive/neutral is 
preferable. 
Except with respect to Gaius Gracchus, Appian and Sallust differ in 
opinion on yet another politician: Caesar. Appian describes him with the 
characteristics of the negative image of the demagogue: Caesar spent a 
tremendous amount of money on his election campaign. Later, during his 
consulate, he proposed laws to please the people. He passed his agrarian 
law in the assembly with violence and he ignored the senate and his 
colleague. Ceaselessly, he worked towards sole rule. (2.1,10-13, and 149-
150.) 
But in Sallust the picture of the same person corresponds with the 
positive/neutral image of the demagogue. In the Catilina, Sallust resists 
the allegation that Caesar was involved in the conspiracy of Catiline. Some 
want to press charges against Caesar, and Sallust says: "Moreover, the 
opportunity for an attack seemed favorable, because (Caesar) was heavily 
39
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in debt on account of his eminent generosity in private life and the greatest 
munifications when in office."42 Sallust represents Caesar as someone 
who had indebted himself from altruistic motives. But he declines to 
mention that Caesar's munifications consisted of magnificent games for 
the plebs in order to start up his political career. In short, they are the 
same largitiones on account of which Caesar receives the designation of 
demagogue in the negative sense from Appian. 
In the final part of the Catilina, Sallust compares Caesar and Cato the 
Younger, the two individuals whom he considered the greatest of his time, 
the persons with the most virtus : "Caesar was held great because of his 
benefactions and munifications, Cato for the integrity of his life."43 Again 
we see an euphemistic description of Caesar's actions. For the extravagant 
shows at the beginning of Caesar's political career represent one of the 
most successful cases of popular policy in the late Republic. 
To conclude, we have been able to ascertain in Appian and Sallust the 
existence of different judgments on Caesar and Gaius Gracchus. On 
account of the same actions Caesar and Gracchus are considered 
demagogues in the negative sense by Appian, and demagogues in the 
positive/neutral sense by Sallust. Without returning to the old view of 
Sallust as a Tendenzschriftsteller, a pamphleteer, we can still say that 
Sallust, in any case, does not give a negative representation of Caesar, as 
has been argued in some recent studies on Sallust. According to EARL and 
TlFFOU, Cato the Younger clearly wins in the comparison with Caesar.44 
In describing the fight between populares and optimates, which he 
abhorred, Sallust did not want to ascribe the objectionable behavior of the 
populares to his friend Caesar and to Gaius Gracchus. Sallust's political 
opinions color his account of popular politics. Unlike Sallust, Appian did 
not consider the late Republic as a party strife between populares and 
optimates. Looking back, Appian represented it as a period of civil strife, 
in which everyone was after everyone's blood and for which there existed 
only one solution: monarchy45. This too results in a colored picture, but 
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Appian undeniably takes a balanced position. For he shows that certain 
actions of opponents of demagogues were equally demagogic.46 
Demagogos and Popularis 
The characteristics of the demagogue in the negative sense as well as in the 
positive/neutral sense, developed in fourth-century Greece, were applied 
by Greek historians to Roman popular leaders. Plutarch did not see an 
essential difference between the political life of Greeks and Romans, 
which is confirmed by his use of the term demagogos for Roman 
populares. Furthermore, he was influenced by Plato and Aristotle.47 
From these philosophers he particularly must have adopted the negative 
image of the demagogue. 
The Roman way of thinking about politics was influenced by Greek 
thought. A marked example is Cicero. Cicero regularly takes examples 
from Greek history to underscore his arguments regarding demagogy. 
Also he quotes, albeit not uncritically, Aristotle and Plato as authorities 
{Off. 2.56, Rep. 1.65). Cicero's Greek examples concern both the 
demagogue in the negative sense48 and in the positive/neutral sense. Just as 
for Thucydides and Plutarch, so too for Cicero, Pericles was the classic 
example of the demagogue in the positive/neutral sense and Cicero 
contrasts Pericles as a good popularis with bad Greek populares (Or. 
3.138, Rep. 4.11). According to FUHRMANN, Cicero's political ideas 
were a mixture of Greek philosophy and Roman political practice.49 
Greek and Roman authors employed the ancient image of the 
demagogue to describe a certain type of politician, in this case the 
popularis 50, of the late Republic. The negative image especially was 
suited for this, in view of its three constantly recurring qualities. The 
mention of one or two characteristics already sufficed to qualify someone 
as a demagogue. Given the ambiguous meaning of the concepts 
demagogos andpopularis, the authors rather use characteristics instead of 
the terms themselves. Sallust and Appian, for example, hardly make use 
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of the words popularis and demagogos respectivily, but they do employ 
the characteristics in their descriptions. Characteristics were also 
employed in the less frequent positive/neutral image, i.e. by stressing the 
absence of the characteristics belonging to the negative image. 
The term popularis became the Latin equivalent of the Greek 
demagogos.51 For every educated Greek or Roman it must have been 
obvious which type of politician was meant when a person of the late 
Republic was denoted with certain qualities. This is true above all of the 
negative image of the demagogue. The inevitable conclusion is that the 
best translation oí popularis is "demagogue".52 
In the political practice of the late Republic the popularis was not equal 
to the demagogos of Greek democracy. It happens more than once that 
Romans borrow Greek political concepts to describe contemporary 
situations, e.g. tyranny.53 As far as the Greek authors are concerned, it is 
possible to speak of an interpretano Graeca .54 For a study of popular 
leadership and the relationship between the popular leader and his public 
in particular, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between the actual 
actions of those who were known as demagogues and the commonplace 
description of these politicians. 
The research on collective behavior has shown that populares and 
optimates used the same methods to gain the support of the plebs, although 
the optimates did this in reaction to the behavior of the populares. 
Populares were depicted as demagogues in the negative sense, optimates 
such as Cicero and Cato the Younger as demagogues in the 
positive/neutral sense. This obviously shows a political bias of ancient 
authors in favor of the senatorial majority. Cicero, partisan of the 
optimates, even poses as a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense. 
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The Image of the Crowd 
Did a difference of opinion exist on the behavior of the crowd, similar to 
the case of the demagogues? Many studies have already appeared on this 
subject, the most important conclusions of which will be summarized 
here. 
It is impossible to draw conclusions from the difference in the use of 
words. The terms for "crowd" and "people" are used interchangeably and 
synonymously. The diversity in vocabulary is mostly a mere matter of 
style; an author thus tries to avoid repetitions. This is true of both Greek 
and Latin authors.55 
The judgment of ancient authors on the behavior of the crowd is 
always a moral one. The approval or disapproval of the behavior can be 
ascertained from the adjectives.56 Words such as populus, plebs, 
multitudo, or their Greek equivalents alone or combined with moralistic 
adjectives, therefore, hardly provide any details on the participants in 
collective behavior. 
Though the people have a right to express their opinion and their 
grievances, on the whole they are denied an independent judgment. If the 
people adopt an attitude in opposition to the ruling class, it is usually 
considered as having been caused by their leaders. This outlook was 
widely accepted among the higher social strata in antiquity.57 A typical 
example is the frequent metaphor of the sea: 
"That as the sea, though naturally calm, becomes rough and stormy beneath a 
strong wind, so is it with the Roman people; peaceable enough when left to 
themselves, the speech of demagogues can rouse them like a furious gale. "58 
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We have seen that differences can be ascertained between authors in 
their judgment on the same popular leaders. Also differences can be 
established in their judgment on similar actions of different politicians. 
Unlike with the demagogues, ancient authors remarkably agree in their 
attitude towards the people. The crowd is good when it conforms to the 
élite, the crowd is bad when it acts violently. This can be explained by the 
fact that the literary sources on the late Republic were produced by 
members of the élite among whom no real democrats were anymore to be 
found.59 With regard to demagogues divergent opinions could exist, since 
they belonged to the same status group. The different political views 
within the élite concerning popular policy led to different judgments of 
popular leaders. 
The Problem of Perception 
How far did the ancient image of the demagogue correspond to reality? 
Generalizing, one could state that Caesar's popular leadership led directly 
to one-man rule. However, it should never be forgotten that the ultimate 
decision of the straggle for power was made on the battlefield. Demagogy 
alone was not sufficient to attain supreme power in Rome. 
What exactly was the perception of popular leaders and collective 
behavior by the contemporaries in the late Republic? Sallust blames the 
problems of the late Republic on the absence of an external enemy after 
the Third Punic War, as a result of which the élite and the people only 
pursued their own interests and increasingly drifted apart. The ruling 
class reserved the honorific and lucrative positions to itself and did not 
allow the people to share in the fruits of empire. (lug. 41.) Sallust 
attributes major political conflicts to the dissension among the élite (Cat. 
38.3-4). 
Cicero points out the custom of acquiring political allies by promising 
career opportunities.60 He further proposes some practical improvements 
within the existing system, such as enlargement of the number of lower 
magistrates, a better training of senators, and a closer tie between 
provinces and senate.61 
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The extraordinary commands were not unconstitutional and not in 
themselves a cause for the fall of the Republic.62 Nonetheless, there was a 
growing awareness among the élite that such a source of power 
counteracted the principles of equality within the oligarchy. For that 
reason the senate resisted Pompey's command against the pirates.63 The 
endorsement of or the resistance to such commands, however, was mostly 
determined by political alignments. For example, in 66 Cicero was 
friendly with Pompey. Therefore, in his Pro Lege Manilla, he strongly 
supported the proposal to grant Pompey a great command in the East. 
After his consulate, Cicero became a stout advocate of the oligarchy. But 
after Pompey had arranged Cicero's recall from exile in 57, Cicero 
himself proposed to entrust Pompey with the cura annonae, whereas a 
part of the senate disagreed (Cic. Dom. 16). In February of 56, Cicero 
again felt free to denounce the extraordinary commands by referring to 
Cato the Younger (Sest. 60). After the conference of Luca in the same 
year and his reconciliation with Caesar, Cicero once more became careful 
in his critiques of these commands (Prov.Cons. 38). In short, there was a 
perception that the extraordinary commands produced a danger for the 
existing order, but the majority of the Roman élite did not always realize 
that the extraordinary commands also provided solutions to real problems 
which called for action. 
The perception of political violence was thus that, while violence by 
political opponents was denounced, violence as a political means for one's 
own purposes was approved.64 An important reason why during the late 
Republic effective measures against the increasing use of violence in 
politics were never taken is the lack of consensus in the élite on the 
legitimacy of violence. Even on a particular form of violence such as the 
senatus consultum ultimum there was disagreement, and therefore 
Clodius in 58 was able to drive Cicero into exile without much opposition. 
The same can be said about largitiones. As such they were not bad and 
fit into the political tradition. But approval or disapproval depended on 
who gave them and in what way.65 
Are the problems of the people recognized? A characteristic 
conception is the one in Cicero's De Legibus (3.24 and 31-32) that in 
every polity the moral changes among the élite have their repercussions 
on the people. As the popular assemblies time and again took decisions 
which did not comply with the wishes of the oligarchy, Cicero lost 
confidence in them. He blamed it on the lack of representativity of the 
participants and preferred the popular expressions in the theater, which 
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were favorable to the oligarchy.66 The growing dissension within the élite 
was indeed an important cause for the arising of political conflicts. It 
alone, however, was insufficient; the conflicts were related to the specific 
problems of the people itself, a fact that was not realized. Distributions of 
com and money or public works were not meant as poor relief, but issued 
from the liberality of the rich, who demonstrated their social standing by 
ostentatious expenditure, and from the idea among the élite that it was the 
responsibility of the ruling class to provide for a sufficient food supply 
and an efficient city government.67 Peace and quiet, that was what the 
plebs needed to be satisfied, so thought the Roman upper class.68 
Furthermore, the vertical organization of Roman social structure 
impeded the perception of the poor as a distinct social group. Welfare was 
a private affair and belonged to the sphere of patron-client relations.69 
Few, with the possible exception of Clodius, had an eye for the interests of 
the lower social strata. And if they had, the interests were interpreted in 
the wrong way, as is shown by Rullus' agrarian law.70 If the problems 
were perceived, they were used only to mobilize the crowd for the 
advancement of one's own political career. 
Was the stereotype description of popular leaders and collective 
behavior only a way to grasp these phenomena in familiar phraseologies, 
or was it considered to be consistent with reality? First of all, it is 
remarkable that only non-contemporary ancient authors apply the 
negative image of the demagogue to optimates, i.e. those who were not 
known as popular leaders during the late Republic. Cicero and Sallust 
were too much entangled in the political controversies of their era to 
make that subtle distinction. Only later authors, whose writings no longer 
participated in the political discussion of the late Republic, could judge the 
behavior of late Republican politicians with some objectivity. A 
positive/neutral image of the demagogues Caesar and Gaius Gracchus can 
only be seen in Sallust, an author who belonged to the political tradition of 
both populares. Cicero's posture as a demagogue in the positive/neutral 
sense is a component of his propaganda. He also describes the populares 
of the past in favorable terms, but that is only to indicate the wickedness of 
the contemporary popular leaders.71 
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Typical of popular politics in the late Republic is that in itself it did not 
bring any innovations. The methods used were merely a more 
sophisticated and perfected version of the traditional elitist ways of 
dealing with the plebs. Consequently, it is natural that popular politics as 
such was not considered a problem. The persons are attacked, not the 
political method.72 The censure of the popular leaders has moral grounds; 
they are reproached with an improper and blameworthy use of the 
prevailing political methods. Popular action too could be seen by the· 
contemporaries within a traditional, and therefore acceptable, 
framework. It was not realized that popular policy was made possible by 
structural dysfunctions in the existing Roman political and social order. 
Only in case of political conflicts were the Greek stereotypes dug up to 
accuse opponents. Cicero appears to be a stout opponent of popular 
politics, but that is merely on the surface. Everything depends on the 
political situation. When the political purist Cato accused Murena in 63 of 
aiming at personal power by means of pleasing the people, Cicero 
answered in defence of Murena that he did nothing which counteracted 
Roman tradition (Cic. Mur. 74). 
All this is not to say that the Romans were blind. Sallust, as is shown by 
DE В LOIS7 3, had an awareness of the consequences of the Roman 
expansion. But his perception was influenced by the strong moralistic 
tradition in Roman historiography, a lack of a quantifying abstract 
approach, and a not empirically founded explanation for the phenomena 
and developments he observed. Cicero was a shrewd observer. He knew 
exactly the purpose of certain political methods, how a crowd should be 
mobilized, and which groups were politically active. He also understood 
the importance of leadership. Cicero, like most of his contemporaries, 
was aware of the difference between the Roman and the Greek situation, 
but the causes behind them were not recognized; improvements were 
merely sought within the frame of the restoration of the old morals from 
the past. Even in plans for reform, such as Cicero's De Legibus 3 and 
Sallust's Epistula ad Caesarem, both authors thought in terms of the 
existing Republican institutions.74 Possibly the Roman élite did not want 
to perceive the true causes; everyone, at least formally, was satisfied with 
the existing system, and no one needed an alternative. At the end of the 
year 50, as the great conflict with Caesar was imminent, Cicero realized 
that Caesar had been overindulged and that the élite should have taken 
action against him when he was not so powerful; but then it was too late. 
(An. 7.7.6.) 
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The most striking case of misperception in the late Republic is the 
expectations of the conspirators against Caesar in 44. Brutus, Cassius, and 
the other tyrannicides wanted by their assassination of Caesar to restore 
the Republic. Even more, they wanted to restore the Republic as it had 
been centuries before, with a virtuous oligarchy. They expected the plebs 
to welcome their act, but, as Appian neatly remarks, the people they had 
before them were no longer the inhabitants of the Rome of their 
forefathers.75 
This brings us to the final aspect of perception. As was remarked in the 
introduction, most modem scholars agree that the main cause for the fall 
of the Republic lay in governing an empire with the institutions of a city-
state. Perhaps we can go even further by arguing that it was also 
governing an empire with the conceptual framework of a city-state. Rome 
was the center of political activity. The institutions and the political 
thought were still those of a city-state. The ideology of the élite was based 
on Greek education and the traditions of early Rome. Both came from a 
political culture in city-states. The Romans tried to find solutions for 
current problems in Greek political theory and their own history. Greek 
philosophy offered useful concepts to describe Roman politics in terms of 
a city-state. Greek political philosophy even nowadays provides us with a 
most useful frame of reference, but twentieth-century politics are not the 
politics of a city-state anymore. That was already the case in late 
Republican Rome. But this perception had not yet entered the Roman 
mind. The Roman polity had expanded far beyond a city-state. It had a 
huge empire filled with different nations, a professionalized army of 
Italians quite different from the earlier citizen-soldiers, and resources of 
a magnitude that, when put to use in politics, far surpassed the resources 
of a city-state. Despite the fact that an awareness of the growth of the 
empire existed, it seems that the consequences were not perceived by 
Roman thought, which still was on the scale of a city-state. It took several 
civil wars and the genius of Augustus to realize what was really 
happening. 
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Epilogue 
Popular leadership and collective behavior were frequent phenomena 
during the late Republic and were not insignificant in the political process. 
The Roman Republic perished in a series of civil wars, which started with 
the crossing of the Rubicon by Caesar in 49 and ended with Octavian's 
victory at Actium in 31. Octavian soon received a new name - Augustus -
and founded a new political system, the Principate, which would govern 
the Roman empire in the subsequent three centuries. The achievement of 
Augustus with his new regime and the reorganization of society offer a 
good opportunity for a review of the most important aspects of popular 
leadership and collective behavior during the late Republic.1 We have to 
keep in mind, incidentally, that Augustus did not begin with a clear-cut 
plan, but introduced his reforms during his long reign (until A.D. 14) by 
trial and error. Nonetheless, Augustus showed that he had a good 
perception of the problems of the late Republic and a sense of Realpolitik. 
The Achievement of Augustus 
A number of factors caused the outbreak of the civil wars and the 
downfall of the Republic. Augustus found remedies for the Republican 
problems and his power was founded on four pillars. 
The late Republic finally had succumbed to civil wars which were 
fought with professionalized armies. The soldiers and the officers were 
more closely tied to their general, who could provide for income and 
pension, than to the state for which they nominally fought. Augustus 
adapted the existing practice by creating a standing professional army. He 
took care that the majority of the army units fell under his command by 
his control of the most important provinces from a military viewpoint. He 
also provided for regular pay and a thorough pension scheme by land 
distributions and discharge bounties for veterans. He clearly 
demonstrated to the soldiers that their economic welfare depended on the 
emperor. 
The second pillar of Augustus' power consisted of his control of the 
upper strata. First of all, of course, Augustus had carried out a bloody 
purge of the Roman élite during the civil wars, so that few possible rivals 
were left, but, besides that, he also undertook a number of structural 
measures. One of the most important reasons for the political conflicts 
1
 On Augustus, among many other publications, see: L. DE BLOIS, De erfenis van de 
Romeinse burgeroorlogen en de opbouw van de monarchie van Augustus, Lampas 13 
(1980), pp. 23-39; A.H.M. JONES, Augustus, London 19772 (1970); F. MILLAR, E. 
SEGAL (eds.), Caesar Augustus. Seven Aspects, Oxford 1984. 
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and the rise of popular leadership in the late Republic was the fierce 
competition among the élite for a limited number of magistracies and the 
prizes to be gained after occupying an office with imperium. Augustus 
regulated the senatorial careers, made the career success of the élite 
dependent on their loyalty to the princeps, and made sure that the 
senators' ambitions were sufficiently satisfied by increasing the number 
of magistracies. He introduced a clear separation among the upper strata 
by the institution of marked-off status groups: senators (with a division 
between patricians and plebeians), équités, and decuriones. The équités 
were drawn into the imperial administration by the institution of a 
number of equestrian offices in the army and the imperial administration. 
The status groups were clearly separated, but for ambitious and capable 
individuals there existed opportunities for upward mobility. By 
increasing the number of offices and by improving the provincial 
government, Augustus moreover was able to provide a solution for the 
Republican dysfunctions in the imperial administration. For during the 
Republic the city-state based polity had proven inadequate for an efficient 
government of the empire. 
As far as the imperial administration as well as the army were 
concerned, Augustus integrated into the new political system the 
increasing professionalization and specialization resulting from structural 
differentiation. Furthermore, Augustus surrounded himself with a 
number of loyal and capable assistants, like Maecenas and Agrippa, who 
advised him and performed tasks for him. 
The third pillar of Augustus' power was his personal wealth. Because 
he had inherited Caesar's estate and increased it by confiscations during 
the civil wars, Augustus acquired a fortune which no one in the upper 
class could match. This fortune was furthermore supplemented by the 
institution of imperial domains, such as the rich province of Egypt, the 
revenues of which fell entirely to the emperor. Augustus' financial 
resources enabled him to make his influence everywhere felt in Roman 
state and society: in the army, in the upper strata, and in his liberality 
towards the plebs. Furthermore, the imperial domains were administered 
by a loyal staff, which could serve as the eyes and ears of the emperor. 
The final, and for our subject the most important, pillar was the fact 
that Augustus manifested himself as the foremost popular leader. This 
meant that, along the lines of the relationship between popular leadership 
and collective behavior, he developed into the superpatron of the public 
clientele.2 Augustus' goal, as in other parts of his policy, was to restore 
order in politics and society by on the one hand asserting control and on 
the other hand removing the causes of late Republican problems. 
First, Augustus implemented a number of restrictive and structural 
measures whose purpose was to reduce the opportunity for collective 
behavior and to channel and institutionalize certain aspects of it. Augustus 
2
 See MARTIN 225-226; TAYLOR, PP, 176-178. 
194 
established a police force. The urban cohorts were permanently stationed 
in the city to preserve law and order. They could receive assistance from 
the praetorian guard. Next to these, the vigiles were established to serve as 
a fire brigade and night watch. With these measures Augustus increased 
social control and at the same time provided for a more orderly city 
administration. 
Additionally, Augustus took measures to preserve the existing reality 
of organizations of the plebs, such as colleges and neighborhoods. The 
organizations were institutionalized and regulated, with the result that 
these important factors in the process of mobilization became a binding 
force of the imperial regime. 
The popular assemblies kept functioning, but only nominally. The 
decisions that were taken depended on the judgment of the princeps. The 
members of the plebs seemed to be increasingly less interested in 
participating. Not surprisingly, for their desires were realized by the 
emperor, and if the plebs had grievances they addressed him directly. The 
plebs very soon realized who was in charge. After Augustus, probably 
during the reign of his successor Tiberius, the popular assemblies were 
abolished without protest. 
As has been remarked before, the theater and the circus during the 
Principate partly took over the function of the popular assemblies in 
expressing the will of the people. On such occasions the plebs could enter 
into direct contact with the emperor to show its approval or disapproval. 
This brings us again to the question of who the spectators at the games 
were. During the late Republic the audience mainly was composed of 
personal clients of nobles and country folk, while artisans and 
shopkeepers participated in other types of collective behavior. 
The target group of the emperor was the urban plebs; this group 
formed the major part of his public clientele. We may therefore assume 
that now especially this group was admitted to the games. Augustus issued 
regulations for the muñera to reduce the number and quality of private 
munifications and to keep them under state control. He thus avoided the 
risk that popular favor fell to a rival. In addition, Augustus himself gave 
vast muñera, so that he would receive the credit. He therefore could also 
determine who was admitted to the games. Moreover, the rural plebs had 
increasingly less reason to travel to Rome to attend the games. The 
number of games in the Italian municipalities increased and local 
magistrates were stimulated to organize these after the example of Rome.3 
Second, Augustus took a number of measures which limited the 
opportunities for competing popular leaders. His regulations with regard 
to the games have just been mentioned. His enormous financial means 
further gave him a financial advantage over possible competitors. For 
example, when the elections still officially occurred through the popular 
assemblies, Augustus took some legal measures against electoral 
3 See VILLE, op.cit., 122-123 and 175-188. 
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corruption. Besides that, however, he distributed 1000 HS per person in a 
few tribes, so that the voters had little to expect from other candidates 
(Suet. Aug. 40). One of the main reasons why Augustus maintained the 
grain distributions, so he said, was to frustrate the opportunities of 
possible rivals (Suet. Aug. 42.3). 
Third, he turned the plebs into his personal clientele by acting as its 
patron, by concrete and symbolic gestures. He thereby became a 
trendsetter for his successors4. Augustus maintained the corn 
distributions. The number of com recipients was fixed, which resulted in 
the creation of a privileged group among the lower strata, the plebs 
frumentaria, which had a vested interest in the preservation of the new 
regime. Augustus took measures to secure a regular com supply and 
eventually established an important magistracy, the praefectus annonae, 
specially responsible for it. The province of Egypt, annexed by Augustus, 
was his private domain and soon became one of Rome's main granaries. 
At times of extreme shortage the emperor contributed from his private 
means to alleviate the need. He regularly distributed money to the people 
in the theater. Furthermore, a vast building program was executed in 
Rome by Augustus himself and his loyal followers, which provided much 
employment for city-dwellers. Finally, Augustus secured peace and order 
after the civil wars and he played along with the imperialist sentiments of 
the plebs by making the most of the military successes of his regime. 
Augustus' symbolic behavior was aimed at guarding himself against 
arrogance. He did not pose as sole ruler, but as first citizen - princeps 
civitatis. His display of power was modest. He had himself pictured among 
and not above the people, and showed his respect for the people by his 
obvious and interested presence at the games. 
Fourth, a factor which contributed to the acceptance of Augustus as 
leader was his maintenance of the Republican institutions. Augustus 
invested himself with Republican regalia to legitimize his leadership. He 
htlàtribunicia potestas not only because of its legislative powers and the 
right of veto, but also to demonstrate his responsibility towards the plebs.5 
After a period of political conflict and a series of civil wars, Augustus 
established a stable and lasting regime. Collective behavior still occurred 
during Augustus and afterwards. But because of the reduction of political 
conflicts, the absence of rivals who could act as leaders, and the Augustan 
settlement, collective behavior lost the importance it had had in the 
political process of the late Republic. To the extent it occurred, it was part 
of the normal behavioral pattern within the relationship between patron 
and client, between princeps and plebs; in short, the function it had 
received during the late Republic. 
4
 See A. CAMERON, Bread and Circuses: The Roman Emperor and his People, London 
1973, esp. pp. 10-11; YAVETZ, Plebs, Ch. 6. 
5
 On the tribunicia potestas, cf. YAVETZ, Plebs, 55-57 and Ch. 5; R. GILBERT, Die 
Beziehungen zwischen Princeps und stadirömischer Plebs im frühen Principal, 
Bochum 1976, pp. 233-238. 
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In his person Augustus accumulated the pillars of power: armed 
forces, control of the élite, wealth, and patronage of the public clientele. 
That is why Augustus, perhaps more than Louis XIV, would have been 
entitled to say: "L'État, c'est moi". 
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Appendix A 
Prosopography of Assistant Leaders 
Appendix A provides a survey of assistant leaders, divided into two categories. The 
assistants of the popular leaders, for reasons of convenience, are called populares, their 
opponents optimates. The qualification as assistant leader of either group has been 
made on the basis of political allegiance and political behavior. In reality, the 
distinctions between the two groups perhaps were not so sharp as they are made here. 
Coalitions changed rapidly over the issues and some persons supported two opposing 
politicians at the same time. For some assistant leaders the allegiance was uncertain and 
the political behavior ambiguous. The names of these assistant leaders are listed in plain 
font; the other assistants, whose positioning is certain, are listed in boldface. 
The first line for each assistant leader provides the number and name. The order is 
alphabetical. The second line gives the references to prosopographical works from 
which most of the information is, derived. References to M RR are to the pages in 
Volume 2. References to RE, OÉ, NMRS, and SWRP are to the numbers in their 
respective prosopographies. 
Next follows the year of the tribunate when the person was ACTIVE as an assistant 
leader, the highest magistracy (HIGH.MAG.) attained, and, if applicable, the 
legation(s) held (LEG.). 
On the following line the political ALLEGIANCE of the assistant during his 
tribunate is indicated, and also whether he changed his allegiance afterwards, with the 
date of the CHANGE. Changes of allegiance before the tribunate are not taken into 
account (e.g. Ap-5). Pompey's assistant leaders who remained with him in the civil 
war are considered not to have changed their allegiance. These persons did not have 
make a choice in favor of the optimates ; they simply remained faithful to their leader. 
The optimates who changed their allegiance to Caesar immediately after the battle of 
Pharsalus in 48 are considered among the changers, because, despite Pompey's defeat, 
the odds in the civil war were still equal. Those who went over to Caesar at a later date 
(for example after the battle of Thapsus in 46) are considered not to have changed, 
because at that time the war was decided and there was no question any more of a 
choice between two equal political groups. 
Then follows TYPE of change: within the group or to the other group. In 49 
Pompey represented the optimates. Therefore, the populares -assistants who chose 
Pompey in 49 changed to the optimates. The optimates -assistants who made the same 
choice in 49 are considered to have changed their allegiance within their own group. 
If the assistant leader has changed his allegiance, the next line specifies to which 
leader(s) he has changed his allegiance (SPECIFICATION). 
Finally, the involvement, if any, of the assistant leader in collective behavior is 
listed (INV.COLL.BEH.). Reference is made to the list of cases of collective behavior 
in Appendix B. References between brackets refer to cases where the assistant leader 
did not provide leadership but was involved in another way, for example in a repressive 
role or as a victim of violence. 
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POPULARES 
Ap-1. Aelius Ligus 
MRR 195; RE 83 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Vetoed the proposal in the senate for Cicero's recall from exile. Cicero 
(Sest. 94) calls him and the tribunes of the next year Serranus (Ap-6) and Numerius 
(Ap-33) quisquillas seditionis Clodianae : "the riffraff of Clodius' seditions". 
Ap-2. C. Alfius Flavus 
MRR 189; RE 7 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 59 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: In 63 on Cicero's side; as tribune a Caesarian. Cicero keeps speaking 
of him in an amiable tone: Sest. 113-114. 
Ap-3. A. Allienus 
MRR 217; RE l;NMRS 21 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49 LEG.: 61-59, 44-43 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74) 
COMMENT: Co-author of the lex Mamilia Rascia All'iena Peducaea Fabia together 
with Fabius (Ар-15), Mamilius (Ap-25), Peducaeus (Ap-35), and Roscius (Ap-42). 
The law dealt with the extension of municipal organization in connection with 
Caesar's agrarian law and the activities of the land commissioners. On the law see 
IJGRR 401-403. In 49 a Caesarian (BRUHNS, Caesar, 45). 
Ap-4. T. Ampius T.f. Balbus 
MRR 167; RE 1; NMRS 23 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 59 LEG.: 49-48 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: From Ancia? Passed a law with his colleague Labienus (Ap-20) 
permitting Pompey to wear the dress of a triumphator at the games. Also a close 
friend of Cicero. 
Ap-5. M. Antonius M.f.M.n. 
MRR 258; RE 30; SWRP 91 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: cos.44, 34 LEG.: 52-51, 48 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-91) 
COMMENT: Marc Antony. His career and allegiance before the tribunate are 
interesting: in 58 a friend of Clodius and the "torch of Clodius' incendiations" 
(incendiorumfax, Cic. Phil. 2.48). Then praefectus equitum with Gabinius (Ap-18) 
in Syria (57-55). Quaestor and legate with Caesar in Gaul (52), where he remained 
until his tribunate. Defeated Domitius (Ao-37) in the election for the augurate in 50. 
Was elected to the tribunate with the support of Caesar. As tribune, together with 
his colleague Cassius (Ap-11), tried to protect Caesar's interests in the preamble to 
the civil war by interceding against an anti-Caesarian decree (Caes. ВС 1.1-8). 
Subsequently, both tribunes were forced to seek refuge with Caesar. From then on, 
Antony remained loyal to Caesar till the end. 
In his youth inherited the heavy debts of his father, but was able to repay them with 
the help of Curio (Ap-46). Married a rich wife. His military exploits probably 
brought him profits. Financial needs alone will not have been a motive to join 
Caesar. Antony was an ambitious politician. As a young man already he chose the 
via popularis. His subsequent choices for Clodius, Gabinius (with Pompey on the 
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background), and Caesar seem to indicate that he chose the leader, from whom he 
expected the best career opportunities. 
Ap-6. Sex. Atilius Serranus Gavianus 
MRR 201-202; RE 70 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Unsuccessfully opposed a proposal in the senate to recall Cicero from 
exile. Cooperated with his colleague Numerius (Ap-33) to prevent Cicero's recall. 
See Ap-1. Cic. Sest. 72 suggests a lower (provincial) background. 
Ap-7. Q. Caecilius Q.f.Q.n. Metellus Nepos 
MRR 174; RE 96 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 57 LEG.: 67-63 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-25, 51. 
COMMENT: Legate of Pompey against the pirates and in the East. As tribune 
attacked Cicero for the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators. Vetoed Cicero's 
final speech at the end of 63. Was supported by his colleague Calpumius (Ap-9). In 
January, 62 he proposed to summon Pompey to Italy to crush the revolt of Catiline. 
He also tried to enable Pompey to stand for the consulate in absentia. His proposals 
brought him into violent conflict with his colleague Cato (Ao-27; see also Ao-23). 
Martial law was declared and Metellus left Rome to join Pompey. 
Ap-8. C. Caelius Cf. Rufus 
MRR 241; RE 7;NMRS 77 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 51 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 51 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: From Tusculum. Vetoed several anti-Caesarian resolutions of the 
senate, among them the proposal to depose Caesar from his command in Gaul (Cic. 
Fam. 8.8.6-8). Cooperated with his colleagues Cornelius (Ap-14), Pansa (Ap-51), 
and Vinicius (Ap-52). 
Ap-9. L. Calpumius Bestia 
MRR 174; RE 24 
ACTIVE·, tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: aed. 59 
ALLEGIANCE: Catiline CHANGE: yes (61?) 
TYPE: to optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Cicero and Sestius 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-23 
COMMENT: See Ap-7. Sympathizer of Catiline, but did not take part in the 
conspiracy. He should be identified with RE 25 (BRUHNS, Caesar, 50 and 65). 
Provided shelter for Sestius (Ao-31) during an attack by Clodius. Charged de 
ambitu in 56, defended by Cicero, and exiled. Bestia appears as a friend of Cicero, 
Caelius (Ao-10), and Sestius (Ao-31). Perhaps sometime during the civil war with 
Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 51 n.20). In 43 he joined Antony in the hope of 
becoming consul. 
Ap-10. L. Caninius Gallus 
MRR 209; RE 3 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 56 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-69; (B-67) 
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COMMENT: Tried to give Pompey the duty of restoring King Ptolemaeus to the 
Egyptian throne. From 49, probably a moderate Caesarian (BRUHNS, Caesar, 51 
n.5). Friendly with Cicero. 
Ap-11. Q. Cassius Longinus 
МЯЛ 259; RE 70;SWRP 111 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 49 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Quaestor under Pompey in Spain ca. 52. Already before his tribunate 
a political ally of Caesar (Cic. Arr. 6.8.2 and 7.3.5). On his tribunate see Ap-5. 
During the civil war he went with Caesar to Spain. He ruthlessly acquired money 
by corruption and plundering the Spanish provinces. His allegiance to Caesar might 
have been for motives of gain. 
Ap-12. M. Coelius M.f. Vinicianus 
MRR 228; RE 27 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 53 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 48? 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
COMMENT: With his colleague Hirrus (Ap-24) proposed to make Pompey 
dictator. Cicero withheld him from carrying the bill on Pompey's wish (Cic. QFr. 
3.8.4, Fam. 8.4.3). On Caesar's side in the civil war (BRUHNS, Caesar, 50). 
Ap-13. C. Cornelius 
MRR 144; RE 18 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 67 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-ll, 12, 16; (B-13) 
COMMENT: Proposed several typical papillaris laws: ban on loans to foreign 
states, exemption from the laws could only be decided on by the comitia, the 
praetors should follow their own edicts, a severe bribery law. He succeeded in 
carrying the law on the praetors. His bribery law failed, but it forced the consul 
Calpumius Piso (MRR 142) to carry a milder one. See on Cornelius' tribunate and 
his allegiance to Pompey: M. GRIFFIN, The Tribune С Cornelius, JRS 63 (1973), 
pp. 196-213. He later became an electioneering expert (Com.Pet. 19). 
Ap-14. P. Cornelius 
MRR 2A\;RE 44 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 51 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar 
COMMENT: See Ap-8. 
Ap-15. С Fabius 
MRR 217; RE 17 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55? LEG.: 54-49 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74) 
COMMENT: See Ap-3. Legate of Caesar. 
Ap-16. L. Flavius 
MRR \M\RE 17 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 60 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 58 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49 or earlier) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
HIGH.MAG.: tr. pi. 51 
CHANGE: no 
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COMMENT: Failed to carry an agrarian law for Pompey's veterans. As praetor, he 
guarded the Armenian prince Tigranes, a hostage of Pompey who managed to 
escape with the help of Clodius. In 49 with Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 45). 
Ap-17. Q. Fufius Q.f.C.n. Calenus 
MRR 180; RE Ì0;NMRS 185 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 61 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 47 LEG.: 51-49, 48-47, 43 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: yes (51) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-29; (B-30, 36) 
COMMENT: From Cales? Started his political career under Cinna; blocked after 70 
during the aristocratic reaction. As tribune, supported Clodius in the Bona Dea trial. 
In 51 became legate of Caesar in Gaul, which enabled him to become consul in 47. 
Ap-18. A. Gabinius A.f.n. 
MRR 144-145; RE ll.SWRP 147 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 58 LEG.: 66-63, 48-47 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-8, 9, 10, 12, 37; (B-35, 39, 43, 45, 48, 79, 80) 
COMMENT: Carried a law to grant unlimited powers and major resources to 
Pompey to fight the pirates (/ex Gabinia depiratis, B-8,9,10). See Ao-29,30, and 
35. Perhaps in debt during his tribunate. Financially he profited substantially from 
his legations under Pompey and also from his provincial command. As consul, he 
cooperated with Clodius, but later withdrew his support at the instigation of 
Pompey (see B-48). See Ap-55. During his trial in 54 he was insufficiently helped 
by Pompey and exiled (see Ao-22). In 49, he joined Caesar as revenge. See Ap-23. 
Ap-19. C. Herennius S.f. 
MRR \M\RE 8;0£ \№\NMRS 204 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 60 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 60 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Son of a divisor from an equestrian family. As tribune, failed to carry 
a bill to transfer Clodius to the plebs. Seems to have been impoverished. 
Ap-20. T. Labienus 
MRR 167-168; RE 6;NMRS 220; SWRP 158 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: pr.? 59 LEG.: 58-49, 49-45 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: to optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-21 
COMMENT: From Cingulum (Picenum), and, therefore, likely to have been 
originally a client of Pompey. Charged Rabirius with treason. It was a popular 
action, because Rabirius had been involved in the murder of the popular leader 
Satuminus in 100. He also carried a law to restore the election of the pontifs to the 
people. See Ap-4. He made a fortune as legate in Gaul. 
Despite his long-standing political allegiance with Caesar he chose Pompey's side at 
the outbreak of the civil war. His motives have been much discussed. It does not 
seem likely that patronage of Pompey has been the reason for the change (contra R. 
SYME, The Allegiance of Labienus, JRS 28 (1938), pp. 113-125). Labienus 
thanked most of his career and his fortune to Caesar. It is possible that Labienus' 
success made him feel equal to Caesar and that he refused to be treated as a 
subordinate (Dio 41.4.3-4; on his motives see W.B. TYRRELL, Labienus' 
Departure from Caesar in January 49 B.C., Historia 21 (1972), pp. 424-440, esp. 
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437-440). Furthermore, he distrusted the strength of Caesar's forces (Cic. An. 
7.16.2). TYRRELL (435) thinks Labienus' knew better and supposes that his 
remarks on Caesar's troops were only meant to mislead his new partisans. 
TYRRELL's supposition seems to be influenced by the success of Caesar's army in 
the civil war. It is very possible, however, that Labienus, the most prominent 
member on Caesar's staff, had more confidence in the Pompeians. And before 
Pharsalus, and even after that, the outcome of the civil war was not at all decided. It 
seems that Labienus calculated that chances of promotion would be better with the 
Pompeians. Also, the Pompeians possibly offered him career opportunities, for 
example an army of his own, in order to draw him away from Caesar (TYRRELL 
438). Labienus joined what he believed to be the winning side (F.E. ADCOCK, 
САН vol. IX, 19622 (1932), p. 638). 
Ap-21. D. Laelius 
MRR 223; RE 6 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 54 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 54 LEG.: 49 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-82 
COMMENT: Son of RE 5, a legate of Pompey in Spain in 77. As tribune, he 
protected Gabinius when the latter was attacked after his conviction. 
Ap-22. C. Licinius L.f. Macer 
MRR 110;RE 112; SWRP 161 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 73 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 68? 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Agitated for the restoration of the tribunicia potestas. Promised the 
people that Pompey would restore the powers of the tribunate when returning from 
Spain (Sail. Hist. 3.48M). Accused Rabirius, involved in the assassination of 
Satuminus in 100, of sacrilege (Cf. Ap-20). 
Ap-23. M. Lollius Palicanus 
MRR 122; RE 21; NMRS 231 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 71 HIGH.MAG.: pr. ca. 69 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-4 
COMMENT: From Picenum, the recruiting ground of Pompey's clientele. Actively 
sought the support of Pompey for the restoration of the tribunicia potestas. Had a 
marital relationship with Gabinius (Ap-18). 
Ap-24. C. Lucilius Hirrus 
MRR 229; RE 25; SWRP 166 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 53 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 53 LEG.: 49-48 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: See Ap-12. 
Ap-25. Mamilius 
MRR 217 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55? 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74) 
COMMENT: See Ap-3. 
Ap-26. C. Manilius (Crispus?) 
MRR 153; RE 10 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 66 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 66 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
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INV.COLL.BEH.: В-14, 18; (В-17) 
COMMENT: First, he carried a law to distribute the votes of the freedmen in all the 
tribes (lex Manilla de libertinorwn suffragiis). The law was immediately annulled. 
See Ao-37. He then carried a bill to grant Pompey a great command in the East 
supplementary to his command against the pirates. In 65 he was convicted for 
maiestas and exiled. 
Ap-27. L. Marcius L.f.L.n. Philippus 
MRR 259; RE 77 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 38 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Vetoed the proposal to send Faustus Sulla to Mauretania to secure 
support for Pompey. 
Ap-28. C. Memmius 
MRR 153; RE %,SWRP 173 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 66 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 58 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-17 
COMMENT: Delayed the permission for Lucullus' triumph in the interest of 
Lucullus' rival Pompey. As praetor, against Caesar and Vatinius. See Ao-32. 
Ap-29. C. Messius 
MRR 202; RE 2;NMRS 252; SWRP 175 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: aed. pi. 55 LEG.: 54, 46 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey, Cicero CHANGE: yes (54,49,48) 
TYPE: first within populares then to optimates then back to populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar to Pompey to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-72; (B-51) 
COMMENT: From Teanum Sidicinum? Supported Pompey in proposing Cicero's 
recall (see Ao-16). Added financial powers and maius imperium to the cura 
annonae, which the consuls had granted Pompey. Legate of Caesar in 54. In the 
civil war first with Pompey and after Pharsalus with Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 49 
n.2 and 61 n. 49). In 46 legate of Caesar. 
Ap-30. Q. Mucius Orestinus 
MRR 162; RE 12 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 64 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 64 
ALLEGIANCE: Catiline CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-23 
COMMENT: Attacked Cicero during his campaign for the consulate. 
Ap-31. T. Munatius L.f.L.n. Plancus Byrsa 
MRR 235; RE 32;NMRS 263 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 52 LEG.: 43 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, Pompey CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-86, 87, 88 
COMMENT: From Tibur. Supported the Pompeian candidates for the consulate 
Hypsaeus (Ap-56) and Scipio (Ao-8). After Clodius' death, provided leadership to 
the people in rioting and promoting Milo's (Ao-2) conviction. He was helped by his 
colleagues Pompeius (Ap-38) and Sallustius (Ap-45). 
All ten tribunes of 52 proposed a law to permit Caesar to stand for the consulate in 
absentia. Besides Plancus, four others are known: Caelius (Ao-10), Cumanus (Ao-
20), Pompeius (Ap-38), and Sallust (Ap-45). 
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Plancus was prosecuted by Cicero for his involvement in the rioting and exiled. 
Caesar supported him financially during his exile. In 49, Caesar recalled him from 
exile, and he remained on Caesar's side. (BRUHNS, Caesar, 50 and 65 n.16.) 
Ap-32. M. Nonius Sufenas 
MRR 209; RE 52 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55? 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey? CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67) 
COMMENT: Delayed the elections on behalf of the triumvirate with his colleagues 
Cato (Ap-39) and Procilius (Ap-40). In the civil war with Pompey (BRUHNS, 
Caesar, 43). 
Ap-33. Q. Numerius Q.f. Rufus 
MRR 202; RE 5; NMRS 282 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57 LEG.: 55 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, (Caesar?) CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: From Picenum? See Ap-1 and 6. Cic. Sest. 82 suggests a lower 
(provincial) background. About 55 legate of Caesar in Dalmatia. 
Ap-34. Q. Opimius 
MRR 97; RE 11 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 75 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 75 
ALLEGIANCE: Cotta cos. 75 CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Supported Cotta's law to reopen the cursus for former tribunes of the 
plebs. 
Ap-35. Sex. Pcducaeus 
MRR 217; RE 6 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: pr.? 49? LEG.: 40 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73, (B-74) 
COMMENT: See Ap-3. In the civil war with Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 50). 
Ap-36. A? Plautius (Plotius?) 
MRR 128; RE 3;NMRS 322 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 70? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 70? 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar, Pompey CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: From Trebula Suffenas? With the support of Caesar carried a law to 
restore the citizenship to former followers of Lepidus. Possibly proposed a lex 
Plotia agraria, distributing land to Pompey's veterans of the Sertorian war (Cic. Att. 
1.18.6), and the lex Plotia de vi. 
Ap-37. A. Plautius (Plotius) 
MRR 209; RE 8; NMRS 324 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr.urb. 51 LEG.: 67-62 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67) 
COMMENT: From Trebula Suffenas? Legate of Pompey. As tribune, he tried to 
charge Pompey with the restoration of King Ptolemaeus to the Egyptian throne. As 
tribune and aedile, aligned with his colleague Cn. Plancius (Ao-26). Fought with 
Pompey in the civil war. 
Ap-38. Q. Pompeius Rufus 
MRR 236; RE 4\;SWRP 187 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 52 
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ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, Pompey CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-86, 87, 88 
COMMENT: Sulla's grandson. See Ap-31. Dropped by Pompey, he was convicted 
and exiled. Caesar probably got him back, which brought him on Caesar's side in 
the civil war. (BRUHNS, Caesar, 51 n. 22.) 
Ap-39. C. Porcius Cato 
MRR 209; RE 6 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: yes (56) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-67, 83; (B-37) 
COMMENT: See Ap-32. Supported Clodius in pressing for the holding of the 
aedilician elections. Attacked the proposals for the restoration of the Egyptian King 
by Pompey or Lentulus Spinther. Proposed to prosecute Milo (Ao-2). After the 
conference of Luca worked in support of the triumvirate. Possessed an armed gang 
of gladiators, which he was unable to support and was forced to sell. Milo (Ao-2) 
bought them through an intermediary. Helped by Pompey during his trial in 54 and 
acquitted. 
Ap-40. L. Procilius 
MRR 209; RE l;NMRS 343 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 56 
ALLEGIANCE: triumvirate CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67) 
COMMENT: From Lanuvium. Perhaps the son of a senator. See Ap-32. 
Ap-41. L. Quinctius 
MRR 103; RE \2;NMRS 351 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 74 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 68 LEG.: 71 
ALLEGIANCE: Crassus? CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-3 
COMMENT: Agitated for the restoration of the tribunicia po tes tas and thereby 
encountered the opposition of the consul Lucullus. Fought with Crassus against 
Spartacus. As praetor tried to depose Lucullus of the command in the East. 
Ap-42. L. Roscius Fabatus 
MRR 2Y1;RE Ì5;NMRS 358 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49 LEG.: 54, 46 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74) 
COMMENT: From Lanuvium. See Ap-3. Legate of Caesar in 54 and 46. In the 
civil war with Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 45). 
Ap-43. L.? Rubrius 
MRR 259; RE 5;NMRS 363 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 49? 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar? CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: From Casinum? Carried a law concerning Cisalpine Gaul, which is 
cited in the Caesarian law on this province. 
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Ap-44. P. Rutilius Lupus 
MRR 209; RE 27 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49 LEG.: 48 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67) 
COMMENT: Attacked Caesar's agrarian law and supported Pompey's claim to 
restore King Ptolemaeus to the Egyptian throne. As praetor, in the service of 
Pompey (BRUHNS, Caesar, 44). 
Ap-45. С Sallustius Crispus 
MRR 236; RE 10; NMRS 372; SWRP 193 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 46 LEG.: 49, 47 
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, Caesar CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-86, 87, 88 
COMMENT: The historian. From Amitemum. See Ap-31 and 38. Ousted from the 
senate, but reinstated by the dictator Caesar. Indebted in his youth; made a fortune 
as governor of Africa 46-45. 
Ap-46. C. Scribonius Curio 
MRR 249; RE 11; SWRP 194 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 50 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 50 LEG.: 49 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (50) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-30, 91, 92; (B-36) 
COMMENT: In his youth a supponer of Catiline, in 61 of Clodius. As tribune, 
started as an anti-Caesarian. Proposed laws on public works and the corn supply. 
After Caesar paid his debts, which he had incurred from his costly games, went 
over to Caesar. He proposed that Caesar and Pompey should lay down their 
commands simultaneously. He joined Caesar in Gaul and fought with him in the 
civil war. See Ap-5. 
Ap-47. P. Servilius M.f. Rullus 
MRR 168; RE 80 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 63 
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: As tribune, possibly pushed forward by Caesar. Proposed an agrarian 
law, which was successfully opposed by Cicero. 
Ap-48. Cn. Sicinius 
MRR 93; RE 9 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 76 HIGH.MAG: tr.pl. 76 
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Attempted to restore the powers of the tribunate. 
Ap-49. С Trebonius Cf. 
MRR 2\1;RE 6; NMRS 444 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 45 LEG.: 54-49, 46-45 
ALLEGIANCE: triumvirate CHANGE: yes (54) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74) 
COMMENT: Carried the law to grant Pompey and Crassus a five year command in 
Spain and Syria respectivily. Subsequently legate of Caesar. 
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Ap-50. P. Vatinius P.f.Ser. 
MRR \90,RE 3,NMRS 467,SWRP 216 
ACTIVE trpl 59 HIGH MAG cos 47 LEG 62,58 56,5147 
ALLEGIANCE Caesar, triumvirate CHANGE no 
INV COLL BEH B-34, 38, 49, 71 
COMMENT Helped Caesar in passing the lex lidia agraria and the lex luha de agro 
Campano Was opposed by Anchanus (Ao 1), Cdlvinus (Ao 15), and Fannius (Ao-
18) Passed the lex Vatmia de imperio С Caesaris, granting Caesar his command in 
Gaul for the duration of five years He also ratified Pompey s enactments in the 
East Followed Caesar as legate to Gaul and probably profited financially from it 
Ap-51. C. Vibius C.f.Cn.n. Pansa Caetronianus 
MRR 241, RE 16,SWRP 219 
ACTIVE trpl 51 HIGH MAG cos 43 
ALLEGIANCE Caesar CHANGE no 
COMMENT From Perusia7 His father, a Manan, had been put on the Sullan 
proscription list See Ap-8 
Ap-52. L. Vinicius (M.f.) 
MRR 241, RE l,NMRS 494 
ACTIVE trpl 51 HIGH MAG cos 33 
ALLEGIANCE Caesar CHANGE no 
COMMENT From Cales? See Ap-8 
The following four persons were not tnbunes of the plebs, and, therefore have not been 
taken into account in the quantitative analyses of Chapter 1 They are listed here 
because they acted as assistant leaders dunng their consulate 
Ap-53. L. Aemihus M f.Q.n. Lepidus Paullus 
MRR 2A1,RE %\,SWRP 80 
ACTIVE cos 50 HIGH MAG cos 50 LEG 43 
ALLEGIANCE Caesar? CHANGE no 
COMMENT Became a supponer of Caesar after Caesar had provided him with the 
financial means to restore the Basilica Aemilia Supported Caesar by keeping his 
colleague Claudius Marcellus in check Did not participate actively in the civil war 
(BRUHNS, Caesar, 40) In 43 legate of Sex Pompey 
Ap-54. L. Afranius A.f. 
MRR 182-183, RE 6,OÉ n,NMRS 9,SWRP 82 
ACTIVE cos 60 HIGH MAG cos 60 LEG 75-72,66-61,55-49, 
48-46 
ALLEGIANCE Pompey CHANGE no 
COMMENT From Cupra Maritima (Picenum) and, therefore, belonging to 
Pompey's clientele A typical vir mihtans Held many lucrative legations under 
Pompey 
Pompey rewarded his services and loyahty by providing the money for large-scale 
bnbery dunng the election campaign for the consulate See Ao-37 
Ap-55. L. Calpumius L.f.L.n. Piso Caesomus 
MRR 193, RE 90, SWRP 107 
ACTIVE cos 58 HIGH MAG cos 58 LEG 49, 43 
ALLEGIANCE Clodius? Caesar? CHANGE no 
COMMENT His daughter Calpurnia married Caesar, who supported him in the 
consular elections Together with his colleague Gabmius (Ap-18) actively supported 
Clodius Both received a provincial command (Macedonia and Syna) through a law 
which Clodius passed in the assembly Financial needs do not seem to have been a 
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motive to seek the allegiance to Clodius. After his consulate took a neutral and 
conciliatory stand (BRUHNS, Caesar, 40). 
Ap-56. P. Plautius Hypsaeus 
MRR 2\&,RE 23;SWRP 183 
ACTIVE: cos.cand. 53 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey, Clodius CHANGE: yes (49?) 
TYPE: within populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar? 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-84, 86; (B-85) 
COMMENT: Held a lucrative proquaestorship under Pompey in the East as from 
65. Supported by Pompey and Clodius during the consular campaign in 53. 
Dropped by Pompey and convicted de ambita. See Ap-31 and Ao-8. In the civil 
war with Caesar. The date of the change is unknown. (BRUHNS, Caesar, 46). 
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OPTIMATES 
Ao-1. Q. Ancharius Q.f. 
MRR 189; RE 3 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 56 LEG.: 73-72 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-34) 
COMMENT: His father (RE 2) was killed by Marius in 87. The family had been 
senatorial for one or two generations. As tribune, he opposed the triumvirate with 
his colleagues Domitius (Ao-15) and Fannius (Ao-18). See Ap-50. 
Ao-2. T. Annius Milo (Papianus) 
MRR 201; RE 67;NMRS 30; SWRP 86 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero and others CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-57, 58, 67, 87; (B-51, 63, 65, 77, 84, 86, 88) 
COMMENT: From Lanuvium. In close cooperation with his colleague Sestius (Ao-
31), opposed Clodius in every way, through violence and politically. They 
organized operae and tried to fight Clodius with his own methods. They worked 
for Cicero's recall. See Ao-16. Bought the gladiatorial gang of C. Cato (Ap-39) in 
56. 
In 52 he killed Clodius, was convicted, and exiled to Masillia. 
His political expenditures (armed gangs, games, distribution of money) caused him 
severe debts. 
Ao-3. L. Antistius Vetus 
MRR 209; RE 47 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: cos.suff. 30 
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-69; (B-67) 
COMMENT: Attempted to prosecute Caesar for his acts as consul in 59, but 
checked by his colleagues. L. Antistius, RE 13 and Antistius Vetus, RE 47 should 
be considered the same person: D.R. SHACKLETON BAILEY, TWO Studies in 
Roman Nomenclature, s.l. 1976 (= ΑΡΑ-Am. Class. Studies 3), pp. 11-13. 
BRUHNS, Caesar, 50 lists him as a Caesarian at the outbreak of the civil war. 
BRUHNS' conjecture is based on Cic. An. 14.9.3, where Vetus is mentioned as 
fighting the Pompeians in Asia in 44. It is quite possible, also in view of his 
behavior during his tribunate, that he changed his allegiance shortly before 44 or at 
the earliest after Thapsus. Therefore, he should be considered a nonchanger. 
Ao-4. P. Aquillius Gallus 
MRR 216; RE 25 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-71; (B-73) 
COMMENT: With his colleague Ateius (Ao-5) in opposition to the consuls Pompey 
and Crassus; tried to prevent the passage of the lex Trebonia (Ap-49). 
Ao-5. C. Ateius (L.f.Ani.) Capito 
MRR 216; RE 1\NMRS 52; SWRP 94 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-71, 74; (B-73) 
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COMMENT: From Castrum Novum? See Ao-4. A friend of Cicero (Cic. Fam. 
13.29.2). In 49, a partisan of Pompey. After Thapsus to Caesar. (BRUHNS, 
Caesar, 49 n.7.) 
Ao-6. C. Caecilius Comutus 
MRR 179; RE 43 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 61 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 57 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero? CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Cic. An. 1.14.6 calls him an adherent of the senatorial party. As 
praetor, worked for the recall of Cicero. 
Ao-7. L. Caecilius Metellus 
MRR 259; RE 75 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 49 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Attempted to forbid Caesar access to the treasury in the Aerarium 
Saturni, which Caesar wanted to use for his war funds. Seems to have followed 
Pompey in 49 (BRUHNS, Caesar, 49 and 50 n.l 1). In 48, he was denied access to 
Italy (Cic. Ait. 11.7.2). 
Ao-8. Q. Caecilius Q.f.Q.n. Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica 
MRR 189; RE 99,SWRP 103 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 52 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (53) 
TYPE: to populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-54, 86; (B-85) 
COMMENT: In 53 with Hypsaeus (Ap-56) a consular candidate for the populares 
against Milo. See Ap-31. His consular campaign involved him in debts (distribution 
of money; armed gangs). He was prosecuted, but acquitted with the help of 
Pompey who had married his daughter in 53. He helped to precipitate the civil war 
in order to enrich himself. 
Ao-9. L. Caecilius L.f. Rufus 
MRR 16T,RE 110; S WW 104 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: pr.urb. 57 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-55, 56) 
COMMENT: As tribune, proposed to restore civil rights to P. Autronius Paetus and 
P. Cornelius Sulla, but was forced to withdraw the bill. Promised to veto the lex 
Servilla agraria (Ap-47). As praetor, helped to recall Cicero. In 49 on Pompey's 
side (BRUHNS, Caesar, 43). 
Ao-10. M. Caelius M.f.Vel. Rufus 
MRR 235; RE 35; OÉ 6S;NMRS 78; SWRP 105 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: pr.per. 48 
ALLEGIANCE: Milo (and Caesar?) CHANGE: yes (50, 48) 
TYPE: first to populares then back to optimates 
SPECIFICATION: first to Caesar then back to Milo 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-87 
COMMENT: From Interamnia Praetuttiorum. Son of an eques. Supported Milo 
(Ao-2) from personal enmity with Clodius (Cic. Mil. 91; Ase. 33-37C). See Ap-31. 
Despite his support for the proposal to grant Caesar the possibility to stand for the 
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consulate /л absentia, he is considered an assistant of the optimates during his 
tribunate because of his support for Milo. 
Indebted because of political expenditures. Changed his allegiance to Caesar in the 
hope of financial aid. As Caesar did not fulfill his expectations for financial gain and 
career opportunities, he mobilized the crowd in 48 by promising cancellation of 
debts. On his agitations in 48 and the reasons for his breach with Caesar, see: 
BRUHNS, Caesar, 123-137. After this he went back to Milo. 
Ao-11. C. Cassius Longinus 
MRR 259; RE 59;SWRP 110 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 44 LEG.: 47-46 
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey? CHANGE: yes (48) 
TYPE: to populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
COMMENT: The tyrannicide. Anti-Caesarian. Until Pharsalus in the service of 
Pompey, then to Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 49, 50 n.12, and 120). His brother and 
colleague Q. Cassius (Ap-11) was a pro-Caesarian from the start. 
Ao-12. С Cestilius 
MRR 202; RE UNMRS 115 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51) 
COMMENT: Active in the recall of Cicero from exile. See Ao-16. 
Ao-13. M. Cispius L.f. 
MRR 202; RE 4; NMRS 120 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. after 49? 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: \o populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51) 
COMMENT: Active in the recall of Cicero. See Ao-16. 
Prosecuted de ambitu, defended by Cicero, and exiled. Recalled by Caesar. 
(BRUHNS, Caesar, 51 n.21.) 
Ao-14. M. Curtius Peducaeanus 
MRR 202; RE 23 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 50 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero? CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51) 
COMMENT: In favor of the recall of Cicero. See Ao-16. 
Ao-15. Cn. Domitius Calvinus 
MRR 189; RE 43;SWRP 140 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 53, 40 LEG.: 62 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (53) 
TYPE: to populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-81; (B-34) 
COMMENT: See Ao-1 and 32. In 53, he was elected consul against the will of 
Pompey with the support of Caesar (GELZER, Caesar, 132; BRUHNS, Caesar, 39). 
In 49, the only nonexiled consular on the side of Caesar. 
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Ao-16. Q. Fabricius 
MRR 202; RE 7 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51) 
COMMENT: Leader of the eight tribunes who in January proposed to recall Cicero. 
Ao-17. T. Fadius (Gallus) 
MRR 202; RE 9; NM RS 169 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51) 
COMMENT: From Arpinum? or Bononia? If from Arpinum (Cicero's birthplace) 
probably under the patronage of Cicero. Quaestor in the service of Cicero in 63. As 
tribune active in the recall of Cicero. See Ao-16. 
Ao-18. C. Fannius C.f. 
MRR 189; RE 9 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 54? 50? LEG.: 43-42? 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-34) 
COMMENT: See Ao-1. In 49 he chose Pompey. 
Ao-19. C. Furnius 
MRR 249; RE 3;NMRS 190 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 50 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 29 LEG.: 44-43,41-39 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: to populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
COMMENT: Cicero relied on him to prevent the prorogation of his provincial 
command. In 49 changed his allegiance to Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 50). 
Ao-20. ? Manilius Cumanus 
MRR 235; RE 24;NMRS 244 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 52 
ALLEGIANCE: Milo CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: From Cumae? Helped Milo (Ao-2) in the aftermath of the murder on 
Clodius. See Ap-31. Despite his support for the proposal to grant Caesar the 
possibility to stand for the consulate in absentia, he is considered an assistant of the 
optimates during his tribunate because of his support for Milo. 
Ao-21. L. Marius 
MRR m;RE 19 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 62 LEG.: 62-60 
ALLEGIANCE: Cato CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Supported his colleague Cato (Ao-27) in passing a law to compel 
triumphators to report the number of enemies killed and their own losses. 
Ao-22. C. Memmius 
MRR 223; RE 9 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 54 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 54 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Prosecuted Gabinius (Ap-18) for extortion. 
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Ao-23. Q. Minucius Q.f. Thermus 
MRR n4;RE 67 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 58? 53? LEG.: 43 
ALLEGIANCE: Cato CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-25) 
COMMENT: Helped his colleague Cato (Ao-27) to oppose the tribune Metellus 
(Ap-7), who wanted to summon Pompey for the repression of Catiline. In 49, he 
fought as propraetor with the Pompeians against Caesar. In 47 or later to Caesar 
(BRUHNS, Caesar, 117 n.7). 
Ao-24. L. Ninnius Quadratus 
MRR 196; RE 3; NMRS 272 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-73, 48) 
COMMENT: From Pompeii? Supported Cicero, but declined to act against Clodius' 
bills. Began to formulate a bill to recall Cicero. In 49, probably an ally of Pompey 
(BRUHNS, Caesar, 49). MEIER, RE, 589 calls him a popularis because of his 
allegiance with Pompey. But it is more likely that he aligned himself to Pompey, 
after Pompey had become the defender of the senatorial cause. Cf. LGRR 109. 
Ao-25. L. Novius (Niger?) 
MRR 196; RE 7; NMRS 280 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58 
ALLEGIANCE: independent? Pompey? CHANGE: no 
COMMENT: Accused Clodius of planning an attempt on Pompey 's life. He 
should be considered an optimate for his action against Clodius in 58. Cf. LGRR 
109. 
Ao-26. Cn. Plancius Cn.f. 
MRR 209; RE 4,OÉ 274; NMRS 321; SWRP 182 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: aed. 54 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE: within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67, 69) 
COMMENT: From Atina. His father was a princeps equestris ordinis and head of 
the societas publicanorum of Asia. As tribune on Cicero's side, but did nothing in 
particular. Chose the side of Pompey in the civil war. 
Ao-27. M. Porcius Cato Uticensis 
MRR 174-175; RE 16; SWRP 189 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 54 LEG.: 67 
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-22; (B-25, 30, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75) 
COMMENT: Cato the Younger. See Ao-21 and 23. Became tribune to oppose 
Metellus (Ap-7), which he did successfully. Convinced the senate to take a hard 
stand and execute the Catilinarian conspirators. On his initiative the senate took the 
decision to augment the number of grain recipients in order to undermine popular 
support for Catiline (Plut. Cat.Min. 26.1, Caes. 8.4). He was an independent and 
obstinate defender of the traditional values of the Republic and the senatorial 
oligarchy. 
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Ao-28. L. Racilius 
MRR 209; RE l;NMRS 354 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 56 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero, Spinther, Milo CHANGE: yes (49?) 
TYPE: to populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67, 69) 
COMMENT: A staunch supporter of the optimates against Clodius and the 
triumvirate. In 48 a Caesarian in Spain (BRUHNS, Caesar, 51 n.4). 
Ao-29. L. Roscius Otho 
MRR 145; RE 22;NMRS 359 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 63? 
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-8, 9, 20) 
COMMENT: From Lanuvium? Known for the lex Roscia to reserve fourteen rows 
in the theater for the équités. Supported his colleague Trebellius (Ao-35) against de 
lex Gabinia depiratis (Ap-18). 
Ao-30. P. Servilius Globulus 
MRR 145; RE 66 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 64 
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no 
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-ll) 
COMMENT: Opposed the legislation of Cornelius (Ap-13; Asc. 58, 61C), and not 
Gabinius (MRR ). 
Ao-31. P. Sestius L.f. 
MRR 202; RE 6; SWRP 198 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 54? 50? 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero, Milo CHANGE: yes (48) 
TYPE: to populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-57; (B-51, 52, 54) 
COMMENT: See Ao-2 and 16. Indebted because of his political expenditures. 
Answered Clodius' violence with a gladiatorial gang of his own. 
In 56 defended by Cicero when accused for breach of the peace (de vi ). In the civil 
war with Pompey, after Pharsalus with Caesar. 
Ao-32. ? Terentius 
MRR 223; RE 2 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 54 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 54 
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: yes (49?) 
TYPE: within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-82 
COMMENT: Interceded on behalf of the consular candidates Dominus (Ao-15) and 
Memmius (Ap-28), who were involved in a bribery scandal. In 48 in Ponipey's 
army (BRUHNS, Caesar, 49 n.9). 
Ao-33. Q. Terentius Culeo 
MRR 197; RE 44 
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58 LEG.: 43 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero, (Pompey) CHANGE: no 
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COMMENT Proposed to annul the law exiling Cicero Tned to draw Pompey 
away from his alliance with Caesar back to the senatonal side His actions in 58 put 
him in the optimate camp Cf LGRR 108. 
Ao-34. M. Terentius Varro 
MRR 473, RE 84, OÉ 336, SWRP 204 
ACTIVE trpl 8?, б? HIGH.MAG.: pr before 67 LEG.: 78-77, 76-71, 67, 
50-49 
ALLEGIANCE Pompey CHANGE: yes (48) 
TYPE lo populares 
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar 
COMMENT The author and poet. From Reate. Probably an eques Quiet during 
his tribunale, known as a great fnend of Pompey and Cicero Held many legations 
under Pompey After Pharsalus went over to Caesar (BRUHNS, Caesar, 44 and 45 
η 31) He wanted to conserve the old res publica and had in fact an apolitical 
character (RE col. 1175-1177). Because of these opinions and because he did not 
participate in popular policy, he has been listed with the optimates, despite his long­
standing relationship with Pompey. 
Ao-35. L. Trebellius 
MRR 145, RE 3, NMRS 443 
ACTIVE tr pi 67 HIGH.MAG.: tr pi. 67 
ALLEGIANCE· independent CHANGE: no 
INV COLL BEH.: (B-8, 9) 
COMMENT: From Southern Italy' See Ao-29 Vetoed Gabimus' (Ap-18) pirate 
law, but withdrew when Gabimus attempted to have him deposed of the tribunate 
by the assembly. 
The list of the optimates closes with the following three persons, who acted as assistant 
leaders while holding a different magistracy than tribune of the plebs They, like Ap-
53-56, have been excluded from the statistics in Chapter 1. 
Ao-36. P. Cornelius P.f.L.? n. Lentulus Spinther 
MRR 167, RE 23S,SWRP 129 
ACTIVE aed cur 63 HIGH MAG . cos 57 
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE, yes (50) 
TYPE within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV COLL BEH. B-58, (B-23, 53) 
COMMENT Supported Cicero in the repression of the Catilinanan conspiracy (Cic 
Red Pop 15, Sail Cat 47 4) During his consulate earned the law to recall Cicero 
Despite drawing up the bill to give Pompey the cura annonae, he remained opposed 
to the tnumvirate Cf. LGRR 144-145. Eventually, about 50, he chose Pompey s 
side (BRUHNS, Caesar, 38 and 39 η 4) 
Ao-37. L. Domitius Cn.f.Cn.n. Ahenobarbus 
MRR 153, RE 21, OE 133, SWRP 139 
ACTIVE q 66 HIGH MAG : cos. 54 
ALLEGIANCE· independent, (Сшего1») CHANGE· yes (49'>) 
TYPE within optimates 
SPECIFICATION, to Pompey 
INV COLL BEH . B-79, 80, (B-14, 70, 78, 91) 
COMMENT Follower of Sulla (Dio 41.11 1-2) Secured votes for Cicero during 
Cicero's campaign in 67 for the praetorship (Com Pet 33). As quaestor, violently 
opposed Manihus' (Ap-26) law on the votes of the freedmen Cicero counted on his 
support during the consular campaign of 64 (Cic/lrr 1.1.3) As aedile in 61, 
opposed the election of Afranius (Ap-54; Cic. A« 1.16 12). Acquired large tracks 
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of land in the Sullan proscriptions. His landed property enabled him to use his 
tenants and slaves in politics and to offer a personal land distribution to his soldiers 
in the civil war He had important connections in Gaul and with the publicans 
Ao-38. M. Favonius 
MRR 235, RE 1 
ACTIVE: aed. 52 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49 
ALLEGIANCE: independent, Cicero CHANGE: yes (49) 
TYPE- within optimates 
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey 
INV.COLL BEH.: (B-30, 73) 
COMMENT: As senator in 59, refused to take the oath on the lexlulia agraria, but 
succumbed (Plut Cat Min 32.3; Dio 38.7.1). During the years 59-53 constantly 
opposed the interests of the triumvirate. As aedile let Cato (Ao-27) organize the 
games, which made Cato popular (Plut. Cat Min. 46; Dio 40.45.3). Joined Pompey 
in the civil war. 
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Appendix В 
Collective Behavior 78-49 B.C. 
Appendix В provides a chronological survey and a detailed analysis of cases of 
collective behavior between 78 and 49 B.C. The following definition of collective 
behavior has been used for the selection of cases: every larger gathering of people in 
which some action or reaction of the crowd is discernible. This is a deliberately broad 
and rather vague definition in order to include as many cases as possible. The details of 
some of the cases do not go beyond one short sentence in the sources. For the same 
reason "action/reaction" has been taken broadly as well. Therefore, some cases have 
been included where a crowd gathered with a specific purpose but where no real action 
or expression of an opinion could be discerned (e.g. B-29, 33). In case of doubt the 
decision of inclusion or exclusion of the case has been taken on the ground of political 
value, since I am specifically interested in cases of collective behavior with a political 
overtone (excluded are e.g. Plin. NH 8.7.21; Val.Max. 2.10.8). 
LINTOTT (212-215) provides a list with occurrences of violence in the late Republic. 
Most of his cases have been included in my list; some have not, because there did not 
seem to have been a larger group involved or because no disturbances are mentioned in 
the sources (lex Lutatia de vi, in 78, LINTOTT 212). When this book went to press, I 
had not yet received: C. VlRLOUVET, Famines et émeutes à Rome des origines de la 
République à la mort de Néron, Paris 1985.1 hope to come back to it in a review. 
Of course there have been many more cases of collective behavior than the 92 cases 
listed below. Many laws were passed in the assembly; each year magistrates were 
elected. For this the people gathered in great numbers to vote. Also many shows were 
performed, during which many flocked to the theater and the circus. When a general 
held a triumph, Rome was filled with spectators. All these cases have not been listed, 
except when an actual action or expression of the crowd has been recorded in the 
sources: i.e. when the participants acted as a group instead of a number of individuals 
casting a vote or attending the games. 
The list has been made in order to analyze the individual cases systematically and in 
detail, and to compare them in order to find similarities and differences in the different 
types of collective behavior which occunred during the late Republic. In light of the 
above and in view of the lacunose source material, the list cannot be considered a 
representative sample of collective behavior in the late Republic in general. But, as has 
been stated in the Preface, at least the successful and spectacular cases will have been 
recorded. Therefore, the list should not be considered complete, but it can be 
considered representative of politically significant collective behavior during the late 
Republic. The list has the pretension of being exhaustive regarding the records in the 
sources. 
The list is chronological; the cases for which only the year, but not the month or day 
is known have been listed in the order as they appear in the sources. Each case has been 
given a number and a short title. On the second line the DATE (year, month, day) is 
given (the dates are pre-Julian) and the DURATION. A distinction is made between 
cases which lasted one day or less (< 1 day), 2 days, or more than 2 days (> 2 days). A 
smaller subdivision is impossible for lack of data. 
The third line gives the TYPE of collective behavior and a SPECIFICATION. The 
different types are: assembly, riot, demonstration, and public manifestation. Of course 
riots and demonstrations occurred during assemblies as well, but the distinction is made 
in order to establish a difference between cases occurring within the traditional political 
framework of the assemblies and those occurring outside. The assembly-type consists 
oîcontiones and centuriate and tribal assemblies. Although a contio is not an assembly 
in the formal sense, because no political decisions were taken in such a meeting, and 
should be translated as "meeting" (TAYLOR, RVA, Ch. II), contienes have been 
grouped as assemblies. The reason is that they were an institutionalized form of 
collective behavior which belonged to the various types of Roman political gatherings. 
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Furthermore, contiones, just like the tribal and centuriate assemblies, could only be 
called by a magistrate. In the specification, I have distinguished between contiones, 
tribal assemblies (legislative and elective), and centuriate assemblies (legislative and 
elective). No distinction has been made between the comitia tributa in the strict sense 
and the concilium plebis. The distinction between the two remained intact during the 
late Republic (TAYLOR, RVA, 60-64). In the concilium plebis the patricians were 
excluded and the assembly could only be presided by a tribune of the plebs. 
Nevertheless, since the involvement of a magistrate becomes clear from the 
mobilization-factor, since the exclusion of the patricians only concerned a minor part of 
the élite, and since the procedures in both assemblies were the same, the concilium 
plebis is considered a tribal assembly in the case-studies. 
The fourth line gives topographical details (LOCATION). The fifth line gives 
information on the involvement of LEADERSHIP and on the leadership TYPE. A 
distinction has been made between top, assistant, and intermediate leadership along the 
lines set out in Chapter 1. 
The sixth line gives the PARTICIPATION. The number of participants in any case 
is impossible to establish. The seventh line lists the terms used by the sources 
(TERMINOLOGY) to describe the participants. 
The eighth line lists the factor(s) of MOBILIZATION used: organization (ORG.), 
SYMBOLS, precipitating incident (PREC.INCID.), opportunity (OPP.), and the 
authority and the powers of a magistrate (MAG.), e.g. to call an assembly. In Chapter 
3 I have discussed more factors of mobilization, e.g. communication and propaganda. 
Some of these did not result directly in collective behavior, but were responsible for the 
creation of an atmosphere which was conducive to collective behavior. In the case-
studies only those factors of mobilization have been listed which led directly to the 
individual cases of collective behavior. 
The ninth line states whether VIOLENCE was used and, if so, what TYPE. When 
possible, details on victims are given as an indication of the intensity of the violence. I 
have also considered as violent those cases in which the behavior constituted a mere 
threat, without resulting in the actual seizure or damaging of persons and objects. A 
threat shows the hostility of the crowd towards someone or something and should be 
considered an act of violence, for the crowd uses coercion to achieve its goal. Whether 
the intensity of the violence goes beyond threat depends on the reactions of the persons 
threatened or on repression. 
The tenth line tells whether there was any REPRESSION. The eleventh line gives 
the CAUSE and/or GOAL of the action, and whether the goal was reached 
(SUCCESS). 
The twelfth line provides the SOURCES. The thirteenth line refers to MODERN 
WORKS which have treated the case or which provide background information. 
The fourteenth line describes the events (DESCRIPTION), and the fifteenth line, 
finally, provides any further information (COMMENT). 
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1. Sulla's funeral 
DATE: 78-?-? DURATION: < 1 day. 
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: funeral procession 
LOCATION: throughout Rome; via Forum to Campus Martius. 
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (Top [Catulus, Sullani, PompeyJ) 
PARTICIPATION: soldiers, veterans, rural plebs. 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: army? 
SYMBOLS: fasces, standards, crowns, gifts 
PREC.INCID.: Sulla's death 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat by soldiers 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful attempt by Lepidus et al. 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Sulla after he died SUCCESS : yes 
SOURCES: App. 1.105-106; Plut. Pomp. 15.3, Sulla 38. 
MODERN WORKS: NlCOLET, Métier, 463-464. 
DESCRIPTION: After Sulla died in 78 a cortege was organized. From outside Rome, a 
great number of soldiers, veterans, and common people came to Rome. Sulla's fasces 
and standards were borne in front of the procession. Also golden crowns and the 
presents Sulla had received from cities, friends, and his legions were carried. A great 
procession was held through the city. All the priests and priestesses, the senate, and the 
magistrates in their official attire joined the cortege from fear of the soldiers. The 
équités went along as well. Everyone - upper class, soldiers, and plebs - loudly cried 
farewell to the corpse. A stop was made at the Forum, where orators held funeral 
speeches. The corpse was then carried to the Campus Martius where it was committed 
to the flames. 
COMMENT: The rural plebs probably consisted of veterans who had been settled by 
Sulla in colonies on land confiscated from the Marians and Italian towns and on public 
land. On Sulla's allotments see: BRUNT, Manpower, 300-312. 
Lepidus, cos. 78, and his adherents had unsuccessfully tried to prevent the official 
funeral. Pompey had foiled their plans and made sure everything passed off in an 
orderly and honorable fashion (Plut. Pomp., Sulla 38.1). According to Appian, 
Catulus, Lepidus' colleague in the consulate, and the Sullan party, which probably 
included Pompey, had resisted Lepidus. 
2. Food riot 
DATE: 75-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: food riot 
LOCATION: Via sacra (Forum) 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plebs 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: com shortage, appearance of the consuls in public? 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded? 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: com shortage SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Sail. Hist. fr. 2.45M. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 435; LlNTOTT 212; RlCKMAN, op.cit., 45 and 166-168. 
DESCRIPTION: There was a severe com shortage. The consuls accompanied Q. 
Metellus, candidate for the praetorship, on the via sacra. They were attacked by the 
plebs and were forced to run. 
COMMENT: The riot took place in the year of Metellus' candidature for the 
praetorship. Metellus, later called Creticus, was praetor in 74. 
The com shortage was caused by piratical activity. In 74, the praetor M. Antonius was 
sent to Crete to fight the pirates, but he was not very successful. (RlCKMAN.) 
The riot is considered successful, because in this and the following years measures 
were taken to reduce the problems in the food supply: one of the aediles of 75, Q. 
Hortensius Hortalus, made himself popular by distributing free com rations to the 
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people. It is unkown whether he was in any way involved in the riot. M. Seius beat the 
nobilis M. Pupius Piso in the aedilician elections of 75. As aedile in 74, Seius sold the 
people cheap com and oil during the whole year. (Cic. Plane. 12, Off. 2.58, Verr. 
2.3.215; Plin. NH 15.2 and 18.16.) In 73, the lex Terentia Cassia re-established the 
com subsidies, which had been abolished by Sulla, and introduced a second yearly 
com tithe from Sicily (RICKMAN). 
3. Trial of Oppianicus 
DATE: 74-12-? DURATION: > 2 days 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio + public trial 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Quinctius Ap-41 
PARTICIPATION: plebs contionalis 
TERMINOLOGY: quiddam hominum genus 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: Quinctius' garb 
PREC.INCID.: condemnation of Oppianicus 
MAG.: tr.pl. Quinctius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat against jury 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: redress of senatorial corruption SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Cluent. 77-79,90, 93, 103, 108,110-112. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTr213. 
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Quinctius protested against the conviction of Oppianicus. 
There were indications that the jury had been bought. Quinctius held daily riotous 
contienes. He wore a purple garb which reached to his heels. The result was the 
prosecution of С Junius, the president of the court in Oppianicus' trial. The speakers at 
Junius' trial were threatened by the crowd. Junius was convicted. 
COMMENT: The date is derived from Cluent. 108, where Cicero states that Quinctius 
left office a few days after the conviction of Junius. Therefore it happened in 
December. The participants were those with whom Quinctius was popular, "a certain 
type of people", Cluent. 110. 
If a tribune of the plebs presided a tribal assembly, he was dressed in the undecorated 
toga of the ordinary citizen, while other magistrates wore a purple-bordered toga 
(TAYLOR,RVA, 63-64). Quinctius' clothing was purple {Cluent. 111). Probably 
Quinctius wanted to show himself with the authority of other magistrates, especially 
because at that time the tribunate of the plebs still suffered from the Sullan restrictions. 
Oppianicus was prosecuted for murder. Quinctius acted as his defendant. Quinctius 
used Oppianicus' conviction and the rumors of corruption to expose senatorial justice. 
4. Pompey's contio 
DATE: 71-12-10 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Circus Flaminius? (Campus Martius) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
assistant = Lollius Ap-23 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: populus Romanus (Cic.) 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: Circus Flaminius? 
MAG.: tr.pl. Lollius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: (support for Pompey's program) SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Verr. 1.45; Sail. Hist. 4.43M. 
MODERN WORKS: VAN OOTEGHEM, Pompée, 140. 
DESCRIPTION: Pompey as consul designate held his first contio outside the city. The 
tribune M. Lollius Palicanus had called the contio. As everyone expected, Pompey 
announced his intention to re-establish the tribunicia potestas. The contio reacted with a 
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munmer of approval (admurmuratio, Cic). Next, Pompey said that the provinces had 
been plundered, that the courts acted outrageously, and that he wanted to take action 
against it. Loudly cheering, the populas Romanus showed their approval. 
COMMENT: For the date see VAN OOTEGHEM. 
Perhaps the contio was held in the Circus Flaminius, see B-29. 
5. Acclamation of Pompey 
DATE: 70-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: recognitie equitum 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos, politai 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: censors 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: Pompey's popularity as general SUCCESS: (yes) 
and consul 
SOURCES: Plut. Pomp. 22.3-6. 
DESCRIPTION: During his consulate, after having restored the tribunate and given 
back the court juries to the équités, Pompey officially asked to be dismissed from 
military service as eques. As was the custom, he and other équités led their horses 
before the censors in the Forum and Pompey gave an account of his campaigns. Next, 
he was loudly acclaimed by the people. 
COMMENT: Pompey thanked his popularity to his successes as a military commander 
and to the restoration of the tribunate. The recognitio equitum was the official dismissal 
from military service which was granted to the équités after a minimum of ten years 
military service. During the ceremony the eques returned the public horse to the state. 
6. Reconciliation of Pompey and Crassus 
DATE: 70-12?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly? SPECIFICATION: contio ? 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: intermediate = Onatius Aurelius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: consuls 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of civil strife SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 1.121; Plut. Crass. 12.3-4, Pomp. 23.1-2. 
DESCRIPTION: When the consuls Pompey and Crassus sat in the Forum on the cimile 
chairs, the people asked them to be reconciled to each other, because they feared that 
the dissensions between the two and their armies, who were still under arms, would 
lead to civil war. First Pompey and Crassus refused. Then soothsayers (App.) or 
Onatius Aurelius, an eques from the country, from divine inspiration (Plut.) spoke to 
the people. The people again besought the consuls and reminded them of the civil war 
between Marius and Sulla. Pompey and Crassus then publicly settled their dispute. 
COMMENT: For the date: see Plutarch, according to whom it happened at the end of 
Pompey's and Crassus' consulate. 
Nothing further is known of Aurelius. Nor is it possible to establish whether he acted 
on his own account or on someone else's. 
7. Julia's funeral 
DATE: 68-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: funeral procession 
LOCATION: Rome (Forum) 
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LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos 
MOBILIZATION: S YM BOLS : images of Marius 
PREC.INCID.: Julia's death 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful 
CAUSE/GOAL: increase of Caesar's popularity SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Plut. Caes. 5.1-2. 
MODERN WORKS: NICOLET, Métier, 464. 
DESCRIPTION: Julia, Marius' widow and Caesar's aunt, died. Caesar held a funeral 
oration in the Forum. In her cortege he showed images of Marius (eikonai, statues or 
portraits). It was the first time since Sulla that these were shown to the public. Some 
persons therefore shouted reproaches at Caesar, but the people reacted with loud 
approval for Caesar. The result of the procession was an increase of Caesar's 
popularity. See also B-19. 
COMMENT: In the same year, Caesar made himself popular by showing his feelings in 
a funeral oration for his deceased wife Cornelia (a daughter of Cinna, Marius' partner). 
It was unusual to hold a funeral oration for women who died young. (Plut. Caes. 5.2; 
Suet. lul. 6.1.) 
8. Lex Gabinia de piratis 1 
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey (+ Caesar) 
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: homiloi, pollai (Dio), dèmos, plèthos (Plut.), universas populas 
Romanus (Cic.) 
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: com shortage 
MAG.: tr.pl. Gabinius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat of the public; wounded (consul Piso) 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful attempt by Trebellius (Ao-35) and Roscius (Ao-29) 
CAUSE/GOAL: com shortage SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 36.23.1-24.4; Plut. Pomp. 25.1-4; Cic. Imp.Pomp. 44. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 435; LlNTOTT 212; OOTEGHEM, Pompée, 159-181; 
RlCKMAN, op.cit., 51-52; SEAGER, Pompey, 28-39. 
DESCRIPTION: The pirates had cut off the com supply. The tribune Gabinius, on 
account of Pompey or to do him a favor, proposed to charge one ex-consul with the 
war against the pirates for three years, with full power throughout the Mediterranean 
and a large force. Gabinius did not put Pompey's name in his proposal, but the plebs 
would obviously think of Pompey. The plebs reacted enthusiastically to Gabinius' 
proposal. Caesar supported the bill in order to gain popularity. The majority of the 
senate, however, refused to give Pompey such an extraordinary command and resisted 
Gabinius' proposal. The people then attacked the senate when it was in session in the 
Curia, and the senators had to run. The consul Cn. Calpumius Piso would have been 
lynched, if Gabinius had not saved him. Trebellius and Roscius unsuccessfully spoke 
in opposition of the proposal. 
COMMENT: Gabinius probably first put his proposal to the senate and then told the 
people the proposal and the senate's reaction in a contio. Next, the plebs attacked the 
senate. 
Plutarch (25.5-7) has Catulus speak at this occasion and also mentions Roscius' raising 
of his fingers during this contio (see B-9). However, since Dio's account is the most 
detailed and probably based on Sallust (Hist. 5.17-27M), his sequence of events is 
followed for the most part. 
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9. Lex Gabinia de piratis 2 
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < Iday 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: conno and tribal legislative 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos, homiloi (Dio), dèmos, ochlos (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: com shortage 
MAG.: tr.pl. Gabinius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat against Roscius 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful veto by Trebellius (Ao-35) and opposirion of Roscius 
(Ao-29) 
CAUSE/GOAL: com shortage SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 36.24.5-37.1; Plut. Pomp. 25.5-26.2; Ase. 72C; Liv. 99; Vell.Pat. 
2.32.1-2. 
MODERN WORKS: See B-8. 
DESCRIPTION: Gabinius called a contio for discussion on his pirate law. Pompey 
held a speech in which he stressed his attentiveness to the community. Next, Gabinius 
spoke to the people. Finally, Gabinius let Catulus hold a speech. Catulus spoke against 
the bill and pointed to the danger of one-man rule in the law. When he asked the people 
who else should get a major command if Pompey would die, the crowd responded 
"You, Catulus". The conno was dismissed and a concilium plebis assembled to vote on 
Gabinius' proposal. The tribune Trebellius vetoed the bill. Gabinius had the assembly 
vote on the deposition of Trebellius. Trebellius withdrew his veto as soon as the first 
seventeen tribes had voted in favor of his deposition. Now the voting on the lex 
Gabinia could start. The tribune Roscius did not dare to speak, but raised two fingers to 
indicate that two persons should receive the command against the pirates. He was met 
with a threatening uproar of the crowd. Gabinius' law was passed. 
COMMENT: This case happened at least three weeks after the former. B-8 describes 
the promulgation of the law and the reactions to it. It was obligatory to have a three 
week interval between a proposal and the actual vote in order to have time for thought 
and discussion (TAYLOR, AVA, 16). 
The sequence of events of this case in Dio and Plutarch do not agree. A part of Dio's 
account is lost. His account is probably based on Sail. Hist. 17-27M. The sequence of 
events in Dio is as follows: contio on the voting-day, Pompey's speech (36.24.5-26), 
Gabinius' speech (36.27-29), concilium plebis, Trebellius' veto (36.30.1), vote on 
Trebellius (36.30.2), Roscius' raising of two fingers (36.30.3), speech of Catulus 
(36.30.4-36a), actual vote on lex Gabinia (36.37.1). Of these events Plutarch (25) only 
mentions Catulus' speech, Roscius' finger sign, and the reaction of the crowd; he puts 
it all before the day of the actual vote. 
What usually happened in Rome was that at least one contio was held in the period 
between the promulgation of a law and the comitia during which the voting took place. 
Often a contio was held on the day of the voting. The contio was then dismissed to 
separate the nonvoters (e.g. the patricians in case of a concilium plebis presided by a 
tribune of the plebs) and to let the voters divide themselves in the tribal order to vote 
(the actual comitia). During contiones speeches and discussions were held, at the 
assembly only voting took place. (TAYLOR,RVA, Ch. II, pp. 75 and 111.) Catulus' 
speech will have taken place during a contio. 
In light of the above, the sequence was as follows: a contio on the day of the voting 
with all the speeches including the one of Catulus (despite Plut.), a concilium plebis to 
vote on the lex Gabinia, Trebellius' veto, vote on Trebellius, Roscius' fingers (despite 
Plut.), vote on the lex Gabinia. 
As Asconius (72C) already noriced, the vote on the deposition of the tribune Trebellius 
provides a parallel with Tiberius Gracchus, who had used the same method against the 
tribune Octavius in 133. 
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10. Lex Gabinia de piratis 3 
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: (assembly) SPECIFICATION: (contio) 
LOCATION: ? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Pompey) 
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: homilos (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: com shortage 
MAG.: tr.pl. Gabinius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: (by Pompey) 
CAUSE/GOAL: deposition of consul Piso SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Dio 36.37.2; Plut. Pomp. 27.1-2. 
DESCRIPTION: The people were delighted that the com prices had fallen as a direct 
result of the passing of the lex Gabinia. When the consul Piso tried to sabotage the 
organization of Pompey's campaign, Pompey came back to Rome. He was met by a 
great throng. The people wanted to depose Piso from his office. Gabinius had already 
drawn up a bill for that purpose. Pompey prevented it and made the people calm down. 
COMMENT: The type of the collective behavior is not certain. It might have been a 
spontaneous gathering. Since Plutarch, however, mentions the involvement of 
Gabinius, it is likely that it was organized by him. Perhaps Gabinius acted on his own 
account. Pompey wanted to stop Piso's manipulations, and after that had happened, 
there was no need of antagonizing the senate further by deposing Piso. 
The fact that the com prices fell immediately after the passing of the lex Gabinia (Plut. 
Pomp. 26.2 and 27.2; Cic. Imp.Pomp. 44), shows that the com shortage was not only 
due to piracy, but also to speculation by merchants. 
11. Lex Cornelia de legum solutionibus 
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < Iday 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Pompey) 
assistant = Cornelius Ap-14 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: ochlos (Dio), populas, ex ultima contione (Ase.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.:opero«? 
MAG.: tr.pl. Cornelius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (consul Piso, stoning) 
symbolic (breaking of the fasces) 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Globulus (Ao-30) and the consul Piso 
CAUSE/GOAL: political reform SUCCESS : yes 
SOURCES: Dio 36.39.2-40.1; Ase. 58C. 
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, Asconius II, 144-157; LGRR 214 and 437; 
LINTOTT212. 
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Cornelius had proposed a bill that only the people could 
grant dispensation of the laws. The bill reduced the power of the senate. The tribune 
Servilius Globulus, at the instigation of the senate, vetoed the law and made the herald 
stop reading the bill. Cornelius now read the bill himself. The consul Piso protested. 
The people threatened him. Piso ordered his lictor to arrest those who tried to hit him. 
The crowd reacted by breaking the lictor's fasces. From the back of the assembly 
stones were thrown at the consul. Cornelius dismissed the assembly. Later the senate 
accepted the bill in a moderate form. 
COMMENT: The type of the assembly is difficult to assess. Asconius says that it 
happened on the legis ferundae dies, which can mean the "day for the proposal of the 
law" (= contio) or the "day to pass the law" (= tribal assembly). Then he says that 
stones were thrown from the back of the contio and that Cornelius dismissed the 
225 
concilium. The solution is probably to be found in Dio. He says that Cornelius 
dismissed the assembly (sullogos) before the vote (prin epipsèphisai ). Therefore, the 
events took place during the contio which preceded the concilium plebis for the voting 
of the law. 
It is possible that an organized small group was responsible for the escalation of 
violence, since Asconius mentions that not the entire assembly threw stones at Piso, but 
that the stones came from the back of the assembly. 
12. Consular elections 
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey? 
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18?, Cornelius 
Ap-14? 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: populus, multitudo 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. 
VIOLENCE: yes? TYPE: threat? 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Lollius SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Val.Max. 3.8.3; Dio 36.39.1. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 132 and 442; LINTOTT212. 
DESCRIPTION: M. Lollius Palicanus (Ap-23) was a candidate in the consular 
elections. He was strongly supported by the people. In his campaign he received the 
backing of some tribunes of the plebs. They incited the people and forced the consul 
Piso to appear on the rostra. The tribunes asked Piso if he wanted to accept Lollius' 
candidacy for the consulate. Piso refused. 
COMMENT: Lollius was not elected. 
Since Lollius was a Pompeian and since he was connected to Gabinius' family by 
marriage, the tribunes who supported him probably were Gabinius and Cornelius. 
There are no other populares assistant leaders known in this year. 
Dio only mentions that some violence occurred during the consular elections. 
13. Lex Calpumia de ambitu 
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: intermediate = divisores 
PARTICIPATION: divisores 
TERMINOLOGY: multitudo 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: cos. Piso 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded? (Piso) 
REPRESSION: by Piso and a manus 
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of the law SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Ase. 75-76C. 
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, Asconius II, 144-157; LGRR 213-215 and 437; 
LINTOTT212. 
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Cornelius (Ap-14) had proposed a severe anti-corruption 
law, which he failed to carry. The senate then adopted the matter in a mitigated form. 
Cornelius and the people refused to accept it, because the divisores had been excluded. 
The consul Piso subsequently proposed a more severe bribery law. The assembly 
which was to vote on the bill was disrupted by a crowd of divisores. The bribery 
agents drove Piso from the Forum. Piso came back with a larger armed gang and made 
the law pass. 
COMMENT: The content of the several bribery laws is unknown. It is strange that 
Cornelius proposed measures against the divisores, since he later became an 
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electioneering expert. He could not have become successful in that profession without 
good contacts with the divisores. Yet Asconius (75C), quoting Cicero, specifically 
states that Cornelius resisted the exclusion of the divisores. Piso must have included 
them again in his bill and, therefore, they reacted. Perhaps the divisores were able to 
mobilize other people in addition to themselves for the riot. 
14. Lex Manilla de libertinorum suffragiis 
DATE: 67-12-29/66-1-1 DURATION: 2 days 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative 
LOCATION: Capitol 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Pompey, Caesar, Cicero) 
assistant = Manilius Ap-26 
intermediate = magistri vicorum ? 
PARTICIPATION: fteedmen (= tabernarii ) and slaves 
TERMINOLOGY: tines ek tou homilou (Dio); libertinorum et servorum manus (Asc.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: collegia compitalicia 
OPP.: Compitalia 
MAG.: tr.pl. Manilius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead 
REPRESSION: by quaestor Domitius (Ao-37) 
CAUSE/GOAL: political reform SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Asc. 45 and 65C; Dio 36.42.1-43.2; Liv. 100. 
MODERN WORKS: ALFöLDI, Caesar, 76; FLAMBARD, Asconius II, 269-294; idem, 
Ktema, 162-163; LlNTOTT 212; MARSHALL, Asconius, 195 and 233-234; NOWAK, 
op.cit., 51-53. 
DESCRIPTION: Dio: The tribune Manilius proposed to distribute the votes of the 
freedmen over all the tribes, thus increasing the weight of their votes. He called an 
assembly on the last day of 67 towards evening. He had persuaded some of the plebs. 
The law was annulled the next day by the senate. The plebs (plèthos) was against 
Manilius' bill. To regain his popularity Manilius proposed to charge Pompey with the 
war in the East. Caesar and Cicero strongly urged the people to support this proposal. 
Asc: During the Compitalia Manilius proposed the bill with the support of a gang of 
freedmen and slaves. Manilius used violence and put the Capitol under siege. The 
quaestor Domitius violently repressed the uprising. Many adherents of Manilius were 
killed, with which Domitius offended the plebs (plebs infima) and ingratiated himself 
with the senate. Manilius later proposed to grant Pompey the command against 
Mithridates. 
COMMENT: It is not certain whether Pompey, Caesar, and Cicero also supported 
Manilius' freedmen law. 
The Compitalia were a religious festival organized in the city by the collegia 
compitalicia presided by magistri vicorum. Freedmen and also slaves participated. 
Therefore, a large part of the plebs, and especially the people who would profit from 
Manilius' proposal, were already on the streets. It is very likely that Manilius used the 
organization of the collegia to mobilize a following for the assembly and to organize 
streetgangs. 
Dio and Asconius both state that Manilius passed the law with only a part of the urban 
plebs, but they seem to differ on the reaction of the plebs. According to Dio the plebs 
(i.e. the freebom) were opposed to Manilius' law, while in Asconius' version they are 
angry with Domitius for killing Manilius' adherents. Perhaps the two authors refer to 
different groups among the plebs or Domitius used excessive violence in the eyes of the 
plebs. The question remains open. 






DURATION: < 1 day? 
SPECIFICATION: trial 
TYPE: top = Autronius 
PARTICIPATION: gladiators, slaves 
TERMINOLOGY: gladiator ii, fugitivi 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: gladiatorial gang 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, physical violence) 
REPRESSION: ? 
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Autronius SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Sulla 15. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 441; LlNT01T212. 
DESCRIPTION: P. Autronius Paetus cos.des. was charged with electoral corruption. 
He wanted to disrupt his trial, first with gladiators and runaway slaves, next through 
stoning and rioting. Autronius was convicted. 
COMMENT: Autronius and P. Sulla, elected for the consulate of 65, were removed 
from office for corruption. Autronius later was involved in the conspiracy of Catiline 
and convicted in 62. 
16. Trial of Cornelius 
DATE: 66-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Cornelius Ap-14? 
intermediate = operanon duces 
PARTICIPATION: ? 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: collegia ? 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: prosecutors threatened 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Cornelius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Asc. 59-60 and 75C. 
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, Asconius I, 63 and 69; LGRR 438; LlNTOTT 212. 
DESCRIPTION: The Cominius-brothers charged Cornelius with treason {maiestas). At 
the tribunal they were threatened by known gang leaders {noti operarum duces, Asc. 
60C). The Cominii had to run for their lives; the next day the charge against Cornelius 
was withdrawn. 
COMMENT: The leadership of Cornelius in this case is uncertain. FLAMBARD's 
translation of Asc. 60C gives Manilius (Ap-26) as the organizer of the riot. However 
Asconius does not mention Manilius at this point. FLAMBARD's addition of Manilius is 
probably based on a misreading of Asc. 66C: de disturbato iudicio Maniliano. 
FLAMBARD reads Manilio, meaning "the trial disturbed by Manilius". But the most 
recent editions (66C, 49St, 71G) all read Maniliano, "Manilius' disturbed trial". This 
means that Manilius disrupted his own trial (B-17) and not Cornelius'. See also 
PHILLIPS, Latomus, 597 n.6 and pp. 603-605; WARD, TAPhA, 549 and n.16. 
Perhaps the mobilization of a crowd was facilitated by using collegia. Asconius (75C) 
mentions that the adherents of Cornelius were organized in collegia and that it was one 
of the reasons for the senate to abolish these organizations in 64. The Cornelii 
Asconius mentions might also be Sulla's freedmen (App. 1.100 and 104; FLAMBARD, 
II, 197; TREGGIARI, Freedmen, 171). 
17. Demonstration pro-Manilius 
DATE: 66-12-27 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: conno 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Memmius Ap-28?, tribune 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos (Plut.); homilos (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. 
VIOLENCE: yes? TYPE: Cicero threatened? 
REPRESSION: no 
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CAUSE/GOAL: due process for Manilius SUCCESS : (yes) 
SOURCES: Plut. Cic. 9.4-6; Dio 36.44.1-2. 
MODERN WORKS: PHILLIPS, Latomus, 596; WARD, TAPhA, 545-548; MARSHALL, 
Asconius, 223-224. 
DESCRIPTION: At the end of Cicero's praetorship, Manilius (Ap-26) was brought 
before him as accused. Being a friend of Pompey, Manilius was popular. The people 
were angry because Cicero did not grant Manilius the statutory ten days to prepare his 
defense. Two tribunes of the plebs brought Cicero before the rostra and denounced him 
in front of the people. Cicero explained his behavior by saying that he had acted thus in 
order to let Manilius appear before him, before he would leave office and a praetor who 
would perhaps be less favorably disposed towards Manilius would take over. Manilius 
eventually was convicted. 
COMMENT: For the date see PHILLIPS. 
One of the tribunes that called the contio might have been Memmius, since he is the 
only known popularis assistant leader of this year. 
The action can hardly be called successful, since the only thing achieved was that 
Cicero was forced to account for his behavior. 
18. Trial of Manilius 
DATE: 65-1-? DURATION: < Iday? 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: (Forum?) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Crassus or Catiline and Piso) 
assistant = Manilius Ap-26 
intermediate = operanm duces 
PARTICIPATION: ? 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae 7 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded? 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Manilius SUCCESS: (yes) 
SOURCES: Asc. 60 and 66C; Dio 36.44.2. 
MODERN WORKS: PHILLIPS, Latomus, passim; WARD, TAPhA, 548-554; LGRR 
262 and 441; LlNTOTT 212; MARSHALL, Asconius, 224-226. 
DESCRIPTION: Manilius was prosecuted for treason (maiestas). He disrupted the trial 
by a riot which was staged by gang leaders. The trial was later reconvened. By that 
time, Manilius had already fled the city and was automatically convicted. 
COMMENT: WARD argues that Manilius received support from Crassus. Asconius 
(66C) mentions Catiline and Cn. Piso. 
It is likely that the gangleaders were not alone, but brought their gangs (.operae) with 
them. 
GRUEN (LGRR 262 and n.6) holds that Domitius Ahenobarbus repressed Manilius' 
disruption. GRUEN bases his statement on Schol.Bob. 119St. The Scholia Bobbiensia, 
however, are a very late source, and therefore on itself insufficient as proof. The 
scholiast probably mixed this case up with the repression by Domitius of Manilius' 
freedmen law (B-14). 
19. Demonstration pro-Caesar 
DATE: 65-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering 
LOCATION: Capitol 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: monuments of Marius 




CAUSE/GOAL: Caesarian propaganda SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Plut. Caes. 6; Vell.Pat. 2.43.4; (Suet. Ш. 11). 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 76. 
DESCRIPTION: As aedile, Caesar erected during the night statues in commemoration 
of Marius' victories on the Gennans, which he had ordered to construct in secret. Many 
people reunited on the spot in the morning. Suddenly the adherents of Marius appeared 
in astounding numbers and applauded. 
COMMENT: It is likely that Caesar somehow was responsible for the gathering of the 
crowd in the morning. Caesar increased his popularity greatly. See also B-7. 
According to Suetonius, this popular act by Caesar was a reaction to the oligarchy 
(/actio optimatium) which had foiled Caesar's plans to get a command in Egypt. 
20. Roscius in the theater 
DATE: 63-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: theater-Bellona temple-theater 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: pollai, dèmos, politai 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: claque (équités) 
PREC.INCID.: entrance of Roscius in the theater 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: by cos. Cicero 
CAUSE/GOAL: special seats for the équités SUCCESS : no 
SOURCES: Plut. Cic. 13.2-4. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 438. 
DESCRIPTION: L. Roscius Otho (Ao-29) as tribune in 67 had passed a law to grant 
the équités separate seats in the theater. The law was first applied during Otho's 
praetorship in 63. The people considered it an insult, and, as Otho entered the theater, 
he was hissed, while the équités applauded him. Both groups of spectators shouted 
ever louder and started insulting each other. It came to physical violence. The consul 
Cicero called the people to the temple of Bellona and reprimanded them. The people 
returned to the theater and applauded Otho. 
COMMENT: Roscius is known as an optimates assistant leader. Therefore one might 
surmise that the demonstration in the theater was ρτο-populares. But it need not 
necessarily be the case. Measures concerning the équités, e.g. the question of the jury 
courts, were an important part of the program of the populares. Popular leaders tried to 
curry the favor of the équités in order to have their support against the senatorial 
majority. Roscius granted the equestrian order the same rights as the senators had 
received in the second century: separate seats in the theater. By his popular law Roscius 
probably tried to draw the équités into the senatorial camp, which was weakened by the 
successes of Pompey's popular policy. The spectators in the theater must have seen 
Roscius' measure as a degradation of themselves. The senators among the spectators 
perhaps considered it an unjustified benefit for the équités. Therefore the reaction of the 
public should be seen as inti-populares rather than anti-optimates. 
21. Trial of Rabirius 
DATE: 63-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
assistant = Labienus Ap-20 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: cives imperiti 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: portrait of Satuminus 
PREC.INCID.: remark of Cicero 
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MAG.: tr.pl. Labienus 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: murder of Satuminus/scM SUCCESS : yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Rab.Perd. 18 and 25; (Dio 37.26-27). 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 277-279 and 438; TAYLOR, PP. 123. 
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Labienus, with the support of Caesar, prosecuted C. 
Rabirius for his involvement in the assassination of the popular leader Satuminus in 
100. Cicero defended Rabirius. During his speech, Cicero was forced to react to shouts 
from the public. Cicero called Satuminus an enemy of the Roman people (hostis populi 
Romani, Cic. 18) and the public protested. Cicero said that only a small number of 
imperitous citizens shouted, while the great majority (populus Romanus) remained 
silent. Labienus carried a portrait of Satuminus with him at the trial (Cic. 25). 
COMMENT: Cicero's speech was pronounced during a preliminary confío before the 
voting in the trial (TAYLOR, RVA, 103). 
Cicero's distinction between a small group and the majority was a rhetorical device to 
minimize the importance of the reaction. 
The trial ended without a judgment, because the procedures were stopped after the 
praetor Q. Metellus Celer waved a red flag on the Janiculus, an ancient sign of 
emergency (LGRR 279). Nevertheless the case is considered successful because 
Caesar's and Labienus' publicity goal was reached, namely to denounce senatorial 
repression of a popular leader and to dispute the validity of the senatus consultum 
ultimum (scu). 
It is the only case in which direct reaction of the public during a speech is recorded in 
the speech itself. 
22. Cato the Younger's election to the tribunate 
DATE: 63-7-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal elective 
LOCATION: Campus Maitius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Cato the Younger Ao-27 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: pollai, plèthos 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: (Cato) 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Cato SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Plut. Cat.Min. 21.2. 
DESCRIPTION: As Cato the Younger decided to stand for the tribunate of 62, the 
Campus filled up with people to support him and Cato was elected. 
COMMENT: The tribunician elections were normally held in July (TAYLOR, RVA, 63 
and n.12). 
Plutarch says it happened in the Forum (agora), but it must have been the Campus 
Martius where all the elections took place (TAYLOR, AVA, 47). 
Perhaps Cato had already made public his plans to increase the number of grain 
recipients, which he would do at the end of the year. On Cato's com law: Plut. Caes. 
8.3-4, Cat.Min. 26.1, Mor. 818D (Praec. Ger. Rei Pubi.); RlCKMAN, op.cit., 168-
172. 
23. The conspiracy of Catiline 
DATE: 63-12-17 DURATION: > 2 days 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Rome 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Catiline + fellow conspirators 
assistant = L. Bestia Ap-9, Q. Mucius 
Ap-30 
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intermediate = leño (Cic. 4.17), duces 
multitudinwn (Sail. 50.1) 
PARTICIPATION: artisans, shopkeepers, slaves 
TERMINOLOGY: cheirotechnai (App.),falcarli (Cic. \.%\tabernarii (Cic. 4.17, 
opifices, servitia, cunctaplebs (Sail. 50.1,37.1) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: Lentulus' and Cethegus' slaves and freedmen 
PREC.INCID.: incendies and assassinations 
OPP.: Saturnalia, indebtedness 
MAG.: tr.pl. Bestia; closing of the shops 
VIOLENCE: planned 
REPRESSION: by police action, senatus consultum ultimum, and com law 
CAUSE/GOAL: coup SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: App. 2.2-6; Cic. Cat. passim, esp. 1.8, 10, 2.26, 3.5, 10, and 4.17; 
Diod. 40.5; Sail. Cat. passim, esp. 24.4, 26.4, 29.2, 30.7, 37.1, and 50; Plut. Cic. 
10.2-11, 14-22; Dio 37.29-36 (Liv. 102; Flor. 2.12). 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 416-433; LlNTOTr213; NOWAK, op.cit., 58-70. 
DESCRIPTION: Catiline, an impoverished scion of an obscure patrician family, 
planned a coup in Rome together with some other senators and équités, many of whom 
were indebted. Catiline several times had failed to reach the consulate, and now tried 
his luck with a conspiracy. Incendies and assassinations of important persons in Rome 
were planned. Cancellation of debts and land distribution were promised (Dio 37.30). 
The night of the Saturnalia had been chosen for the action (Cic. 3.10; Diod.; Plut. 18). 
The conspirators convened in the street of the scythemakers (falcarli ). Catiline went to 
the countryside to mobilize support. Lentulus and Cethegus were the leaders in Rome. 
Through a pimp (leñó) they tried to mobilize the shopkeepers. They also contacted 
plebeian leaders (duces multitudinum) The tribunes in the conspiracy probably were to 
order the closing of the shops (Cic. 4.17). The tribune Bestia was to call an assembly 
after the murder of Cicero, but he eventually stayed out. The consul Cicero found the 
conspirators out and put guards throughout the city. He also provided himself with a 
bodyguard. The senate passed the senatus consultum ultimum (the emergency decree). 
Lentulus and Cethegus were arrested. Their slaves and freedmen tried to free diem from 
the prison with artisans (App., Sail.). Cicero had the two leaders killed, which calmed 
the crowd. Cato the Younger proposed to increase the number of grain recipients to 
quell the rebellion (B-22). 
COMMENT: In this case collective behavior hardly arose, but the case has been 
included because of the detailed account in the sources, which provides us with 
important information on participation, methods of mobilization, and repression. The 
conspiracy had most success in the countryside, where Sullan veterans and slaves 
participated. 
During the consular elections, which Catiline lost, Cicero had already worn a 
breastplate to show his determination to keep order (Plut. 14; Cic. Mur. 52; Dio 
37.29). 
The Saturnalia (held December 17) were a kind of Carnival. During the festival the 
roles between masters and slaves were temporarily reversed. The timing was well-
chosen, because during the festival the city would already be in a chaotic atmosphere 
with many people feasting on the streets and more than usual freedom for the slaves. 
One of the main causes for the failure of the conspiracy was the effective repression as 
from the start. The élite for the major part was united and took effective measures to 
quell the rebellion. Another important factor was that mobilization was hampered by 
lack of legitimacy of the conspiracy. Catiline did not hold any magistracy. Catiline's 
fellow conspirator Lentulus was praetor, but was discharged from office and 
imprisoned. Of the tribunes involved, Bestia, who had entered office in December, 
probably withdrew at some point. Mucius had been tribune in 64 and therefore did not 
have any magisterial authority at the time of the revolt. Furthermore, the distress of the 
plebs was relieved by Cato's grain measure. 
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24. Demonstration pro-Caesar 
DATE: 63-12-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: riot 
LOCATION: Forum (outside the Curia) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Caesar) 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Caesar in the senate 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: senate threatened 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: protection of Caesar SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Plut. Caes. 8.3-4, Cat.Min. 26.1, Mor. 818D (Praec. Ger. Rei Pubi). 
DESCRIPTION: Several days after the discussion in the senate on the fate of the 
Catilinarian conspirators, Caesar went to the senate to account for his alleged 
involvement in the conspiracy. As the people noticed that the meeting lasted longer than 
usual, they surrounded the senate building and with loud cries demanded the release of 
Caesar. The action prompted Cato the Younger to propose his com bill. 
25. Pompey's recall 
DATE: 62-1-3 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: conno 
LOCATION: Forum, temple of Castor 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey, Caesar 
assistant = Metellus Ap-7 
PARTICIPATION: plebs, foreigners, gladiators, slaves 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos, xenoi, monomachoi, therapontes (Plut.), homines, 
improbi (Cic). 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: gladiators, slaves 
MAG.: tr.pl. Metellus 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence, stoning) 
REPRESSION: by Cato (Ao-27) and Minucius (Ao-23) 
CAUSE/GOAL: recall of Pompey SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Plut. Cat.Min. 26.2-29.2; Cic. Sest. 62; Dio 37.43; Suet. lul. 16.1. 
MODERN WORKS: UGRR 440; LlNTOTT 213; NOWAK, op.cit., 87-89; TAYLOR, PP, 
127-128. 
DESCRIPTION: Metellus Nepos proposed to recall Pompey with his army from the 
East to repress the Catilinarian conspiracy. The senate did not support Metellus' 
proposal. Metellus then called an assembly to have the people vote on his bill. Metellus 
presided the assembly in the presence of Caesar. They sat at the entrance of the temple 
of Castor surrounded by gladiators and armed servants. Many plebeians in favor of the 
bill were present. The tribunes Cato the Younger and Minucius Thermus forbade the 
reading of the bill. Metellus ordered his armed retainers to disperse the crowd. Cato 
was pelted with sticks and stones, and took refuge in the temple. Metellus tried to 
resume the procedures of the assembly. But he and his adherents were dispersed by 
Cato and supporters. Cato regained the confidence of the plebs. Metellus subsequently 
joined Pompey in the East. 
COMMENT: For the date see the BUDé edition of Plut. Cat.Min. p. 99 n.2 (R. 
FLACELIèRE, E. CHAMBRY, 1976). 
The meeting was the final confio before the voters had been ordered to divide into their 
tribes (TAYLOR, RVA, 62). 
Dio (37.43.3) says that the senate passed the senatus consultum ultimum to restore 
order, but Plutarch (29.2) mentions that Cato resisted severe measures against 
Metellus. 
26. Demonstration pro-Caesar 
DATE: 62-1-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: riot 
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LOCATION: outside Caesar's house 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: multitudo 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Caesar's resignation 
MAG.: pr. Caesar 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat? 
REPRESSION: by Caesar 
CAUSE/GOAL: to restore Caesar in office SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Suet. lul. 16. 
MODERN WORKS: GELZER, Caesar, 51-52. 
DESCRIPTION: The senate deposed Caesar from the praetorship for his support for 
Metellus (B-25). When Caesar resigned his office, the people gathered at his house and 
tumultuously offered their support. Caesar kept the crowd in check and thereby 
regained the respect of the senate and was restored in office. 
27. Attack on Vettius 
DATE: 62-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: conno 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: pr. Caesar 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Vettius) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to support Caesar SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Suet. lui 17. 
DESCRIPTION: Vettius had accused Caesar of complicity in the Catilinarian 
conspiracy. In a contio in front of the rostra the people almost tore Vettius apart. Caesar 
had him imprisoned. 
28. Pompey's return from the East 
DATE: 62-?-? DURATION: > 2 days 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering/procession 
LOCATION: On the road from Brindisi to Rome 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
PARTICI?ATION: Italians/rural plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Pompey's return 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Pompey SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Plut. Pomp. 43.3. 
DESCRIPTION: After debarking in Brundisium, Pompey dismissed his army. He 
travelled to Rome. When they saw that he was travelling in a sober and peaceful way, 
the people poured out of the cities in Italy and escorted him to Rome. 
29. Contio in Circus Flaminius 
DATE: 61-1-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Circus Raminius (Campus Martius) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius, (Caesar) 
assistant = Fufius Calenus Ap-17 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: contemporary popular leader (Pompey), Circus 
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Flaminius 
OPP.: market day 
MAG.: tr.pl. Fufius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: support for Clodius SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 1.14.1-2. 
MODERN WORKS: MOREAU, Ciadiana, 100, 105, and 109-110; SHACKLETON 
BAILEY, Atticus 1,307. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius had entered the house of Caesar during the Bona Dea 
worship, a religious ceremony exclusively for women. Clodius was accused of 
adultery with Caesar's wife and was to stand trial for blasphemy in the Bona Dea affair. 
The people were assembled in the Circus Flaminius on a market day. The tribune 
Fufius used the opportunity to hold a contio. He let Pompey appear before the people to 
express his opinion on the procedures in the planned trial (see B-30). Pompey declined 
to support Clodius and aligned himself to the senate. 
COMMENT: On the date: MOREAU 110. 
The Circus Flaminius was built by the popular leader C. Flaminius, who fell at Lake 
Trasimene in 217. It was built on the spot where the tribal assembly in 449 had ended 
the tyranny of the decemvirate. (TAYLOR, /?VA, 20.) Possibly the Circus Flaminius, 
built on a popular spot by a popular leader, still had a symbolic value in the late 
Republic. The location of the assembly was also determined by the fact that Pompey as 
a military commander was not allowed to enter the Pomerium (MOREAU, 
SHACKLETON). 
According to MOREAU (100), the involvement of Fufius, a partisan of Caesar, and 
Caesar's friendly attitude towards Clodius despite the scandal in Caesar's house shows 
that Caesar backed Clodius. 
30. Lex Pupia Valeria de incestu 
DATE: 61-1-28 or 29 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius, Piso 
intermediate = Curio Ap-46, duces ? 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: toms ilk grex Canlinae 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae, iuvenes 
MAG.: cos. Piso 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat by operae 
REPRESSION: by Cato (Ao-27), Hortensius, and Favonius (Ao-38) 
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 1.14.5. 
MODERN WORKS: MOREAU, Ciadiana, 92-98, 111-115, 120-121, and 125-129; 
LINTOTT 213; TAYLOR, Λ VA, 77. 
DESCRIPTION: The senate had ordered the consuls to propose a law to the assembly 
with special judiciary procedures for Clodius' trial. The jury was to be picked by the 
praetor instead of the usual designation by lot. Clodius' friends resisted the bill, 
because it was disadvantageous to him. The consul M. Pupius Piso disapproved of the 
law, but was forced to draw up the bill. At the assembly he urged the people to vote 
against the law. Young aristocrats and Catiline's adherents under the leadership of 
Curio the Younger agitated against the law as well. The voting-bridges {pontes) were 
occupied by Clodius' gangs (operae). They manipulated the voting by distributing only 
tablets with an "A" (= Antiquo, Nay). The assembly was dismissed by Clodius' 
opponents Cato the Younger, Hortensius, and Favonius. 
Later a compromise was reached by the two parties. The tribune Fufius (Ap-17) drew 
up a new bill in which the passage on the designation of the juries was altered. The bill 
was passed. 
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COMMENT: On the date: MOREAU 112. 
Curio is listed as an intermediate leader, because he did not hold a magistracy in 61. 
The operae possibly stood under the leadership of gang leaders. 
31. Bona Dea trial 
DATE: 61-4/5-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Clodius) 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae ? 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: jury threatened 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Clodius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 1.16; Dio 37.46; Plut. C/c. 29.5-6. 
MODERN WORKS: MOREAU, Clodiana, 151-157, 207-209, 220, and 222-225; 
LINTOTT213. 
DESCRIPTION: At Clodius' trial for the Bona Dea affair, the people supported him. 
The members of the jury were threatened and surrounded themselves with a 
bodyguard. Clodius was acquitted. The jury was suspected of being bribed (probably 
by Crassus). 
COMMENT: On the date: MOREAU 152-157. 
The operae used in the previous case (B-29) were likely to be present at the trial as 
well. 
32. Pompey's triumph 
DATE: 61-9-28/29 DURATION: 2 days 
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: triumph 
LOCATION: throughout Rome 
LEADERS ШР: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: inscriptions with the names of the conquered 
territories and the amount of booty; trophies 
MAG.: (general Pompey) 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Pompey SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Flor. 2.13.9; Liv. 103; Plut. Pomp. 45; Vell.Pat. 2.40.3 and 5. 
DESCRIPTION: For his victories against the pirates and in the East Pompey held a 
magnificent triumph, which lasted two days. At the end of the triumph the people in a 
conno acclaimed him as Magnus (Liv.). 
COMMENT: Pompey enhanced his prestige by showing the leaders of the Cretan 
pirates, who were the prisoners of Metellus Creticus, in his own triumph (Flor.; 
VelLPat.). 
This is one of the triumphs during which reactions of the public are recorded. There 
have been, of course, more triumphs, but I have only listed the ones with attested 
collective behavior. 
33. Caesar's contio with Pompey and Crassus 
DATE: 59-1 -? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: conno 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: homilos (Dio); dèmos (Plut.) 
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MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS : contemporary popular leader (Pompey, Crassus) 
MAG.: cos. Caesar 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: Caesar's legislative plans SUCCESS : yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.10; Plut. Pomp. 47.4-5, Caes. 14.2-3; Dio 38.4.4-5.5. 
MODERN WORKS: GELZER, Caesar, 66. 
DESCRIPTION: Caesar brought Pompey and Crassus on the rostra before the people. 
Caesar asked them if they supported his bills. They answered affirmatively. Pompey 
expressed his willingness to defend the people against opposition. 
COMMENT: Since this case happened shortly before the next, which most probably 
took place in January, the events should be set in January as well. 
34. Lex lulia agraria 
DATE: 59-1 -? (second half) DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar, Pompey 
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50 
intermediate = Fibulus 
PARTICIPATION: plebs, veterans 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos (Dio), dèmos, stratiotai, hopla (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: cheira (App.), army 
MAG.: cos. Caesar 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: armed men; wounded (Bibulus, Cato, 
tribunes); symbolic (breaking of úit fasces) 
REPRESSION: by Bibulus, Ancharius (Ao-1), Calvinus (Ao-15). Fannius (Ao-18), 
and Cato (Ao-27) 
CAUSE/GOAL: agrarian law SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.10-11; Cic. Vat. 22 and 31; Dio 38.6.1-4; Liv. 103; Plut. Caes. 
14.6, Cat.Min. 32.2-3, Luc. 42.6, Pomp. 48.1-3; Suet. lut. 20.1. 
MODERN WORKS: GELZER, Caesar, 66; LGRR 437; LINTOTT 213; NOWAK, 
op.cit., 89-90. 
DESCRIPTION: Caesar proposed a law for the distribution of lands to the poor and to 
the veterans of Pompey's campaigns in the East. The senate opposed the bill. Caesar 
took the measure before the people. He had already organized a gang (cheira) and 
people flocked to the assembly with concealed daggers (App.). Pompey had soldiers 
enter the city to participate in the voting (Plut.) The plebs occupied the Forum on the 
night before the assembly (Dio). The consul Bibulus with two (Plut.) or three (Dio) 
tribunes came to the Forum to stop the procedures. They were attacked by the armed 
men under the leadership of Vatinius and probably С Fibulus (Cic). Bibulus' fasces 
were broken. He received a basket of ordure on his head (Plut.). Cato the Younger 
(Ao-27) also tried to stop the assembly, but he was twice ejected from the Forum by the 
Caesarians (App.). Caesar's law was passed. 
COMMENT: On the date see SEAGER, Pompey, App. I. Subsequent legislation was 
passed by Caesar and Vatinius on the ratification of Pompey's enactments in the East 
and the rebate for the publicans (March), the division of the Campanian lands (April) 
and Caesar's provincial command (Gaul and Illyricum; May). 
The opposing tribunes were Ancharius, Calvinius, and Fannius, according to Cic. 
Sest. 113, Vat. 16. 
The clause that land should be distributed to fathers with at least three children, which 
made Caesar popular with a multitude of men (App.), probably belonged to the agrarian 
law on Campania (LGRR 399-400). On the lex Campana see further BRUNT, 
Manpower, 314-318. 
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35. Gabinius at the shows 
DATE: 59-7-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: theater 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: entrance of Gabinius? 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: unpopularity of Gabinius SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 2.19.3 and 24.3. 
MODERN WORKS: SHACKLETON BAILEY, Atticus I, 389; VILLE, op.cit., 61-62 (no. 
11). 
DESCRIPTION: Gabinius (Ap-18) had organized gladiatorial shows before the 
consular elections in July, in which he was a candidate. During the shows Gabinius 
and his supporters were hissed. 
COMMENT: Gabinius was nevertheless elected consul for 58. 
From this case we must conclude that an organizer of shows could not entirely 
manipulate the composition of the spectators. Probably other people had furnished 
tickets to spectators as well. 
36. Caesar and Curio at the shows 
DATE: 59-7-? (between July 6-13) DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: theater 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: équités 
PREC.INCID.: lines of the actor, entrance of Caesar and Curio 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: unpopularity of the triumvirs SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 2.19.3; Val.Max. 6.2.9. 
DESCRIPTION: During the ludi Apollinares (July 6-13), the actor Diphilus said a few 
lines which could be conceived as a criticism of Pompey and the increase of his power. 
The public applauded. When Caesar entered the theater, the spectators remained silent, 
which was seen as a hostile attitude. Next, Curio the Younger (Ap-46) entered, at that 
time an opponent of the triumvirs. He was loudly applauded. The ovation was started 
by the équités, who stood up (Cic). 
COMMENT: Cic. Att. 2.18.1 (written in June): Curio is everywhere applauded by the 
boni ; the pro-Caesarian praetor Q. Fufius Calenus is hissed. Att. 2.20.4 (written in 
July): hatred of the populares is very popular. Att. 2.21.1 (written after July 25): the 
triumvirate has encountered the wistles of the crowd (sibili vulgi ). 
Since the lex Rascia, the équités had separate seats in the theater and could act as a 
claque (see B-20). 
The applause for Curio was started by the équités. Furthermore, Cicero says that Curio 
elsewhere received applause from the boni for his opposition to the triumvirs, while 
Fufius (Ap-17) was hissed. Boni is a vague term to indicate the conservative members 
of the Roman élite and all those who supported them (HELLEGOUARC'H, op.cit., 484-
493). The participants in this case obviously did not belong to the plebs contionalis. 
The games should have been presided by the urban praetor, it is unknown who he was. 
37. Attack against С Cato 
DATE: 59-?-? (second half) DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: confío 
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LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Pompey) 
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae 
MAG.: unknown 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Cato) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to support Pompey SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Q.Fr. 1.2.15, Sest. 18. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 442; LlNTOTT 213. 
DESCRIPTION: С Porcius Cato wanted to prosecute Gabinius for corruption. In a 
conno he called Pompey a tyrant. The people almost lynched Cato and he had to run. 
COMMENT: According to Cic. Sest., Gabinius prided on having operae which had 
helped him to prevent a prosecution de ambita. The gangs probably were used in this 
case. 
Cato later changed his allegiance and became an assistant leader (Ap-39) of Clodius. 
38. Contio with Vettius 
DATE: 59-8-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos (App.) 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. Vatinius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: popularity of Caesar SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.12 and 17; Cic. Att. 2.24.3, Vat. 24; Dio 38.9.2-4; Plut. Luc. 
42.7-8; Suet. lul. 20.5. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTT 213. 
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Vatinius (Cic. Vat.) let Vettius appear in a contio to admit 
that he was ordered by Bibulus, Cicero, and Cato to assassinate Caesar and Pompey. 
The people were furious and surrounded Caesar to protect him against conspiracies. 
COMMENT: On the date see С MEIER, Zur Chronologie und Politik in Caesars erstem 
Konsulat, Historia 10 (1961), pp. 68-98, esp. 88-93. 
Vettius was perhaps bought by Caesar and Pompey (Plut., Suet.) or by Clodius 
(SEAGER, Pompey, 99-100). Vettius was later murdered in prison. 
See B-27. 
39. Isis riot 
DATE: 58-1-1 DURATION: < 1 day 





MOBILIZATION: ORG.: collegia ? 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Gabinius threatened 
REPRESSION: by cos. Gabinius (Ap-18) 
CAUSE/GOAL: reinstatement of popular cult SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Tertul. Ad Nat., 1.10.17-18, Apol. 6.8. 
MODERN WORKS: ALFÖLDI, Caesar, 63-66. 
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DESCRIPTION: The senate had forbidden the cult of the Egyptian gods Isis, Serapis, 
Harpocrates, and Anubis because it was considered subversive to the state. Their 
sanctuaries were destroyed. A crowd beleaguered the consul Gabinius to hear his 
opinion on the affair. Gabinius supported the senatorial measure and prevented the 
erection of altars. 
COMMENT: It is one of the few spontaneous cases of collective behavior between 78-
49 B.C. that we know of. The absence of élite leadership explains the lack of success 
of the action. 
Organization was possibly provided by collegia which were established for the cult. 
The cult of the Egyptian goddess Isis was popular with the plebs during the late 
Republic. The Roman government tried to reduce the cult several times until it was 
definitely banned in the early Empire. (ALFöLDI, Caesar, 52-74.) 
40. Compitalia 
DATE: 58-1-1 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: religious games 
LOCATION: throughout Rome (at the crossroads) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 




MOBILIZATION: ORG.: collegia compitalicia, vici 
SYMBOLS: lictors, togapraetexta 
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: games for theplebs urbana SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Asc. 7C; Cic. Pis. 8 and 23. 
MODERN WORKS: MARSHALL, Asconius, 94-95. 
DESCRIPTION: The Compitalia were celebrated under the leadership of Sextus 
Clodius, one of Clodius' intermediate leaders (operarum Clodianarum dux, Asc). 
Sextus had imbued himself with the insignia of the Roman magistrate: lictors and the 
togapraetexta. 
COMMENT: The ludi compítales were religious games for the urban plebs. They were 
organized at the crossroads of the neighborhoods by the principals {magistri vicorum) 
through the collegia compitalicia. 
At this moment the celebration of the Compitalia was still forbidden. In 64, the senate 
had prohibited the collegia and thereby the games. Three days after the celebration of 
the games in 58, Clodius would pass a law in the assembly by which the collegia were 
reinstated (Cic. Pis. 9). 
41. Recruitment of collegia 
DATE: 58-1 -7/9 DURATION: > 2 days 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio ? 
LOCATION: Forum (tribunal of Aurelianus and temple of Castor) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: freebom, freedmen, artisans and shopkeepers 
TERMINOLOGY: liberi, servi 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: collegia, decuriae, vici 
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius, closing of the shops 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: reinstatement of the collegia SUCCES S : yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Dom. 54, 129, Sest. 34, Pis. 11 and 23, Red.Pop. 13, Red.Sen. 32-
33. 
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DESCRIPTION: Soon after passing his lex de collegiis, Clodius recruited (dilectus) 
"slaves" into collegia at the tribunal of Aurelian. The people were brought together by 
an edict of Clodius to close the shops (Dom.). The people were inscribed in 
neighborhoods (yicatim) and divided into squads of ten (decuriae). The temple of 
Castor was occupied, its steps demolished, and used as an aimoiy. 
COMMENT: For the date see GRIMAL, Études, p. 145. 
Cicero mentions slaves, which is probably exaggerated. More likely they were 
freedmen, specifically artisans and shopkeepers who formed the majority of the 
members of the collegia. In the De Domo 54 Cicero mentions that also freeborn 
(liberi) participated. In that passage, Cicero also mentions the closing of the shops in 
the description of the events (cum edictis tuis tabernas Claudi iubebas ) . This implies the 
participation of tabernarii and opifices. 
The temple of Castor was an important spot in the Forum. It was the scene of meetings 
and assemblies. Its steps were used for voting. Clodius occupied this strategic spot in 
order to be able to rule the assemblies. (See TAYLOR, RVA, 27-28 and 41-44.) 
42. Riot against Ciceronians 
DATE: 58-Int-19 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Capitol 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: ? 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stones, swords, physical 
violence) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: exile of Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Dom. 54, Sest. 26, Pis. 23. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius had deposed his rogatio de capite civis, which was to prohibit 
the execution of a Roman citizen without a trial. The bill obviously was directed against 
Cicero, who had ordered to kill the imprisoned Catilinarian conspirators in 63 without 
granting them a trial. While the senate was in session over this matter, a huge crowd 
from the city and the Italian countryside assembled on the Capitol to support Cicero. 
With stones, swords, and fists Clodius had them driven away. 
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, op.cit., 147. 
Clodius' bill was passed shortly afterwards, and Cicero went into exile before he was 
forced to it by law (B-47). 
43. Demonstration of équités 
DATE: 58-Int-19 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Cicero, Q. Hortensius, С Curio) 
PARTICIPATION: équités 
TERMINOLOGY: équités, kippeis 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: senate meeting 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: by cos. Gabinius (Ap-18) 
CAUSE/GOAL: support Cicero SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Dom. 55, Pis. 23 and 64, Red.Sen. 12; Dio 38.16.2-4. 
MODERN WORKS: NlCOLET, Métier, 475. 
DESCRIPTION: When the senate was deliberating on the Ciceronian question, the 
équités came together to express their support for Cicero. The senators Hortensius and 
Curio (the Elder probably) were their spokesmen (Dio). The consul Gabinius (Ap-18) 
refused them access to the senate. He even drove one of them, L. Aelius Lamia, from 
the city. 
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COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, op.cit., 147. 
44. Accusation of Hortensius and Curio 
DATE: 58-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
intermediate = claqueurs 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plètlios 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat by plebs? 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 38.16.5. 
DESCRIPTION: Hortensius and Curio had participated in the demonstration of the 
équités (B-43). Clodius brought them before the people, where they were rebuked by 
claqueurs (tinôn propareskeuasmenôn, "some who were prepared for it"). The 
claqueurs abused them by means of slogans (sunenekopse). 
45. Contio in the Circus Flaminius 
DATE: 58-Int-23 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Circus Flaminius (Campus Martius) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: Circus Flaminius 
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Red.Sen. 13 and 17, Sest. 33; Dio 38.16.6. 
DESCRIPTION: In a contio, held in the Circus Flaminius, Clodius asked the consul 
Gabinius (Ap-18) to express his opinion on Cicero's exile. Gabinius told the people he 
approved Clodius' policy and, additionally (Dio), accused the équités and the senate. 
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, op.cit., 147. 
For the symbolic value of the Circus Flaminius see B-29. 
By the approval of the consul Clodius probably sought an extra legitimization of his 
actions against Cicero. 
46. Contio with Caesar 
DATE: 58-2?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: contio 
LOCATION: Circus Flaminius? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: homilos (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: contemporary popular leader (Caesar), Circus 
Flaminius? 
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 38.17.1-2; Plut. Cic. 30.4. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius produced Caesar in a contio to express his opinion on the 
Ciceronian question. Caesar told the people that he considered the execution of the 
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Catilinarian conspirators illegal. Clodius had to assemble the people outside the walls, 
for Caesar was already in command for his Gallic campaign and was not allowed to 
enter the city boundary. 
COMMENT: The contio was likely to have taken place in the Circus Flaminius, located 
on the Campus Martius outside the pomerium (cf. B-29 and 45). For its symbolic value 
see B-29. 
Caesar obviously was still popular at this time. The plebs will also have remembered 
his position during the Catilinarian conspiracy (see B-24 and 26). 
47. Lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis 
DATE: 58^-25 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
intermediate = Fidulius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs (freedmen?) 
TERMINOLOGY: egentes, servi 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae, centum 
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Dom. 79-80, Sest. 65. 
MODERN WORKS: BUDé edition of Cic. Red.Sen., pp. 12-14 (P. WUILLEUMIER, 
1952); L1NT01T214; TAYLOR, PP, 60-62. 
DESCRIPTION: In March, Clodius had passed his lex de capite civis, with which he 
had rendered the killing of the Catilinarian conspirators illegal. Now, Clodius had the 
assembly vote on a lex de exsilio Ciceronis by which the clauses of the former law 
were specifically applied to Cicero. Gangs (operae) were at the assembly to influence 
the voting. They consisted of poor (egentes) and slaves (semi, more likely freedmen). 
The gangs were led by Fidulius, who was there with a group of 100 men (centum) to 
shout in favor of the law. Fidulius had passed the night in the Forum and was the first 
to vote. 
COMMENT: For the date: BUDé 12. 
No real violence seems to have occurred. 
Fidulius' role is interesting. He was the first to vote. The first voter, and especially the 
first group to vote were very important in Roman voting. E.g. in the centuriate 
assembly the vote of the first century (centuria praerogativa) usually was followed by 
the subsequent groups. In the tribal assembly the voting order of the tribes was 
determined by lot. The name of the first voter in the first tribe to vote was recorded. 
Perhaps the presiding magistrate could designate the first voter. (NiCOLET, Métier, 
383-385; TAYLOR, AVA, 70-74 and 76.) Compare also B-71, where Pompey 
dissolved the assembly after an unfavorable vote by the first tribe. 
48. Attacks against Pompey and Gabinius 
DATE: 58-?-? DURATION: > 2 days 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Rome 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: ? 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae ? 
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded; symbolic (breaking of the fcuces) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Red.Sen. 7,Red.Pop. 14, Pis. 28; Dio 38.30.2; Plut. Pomp. 49.2. 
243 
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 214. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius had violently helped to escape Tigranes, son of the King of 
Armenia, who was a hostage of Pompey. It led to a breach between Clodius and 
Pompey and Gabinius (Ap-18). After this, Clodius attacked Pompey, Gabinius, and 
their followers several times during which the fasces of the consul were broken. 
Pompey was forced to remain inside his house. 
COMMENT: The tribune Ninnius (Ao-24) had consecrated Clodius' goods (Cic. Dom. 
125), but it does not seem to have affected Clodius' popularity. Clodius did the same 
thing to Gabinius' goods in a contio (Cic. Dom. 124-127; Dio 38.30.2). It was meant 
to reduce Gabinius' legitimacy in office. 
49. Trial of Vatinius 
DATE: 58-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50 
PARTICIPATION: plebs, soldiers? 
TERMINOLOGY: milites 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae ?, army ? 
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: physical violence, 
reversement of the voting ums 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Vatinius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Vat. 33-34, Sest. 135. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 292 and 442; LlNTOTT 214. 
DESCRIPTION: Vatinius had to stand trial for the machinations during his tribunate in 
59. He had already left Rome to join Caesar as a legate, but returned for the trial. 
Clodius and Vatinius violently disrupted the trial. Clodius took the lead of a group of 
armed men. The judges and the prosecuters had to run. The voting ums and the seats of 
the judges were destroyed. The trial was not reconvened. 
COMMENT: Since Vatinius had already joined Caesar as a legate before the trial, it is 
possible that he brought some soldiers with him for support. Cicero calls the armed 
men under the leadership of Clodius "soldiers" {milites, Vat. 33). 
50. Lucullus' funeral 
DATE: 57-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 





MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: entrance of the funeral procession in the Forum 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: by M. Licinius Lucullus 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Lucullus SUCCESS: (no) 
SOURCES: Plut. Luc. 43.2-3. 
DESCRIPTION: L. Licinius Lucullus, the great general of the early 60s, died. Young 
aristocrats carried his corpse to the Forum. Unexpectedly the people assembled and 
asked for a funeral on the Campus Martius. Because no preparations had been made, 
Lucullus' brother Marcus was able to convince the people that it was best to bury 
Lucullus on his estate in Tusculum. 
COMMENT: The date is uncertain. 
Probably a spontaneous action of the plebs. 
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51. Lex Fabricia 
DATE: 57-1 -23 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
assistant = Ap. Claudius pr., Metellus 
Nepos Ap-7 
PARTICIPATION: (slaves) and freedmen 
TERMINOLOGY: semi 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: gladiators 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: dead, wounded 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by tribunes 
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of Cicero's recall SUCCESS : yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Sest. 75-78, Mil. 38; Dio 39.7.2-3. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 440-441; LlNTOTr214; NOWAK, op.cit., 129-131. 
DESCRIPTION: Q. Fabricius (Ao-16) and seven other tribunes proposed the recall of 
Cicero from exile. They had the backing of Pompey. They put the bill before the 
assembly. During the night before the voting, Fabricius and adherents occupied the 
rostra. Clodius and his men (mainly slaves, Cic.) occupied the Forum. Clodius had the 
support of the consul Metellus Nepos and of his brother Appius Claudius the praetor. 
Appius had bought gladiators for the games he was to give. He put the gladiators at the 
disposition of Clodius. In the morning Clodius and his men attacked Fabricius and 
killed some of his group. The tribune Cispius (Ao-13) was also forcibly evicted. 
Cicero's brother Quintus had to hide himself behind the corpses of slaves and 
freedmen. The Forum was filled with blood and the Tiber with corpses (Cic). The bill 
was not passed. 
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, op.cit., 158. 
The tribunes who assisted Fabricius were Milo (Ao-2), Cestilius (Ao-12), Cispius (Ao-
13), Curtius (Ao-14), Fadius (Ao-17), Sestius (Ao-31), and Messius (Ap-29). 
Cicero's description of the carnage created by Clodius is a rhetorical exaggeration. 
Cicero (Sest. 75) also says that Fabricius and his men occupied the rostra shortly 
before sunrise (aliquanto ante lucent), while Clodius took possession of the Forum in 
the middle of the night (multa de nocte), indicating that Clodius was first to take illegal 
action. Cicero obviously wants to play down any manipulation by Fabricius. What 
probably happened was that both parties went down to the Forum at night in order to 
take up positions to influence the voting at dawn. 
Since Cicero mentions slaves and freedmen among the victims, Fabricius probably took 
a band of personal clients and slaves with him to the assembly. 
Dio's contention that the plebs (plèthos) was in favor of Cicero's recall is difficult to 
believe, since the law on the recall eventually had to be proposed in the centuriate 
assembly for it to be passed (B-58). 
52. Attack on Sestius 
DATE: 57-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative? 
LOCATION: Forum, temple of Castor 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
intermediate = Lentidius, Titius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: manus, collegia ? 
PRECINCID.: obnuntiatio 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: Sestius' obstruction SUCCESS: (yes) 
SOURCES: Cic. Sest. 79-80, Mil. 38, Red.Sen. 7, Red.Pop. 14. 
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DESCRIPTION: The tribune Sestius (Ao-31) went to the temple of Castor to tell the 
consul that the auspices were unfavorable. He was attacked by a gang (rnanus) of 
Clodius led by Lentidius and Titius. Sestius was severely wounded. 
COMMENT: It took place shortly after B-51. 
It happened probably during a tribal assembly. The purpose of the assembly is 
unknown. Sestius did an obnuntiatio by which assemblies could be stopped in case of 
unfavorable omens. However, one of the four laws Clodius had passed in January 58 
dealt with the repeal of the Leges Aelia et Fufia, which had established the practice of 
obnuntiatio. Sestius' act therefore was illegal. 
53. Demonstration pro-Cicero 
DATE: 57-5-1, 2, or 3 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: theater 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: intermediate = claqueur 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: populus Romanus 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: announcement of senatorial standpoint, entrance of 
senators, entrance of Clodius, lines of the actor 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Clodius threatened 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: support Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Sest. 116-123. 
DESCRIPTION: After a meeting in the temple of Virtus, the senate expressed itself in 
favor of Cicero's recall. When the senatorial decision was announced in the theater, the 
public applauded. The senators entered the theater and were individually applauded. 
The consul Lentulus Spinther (Ao-36) was loudly cheered. When Clodius entered, he 
was hissed and threatened. The actor on the scene made allusions to Cicero. The 
spectators cheered him loudly. 
COMMENT: It took place during the ludi Florales (May 1-3): GRIMAL, op.cit., 127-
128. 
Cicero, in his description of the events, grants a large role to the actor in directing the 
enthusiasm of the public towards Cicero and the senate and the unfavorable reaction 
towards Clodius. In this case, therefore, the actor acted as a claqueur. 
In August, the centuriate assembly recalled Cicero. It is likely that the public in the 
theater was composed of the people whose votes counted in that assembly. 
54. Sestius at the shows 
DATE: 57-5-9/13 DURATION: 2 days? 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (assistant = MeteUus Scipio Ao-8?) 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: omnes genus hominum, universus populus Romanus 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: entrance Sestius, App. Claudius 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: support Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Sest. 124-126. 
MODERN WORKS: VILLE, op.cit., 62 no.13. 
DESCRIPTION: Gladiatorial shows were organized in the Forum by Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Scipio (Ao-8). AU kinds of people (omnes genus hominum ) were present and 
the Forum was crowded. People were even standing on the Capitol. When P. Sestius 
(Ao-31) showed himself to the public, he was loudly applauded. When Ap. Claudius, 
Clodius' brother, showed himself, he was hissed. 
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, op.cit., 162. 
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At this time Caecilius Metellus (Ao-8) still was on the side of the optimates, which 
might explain the composition and the reaction of the public. 
55. Food riot during the ludi Apollinares 
DATE: 57-7-? (first haß) DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: food riot 
LOCATION: theater 
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Clodius) 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: infima coacta multìtudo 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: collegia ? 
PREC.INCID.: com shortage 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: com shortage SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Ase. 48C. 
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, op.cit., 98 and 111-113; LINTOTT 214; MARSHALL, 
Asconius, 72 and 200; NOWAK, op.cit., 131-132; NICOLET, Métier, 485. 
DESCRIPTION: The urban praetor L. Caecilius Rufus (Ao-9) presided the ludi 
Apollinares (July 5-13). Because of a com shortage a crowd was brought together and 
entered the theater. The spectators were forcibly ejected. 
COMMENT: MARSHALL argues that Asconius has made a mistake over the name of 
the games and that his story should be identified with the food riot during the ludi 
Romani (B-60). Asconius, however, specifically states that the urban praetor presided 
the games. In fact, the ludi Apollinares were always presided by the urban praetor; the 
ludi Romani were the responsibility of the aediles (BALSDON, Leisure, 261). There 
have therefore occurred two distinct food riots in 57. 
It was not a spontaneous riot. Asconius calls the crowd infìnta coacta multitudo ("a 
collected crowd of the lower classes"). His use of coacta (from cogo) implies that the 
crowd did not assemble by itself, but was mobilized by someone. That person most 
probably was Clodius, in view of the parallelism with B-60 (thus also BENNER 111-
113andn.429). 
In BENNER's representation (98 and 111), the adherents of Clodius were already seated 
in the theater and next ejected the other spectators. This, however, does not comply 
with Asconius, who indicates that a crowd from outside forced all spectators out of the 
theater (... multitudo... tumultuata est ut omnes qui in theatre spectandi causa 
consederant pellerentur). 
The riot is considered successful, because the prices seem to have fallen shortly 
afterwards and because in September the senate took measures to improve the com 
supply. 
Shortly after the riot, the senate passed a decree that a bill should be proposed to the 
centuriate assembly to recall Cicero (Cic. Sest. 129; GRIMAL, op.cit., 129 and 164). 
Cicero has it, that right after the decree the com prices suddenly fell because there was a 
general feeling that law and order would be re-established (DOW. 14, Red.Pop. 18). If 
this is true, it is likely that the price fall was not due to a reduced fear of disorder but to 
measures taken by the upper strata, e.g. pressure on the grain traders, to alleviate the 
com situation in order to calm down Clodius' supporters before the voting on the recall 
of Cicero. 
56. Attack on the house of Caecilius Rufus 
DATE: 57-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: house of Caecilius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: collegia ? 
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VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: Caecilius' support for Cicero SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Mil. 38. 
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, op.cit., 112. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius attacked the house of the urban praetor Caecilius Rufus (Ao-
9). 
COMMENT: For the date see Ase. 48C. 
It is possible that Clodius used his contacts in the collegia to bring together an armed 
gang, as he usually did. 
Since Asconius comments the passage of Cicero with the description of B-55, the two 
cases must have been connected and probably followed one another (see also 
BENNER). 
57. Clodius evicted from the Forum 
DATE: 57-8-4 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly? SPECIFICATION: contio ? 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
assistant = Milo Ao-2?, Sestius Ao-31? 
PARTICIPATION: Italians, rural plebs, 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos, ek ton perix poleôn (Plut.), 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: cheira 
MAG.: tr.pl.? 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Clodius 
CAUSE/GOAL: recall Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Plut. Cic. 33.3; Pomp. 49.3. 
DESCRIPTION: Before the voting on the recall of Cicero, a fight took place in the 
Forum between the adherents of Pompey and Clodius. Pompey escorted Cicero's 
brother Quintus to the Forum with a band of armed men (cheira). Pompey's group was 
composed of members of the plebs and people from the Italian cities who had been 
brought to Rome to vote for the recall of Cicero. It came to a fight with the Clodians, 
who were evicted from the Forum. After this the voting took place. 
COMMENT: The events took place right before the subsequent centuriate assembly 
which recalled Cicero (B-58), perhaps during a preliminary contio. The two cases are 
considered distinct, because Plutarch says that the fight took place in the Forum 
(agora), while the centuriate assembly was situated on the Campus Martins. 
The involvement of Milo and Sestius is not attested, but likely because they were 
Clodius' fiercest opponents and at least Milo was involved in the next case. 
58. Lex Cornelia 
DATE: 57-8-4 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate legislative 
LOCATION: Campus Martius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
assistant = Milo Ao-2, cos. Lentulus 
Spinther Ao-36 
PARTICIPATION: Italians, rural plebs, élite 
TERMINOLOGY: municipiis clausis, populus, concursus totius Italiae, tota Italia, 
omnes ordines (Cic), dèmos (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: Pompey's Italian clientele 
MAG.: cos. Lentulus Spinther 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: recall of Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
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SOURCES: App. 2.16; Cic. Au. 4.1.4, Dont. 75 and 90, Mil. 38-39, Pis. 80; Dio 
39.8.2-3; Liv. 104. 
MODERN WORKS: NlCOLET, Métier, 398-400; TAYLOR, PP, 60-62. 
DESCRIPTION: On the Campus Martius a centuriate assembly was convened to vote 
on the bill proposed by the consul Cornelius Lentulus Spinther on the recall of Cicero. 
Pompey had done his best to mobilize support from the Italian countryside. He was 
helped by Milo (App., Liv.). The assembly passed the law and Cicero could return to 
Rome. 
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, op.cit., 165. 
It was obviously not the plebs contionalis which voted in favor of the recall of Cicero. 
As Cicero himself says фот), the people in this case were mobilized not by closing 
the shops, but by closing the Italian cities {non tabernis, sed municipiis clausis). 
Furthermore, the law was passed in the centuriate assembly in which the votes of the 
rich citizens were more important than those of the plebs. 
59. Return of Cicero 
DATE: 57-9-4 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering 
LOCATION: suburbs - porta Capena - СаріюіУРошт - Cicero's house 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Cicero 
intermediate = nomenclátor 
PARTICIPATION: plebs, Italians, rural plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: infima plebs, populus Romanus, multitudo 
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: ludi Romani 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.16; Cic. Att. 4.1.5; Dom. 75-76, Sest. 131; Plut. Cic. 33.5. 
MODERN WORKS: GRIMAL, op.cit., 136 and 166. 
DESCRIPTION: When Cicero returned from exile, he was greeted by the people 
known to his nomenclátor {Att.) and hailed by loudly cheering crowds all the way to 
his house. 
COMMENT: The date was well-chosen. On that day, the ludi Romani started and 
Rome was filled with people from the rural districts who had travelled to the city to 
attend the games (GRIMAL 136). 
60. Food riot during the ludi Romani 
DATE: 57-9-7 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: food riot 
LOCATION: theater - Capitol 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
intermediate = Sergius, Lollius, armati 
duces 
PARTICIPATION: tabernarii, freedmen 
TERMINOLOGY: servi, multitudo, gladiatores (Cic), homilos (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: manus, operae, claque 
PREC.INCID.: corn shortage 
OPP.: com shortage 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, cos. Q. Metellus) 
REPRESSION: ? 
CAUSE/GOAL: com shortage SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 4.1.6-7, Dom. 6-7, 10-16, Farn. 5.17.2; Dio 39.9.2-3. 
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, op.cit., 98; GARNSEY, in: GARNSEY, Trade, 59; 
LGRR 436; LlNTOTT 214; NlCOLET, Métier, 274-276; NOWAK, op.cit., 133-134; 
RICKMAN, op.cit., 173-174; SHACKLETON BAILEY, Atticus //, 167. 
DESCRIPTION: Immediately after Cicero's return, the price of grain had risen high. 
Clodius made his gangs run through the city at night to mobilize the plebs and to 
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suggest Cicero as a scapegoat for the dearth (operarum ilia concursatio nocturna non a 
te ipso instituto me frumentum flagitabat?, Dom. 14). The next day, a crowd rushed 
into the theater, where the ludi Romani were being held. From there the crowd went to 
the Capitol where the senate was meeting in the temple of Concord. (Au., Dom. 11, 
Dio.) The senate was discussing the com situation (An.). Clodius had brought a gang 
of slaves and armed men to the Capitol (manus, Dom. 6). The senate was threatened 
(Dio). Stones were thrown, started by Sergius, Lollius, and other duces of Clodius; the 
consul Q. Metellus was wounded (Dom. 12-14). At the instigation of Clodius and 
Sergius, Lollius, and other intermediate leaders, and with the help of Clodius' gangs 
(operae) the crowd shouted that Cicero had caused the dearth (Att., Dom. 14-15). The 
boni suggested that Pompey should provide a solution. The multitudo agreed and called 
on Cicero to make such a proposal (Att., Dom. 16). Cicero did, and the senate passed a 
decree to put Pompey in charge of the com supply (cura annonae ; Att., Dom. 16, Dio). 
Cicero was applauded after the new fashion (more hoc insulso et novo plausum 
dedisset, Att.). 
COMMENT: It is one of the best documented riots of the late Republic. 
The methods of mobilization and the role of the leadership are interesting. Through the 
organization Clodius had built up he was able to tum the feelings of distress among the 
plebs into collective action. During the night, he had his gangs run through the city to 
mobilize the plebs and to suggest a scapegoat. The timing was well-chosen: the senate 
was meeting on the question of the corn supply. Clodius led the crowd to the senate. 
There he and his intermediate leaders led the people in scapegoating Cicero and in acts 
of violence. His gangs served as a claque in shouting slogans. 
BENNER's suggestion (98) that the Clodians formed part of the theater public does not 
comply with the sources. 
The participants are likely to have consisted mainly of shopkeepers, since Cicero calls 
Sergius, one of Clodius' intermediate leaders in the riot, an "agitator of shopkeepers" 
(concitator tabernariorum, Dom. 13). Also Cicero's use of servi ("slaves", an insult for 
freedmen, Dom. 6) points in this direction. The spectators in the theater were different 
from Clodius' following. It should be stressed that the riot took place during the 
theatrical performances. During the last five days of the ludi Romani (September 15-
19), chariot races were held. During these very popular races 250.000 Romans 
gathered in the Circus Maximus. (BALSDON, Leisure, 248 and 268.) At the time of the 
riot only a limited number attended the games, including quite a few people from the 
countryside (see B-59). 
The question of repression is difficult to answer. Cicero says that Clodius and his 
armed gangs had been driven away before Cicero went to the Capitol (Dom. 6-8 and 
15). This suggests repression. Cicero, however, mentions it in a propagandistic 
speech. In his letter to Atticus, he does not mention it and suggests that Clodius was 
still there to accuse him. What happened was a canalization of the collective behavior. 
Some people (boni, most likely members of the upper class) suggested Pompey as a 
savior. He was an obvious choice. Pompey was the great organizer who was there to 
save Rome in case of trouble. The plebs agreed and their attention was diverted from 
Cicero to Pompey. There was not much Clodius could do now. 
The cause of the dearth is uncertain. There was no real famine yet. The price was high 
and famine was feared (Dom. 12). The shortage might have been due to supply 
problems caused by the lex Clodia frumentaria of 58 and the subsequent manumission 
of slaves on a large scale (RlCKMAN). Clodius blamed Pompey for it. In the senate he 
accused Pompey of having caused the dearth himself, so that he would receive another 
great command, the care for the com supply (Plut. Pomp. 49.5). Pompey, having an 
important clientele among the sea traders and the eastern provinces since his conquest 
of the East and his defeat of the pirates, was certainly capable of creating a grain 
shortage. In Cicero's account there are some indications of a controversy in the senate 
over Pompey's command. Many senators, especially all the consulars except Messalla 
and Afranius (Ap-54), were absent at the meeting during the riot. They feared for their 
lives. (Att., Dom. 8.) During the meeting on the next day, where the details on 
Pompey's cura annonae were filled in, there was a large attendance. Clodius suggested 
in the senate that the decree on Pompey's command should be annulled, since it had 
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been passed by an insufficient number of senators (Dom. 10). The senate however did 
not agree. See also GARNSEY. 
The food shortage could jeopardize the popularity Clodius had gained by his com law 
of the preceding year. Still, he turned the situation to his advantage. He staged a riot at 
the right moment and suggested a scapegoat to the people in distress, before they could 
think of him. The riot shows that Clodius still had a large influence among the plebs. 
Though the riot eventually did not go along his plans, it seems that he escaped the crisis 
with his popularity intact. For the plebs, in any case, the riot was successful. The élite 
was forced to take measures to relieve the distress. 
61. Attack on Cicero's house 
DATE: 57-11-3 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Cicero's house 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: armati homines 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage (houses of M. and Q. 
Cicero; porticus Catuli); wounded (physical 
violence) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: intimidation/support Clodius SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Aft. 4.3.2, Cae/. 78, Mil. 87; Dio 39.20.3. 
MODERN WORKS: NOWAK, op.cit., 135-136. 
DESCRIPTION: At the instigation of Clodius, aimed men drove away the workmen 
who were rebuilding Cicero's house. Catulus' portico was demolished. They threw 
stones at Q. Cicero's house and set it afire. 
COMMENT: Dio mentions that Clodius was stopped by Milo. If so, Cicero would not 
have failed to mention Milo's involvement. Dio probably confuses this case with other 
events. 
There was probably more to this case than Cicero makes us believe. It was not just an 
attack on Cicero's property. When Cicero went into exile, Clodius tore down his house 
and built a temple for the goddess Libertas on the site. The adjacent portico of Catulus 
was destroyed. Clodius built a new one and had his name inscribed on it. These 
symbolic acts by Clodius were to show that he had restored liberty and that he was the 
defender of the interests of the plebs. After Cicero's recall, both his house and Catulus' 
portico were rebuilt by senatorial decree. It was meant to destroy the monuments of 
Clodius' popular power. By sabotaging the restoration Clodius unsuccessfully tried to 
prevent it. 
62. Attack on Cicero 
DATE: 57-11 -11 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, swords) 
REPRESSION: by Cicero and escort 
CAUSE/GOAL: intimidation SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 4.3.3. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTr214; NOWAK, op.cit., 136. 
DESCRIPTION: On the Via Sacra Cicero and his escort were suddenly attacked by 
Clodius and his operae. Cicero withdrew in Tettius Damio's forecourt, from which 
they could keep the Clodians at a distance. 
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63. Attack on Milo's house 
DATE: 57-11-12 DURATION: < Iday 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Milo's house 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: homines, notissimi ex omni latrocinio Clodiano (Cic.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae ? 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: dead 
REPRESSION: by Flaccus and gang 
CAUSE/GOAL: intimidation SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 4.3.3, Sest. 85, Mil. 38; Dio 39.20.3. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTr214; NOWAK, op.cit., 136-137. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius tried to storm and burn Milo's (Ao-2) house in the Cermalus 
with armed men. Q. Flaccus with a band of strong men prevented it and killed the most 
notorious adherents of Clodius. 
COMMENT: Flaccus is otherwise unknown. He probably was one of the assistant or 
intermediate leaders of the Ciceronians. 
Dio says that Milo prevented Clodius' attack. This remains uncertain, because Cicero 
would have mentioned Milo's involvement if it had been the case. 
64. Riot at the senate 
DATE: 57-12-? DURATION: < Iday 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Forum (at the Curia) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: senate threatened 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. ß.Fr. 2.1.3. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 442; NOWAK, op.cit., 137-138. 
DESCRIPTION: The senate was debating on the time of intended trials and elections. 
Clodius wanted the elections to be held before the trials. His opponents wanted the 
reverse order. When Clodius spoke, his operae outside the Curia raised an uproar, 
probably to intimidate Milo's friends. The session of the senate was adjourned. 
COMMENT: Clodius was one of the persons who had to stand trial. He wanted the 
aedilician elections, for which he was a candidate, to pass first. If he was elected, he 
had the immunity of a magistrate and could not be prosecuted. Clodius was elected 
aedile and not convicted. 
65. Trial of Milo 
DATE: 56-2-6 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae, claque 
PREC.INCID.: appearance of Pompey 
OPP.: com shortage? 
MAG.: aed. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat, wounded (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: by Cicero and gang 
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CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Milo SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Fam. l.Sb.l, Q.Fr. 2.3.2; Dio 39.18-19; Plut. Pomp. 48.7. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 299; LlNTOTT 214; NOWAK, op.cit., 138-139 and 153. 
DESCRIPTION: Milo (Ao-2) was prosecuted by Clodius for violence. Pompey 
appeared at the trial as a witness. During his speech he was hindered by clamor from 
Clodius' gangs (operae, Cic). After he finished Clodius spoke, but he received the 
same treatment by the Ciceronians (Cic). Clodius started rhythmic shouts with his 
gangs. Clodius asked "Who lets the people starve?". Gangs: "Pompey!". C: "Who 
wants to go to Alexandria?". G: "Pompey!". C: "Who do you want to go to 
Alexandria?". G: "Crassus!". Next the Clodians spit at the others. A scuffle followed, 
Clodius was thrown off the rostra and both groups ran away. (Cic.) The trial was 
adjourned for several days. Milo was later acquitted. 
COMMENT: Plutarch's version differs in that he mentions different slogans: "Which 
general is a pansy? Pompey! Who is a homosexual? Pompey! Who scratches his head 
with one finger? Pompey!" Plutarch also mentions the interesting feature that Clodius 
shook his toga as a sign for his gangs to answer him. According to Dio, Clodius used 
this method of rhythmic slogans more often. 
Probably Pompey's cura annonae had not been very successful thus far, because 
Clodius accused him of starving the people and in April Pompey received additional 
funds because of the dearth (Cic. Q.Fr. 2.6.1-2). 
After this event, Clodius reinforced his gangs and Pompey mobilized support from the 
countryside. Pompey had lost the support of the plebs contionalis (contionarius Ule 
populas). (Cic Q.Fr. 2.3.4.) 
Alexandria refers to the Egyption question. Pompey was interested in receiving the 
lucrative task of restoring king Ptolemy to the throne of Egypt. Ptolemy was willing to 
pay generously for his reinstatement in power. 
66. Riot at the Megalesia 
DATE: 56-4-8 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: theater 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: (slaves), freedmen 
TERMINOLOGY: servi 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: vici 
MAG.: aed. Clodius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: games for Clodius' following SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Har.Resp. 22-26. 
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, op.cit., 113-114; LENAGHAN, op.cit., 114-117; 
NOWAK, op.dr., 140. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius as aedile had organized the Megalesian games. At a given 
sign (signo dato) by Clodius, a mob of slaves, collected from all the neighborhoods 
(vis...ex omnibus vicis collecta servorum), stormed into the theater. The consul 
Lentulus, the senate, the équités, and all the boni stood up in protest and left the theater. 
The public was forced out of the theater. The games were now performed for slaves 
only. 
COMMENT: For the date: LENAGHAN 117. 
Cicero's contention that Clodius only admitted slaves is exaggerated. Some slaves will 
have been among the crowd, but Cicero used the servile element as an invective. The 
crowd is likely to have been composed of Clodius' usual urban following: the members 
of the collegia and the neighborhood organizations (vici ), i.e. shopkeepers (freedmen) 
and some slaves. See LENAGHAN 116. Clodius probably had not had the opportunity to 
issue tickets to the urban plebs. Now he violently provided access to the popular games 
for the urban plebs. 
Perhaps the riot was connected to problems in the corn supply (see B-65 and BENNER). 
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Piso (Ap-55), who at that moment was governor of Macedón, had sent convicts to 
Clodius for him to throw to the lions during the games (Cic. Pis. 89). 
67. Demonstration pro-Clod ius 
DATE: 56-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: conno 
LOCATION: Forum (at the Curia) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius, Pompey, Crassus 
assistant = Cato Ap-39 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos, homilos, pollai (Dio), universas populus (Val.Max.) 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: contemporary popular leader Clodius 
MAG.: tr.pl. Cato 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: senate threatened 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by cos. Marcellinus and senate 
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 39.27.3-29.3; Val.Max. 6.2.6. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 443; LlNTOTr214. 
DESCRIPTION: After the conference of Luca, Pompey and Crassus decided to stand 
for the consulate of 55. Since their candidacy had been submitted iiregularly, the consul 
Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus objected. Therefore, through С Cato (Ap-39), they tried to 
postpone the elections, so that they could run for office according to the laws. The 
senate protested by a decree to have the senate dress in mourning as in times of great 
distress. Cato tried to sabotage the voting in the senate by calling in plebeians from 
outside the senate house, for the senate was not allowed to vote when nonsenators were 
present. Other tribunes prevented the entrance of the plebs, so the decree was passed. 
The senate also decreed not to partake in any public events, such as games. Cato 
opposed this too. The senate went outside to the assembled people. The consul 
Marcellinus addressed them. He denounced Pompey's large power and was loudly 
cheered by the people (universus populus, Val.Max.). But now Clodius, who after 
Luca had become reconciled with Pompey, spoke to the people on Pompey's behalf. 
The senators showed their indignation and Clodius went to the senate house. The 
senators denied him access and Clodius was surrounded by the équités, who threatened 
to kill him. Clodius called upon the people. They came to his rescue threatening to bum 
the senate house and to kill Clodius' assailants. 
Pompey and Crassus afterwards were elected according to plan. 
COMMENT: Valerius Maximus only mentions Marcellinus' speech on Pompey to the 
people, but it is likely that it belongs to this case. Dio mentions the speech as well. 
The people probably came together in a contio called by Cato before the senate meeting. 
The tribunes in support of Marcellinus probably were Antistius (Ao-3) and Racilius 
(Ao-28). Plancius (Ao-26) is unlikely to have been involved, because of his low profile 
during his tribunate. The other known tribunes of 56, Gallus (Ар-10), Nonius (Ap-
32), Plautius (Ap-37), Procilius (Ap-40), and Rutilius (Ap-44), were all supporters of 
Cato or Pompey. 
The attitude change in the crowd is interesting. First, Cato had the crowd on his side. 
Then the senators explained their opinion to the people by way of Lentulus' speech. 
The people now agreed with the senate's standpoint and obviously did not like 
Pompey's powerful position. But when Clodius, still popular, was attacked, the crowd 
finally went over to the side of Pompey and Clodius. Of all the popular leaders 
involved in this case, Clodius clearly had the largest influence with the plebs. It shows 
how much Pompey needed Clodius to have his plans realized in the city, unless 
Pompey was prepared to bring country folk and veterans into the city, which was much 
more troublesome. 
68. Cato the Younger's return from Cyprus 
DATE: 56-?-? (Fall) DURATION: < 1 day 
ΊΎΡΕ: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: (triumph) 
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LOCATION: Rome, on the banks of the Tiber - Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = magistrates, senate 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: booty 
MAG.: all magistrates 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Cato SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Plut. Cat.Min. 39.1 and 3; Vell.Pat. 2.45.5. 
DESCRIPTION: Cato the Younger (Ao-27) had been sent to annex Cyprus. When he 
returned, all the magistrates, priests, and senators and many of the people went to the 
Tiber to greet him. Both banks were crowded with people. As Cato entered with his 
ships, it looked like a triumph. The treasure from Cyprus was carried through the 
Forum. 
COMMENT: For the date: NlSBET, op.cit., xxxvii. 
69. Destruction of the tribunician tablets 
DATE: 56-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Capitol 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Cicero 
assistant = Milo Ao-2 and tribunes 
PARTICIPATION: clients? 
TERMINOLOGY: pollai (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae ? 
MAG.: tr.pl. 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: annulment of Clodius' laws SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Dio 39.21.1; Plut. Cat.Min. 40, С/с. 34. 
DESCRIPTION: Cicero, with Milo (Ao-2) and some tribunes (Dio) plus a large group 
of men, went to the Capitol and tore down the tablets with the accounts of Clodius' 
tribunate. This was to show that Clodius' laws, among which the law on Cicero's 
exile, were illegal. Clodius protested and also Cato the Younger, who was afraid that 
his acts in Cyprus would be annulled. For Cato had received the Cyprian command 
through a Clodian law. 
COMMENT: It must have happened after Cato's return from Cyprus, for Plutarch 
places the events after the return in both accounts and has Cato refer to his mission to 
Cyprus in the debate on Cicero's action. 
The tribunes with Cicero probably were Antistius (Ao-3) and Racilius (Ao-28). See B-
67. Gallus (Ар-10) might be a possibility too, since he was friendly with Cicero. 
Cicero probably made use of the gangs Milo had organized. It is most unlikely that 
many members of the urban plebs were eager to participate in this event, because in that 
case they would have acted against a still very popular leader and the com law he had 
passed. Cicero, therefore, will have taken clients and personal retainers with him. 
Cicero's action was not successful, because Clodius' laws were not annulled. 
70. Consular elections 
DATE: 56-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate elective 
LOCATION: Campus Martius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey, (Crassus) 
PARTICIPATION: soldiers, slaves 
TERMINOLOGY: stratiótai (Dio, Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: army, operae ? 
MAG.: (cos.cand. Pompey) 
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VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) and Cato (Ao-27) 
CAUSE/GOAL: election to the consulate SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.17; Dio 39.31; Plut. Cat.Min. 41.4-5, Crass. 15.3-5, Pomp. 51.4 
and 52.1-2. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 443; LlNTOTT 214; NOWAK, op.cit., 97-90. 
DESCRIPTION: On the night before the consular elections, Pompey (and Crassus, 
Plut. Crass.) and his competitor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) went to the 
Campus Martius. Their followers started fighting, and one of Domitius' slaves, a 
torchbearer, was killed. Cato the Younger (Ao-27), who was fighting on Domitius' 
side, was wounded. Domitius had to run. P. Crassus, son of Crassus the triumvir and 
legate of Caesar, had brought soldiers from Caesar's army to Rome to vote in the 
elections (Dio, Plut.). Pompey and Crassus were elected. 
COMMENT: Since the elections were postponed, it must have happened towards the 
end of the year. 
Plutarch says that Pompey was afraid of Cato drawing the "healthy part of the people" 
(tou dèmou to hugiainon. Pomp. 52.1) over to his side and therefore resorted to 
violence. Since it concerned an election in the centuriate assembly which favored the 
propertied classes, by the healthy part of the people Plutarch probably means the boni 
in the Ciceronian sense. 
71. Praetorian elections 
DATE: 55-2-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate elective 
LOCATION: Campus Martius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae ? 
MAG.: cos. Pompey, (Crassus) 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: by Pompey 
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Vatinius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 39.32.1-2; Plut. CatMin. 52. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTT 214; NOWAK, op.cit., 99; TAYLOR, PP, 81-82. 
DESCRIPTION: Pompey and Crassus wanted to have their own candidates, especially 
Vatinius, elected to the praetorship. Cato the Younger (Ao-27) also was a candidate in 
opposition to them. At the assembly presided by Pompey the first tribe voted for Cato. 
Pompey said he had heard thunder, and for this bad omen dissolved the assembly 
(pbnuntiatio). Next the voters were bribed and the optimates {beltistoi, Plut.) ejected 
from the Campus. Vatinius was elected praetor by force. A part of the people were 
assembled in a contio by a tribune. Cato addressed them and he was escorted home by 
a large crowd (plèthos). 
COMMENT: For the date: D.R. SHACKLETON BAILEY (ed.), Cicero: Epistulae ad 
Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum, Text and Commentary, Cambridge 1980, p. 189. 
This case shows the reputation Cato had for his staunch defense of legal procedures. 
See also B-73. Pompey and Crassus could evidently only count on part of the voters 
and had to resort to violence. Furthemiore, at least the city-dwellers would not have 
forgotten Cato's grain measure of 62. 
Dio mentions that Cato's candidature was obstructed, but that the elections themselves 
went without violence. 
The tribune who assembled the contio for Cato probably was either Ateius (Ao-5) or 
Aquillius (Ao-4). See Dio 39.32.3. 
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72. Aedilician elections 
DATE: 55-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal elective 
LOCATION: Campus Martius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey 
assistant = Messius Ap-29? 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: cos. Pompey 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead. 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: election of aediles SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.17; Dio 39.32.2; Plut. Pomp. 53.3. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTr214; NOWAK, op.cit., 98-99. 
DESCRIPTION: During the aedilician elections there was a fight. People were 
wounded and killed. Pompey came home with a blood-spattered toga. 
COMMENT: It took place shortly after B-71. The elections always were situated on the 
Campus. 
Messius perhaps was involved in this case. He was a Pompeian assistant leader and 
was aedile in 55. 
73. Lex Trebonia de provinciis consularibus 
DATE: 55-?-? DURATION: 2 days 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: confio, then tribal 
legislative 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey, Crassus, (Caesar) 
assistant = Trebonius Ap-49, and tribunes 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos (Dio) plèthos, politai, pollai (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: cheira, armed men 
MAG.: tr.pl. Trebonius, cos. Crassus and Pompey 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead; symbolic (statues pelted) 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Cato, Favonius, Ninnius, Ateius, and Aquillius 
CAUSE/GOAL: provincial commands SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 39.32.3-36.2; Plut. Cat.Min. 43.1-5, Crass. 15.5. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 440; LINTOTT214; NOWAK, op.cit., 99-100. 
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Trebonius proposed a law to grant the consuls Pompey 
and Crassus the governorship of Spain and Syria respectively. Also he proposed to 
extend Caesar's command in Gaul for five years. Opposition came from Cato the 
Younger (Ao-27) and Favonius (Ao-38). They were helped by Ninnius (Ao-24) and 
the tribunes Ateius (Ao-5) and Aquillius (Ao-4) (Dio). Favonius and Cato spoke at a 
contio. Favonius used up his time complaining against his time limit. Cato did the 
same, speaking on the political situation in general (Dio). Cato deliberately exceeded his 
time limit (Dio), so that he would be stopped by Trebonius and have another reason to 
criticize him. Trebonius acted accordingly and had his lictor drag Cato from the Forum. 
Cato came back and tried to speak again. Trebonius had him put in jail. Trebonius 
however had to release him for fear of the people. For Cato was accompanied to the 
prison by a large crowd (plèthos, Plut.) who wanted to listen to what he had to say. 
The opposing tribunes did not get a chance to address the assembly (Dio). 
The next day a tribal assembly was convened to vote on the bill. Aquillius had spent the 
night in the senate house, so that he could join the assembly at dawn. But Trebonius 
barricaded the building to prevent Aquillius from getting out. The Forum was occupied 
during the night to keep Cato, Ateius, Favonius, and Ninnius out. Nevertheless they 
managed to get in and declared an omen (obnuntiatio) in order to break up the 
assembly. The lictors of Trebonius and other tribunes (Dio) and/or armed men (hopla, 
Plut.) drove them out and wounded their followers. A few were killed. The law was 
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passed. As the assembly was dissolving, Ateius took the wounded Aquillius and 
showed his wounds to the people. Pompey and Crassus intervened with a bodyguard 
(cheira. Dio) and forced the two tribunes away. They immediately called another 
meeting and passed the measures regarding Caesar's command. Many came together 
and pelted the statues of Pompey (Plut.). But Cato intervened and made them stop. 
COMMENT: The tribunes who acted in support of Trebonius are not attested. But they 
are likely to be found among the known assistant leaders of the populares in this year: 
Allienus (Ap-3), Fabius (Ар-15), Mamilius (Ap-25), Peducaeus (Ap-35), and Roscius 
(Ap-42). 
The attack on Pompey's statues should be seen as a symbolic act of the plebs against 
the injustice which the virtuous Cato had encountered. 
74. Crassus' departure from Rome 
DATE: 55-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly? SPECIFICATION: contio ? 
LOCATION: Rome (at the city gate) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Ateius Ao-5 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: pollai, ochlos (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: burning stove 
MAG.: tr.pl. Ateius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Crassus threatened 
REPRESSION: by Pompey and tribunes 
CAUSE/GOAL: to prevent Crassus' departure SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: App. 2.18; Dio 39.39.6-7; Plut. Crass. 16.3-6; Vell.Pat. 2.46.3. 
MODERN WORKS: TAYLOR, PP. 85. 
DESCRIPTION: Crassus was preparing to leave Rome for his province Syria. It was 
obvious that he had planned a campaign against the Parthians. This was considered an 
unjust war. Ateius assembled a group of people to prevent Crassus' departure. The 
people blocked his passage. Crassus asked Pompey to escort him because of Pompey's 
popularity. As the crowd saw Pompey, they let Crassus pass. Ateius wanted to 
imprison Crassus, but was held back by other tribunes. Ateius, then, placed a burning 
stove at the city gate and cast curses over it. 
COMMENT: Ateius used religious symbols to curse Crassus' Parthian campaign and to 
show the injustice of the war. 
The tribunes who held back Ateius might have been Allienus (Ap-3), Fabius (Ар-15), 
Mamilius (Ap-25), Peducaeus (Ap-35), Roscius (Ap-42), and Trebonius (Ap-49). 
75. Attack on Cato the Younger 
DATE: 54-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: ochlos, pièthos, dèmos 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Cato's entrance in the Forum 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, Cato) 
REPRESSION: by Cato (Ao-27) 
CAUSE/GOAL: annulment of Cato's decree SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Plut. Cat.Min. 44.2-4. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 443; LlNTOTT 214-215. 
DESCRIPTION: Cato (Ao-27), then praetor, had the senate pass a decree against 
electoral corruption. The multitude who found the corruption very lucrative was 
opposed to Cato's decree. When Cato went to the tribunal he was abused and stoned. 
Cato was able to reach the rostra, and through a speech calmed the people. 
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76. Cicero in the theater 
DATE: 54-7-9 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: theater 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Cicero's entrance 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Cicero SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Att. 4.15.6, Q.Fr. 2.15.2. 
DESCRIPTION: Cicero came back to Rome and went to the theater. As he entered, he 
was loudly applauded. 
COMMENT: This happened during the ludi Apollinares (July 5-13). These games were 
possibly organized by M. Fonteius, pr.urb. (MRR 221). 
77. Milo in the theater 
DATE: 54-?-? (Summer) DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: theater 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Milo's entrance? 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Milo SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Q.Fr. 3.1.13. 
DESCRIPTION: Milo (Ao-2) received applause in the theater. 
COMMENT: Cicero's letter was written in September. Perhaps Milo was applauded 
during the ludi Romani (September 15-19). 
These games were not the games Milo organized himself and on which he spent three 
inheritances (Cic. Q.Fr. 3.6.6, written in November 54). 
78. Julia's funeral 
DATE: 54-9-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: funeral procession 
LOCATION: Forum - Campus Martius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: intermediate? = philoi 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: populus (Liv.), dèmos, plèthos (Plut.) 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: clients? 
PREC.INCID.: Julia's death 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: physical violence? 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) 
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Caesar and Pompey? SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Dio 39.64; Liv. 106; Plut. Caes. 23.4, Pomp. 53.4-5. 
DESCRIPTION: Julia, Caesar's daughter and Pompey's wife, died. Pompey wanted to 
bury her on his estate, but the people violently seized the corpse in the Forum and 
buried her on the Campus Martius. It was organized by friends {philoi) of Pompey and 
Caesar or by people who wanted to do them a favor (Dio). The people did it more out 
of pity for the young woman than to honor Pompey and Caesar. But Caesar was more 
honored than Pompey (Plut.). Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) protested against the 
funeral in vain. 
COMMENT: For the date of Julia's death: Cic. Q.Fr. 3.1.17. 
The Campus Martius served as an honorable burial ground. 
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79. Trial of Gabinius 1 
DATE: 54-9-28 DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSraP: yes TYPE: top/assistant = Domitius Ao-37, Appius 
Claudius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: concursus magnus, universus populus (Cic), dèmos, pollai (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Gabinius' appearance 
MAG.: cos. Domitius, App. Claudius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Gabinius) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Gabinius SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Cic. Q.Fr. 3.1.24; Dio 39.60.3-4 and 62. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 322-328. 
DESCRIPTION: Gabinius (Ap-18) had to stand trial for his intervention in Egyptian 
politics. The consuls Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) and Appius Claudius Pulcher, 
Clodius' brother, pressed charges against him. Gabinius was unpopular with the 
people, because of a prohibition in the Sibylline books of an intervention in Egypt. The 
two consuls made the oracle public, despite Pompey's opposition. Appius Claudius 
wanted to please the plebs (demagogia) and hoped to receive bribes from Gabinius if he 
would cause a riot (suntarassó ). (Dio.) 
Gabinius entered Rome unconspiciously during the night of the 27th. The next day he 
had to stand trial. The entire Roman people were in favor of his conviction. He was 
almost killed by the crowd. Gabinius was nevertheless acquitted for the moment. 
COMMENT: Several charges were pressed against Gabinius. The most important of 
those was the restoration of Ptolemy to the throne of Egypt without permission of the 
Roman government. For this charge, Gabinius was eventually convicted and forced 
into exile. 
Both consuls, by making the Sibylline oracles public, were responsible for creating an 
anti-Gabinius mood among the plebs. App. Claudius probably was responsible for the 
riot. 
80. Trial of Gabinius 2 
DATE: 54-10/11-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum? 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top/assisant = Domitius Ao-37, Appius 
Claudius 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos, plèthos (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: flood 
MAG.: cos. Domitius, App. Claudius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: jury threatened 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Pompey 
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Gabinius SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Q.Fr. 3.7.1; Dio 39.61 and 63. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 438. 
DESCRIPTION: The Tiber flooded the lower parts of the city. Many houses, shops, 
and granaries were destroyed and many people died. The plebs considered this a 
punishment from the gods because of Gabinius' acquittal, for Gabinius had gone to 
Egypt despite the prohibition in the Sibylline books. The plebs threatened the jurymen. 
Pompey was unable to change the people's attitude. Gabinius was convicted. 
COMMENT: Dio erroneously puts the flood before Gabinius' return and acquittal. The 
flood however happened in October or November: D.R. SHACKLETON BAILEY (ed.), 
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Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum, Text and Commentary, 
Cambridge 1980, p. 220. 
For the leadership see В-79. 
DURATION: < 1 day 
SPECIFICATION: political 
TYPE: top/assistant = Dominus Ao-15, Messalla 
TYPE: wounded (Sulla's slave) 










CAUSE/GOAL: election of candidates 
SOURCES: App. 2.19; Ase. 20C. 
MODERN WORKS: MARSHALL, Asconius, 128; LlNTOTT 214. 
DESCRIPTION: The competitors of M. Aemilius Scaurus in the consular elections 
attacked a slave of Faustus Sulla, son of Sulla the dictator, with an aimed gang of 300 
men {armati, Ase). 
COMMENT: The competitors of Scaurus who led the attack were Cn. Domitius 
Calvinus and M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (MARSHALL). 
Appian only mentions violence in general at the consular elections of 54. 
SUCCESS: yes 
DURATION: < 1 day 
SPECIFICATION: triumph 
TYPE: assistant = tribunes of the plebs 
82. Pomptinus' triumph 
DATE: 54-?-? 
TYPE: public manifestation 




MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tribunes 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: disrupt triumph SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Dio 39.65. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 438; LlNTOTT 215. 
DESCRIPTION: Gaius Pomptinus wanted to celebrate a triumph over the Gauls, but 
no one was prepared to grant him permission. The praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba 
granted citizenship to some people, so that they could vote on the triumph. The triumph 
was granted and some of the tribunes, who had been left out of the assembly, stirred up 
a riot during the triumph. People were wounded. 
COMMENT: Perhaps the persons who received citizenship were Gauls. Pomptinus 
was Caesar's predecessor in Gaul. One of the tribunes that might have caused the 
disturbance was Q. Mucius Scaevola (Cic. Att. 4.18.4, Q.Fr. 3.4.6). Since it is 
unknown where Pomptinus and Scaevola stood politically, the political value of this 
case is impossible to establish. The other tribunes of 54 who might have been involved 
are: Laelius (Ap-21) and Terentius (Ao-32). 







DURATION: < 1 day 
SPECIFICATION: trial 
TYPE: top = Pompey 
assistant = Cato Ap-39 
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MOBILIZATION: ORG.: clientele 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Asinius Pollio) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Cato SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Sen. Contr. ТАЛ. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 442 and n.164; LlNTOTr215. 
DESCRIPTION: С Cato was prosecuted by Asinius Pollio. During the trial Asinius 
was attacked by Cato's clients. 
COMMENT: Pompey helped his assistant leader Cato during the trial and Cato was 
acquitted. 
84. Riot on the Via Sacra 
DATE: 53-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Forum (Via Sacra) 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
assistant = Hypsaeus Ap-56 
PARTICIPATION: personal attendants 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: OKG.imanus 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Milo (Ao-2) 
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Hypsaeus SUCCESS : no 
SOURCES: Ase. 48C. 
MODERN WORKS: MARSHALL, Asconius, 199; LlNTOTr215. 
DESCRIPTION: The gangs of the competing candidates for the consulate of 52, P. 
Plautius Hypsaeus and Milo (Ao-2), got into a fight on the Via Sacra. Milo's gang 
unexpectedly lost and many fell. 
COMMENT: Asconius says that the headmen, in this case Clodius and Cicero, were 
usually with the candidates they supported. 
The consular elections were cancelled because of the bribery and the violence used. 
Neither Milo nor Hypsaeus were elected. 
85. Consular elections 
DATE: 53-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate elective 
LOCATION: Campus Martius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius 
PARTICIPATION: ? 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: operae 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage (to the saepta), 
wounded (stoning) 
REPRESSION: by Milo (Ao-2) 
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Hypsaeus SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: Ase. 30C; Cic. Mil. 41 and 43. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTr215. 
DESCRIPTION: At the assembly for the consular elections Clodius tried to force the 
voting area (saepta). He used swords and stones. As Milo appeared, Clodius had to 
run. (Cic.) 
COMMENT: Clodius tried to manipulate the voting for the candidates he supported 
(Hypsaeus Ap-56 and Metellus Scipio Ao-8). Clodius and Milo probably had an aimed 
gang with them. Cicero mentions that Milo was accused of having blood-stained hands. 
Asconius gives a general account of the violence around the consular elections. 
The elections were cancelled. See also B-84. 
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86. Riot after Clodius' death 
DATE: 52-1-18/19 DURATION: 2 days 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political (contio) 
LOCATION: Palatine hill - Forum - throughout Rome 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Munatius Ap-31, Rufus Ap-38, 
Sallustius Ap-45 
intermediate = Sex. Clodius, noti homines 
PARTICIPATION: plebs, slaves, shopkeepers 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos, plèthos (App), multidudo, servi, infima plebs.vulgus, 
populus (Asc.), homiloi, ochlos (Dio) 
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: librarium, fasces, martyr 
PREC.INCID.: Clodius' assassination 
MAG.: tr.pl. Munatius, Rufus 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage (Curia, Basilica Porcia, 
houses) 
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Milo's friends 
CAUSE/GOAL: revenge SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.21; Asc. 7, 31-33,42-43,46,49C; Cic. Mil. 13, 27, 33, 90; Dio 
40.48-49; Li v. 107. 
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, AsconiusII, 112-113; MARSHALL, Asconius, 167-
168; LINTOTT215; NlCOLET, Métier, 464-465. 
DESCRIPTION: Clodius and Milo (Ao-2) met coincidentally outside Rome. Milo had a 
band of gladiators with him and murdered Clodius. In the evening the news reached 
Rome; the plebs was thrown into great distress. A great crowd of slaves and plebeians 
(infìmae plebis et servorum maxima multitudo, Asc.) surrounded the corpse in Clodius' 
house on the Palatine hill. Fulvia, Clodius' widow, hightened the indignation of the 
crowd by showing his wounds. The next moming an even larger crowd of the same 
composition assembled, among whom a number of noti homines (Asc.) The tribunes 
T. Munatius Plancus and Q. Pompeius Rufus went to Clodius' house as well. They 
persuaded the people to carry the corpse to the Forum. There the tribunes addressed the 
people in a contio (Asc). Another, less riotous meeting was held by the tribune С 
Sallustius Crispus (Asc.) Under the leadership of Sextus Clodius (Asc, Cic.) the crowd 
carried the body into the senate house and cremated the corpse with the Curia and the 
adjoining Basilica Porcia. Amidst the tumult Sex. Clodius put up the case with Clodius' 
bills (librarium) as a palladium (Cic. 33). Then the crowd (Clodiana multitudo) tried to 
bum the houses of Milo and Lepidus the interrex, but was repelled by arrows. Next, 
the crowd took the fasces and carried them first to the houses of Scipio and Hypsaeus 
and then to the gardens of Pompey. At that point the people loudly called Pompey 
consul and dictator. The house of Lepidus was put under siege for several days by the 
gangs (factiones) of Hypsaeus (Ap-56) and Scipio (Ao-8). They wanted to take 
advantage of Milo's current impopularity by demanding that the postponed consular 
elections should be held immediately. Lepidus' house was releived by Milo's gang 
(manus). 
COMMENT: For the date: Ase. 31C; Cic. Mil. 27. 
Asconius' version is the most detailed; his report is taken as the leading story. 
The senator С Vibienus was not among the noti homines (Asc. 32C): FLAMBARD, 
112-113; MARSHALL 167-168. Among the noti homines perhaps were С Clodius and 
P. Pomponius (Ase. 31C). 
The participation of tabernarii is not specifically attested. At Milo's trial (B-88), 
however, it is. Since the shopkeepers were prepared to work for Milo's conviction, 
since they belonged to Clodius' usual following, and since Asconius uses the same 
terminology in this case and in B-88 (Clodiana multitudo, Asc. 33 and 40-41C), their 
participation in this case is highly likely. 
Appian says that the crowd carried the corpse into the Curia and that the more reckless 
ones (propetesteroi) set the building afire. This detail shows that a small group in the 
crowd took the most daring action, while the majority formed a body of bystanders. 
The popular leader Clodius served as a martyr symbol. 
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The role of the leadership is interesting. The news of Clodius' death made the people 
assemble in great numbers. There was a general feeling of distress. It took leadership to 
turn these feelings into direct action. The tribunes told the people to go to the Forum 
and organized a contio. Sex. Clodius led the crowd in the cremation of the corpse. It 
must have been the tribunes as well who suggested the plebs to fetch the fasces and to 
bring them to Pompey. The tribunes were assistant leaders of Pompey, and Pompey for 
some time was hoping to become dictator. For the plebs, Pompey, Rome's big 
decision-maker and savior in times of distress, was an obvious choice. 
One of the bills Clodius had proposed concerned the distribution of the votes of the 
freedmen over all the tribes (Ase. 52C; LGRR 408-409). This explains the participation 
of freedmen and slaves with the prospect of manumission. Sextus Clodius used the 
case with Clodius' bills as a symbol, a palladium. A palladium was a statue of Pallas 
Athena which served as a talisman to a city. Sextus Clodius wanted to tell the people 
that they need not fear after Clodius' death, because his bills were still there to serve 
their interests and to protect them. This was a suggestion of continuity. 
87. More riots after Clodius' death 
DATE: 52-1-27/30? DURATION: > 2 days 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political 
LOCATION: Forum - throughout Rome 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Munatius Ap-31, Rufus Ap-38, 
Sallustius Ap-45 
PARTICIPATION: plebs, slaves, shopkeepers 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos, therapontes (App.) 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Milo's return 
MAG.: tr.pl. Munatius, Rufus, Sallustius 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: dead, material damage (houses) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of Milo's acquittal SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.22; Ase. 33-34; Cic. Mil. 91; Dio 40.49.5-50.1; Liv. 107. 
MODERN WORKS: LlNTOTT 215; J.S. RUEBEL, The Trial of Milo in 52 B.C.: A 
Chronological Study, TAPhA 109 (1979), pp. 231-249. 
DESCRIPTION: After the murder on Clodius, Milo (Ao-2) returned to Rome in secret. 
He distributed money among the tribes, 1000 asses (400 HS) for each individual. A 
few days later, the tribune M. Caelius (Ao-10) held a contio in the Forum on Milo's 
behalf. The crowd consisted of slaves and rustics which Milo had bribed and 
assembled (therapontôn kai andrôn agroikônplèthos, App.). Caelius and Milo told the 
people that Clodius had ambushed Milo. Caelius wanted to have Milo acquitted by a 
public trial on the spot (App.) The other tribunes burst into the Forum with the armed 
and unbribed part of the people, among which there were many slaves (App., Cic). 
Milo and Caelius escaped dressed as slaves, but many of their adherents were killed. 
The riots continued several days. The crowd persecuted the rich, stoned and killed 
them. Houses were plundered and burnt. (App.) 
COMMENT: For the date: RUEBEL 236-237. 
There were actually two distinct cases of collective behavior: the actions of the group 
mobilized by Milo and Caelius and the actions of their opponents. 
Appian does not mention the names of the tribunes who led the crowd against Caelius' 
contio, but it must have been Munatius and the others who also incited the plebs against 
Milo in the previous and subsequent cases. 
For the participation of shopkeepers, see B-86 and 88. 
There was no actual repression, but the disorders after Clodius' death led directly to the 
appointment of Pompey as sole consul {sine collega) and the passing of the emergency 
decree {senatus consultum ultimum), which granted Pompey powers to restore order 
with every possible means. 
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88. Milo's trial 
DATE: 52-4-4/8 DURATION: > 2 days 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Munatius Ap-31, Rufus Ap-38, 
Sallustius Ap-45 
intermediate = claqueurs? 
PARTICIPATION: shopkeepers 
TERMINOLOGY: multitudo, populus (Asc.) 
MOBILIZATION: MAC: tr.pl. Munatius, closing of the shops 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Marcellus threatened 
REPRESSION: by soldiers 
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Milo SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Asc. 37-38, 40-42, 44-45, 50-52C; Cic. Mil. 3, 45; Dio 40.54.1-2; Plut. 
С ie. 35. 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 338-343; J.S. RUEBEL, The Trial of Milo in 52 B.C.: A 
Chronological Study, TAPhA 109 (1979), pp. 231-249. 
DESCRIPTION: Milo (Ao-2) was prosecuted for the murder of Clodius. Munatius, 
Pompeius, and Sallustius held daily camiones against Milo (Asc, Cic). At one of the 
condones they let Pompey appear before the people to express his fear of an attempt 
against his life by Milo (Asc). 
С Causinius Schola, a friend of Clodius, testified against Milo at the trial. When he 
was interrogated by M. Marcellus the public rose a tumult (Ciadiana multitudo, Asc). 
Marcellus feared for his life and took cover. The next day Pompey attended the trial 
with a bodyguard (praesidium, Asc). The Clodians were intimidated and kept quiet for 
several days. On the eve of the last day of the trial, the tribune Munatius called on the 
people in a conilo to close the shops and to attend the trial in great numbers in order to 
prevent Milo's acquittal (Asc). The next day the shops were closed throughout the city 
and Pompey surrounded the Forum with soldiers (Asc). During Cicero's defense the 
crowd shouted at him and Cicero was intimidated. Milo was convicted and went into 
exile. 
COMMENT: For the date: RUEBEL 240-245. 
The participation of artisans and shopkeepers is obvious from the fact that the shops 
(tabernae) were closed. 
89. Scaurus' trial 
DATE: 52-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial 
LOCATION: Forum 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: plèthos (App.) 
MOBILIZATION: ? 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead 
REPRESSION: by soldiers 
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Scaurus SUCCESS: no 
SOURCES: App. 2.24; Dio 40.53.3. 
DESCRIPTION: Pompey restored order by seeing to it that several people who had 
been involved in the electoral corruption and violence in 53 and 52 were prosecuted. 
Pompey's soldiers were present at the trials as a police force. At one of the trials, the 
one of M. Aemilius Scaurus, the people interceded for Scaurus (App.). Pompey's 
soldiers intervened and killed several. The people remained quiet and Scaurus was 
convicted. 
COMMENT: Dio's account seems to apply to Milo's trial (B-88), but the riot is more 
likely to have taken place at this trial or one of the others. Asconius' detailed account of 
Milo's trial does not mention actual violence by the soldiers. 
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Dio's account of the repression by the soldiers is interesting. He says that Pompey 
ordered the soldiers first to drive the people from the Forum with the fiat of their 
swords. When the people refused to leave and kept shouting, the soldiers wounded and 
killed a few. After that, the crowd kept quiet, also during the subsequent trials. Dio's 
account, however, might be anachronistic and influenced by observations of his own 
time (second and third centuries A.D.), when soldiers served permanently as a police 
force in Rome. 
90. Hortensius in the theater 
DATE: 51 -?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater 
LOCATION: Curio's theater 
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ? 
PARTICIPATION: spectators 
TERMINOLOGY: — 
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Hortensius' entrance 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Messalla SUCCESS : yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Fam. 8.2.1 
MODERN WORKS: LGRR 438; SHACKLETON BAILEY, Familiares I, p. 385. 
DESCRIPTION: M. Valerius Messalla Rufus was prosecuted de ambitu. He was 
defended by the orator Q. Hortensius Hortalus. In spite of abundant evidence Messalla 
was acquitted. The day after the acquittal, Hortensius entered the theater and was 
immediately hissed. Public opinion forced Messalla to be convicted afterwards. 
COMMENT: Messalla was consul in 53. He had possibly received support from 
Caesar during his campaign in 54 (RE Valerius 268, col. 167). Messalla joined Caesar 
in the civil war (BRUHNS, Caesar, 39). Therefore the demonstration in the theater 
should be seen as &nü-populares. 
91. Election of Antony to the augurate 
DATE: 50-8-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal elective 
LOCATION: Campus Maitius 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar 
assistant = Curio Ap-46 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: familiares 
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: clientele? 
MAG.: tr.pl. Curio 
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded? (physical violence) 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Antony SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: Cic. Phil. 2.4. 
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 215; TAYLOR, PP, 93-94. 
DESCRIPTION: By means of violence by Curio and his familiares Antony (Ap-5) was 
elected to the augurate. 
COMMENT: For the date: SHACKLETON BAILEY, Familiares 1,429. 
Antony's competitor was Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37). 
92. Pro-Curio demonstration 
DATE: 50-?-? DURATION: < 1 day 
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering 
LOCATION: Forum - Curio's house 
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Curio Ap-46 
PARTICIPATION: plebs 
TERMINOLOGY: dèmos (App., Plut.) 
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MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: flowers 
MAG.: tr.pl. Curio 
VIOLENCE: no 
REPRESSION: no 
CAUSE/GOAL: to support Curio SUCCESS: yes 
SOURCES: App. 2.27; Plut. Caes. 30.2, Pomp. 58.5-6. 
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Curio had gained popularity by proposing bills on the 
building and repairing of roads (lex viaria) and on the food distribution (lex 
alimentaria). He also proposed that Pompey and Caesar should lay down their 
commands and dismiss their armies simultaneously. The people liked the proposal 
because they hoped it would prevent civil war. After having put the proposal in the 
senate, Curio went outside and was welcomed by the people. They escorted him home 
with applause and scattered flowers and guirlands on him. 
COMMENT: On Curio's bills see: Cic. Fam. 8.6.5; LGRR 472-473; SHACKLETON 
BAILEY, Familiares I, 416-417. 
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Appendix С 
The Negative Image of the Demagogue in Fourth-Century 
Greek Authors 
This appendix surveys the negative image of the demagogue as it appears in the Greek 
authors of the fourth century. 
Third column: Checked are the qualities that are ascribed in the passage to the 
demagogue(s). 
F = flattery of the people, 
S = causing sedition, 
Ρ = aiming at personal power. 
Fourth column: Checked is the specific term (if any) with which the demagogue is 
indicated. 
D = demagogos, demagogia, dèmagogeo, etc., 
R = rhetor, 
Ρ = prostates. 




















































































The Negative Image of the Demagogue in the Sources on the 
Roman Republic from 80-50 B.C. 
The table below is a concordance of the negative image of the demagogue as it occurs in 
the sources of the late Republic. The analysis of the use of the concept of demagogy 
has some ground in common with what is called content analysis in the social sciences. 
But the latter is especially about word frequencies. Since we will never know exactly 
how far the sources that have come down to us are representative of antiquity, and 
since many sources are lacunose, a statistical analysis of the image of the demagogue 
does not seem sensible.1 Therefore, I have not attempted to be exhaustive. The 
evidence for the late Republic is nevertheless abundant. This appendix is a survey of 
the most obvious and explicit passages. It shows how the negative image of the 
demagogue appears in ancient literature. Moreover, it is possible to see what reproaches 
are made to what person. 
The context of the passages, of course, differs widely. But it is just that which 
proves the carry-over of Greek stereotypes in the different literary types: historical, 
philosophical, and rhetorical works, and orations. Take the example of the quality 
"flattery" in three different works: In his Roman History, Dio Cassius says: "Caesar 
courted the good-will of the multitude."2 What Dio is referring to is Caesar's support of 
the Manilian law putting Pompey in charge of the war in the East. It was a measure the 
plebs supported. The next example is from one of Plutarch's biographies: "Then there 
remained but one accusation for envious tongues to make, namely, that (Pompey) 
devoted himself more to the people than to the senate, and had determined to restore the 
authority of the tribunate (...) and to court the favor of the many; which was true".^ 
The final example comes from Cicero's oration In Defence of Sestius: "One man alone 
held all power with the help of arms and brigandage, not by any force of his own; but 
(...) he behaved insolently, played the tyrant, made promises to some, kept his hold on 
many by fear and terror, on still more by hopes and promises."4 Cicero here describes 
Clodius' tribunate in 58. The "promises" Clodius made were his institution of free com 
distribution and the restoration of the collegia. 
In these three examples from different literary types, three different persons are 
accused of courting the favor of the people. In order to know what really happened we 
have to look at the context. Caesar supported the Manilian law, perhaps to make 
himself popular or in support of Pompey. Pompey's restoration of the tribunicia 
potestas certainly was a popular act, but he may also have done it because he thought it 
necessary for the operation of the Roman political system. Clodius' measures furnished 
him with great popularity, but it is also possible that he had a genuine interest in the 
1
 See on the impracticability of content analysis in ancient texts: С NlCOLET, 
Lexicographie politique et histoire romaine: problèmes de méthode et directions de 
recherches. Atti del Convegno sulla Lessicografia politica et giuridica nel campo delle 
scienze dell'antichità, Torino 1980, pp. 19-46, esp. 44-45. 
2
 Dio 36.43.3: "Καίσαρ μ€ν τον те οχλον άμα έθ€ραπαισ€ν." 
3 Plut. Pomp. 21.4: "αΐτιασθαι τοι? βασκαινουσι ττ€ριήν ύπολοιπον, οτι τω 
δήμω προσνέμα μάλλον «αυτόν η τη βουλή, και το της- δημαρχίας- αξίωμα 
(...) «у оже άνισταναι κα4ι χαρίζεσθαι TOÎÇ ιιολλοί?, όπερ ήν αληθές." 
4
 Cic. Sest. 34: "unus omnium potestatem armis et latrociniis possidebat non aliqua vi 
sua, sed (...) insultabat, dominabatur, aliis pollicebatur, terrore ас metu multos, plures 
etiam spe et promissis tenebat." 
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needs of the plebs. At a glance, the three persons seem to be the same, but the context 
makes the difference.5 
First column: The authors are listed alphabetically. First the Greek authors, next the 
Latin. Appian and Sallust are treated more extensively in Appendix E. 
Third column: Checked are the qualities that are ascribed in the passage to the 
demagogue(s). 
F = flattery of the people, 
S = causing sedition, 
Ρ = aiming at personal power. 
Fourth column: Checked is whether in the text demagogos, demagogia, dèmagogeo, 
etc. respectivily popularis, popidariter, etc. are explicitly stated. From 
the low frequency of these terms, one can conclude that they are not 
fundamentally important to the image of the demagogue. The three 
qualities are the most important to the image. 
Fifth column: The person(s) who in the passage are described as demagogues in the 
negative sense (including the year if it refers to certain events). 







































































































Tribuni plebis (59) 
Caesar (59) 
Pompey, Crassus (56) 











Pompey and general (66) 
Pompey (71) 
5
 See also YAVETZ, HSCP, 50. 
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Rullus et al. (63) 
Rullus et al. (63) 





Clodius, Caesar, Pompey, 
















The Negative Image of the Demagogue in Appian and Sallust 
The table below provides a survey of the negative image of the demagogue in Appian's 
Bella Civilia and Sallust's Bellum lugurthinum and De conspiratione Catilinae in the 
same way as in Appendix D. The use of words has not been listed because Appian and 
Sallust seldom use the terms demagogos and popularis . 








































































































Gaius Gracchus (124-123) 
LiviusDrusus (123-122) 
Gaius Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus (122) 
Gaius Gracchus (121) 
Glaucia, Saiuminus (101) 
Satuminus(lOO) 
Satuminus (100) 
General: tribuni plebis 
General 
LiviusDrusus (91) 











1st Triumvirate (59) 
1 st Triumvirate (56) 
General (53) 
Pompey 
Assistants of Clodius (52) 
Milo (52) 














Alexander, Mnaseas (43) 
Antony (42) 















F S Ρ 
χ 
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General: tribuni plebis 
Adherents of Catiline (63) 
General 
Memmius(lll) 
P. Lucullus, L. Annius (108) 
Magistratus seditiosi (107) 
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In de inleiding wordt een overzicht geboden van de sociologische 
theorieën die hebben bijgedragen tot het opstellen van de vraagstelling 
voor het onderzoek. Tevens wordt een overzicht geboden van de 
voornaamste aspecten van de late Romeinse Republiek. 
Chapter 1 : Leiderschap 
Het Romeinse collectief gedrag werd geleid door leiders op drie niveaux. 
Hoofdleiders (b.v. Caesar, Clodius) behoorden tot de belangrijkste leden 
van de Romeinse bovenlaag. Hulpleiders (b.v. Gabinius, Labienus) waren 
jongere politici die het volkstribunaat bekleedden. Tussenleiders (b.v. 
Sex. Clodius) waren personen met verschillende functies; zij waren leden 
van de stadsplebs met een hogere status en zij vormden de schakel tussen 
hoofdleiders en massa. De leiders van verschillende niveaux maakten deel 
uit van een organisatie die tot doel had de Romeinse stadsbevolking te 
mobiliseren en in te zetten in het politiek proces. De leiders stonden in een 
wederzijdse afhankelijkheidsverhouding tot elkaar. 
Chapter 2: Participatie 
In de verschillende vormen van collectief gedrag kunnen verschillende 
soorten participanten onderscheiden worden, hetgeen leidde tot 
verschillende politieke uitingen. De participanten in het politiek meest 
belangrijke collectief gedrag, d.w.z. het gedrag dat zich uitte in 
bijeenkomsten, volksvergaderingen en oproeren, waren de 
handwerkslieden en kleine winkeliers. Zij waren de in sociaal-economisch 
en daardoor ook in politiek opzicht meest onafhankelijke groep binnen de 
Romeinse onderlaag. Zij vormden een publieke clientela, in die zin dat zij 
als collectief een tijdelijke patronage verhouding aangingen met een 
volksleider die tevens magistraat was. Materiële voordelen voor de plebs 
en politieke hervormingsvoorstellen droegen bij tot het verwerven van 
een aanhang onder het volk, maar waren op zichzelf onvoldoende voor 
het mobiliseren van de publieke clientela. 
Chapter 3: Mobilisatie 
Communicatie en propaganda (b.v. slogans zoals "libertas" en 
"commoda") alsmede het imago van de leider waren verantwoordelijk 
voor het tot stand komen van een stemming die kon leiden tot 
daadwerkelijke mobilisatie van de participanten. Het imago van de goede 
leider bestond uit dienstbaarheid aan de res publica d.m.v. militaire en 
politieke prestaties en een bescheiden machtsvertoon. Tot directe 
mobilisatie leidden faktoren als organisatie (b.v. collegia), symbolen (b.v. 
statussymbolen en associatie met vroegere volksleiders), onverwachte 
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gebeurtenissen (b.v. acute deprivatie), gelegenheden tot handelen 
(bevorderd of beperkt door tijd en plaats) en de aanwezigheid van 
leiderschap. Voor een geslaagde mobilisatie was het van belang dat een 
leider een magistratuur bekleedde, zodat de actie gelegitimeerd werd. De 
mobilisatiefaktoren bewogen zich over het algemeen binnen het kader van 
de bestaande Romeinse tradities. Het succes van volksleiders was 
afhankelijk van hun imago en het doelmatig gebruik van hun politieke 
organisatie. 
Chapter 4: Collectief gedrag 
In dit hoofdstuk worden de diverse vormen van collectief gedrag 
beschreven, wordt ingegaan op gewelddadig gedrag en wordt verklaard 
waarom sociale controle in de late Republiek tekort schoot. 
Chapter 5: Politiek 
Collectief gedrag was een belangrijke faktor binnen het Romeinse politiek 
proces. Het was een doeltreffend middel voor de plebs om haar wensen te 
realiseren. De doelen bewogen zich binnen het verwachtingspatroon van 
de traditionele patroon-clientverhoudingen. De strategie van het 
leiderschap was niet gericht op het tot stand brengen van veranderingen, 
maar op het realiseren van persoonlijke ambities. De deelnemers aan 
collectief gedrag waren niet gepolitiseerd en een sociale beweging kwam 
niet tot stand. Collectief gedrag leidde tot het herstellen van de 
traditionele verhouding tussen patroon en cliënt, waarbij een volksleider 
de patroon werd van de publieke clientela. 
Chapter 6: Bronnen 
Antieke auteurs gebruikten concepten uit de Griekse politieke filosofie 
om de gebeurtenissen van de late Republiek te beschrijven. Al naar gelang 
het politieke standpunt van de auteur werden volksleiders beschreven met 
de kenmerken van de negatieve dan wel de positief/neutrale demagoog. 
De Latijnse popularis wordt daarmee tot de equivalent van de Griekse 
demagogos. Het beeld van de massa was negatief bij alle auteurs. 
Tijdgenoten van de late Republiek percipieerden hun periode binnen het 
denkraam van de stadstaat, waardoor bestaande problemen onvoldoende 
onderkend werden. 
Epilogue: 
Aan de hand van het succes van de regering van Augustus wordt een 
terugblik geboden op de relatie tussen volksleiderschap en collectief 
gedrag tijdens de late Republiek. 
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